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rt      WXA^v/ 
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SELF-REALIZATION 


AN  OUTLINE   OF  ETHICS 


BY 

HENRY  W.  WRIGHT 

PROFESSOR    OF   PHILOSOPHY    IN    LAKE    FOREST    COLLEGE 


NETV   YORK 

HENRY  HOLT  AND  COMPANY 


COPTBIOHT,   1913, 
BY 

HENRY  HOLT  AND  COMPANY 


TNt   QUINH   «    iOOEN    CO.    PftEM 

RAHWAT,   N.  J. 


To 

PROFESSOR  JAMES  EDWIN  CREIGHTON 

through  whose  advice  and  encouragement  this  study 
was  begun. 


1C 87161 


PREFACE 

The  writer  on  Ethics  at  the  present  time  is  fortunate 
in  having  at  his  disposal  the  valuable  results  of  two  im- 
portant movements  in  the  science  which  took  place  in 
the  nineteenth  century.  The  one  idealistic,  originating  in 
Germany  but  culminating  as  far  as  Ethics  is  concerned 
in  Great  Britain,  formulated  the  clearest  conception  which 
human  thought  has  yet  attained  of  the  spiritual  activities 
that  cooperate  in  personal  development.  The  other  natu- 
ralistic, continuing  the  tradition  of  English  Utilitarianism 
under  the  illuminating  influence  of  evolutionary  science, 
furnished  us  with  the  most  complete  description  that  we 
possess  of  the  actual  conditions,  natural  and  social,  under 
which  morality  has  developed.  Now  while  these  two  schools 
are  sharply  opposed  in  standpoint  and  method,  their  con- 
clusions, in  so  far  as  these  are  well-founded,  do  not  contra- 
dict but  rather  supplement  one  another.  Hence  the  moralist 
of  to-day,  if  he  wishes  to  profit  by  the  results  of  previous 
ethical  reflection,  must  aim  to  make  his  theory  a  synthesis  of 
these  two  different  bodies  of  truth.  Such  has  been  my  aim 
in  the  present  volume.  The  form  of  the  Moral  Ideal  I  have 
endeavored  to  ground  in  the  essential  nature  of  volition, 
understood  as  the  controlling  agency  in  personal  develop- 
ment; its  content  I  have  sought  to  derive  from  the  actual 
conditions  of  human  existence  as  these  have  been  discovered 
by  empirical  study.  In  carrying  out  this  program  I  was 
made  to  recognize  anew  my  heavy  obligations  to  the  leaders 
of  the  two  schools  above  mentioned.  Among  idealists  I 
owe  most  to  Hegel,  particularly  to  the  pregnant  suggestions 
in  the  Encyclopedia  of  a  moral  "  dialectic  "  whereby  the 


vi  PREFACE 

individual  through  self-negation  overcomes  the  limitations 
of  his  finitude  and  realizes  his  greater  self,  to  Green's 
Prolegomena,  and  to  the  works  of  Edward  Caird.  The 
representatives  of  the  other  school  to  whom  my  debt  is 
largest  are,  perhaps,  Leslie  Stephen,  Herbert  Spencer — and 
Darwin  himself. 

In  the  arrangement  of  my  material  I  have  without  doubt 
been  influenced  decisively  by  the  example  of  a  book  very 
well  known  and  highly  esteemed  by  me — Professor  James 
Seth's  Ethical  Principles.  To  introduce  the  principle  of 
Self-realization  by  a  preliminary  study  of  the  opposing 
theories  of  Hedonism  and  Rationalism,  in  which  the  one- 
sidedness  and  inadequacy  of  each  is  clearly  shown,  has 
always  seemed  to  me  a  logical  procedure  and  one  well 
suited  to  the  purposes  of  a  text-book.  I  should  be  indeed 
remiss  if  I  failed  to  take  the  opportunity  here  presented 
of  expressing  my  deep  gratitude -to  the  author  of  this  book. 
As  my  first  instructor  in  Ethics,  Professor  Seth  rendered 
me  that  high  service  which  is  in  the  power  of  only  the 
greatest  teachers  to  perform — he  produced  in  my  mind  a 
conviction  of  the  importance  and  dignity  of  his  subject 
and  awakened  in  me  an  enthusiasm  for  its  further  study 
which  has  never  waned. 

Of  late  a  growing  tendency  is  noticeable  among  writers 
on  Ethics  to  avoid  the  abstractly  formal,  the  purely  theo- 
retical, and  to  make  their  expositions  concrete  and  prac- 
tical. The  desire  which  thus  finds  expression,  to  keep  ethical 
principles  in  close  and  vitalizing  contact  with  the  facts  of 
actual  morality,  and  thus  to  facilitate  their  application  to 
conduct,  is  in  every  way  commendable  and  promises  well 
for  the  development  of  ethical  science.  But  this  desire, 
in  itself  wholly  praiseworthy,  should  not  in  my  opinion 
lead  to  such  neglect  of  theory  as  to  make  the  ethical 
treatise  merely  a  series  of  discussions  of  different  moral 
problems.  Of  course  the  question  concerns  mainly  the 


PREFACE  vii 

method  of  presentation;  any  scientific  treatment  is  bound 
to  be  systematic  and  in  order  to  be  systematic  must  have 
a  framework  of  theory.  How  prominent  then  should  the 
theoretical  framework  be  made  in  a  text-book  of  Ethics? 
My  belief  is  that  it  should  be  made  sufficiently  prominent 
to  organize  the  material  presented  into  a  well-articulated 
body  of  doctrine  which  can  be  grasped  in  its  unity  and 
whose  parts  are  so  related  that  one  implies  and  thus  leads 
on  to  the  others.  Such  formulation  is  justified,  I  think, 
both  on  logical  and  pedagogical  grounds.  These  considera- 
tions apply  particularly  to  the  treatment  accorded  to  the 
several  virtues.  Classifications  of  the  virtues  have  been 
out  of  fashion  for  some  time  in  ethical  literature.  The 
reasons  usually  given  for  abandoning  the  attempt  thus  to 
classify  the  fundamental  forms  of  good  conduct  are  that 
no  classification  can  hope  to  be  final  or  help  being  schematic 
and  arbitrary.  Now  such  objections  seem  to  me  altogether 
inconclusive  and  whatever  force  they  may  possess  is  in 
my  opinion  far  outweighed  by  the  advantages  which  promise 
to  follow  from  a  systematic  exposition  of  the  leading  virtues. 
The  system  of  the  virtues,  each  clearly  defined  in  its  re- 
lation to  all  the  rest,  may  with  truth  be  said  to  complete 
the  science  of  Ethics,  since  it  exhibits  principles  and  ideals 
in  their  application  to  daily  conduct  and  as  yielding  a 
program  for  actual  living. 

In  conclusion,  I  wish  to  acknowledge  my  indebtedness  to 
friends  in  Lake  Forest  for  helpful  suggestion  and  criticism ; 
especially  I  desire  to  thank  Professor  J.  M.  Clapp  of  Lake 
Forest  College  for  assistance  in  proof-reading,  and  my 
wife  whose  loyal  cooperation  in  all  my  endeavors  has  made 
this  work  possible. 

HENRY  W.  WRIGHT. 

LAKE  FOREST,  ILL., 
March  10,  1913. 


CONTENTS 

PART  ONE 
ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

CHAPTEB  I 
THE  SUBJECT-MATTEB  OF  ETHICS — CONDUCT 

PAGE 

1.  The  Meaning  of  Conduct. — 2.  Essential  Features  of  Voluntary 
Action. — 3.  Voluntary  Action  Defined. — 4.  In  Voluntary 
Action  an  Object  Is  Conceived  as  End, — 5.  Is  Distinguished 
from  Present  Actuality, — 6.  And  Chosen  in  Preference  to 
Other  Ideal  Possibilities, — 7.  Because  of  Its  Appeal  to  the 
Character  of  the  Agent, — 8.  Which  Gains  Expression 
Through  Its  Attainment. — 9.  Ethics  Is  Concerned  with  the 
Whole  of  Human  Conduct. — 10.  Objections  to  This  View  .  3 

CHAPTEB  II 

THE  METHOD  OF  ETHICS — A  PRACTICAL  AND 
NORMATIVE  SCIENCE 

1.   Ethics   as  a  Practical   Science. — 2.    Ethics   as   a  Normative 

Science. — 3.    The  Human  Will  the  Ground  of  Moral  Value. 

—4.    Other  Practical  Sciences:    (a)    Technical, — 5.    (6)   In- 

•  tellectual,    and — 6.     (c)'    ^Esthetic. — 7.    Other    Normative 

Sciences. — 8.    Conclusion 16 

CHAPTER  III 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  ETHICS — THE  DISCOVERY  OF  THE 
SUMMUM   BONUM 

1.  How  Determine  What  Is  Good  Conduct? — 2.  Many  Ends 
Actually  Sought  Are  Good  only  as  Means. — 3.  To  Satisfy 
the  Will  an  Object  Must  Be  an  End  in  Itself. — 4.  The 
Problem  of  the  Summum  Bonum. — 5.  The  Summum  Bonum 
as  the  Moral  Ideal. — 6.  The  Formation  of  the  Moral  Ideal. 
— 7.  Characteristics  of  the  Ideal. — 8.  Source  of  the  Power 

of  the  Ideal ...„,.,,.     29 

iz 


x  CONTENTS 

CHAPTEB  IV 
KNOWLEDGE  OF  THE  GOOD,  OB  CONSCIENCE 

PAGE 

1.  Conscience  Not  a  Separate  Faculty,  but  a  Species  of  Judg- 
ment.— 2.  Conscience  as  Judgment  of  Moral  Value. — 3.  The 
Ground  of  Moral  Judgment  Is  Usually  Emotional  Rather 
than  Rational. — 4.  Intuitional  and  Empirical  Theories  of 
the  Origin  of  the  Moral  Sentiments. — 5.  Experience  as  the 
Source  of  the  Moral  Sentiments. — 6.  The  Idea  of  the  High- 
est Good  as  the  Rational  Ground  of  Moral  Judgment. — 
7.  Moral  Enlightenment. — 8.  Importance  of  Conscience  in 
Human  Life. — 9.  Remorse 38 

CHAPTEB  V 
THE  APPEAL  OF  THE  GOOD  OB  MOBAL  OBLIGATION 

1.  Objects  Appeal  to  the  Will  Through  the  Feelings  They 
Arouse. — 2.  Appeal  of  the  Good  as  Inclination. — 3.  Appeal 
of  the  Good  as  Obligation. — 4.  Conditions  Under  Which  Feel- 
ing of  Moral  Obligation  Arises. — 5.  Significance  of  the 
Feeling  of  Moral  Obligation. — 6.  Kant's  View  of  Moral 
Obligation. — 7.  Goodness  Not  Always  Different  from  In- 
clination.— 8.  The  Duties  of  Morality  Command  Not  as 
Categorical  but  as  Teleological  Imperatives. — 9.  The  Sum- 
mum  Bonum  Alone  Has  the  Authority  of  a  Categorical  Im- 
perative   58 

CHAPTEB  VI 
THE  MOTIVE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

1.  The  Appeal  of  the  Summum  Bonum  as  the  Motive  of  Good 
Conduct. — 2.  Possible  Discrepancy  Between  the  Intention 
and  the  Consequences  of  Conduct. — 3.  Good  Intentions 
When  Accompanied  by  Adequate  Knowledge  Are  Usually 
Productive  of  Good  Consequences. — 4.  Good  Consequences 
in  Most  Cases  Indicate  Corresponding  Degree  of  Goodness 
in  Intention. — 5.  But  Good  Motive  Does  Not  Absolutely 
Insure  Good  Consequences  Because  of  Inability  of  Reason 
to  Foresee  Future  Developments ,..72 


CONTENTS  xi 

PART  TWO 

ffHE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

• 

CHAPTER  I 
THE  NATUBE  OF  THE  GOOD — CONDUCT  OB  CHABACTEB 

PAGE 

1.  The  Supreme  Importance  of  the  Subject. — 2.  The  Good  as 
Determined  by  Custom. — 3.  The  Good  as  Discovered  by 
Reflection. — 4.  Socrates'  View  of  the  Good. — 5.  Merita  of 
the  Socratic  Conception  of  the  Good. — 6.  Defects  of  the 
Socratic  Conception  of  the  Good. — 7.  The  Good  as  Action 
or  the  End  of  Action. — 8.  The  Good  as  Conduct  or  Char- 
acter.— 9.  The  Good  as  Duty  or  Virtue 83 

CHAPTEB  II 
THEOBIES  OF  THE  GOOD — HEDONISM 

1.  Pleasure  as  the  Good. — 2.  Cyrenaicism. — 3.  Element  of 
Truth  in  Cyrenaicism. — 4.  The  Inadequacy  of  Cyrenaicism. 
— 5.  Epicureanism. — 6.  Value  of  the  Epicurean  Theory  of 
the  Good. — 7.  Arguments  in  Support  of  Hedonism. — 8. 
Error  of  Psychological  Hedonism. — 9.  Criticism  of  Ethical 
Hedonism. — 10.  Transition  to  Rationalism  ....  96 

CHAPTEB  III 
THEOBIES  OF  THE  GOOD — RATIONALISM 

1.  The  Standpoint  of  Rationalism. — 2.  Extreme  and  Moderate 
Rationalism. — 3.  Cynicism. — 4.  Stoicism. — 5.  The  Truth  of 
Rationalism:  Reason  (o)  as  a  Distinctively  Human  Fac- 
ulty,— 6.  (6)  As  Extending  the  View  of  Man  to  Include  a 
World  of  Objects  and  Events, — 7.  (c)  As  enlarging  the 
Experience  of  Man  to  Embrace  the  Lives  and  Personalities 
of  Others. — 8.  The  Faults  in  Rationalism:  (a)  It  En- 
courages Injurious  Asceticism, — 9.  (6)  It  Justies  Extreme 
Intellectualism. — 10.  (c)  It  Is  Individualistic  in  Tendency  .  112 

CHAPTEB  IV 
VOLITION  AS  AN  OBGANIZING  AGENCY 

1.  Volition  as  an  Organizing  Agency. — 2.  Volition  as  the 
Synthetic  Activity  Comprehensive  of  Feeling  and  Thought. 


xii  CONTENTS 

PAOI 

— 3.  Development  of  Volition:  Involuntary  Action, — 4. 
Voluntary  Action:  (a)  From  Desire, — 5.  (6)  From  Pur- 
pose,— 6.  (c)  From  Ideal. — 7.  Volition  as  Creative  of  Self- 
Conscious  Personality. — 8.  Volition  Does  Not  Always 
Effect  Complete  Organization, — 9.  But  to  That  Extent  Is 
Not  Fully  Developed 132 


CHAPTEB  V 
THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION  OB  FREEDOM 

1.  The  Good  as  Self-Realization. — 2.  Self-Realization  Through 
the  Instrumentality  of  Volition:  (a)  The  Present  Self, — 
3.  (6)  The  Natural  Self, — 1.  (c)  The  Personal  Self.— 

5.  The  Possibilities  of  Selfhood  as  Actualized  by  Volition. 

6.  Self-Realization     Identical     with     Self-Determination. — 

7.  Libertarianism. — 8.    Determinism. — 9.    Freedom   as   Self- 
Determination. — 10.    Objections   to   This   View       .       .       .   151 


CHAPTEB  VI 
THE  CONDITIONS  OF  SELF-REALIZATION  IN  HUMAN  LIFE 

Form  and  Content  in  Self-Realization. — 2.  The  Incidental 
and  the  Essential  in  Human  Nature. — 3.  Man  as  a  Natural 
Being, — 4.  His  Native  Instincts. — 5.  Man  as  a  Conscious 
Self, — 6.  His  Spiritual  Capacities. — 7.  Necessary  Stages 
in  Self-Realization: — 8.  (a)  Individual, — 9.  (6)  Social, — 
10.  (c)  Universal 169 


PART  THREE 
THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

CHAPTEB  I 
THE  CONCEPTION  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

1.  The  Relation  of  the  Good  to  the  Existing  Human  Individ- 
ual.— 2.  The  Good  as  External  to  the  Individual. — 3.  The 
Good  as  Identical  with  the  Interest  of  the  Individual. — 
4.  These  Two  Aspects  of  Goodness  Explained  by  the  Prin- 
ciple of  Self-Realization. — 5.  Arnold's  Contrast  of  Hebra- 
ism with  Hellenism. — 6.  Hebraism. — 7.  Hellenism. — 8.  Re- 
lation of  Christianity  to  Hebraism  and  Hellenism  .  .  193 


CONTENTS  xiii 

CHAPTER  II 

SELF-REALIZATION  AND  THE  STANDABD  OF  GOODNESS 

MM 

1.  The  Idea  of  the  Good  as  Furnishing  a  Standard  of  Moral 
Judgment. — 2.  Self-Realization  Criticised  as  Failing  to 
Supply  Such  a  Standard. — 3.  The  Ideal  of  Self-Realization 
as  the  Standard  of  Moral  Judgment. — 4.  This  Standard 
When  Applied  to  Human  Life  Yields  Further  Principles  of 
Moral  Distinction. — 5.  The  Principle  of  Individual  Interest. 
— 6.  The  Principle  of  Social  Welfare. — 7.  Maxims  of  In- 
dividual Interest:  (a)  Maxim  of  Prudence, — 8.  (6) 
Maxim  of  Idealism. — 9.  Maxims  of  Social  Welfare:  (a) 
Maxim  of  Altruism, — 10.  (6)  Maxim  of  Humanitarianism  211 

CHAPTEB  III 
SELF-REALIZATION  AND  SELF-SACBIFICE 

1.  The  Problem  of  Self-Sacrifice. — 2.  Self-Sacrifice,  if  a  Duty, 
Must  Be  of  Ultimate  Benefit  to  the  Individual. — 3.  Self- 
Sacrifice,  if  Genuine,  Must  Involve  Real  Loss  to  the  In- 
dividual.— 4.  The  Conception  of  Organization  Furnishes 
Solution  of  the  Problem. — 5.  All  Organization  Involves  the 
Sacrifice  of  Part  to  the  Whole.— 6.  Self -Mastery  .—7.  Self- 
Sacrifice.  8.  Is  Self-Sacrifice  Due  to  Merely  Temporary 
Maladjustment? — 9.  On  the  Contrary,  It  Is  a  Necessary 
Factor  in  Self-Organization. — 10.  Optimism  and  Pessimism. 
— 11.  Conclusion 237 

CHAPTEB  IV 
SELF-REALIZATION  AND  THE  MOTIVE  OF  GOODNESS 

1.  The  Motive  of  Good  Conduct.— 2.  The  Egoistic  Motive: 
Self-Interest. — 3.  Inadequacy  of  the  Egoistic  Motive. — 
4.  The  Altruistic  Motive:  Sympathy. — 5.  Inadequacy  of 
the  Altruistic  Motive. — 6.  The  Religious  Motive. — 7.  Self- 
Realization  as  the  Motive  of  Good  Conduct. — 8.  Self- 
Respect. —  9.  Philanthropy.  —  10.  Reverence.  —  11.  Mixed 
Motives 261 

CHAPTER  V 
SELF-REALIZATION  AND  HAPPINESS 

1.  Pleasure  as  an  Element  in  Self-Realization. — 2.  Self-Real- 
ization Not  Identical  with  the  Greatest  Sum  of  Pleasures, 
— 3.  But  Rather  with  a  Harmony  of  Pleasures,  or  Happi- 


xiv  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

ness. — 4.  Happiness  Thus  the  Feeling  That  Accompanies  the 
Organization  of  Conduct. — 5.  Happiness  Not  to  Be  Ac- 
cepted as  the  Good,  Because  It  Is  Unduly  Subjective  in  Its 
Reference. — 6.  And  It  Implies  a  State  of  Passive  Enjoy- 
ment.— 7.  Is  the  Pursuit  of  Goodness  Certain  to  Result  in 
the  Greatest  Happiness? — 8.  It  Is,  on  the  Assumption 
That  Moral  Purpose  Is  Supreme  in  the  Universe, — 9.  And 
That  Man  May  Complete  His  Moral  Development  in  a 
Future  Life 288 

CHAPTEB  VI 
SELF-REALIZATION  AND  THE  SYSTEM  OF  VIBTUES 

1.  Intuitional  and  Empirical  Conceptions  of  Virtue. — 2.  Virtue 
as  Interpreted  by  Self-Realization. — 3.  The  Classification  of 
the  Virtues. — 4.  Historic  Methods  of  Classifying  the  Vir- 
tues.— 5.  Other  Methods  of  Classifying  the  Virtues. — 
•6.  Defects  of  These  Classifications  Illustrated  by  Pre- 
evolutionary  Classification  of  Living  Forms. — 7.  Classifi- 
cation of  Virtues  as  Stages  in  Self-Organization  Illustrated 
by  Evolutionary  Classification. — 8.  Classification  of  Virtues 
in  Accordance  with  Method  of  Self-Realization. — 9.  Ad- 
vantages of  Such  Classification 305 

PART  FOUR 
THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

CHAPTEB  I 
THE  INDIVIDUAL  VIBTUES 

1.  The  Exercise  of  Volition  as  the  Pre-supposition  of  All  Moral 
Development. — 2.  Temperance. — 3.  Prudence.— 4.  Courage. 
— 5.  Idealism  .  .  . 321 

CHAPTEB  II 
THE  SOCIAL  VIBTUES 

1.    The     Social     Adjustment. — 2.     Kindness. — 3.     Friendship. — 

4.    Justice. — 5.    Benevolence 369 

CHAPTEB  III 
THE  RELIGIOUS  VIRTUES .416 

INDEX  .  423 


PAET  ONE 

ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD 
CONDUCT 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  SUBJECT-MATTER  OF  ETHICS— CONDUCT 

1.  The  Meaning  of  Conduct. — 2.  Essential  Features  of  Voluntary 
Action. — 3.  Voluntary  Action  Denned. — 4.  In  Voluntary  Action 
an  Object  Is  Conceived  as  End, — 5.  Is  Distinguished  from  Pres- 
ent Actuality, — 6.  And  Chosen  in  Preference  to  Other  Ideal 
Possibilities, — 7.  Because  of  Its  Appeal  to  the  Character  of  the 
Agent, — 8.  Which  Gains  Expression  Through  Its  Attainment. — 

9.  Ethics  Is  Concerned  with  the  Whole  of  Human  Conduct. — 

10.  Objections  to  This  View. 

1.  The  Meaning  of  Conduct. — Ethics  may  be  described 
as  the  science  of  conduct,  provided  that  conduct  itself  is 
defined  with  sufficient  strictness.  It  is  natural  to  think  of 
the  term  "  conduct  "  as  synonymous  with  the  word  "  ac- 
tion." But  action  is  defined  by  Psychology  as  movement 
having  conscious  antecedents  and  concomitants,1  and  evi- 
dently is  possible  with  animals  as  well  as  men;  while  the 
field  of  morality  has  always  been  limited  by  the  common 
reason  of  mankind  to  the  sphere  of  human  action.  The 
same  difficulty  arises  if  with  Spencer 2  we  define  conduct 
as  the  adjustment  of  acts  to  ends ;  since  when  thus  defined 
it  includes  the  action  of  all  living  creatures.  If  the  word 
is  used  to  signify  the  subject-matter  of  Ethics,  therefore, 
conduct  must  be  defined  as  voluntary  action  and  thus  lim- 
ited to  the  human  sphere.  For  only  to  such  action  does 
responsibility  attach  and  are  the  moral  predicates  properly 
applicable.  Ethics  is  then  the  science  of  conduct  when  by 
conduct  is  understood  voluntary  action. 

1  TrrcHETfEB :  Outline  of  Psychology,  §  61. 
*  SPENCEB  :  Data  of  Ethics,  Chap.  I,  §  2. 

8 


4   ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

2.  Essential  Features  of  Voluntary  Action. — It  will 
assist  us  in  our  present  undertaking — that  of  determining 
the  nature  of  voluntary  action — if  we  consider  briefly  some 
of  the  essential  features  of  this  type  of  action  before 
attempting  its  formal  definition. 

In  the  first  place,  voluntary  action  always  involves  some 
kind  of  activity  or  change.  Usually  it  involves  change  of 
position  in  space,  or  movement.  So  generally  is  this  the 
case  as  to  suggest  that  movement  is  a  universal  and  neces- 
sary accompaniment  of  all  volition.  Yet  such  is  not  the 
fact  if  visible  movement  is  meant.  For  thinking — the  think- 
ing of  one  who  aims  to  reach  a  definite  conclusion — which 
is  certainly  voluntary,  and  deserves  to  be  classed  as  conduct, 
may  be  unaccompanied  by  any  visible  movement.  It  is 
true  that  even  here  many  psychologists  maintain  that  small 
invisible  movements  occur  within  the  body  of  the  thinker, 
and  constitute  an  essential  element  in  his  activity.3  How- 
ever this  may  be,  it  is  certain  that  activity  of  some  sort, 
a  series  of  changes  possessing  a  measure  of  continuity  and 
direction,  characterizes  all  voluntary  action. 
.  Now  a  stream  which  rushes  down  a  hillside,  turning 
away  to  avoid  large  boulders,  making  a  quiet  pool  here 
and  a  rapid  torrent  there,  exhibits  this  feature  of  activity ; 
it  passes  through  a  series  of  changes  which  are  continuous 
and  all  directed  towards  one  result.  Yet  no  one  would 
think  of  regarding  the  activity  of  the  stream  as  voluntary. 
The  reason  most  obvious  is  that  the  movement  of  the  water 
has  no  conscious  conditions  or  accompaniments.  We  dis- 
cover then  a  second  feature  which  is  essential  to  voluntary 
action — the  presence  of  consciousness.  Because  they  are 
not  conscious,  all  changes  occurring  in  inanimate  objects 

1  "  We  sometimes  think  of  such  doing  as  purely  mental.  In  reality, 
however,  movements  are  involved  in  all  cases,  and  even  were  this 
not  true  the  general  principle  of  habit  so  far  as  this  stands  for  a 
law  governing  the  transmission  of  nervous  currents  would  still  be 
valid." — ANGELL:  Psychology,  p.  76. 


THE  SUBJECT-MATTER  OF  ETHICS  5 

(and  in  plants  as  well)  are  excluded  from  the  sphere  of 
voluntary  action. 

Suppose,  in  the  second  place,  that  consciousness  of  a 
comparatively  simple  form  should  be  present  and  produce 
activity.  A  bull,  aroused  by  the  sight  of  a  scarlet  jersey 
worn  by  a  man  who  is  traversing  the  pasture,  rushes  upon 
him,  goring  and  trampling  him.  Here  we  have  activity 
with  conscious  conditions  and  concomitants.  The  percep- 
tion of  the  red  object  "  angered  "  the  bull  and  prompted 
him  to  attack  the  person  displaying  the  obnoxious  color. 
Yet  we  should  not  call  the  action  voluntary  or  hold  the 
animal  morally  responsible  for  it.  If  asked  why  not,  we 
should  probably  reply  that  the  animal  did  not ' '  know  what 
it  was  doing,"  and  our  meaning  would  be  that  while  the 
act  had  its  source  in  certain  images  and  feelings  in  the 
animal  consciousness,  still  it  was  accompanied  by  no  knowl- 
edge which  could  foresee  the  suffering  and  death  of  the 
man  or  understand  any  of  its  consequences.  Evidently, 
therefore,  foreknowledge  involving  some  ability  to  gen- 
eralize upon  the  past  and  to  anticipate  the  future  is  a 
necessary  feature  of  voluntary  action.  The  addition  of  this 
element  of  foreknowledge  to  volition  rules  out  of  the  field 
tff  conduct  all  animal  action  except  possibly  occasional  acts 
of  a  few  species  of  the  higher  animals  such  as  the  dog  and 
monkey,  which  some  authorities  believe  to  be  capable  of 
an  elementary  form  of  judgment  and  hence  able  to  act 
with  a  limited  degree  of  foreknowledge.4 

Finally  we  can  imagine  activity  conditioned  by  con- 
sciousness and  accompanied  by  foreknowledge,  which  is 
nevertheless  not  voluntary.  Imagine  a  motorist  turning 
down  the  center  of  a  road  in  the  middle  of  which  some 
children  are  playing,  expecting,  if  they  do  not  run  out 

4  Hobhouse  believes  that  certain  of  the  higher  vertebrates,  such 
as  those  mentioned,  are  capable  of  practical  (as  distinguished  from 
conceptual)  judgment.  ( HOBHOUSE:  Mind  in  Evolution,  Chaps.  VI 
and  IX.) 


6   ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

of  the  road,  to  turn  his  machine  to  one  side  or  bring  it 
to  a  stop.  Suppose  that  the  children  do  not  move  and 
the  driver,  owing  to  some  break  in  the  machinery,  is  unable 
at  the  last  moment  to  stop  or  turn  his  car.  The  ensuing 
action  might  with  fairness  be  said  to  have  its  condition 
in  the  consciousness  of  the  driver,  since  he  consciously  gave 
direction  to  the  machine,  and  was  accompanied  by  a  second 's 
clear  foreknowledge  of  the  results  on  his  part.  The  same 
situation  would  exist  if  we  imagined  a  prisoner  of  war 
having  his  finger  pressed  forcibly  by  his  captors  upon  a 
key  which  he  knew  would  explode  a  mine  and  destroy 
one  of  his  own  country's  ships.  We  have  in  both  of  these 
cases — which,  to  be  sure,  make  somewhat  extravagant  de- 
mands upon  the  imagination  but  are  quite  possible — acts 
conditioned  by  consciousness  and  accompanied  by  fore- 
knowledge. We  should  not  dream  of  regarding  them  as 
voluntary,  however;  because  they  are  not  intentional.  A 
fourth  feature  essential  to  voluntary  action  has  been  found. 
Not  merely  must  the  act  have  its  source  in  a  conscious 
process,  and  its  results  be  in  a  measure  foreseen,  but  the 
act  and  its  results  must  be  intended,  i.e.  they  must  be 
consciously  chosen,  be  preferred  and  sought  after  as  ends. 

3.  Voluntary  Action  Defined. — At  least  four  factors 
then  enter  into  voluntary  action:  (1)  activity,  (2)  con- 
sciousness, (3)  knowledge,  and  (4)  intention.  In  order  to 
be  voluntary  an  action  must  have  its  source  in  conscious- 
ness, its  results  must  be  in  a  measure  foreknown,  and  also 
intended.  The  fourth  of  these  factors  of  course  includes 
the  second  and  third;  an  act  can  be  intended  only  if  it 
is  conscious  and  its  result  is  foreseen.  When  the  outcome 
of  action  is  thus  intended  it  becomes  an  end  or  aim  and, 
as  chosen  by  the  agent,  determines  the  nature  and  course 
of  his  activity.  To  the  pursuit  and  attainment  of  this  end 
all  his  action  is  made  a  means.  Gathering  up  in  a  single 
statement  these  different  characteristics,  voluntary  action 


THE  SUBJECT-MATTER  OF  ETHICS  7 

may  be  defined  as  action  in  pursuit  of  a  consciously  chosen 
end.  Let  us  consider  in  further  detail  this  mode  of  activity, 
distinguishing  the  steps  which  enter  necessarily  into  its 
regular  procedure. 

4.  In  Voluntary  Action  an  Object  Is  Conceived  as  an 
End. — All  voluntary  action  is  determined  by  the  idea  of  an 
object  conceived  as  an  end.  This  end  or  aim  by  which  the 
will  is  directed  in  its  activity  is  of  necessity  a  product  of 
thought  and  imagination.  Usually  the  object  which  is 
sought  is  not  present  to  the  senses,  and  hence  must  be 
imagined  or  thought  of.  But  even  when  the  object  desired 
is  present  in  perception,  if  it  is  to  act  as  an  end  it  must 
be  related  in  an  intelligible  way  to  certain  ideas.  With  the 
object  sought,  whether  perceived  or  imagined,  must  be  asso- 
ciated ideas  of  the  means  or  movements  necessary  to  secure 
it,  and  some  conception  of  the  satisfaction  which  will  result 
from  obtaining  it.  Ideas  of  the  two  classes  last  named  serve 
to  relate  the  object  to  the  agent  himself,  make  it  an  object 
for  him,  i.e.  an  end.  Because  the  object  has  this  connection 
with  the  needs  and  capacities  of  the  agent  it  interests  and 
attracts  him.  This  attractive  quality  belonging  to  the  end 
is  signified  in  the  consciousness  of  the  agent  by  a  pleasant 
feeling  which  suffuses  and  colors  the  whole  complex  of 
ideas  which  we  have  been  describing.  An  illustration  will 
make  clearer  the  nature  and  relation  of  these  different  con- 
stituents which  go  to  make  up  the  «nd.  Suppose  that  after 
I  have  settled  down  to  my  evening's  reading  I  discover 
that  I  have  not  a  needed  book  in  my  possession.  At  once 
the  idea  of  going  to  the  library  for  the  missing  book  occurs 
to  my  mind.  The  book  in  the  library  thus  comes  to  be 
thought  of  as  an  end  of  action.  The  book  itself  as  a  specific 
object  is  imagined — the  image  may  be  reproductive  and 
I  see  in  my  fancy  the  back  of  the  book  as  it  appears  on 
the  shelf  or  feel  the  roughness  of  its  binding  when  in  my 
hand,  or  I  may  have  a  verbal  image,  seeing  the  words  of 


8   ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

the  title  printed  out  or  hearing  them  spoken.  With  the 
idea  of  the  book  as  thus  imagined  are  associated  ideas 
more  or  less  vague  of  the  movements  I  must  make  to  procure 
the  book — motor  images  of  the  movements  incidental  upon 
rising  from  my  chair,  leaving  the  room,  walking  across  the 
campus,  and  even  of  reaching  up  to  take  the  book  from 
its  accustomed  place  on  the  shelf.  Finally  there  is  added 
an  idea  of  the  result  of  the  action,  of  the  opportunity  which 
the  possession  of  the  book  will  give  me  to  complete  success- 
fully my  evening's  work.  The  thought  of  thus  finishing 
my  work  pleases  me  and  its  pleasantness  spreads  over  the 
whole  combination  of  ideas  which  thus  becomes  interesting 
and  attractive  to  me.  This  complex  of  ideas  with  its 
pleasant  tone,  which  is  formed  in  much  less  time  than  it 
takes  to  describe  it,  may  be  accepted  as  a  typical  end. 

5.  Is  Distinguished  from  Present  Actuality. — The  end 
as  conceived  or  imagined  belongs  strictly  to  the  ideal 
sphere  and  thus  is  set  in  sharp  opposition  to  objects  which 
actually  exist  or  are  in  present  possession.  This  opposition 
of  the  end  as  ideal  or  imagined,  to  the  present  and  actual, 
is  essential  to  its  nature  and  office  as  end;  for  precisely 
because  it  does  not  actually  exist,  while  it  does  interest 
and  attract,  the  thought  of  the  end  arouses  the  agent  to 
action.  The  opposition  between  the  ideal  and  the  actual, 
due  to  the  thought  of  an  end  unattained,  introduces  strain 
and  tension  into  the  consciousness  of  the  agent.  His  present 
condition  is  rendered  unpleasant  or  even  painful  because 
its  continued  existence  precludes  the  attainment  of  the 
object.  He  is  made  restless  and  uneasy  in  the  actual  by 
the  possibilities  held  forth  by  the  ideal.  Thus,  in  the  illus- 
tration of  the  book  wanted  from  the  library,  the  thought 
of  securing  it  makes  me  discontented  with  the  facilities  of 
my  own  library,  distracts  my  attention  from  other  tasks 
I  might  perform,  and  causes  me  genuine  uneasiness  and 
discomfort. 


THE  SUBJECT-MATTER  OF  ETHICS  9 

6.  And  Chosen  in  Preference  to  Other  Ideal  Possibili- 
ties.— Voluntary  action  requires  that  the  end  be  not  merely 
distinguished  from  actually  existing  objects  but  also  be 
chosen  in  preference  to  all  other  ideal  possibilities.  These 
possibilities  may  take  the  form  of  several  clearly  imagined 
alternatives  to  the  end  finally  realized.  Then  deliberation 
ensues  over  the  desirability  of  these  rival  ends,  with  an 
attempt  to  foresee  the  consequences  involved  in  the  various 
possibilities  of  action,  as  when  one  debates  between  different 
possibilities  of  route  and  destination  in  a  coming  holiday 
excursion.  Or  the  alternative  possibilities  may  be  present 
only  by  implication.  In  many  cases  of  voluntary  action 
there  is  no  debate  between  conflicting  objects;  indeed  it  is 
often  true  that  only  one  possibility  of  action  is  consciously 
considered.  Yet  in  all  action  truly  voluntary,  the  possibility 
of  not  performing  the  action,  of  not  seeking  the  end,  enters 
in  some  form  into  the  consciousness  of  the  agent.  His 
present  condition,  contrasted  as  actual  with  the  idea  of 
the  end,  becomes,  in  the  idea  of  its  continuance  into  the 
future,  itself  an  ideal  possibility.  I  am  aware,  with  more 
or  less  conscious  clearness,  of  the  possibility  of  continuing 
to  sit  in  my  easy-chair  before  the  study-fire  as  an  alterna- 
tive to  going  to  the  library  in  the  rain  for  the  needed  book. 
Consequent  upon  this  feature  of  voluntary  action,  the 
feelings  which  accompany  it  are  further  complicated. 
"While  the  idea  of  procuring  the  needed  book  is  itself 
pleasant,  the  steps  which  must  be  taken  to  attain  this  end 
— those  of  leaving  my  comfortable  chair  and  going  out 
on  an  inclement  night — are  in  thought  highly  unpleasant. 
And  while  my  present  condition  of  need  for  the  book  is 
unpleasant  and  irritating,  the  thought  of  remaining  where 
I  am  in  contrast  to  going  after  the  book  is  very  pleasant. 
Hence  arises  that  baffling  confusion  of  pleasant  and  un- 
pleasant feeling  which  is  attendant  upon  hesitation  and 
decision. 


10    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

Besides  being  contrasted  with  other  possibilities  of  action, 
an  end  must  be  chosen  or  selected  from  among  them  if 
it  is  to  be  voluntarily  realized.  This  choice  consists  in  fixa- 
tion of  the  attention  upon  one  end,  to  the  exclusion  of  all 
other  alternatives.  Thus  to  hold  attention  upon  one  end 
requires  effort,  since  it  involves  a  resisting  of  the  attrac- 
tions of  other  objects  which  are  often  very  powerful. 
Modern  psychology  has  taught  us  that  the  effort  involved 
in  volition  is  effort  of  the  attention  in  holding  an  idea 
in  the  focus  of  consciousness  despite  all  influences 
working  to  crowd  it  out,  and  not  effort  exercised  in  ener- 
gizing unwilling  muscles  and  in  moving  laggard  limbs 
to  carry  out  the  fiat  of  consciousness.  Let  the  idea  be 
attended  to,  the  psychologist  tells  us,  and  it  will  work 
itself  out.  This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  only  effort 
enough  need  be  exerted  to  bring  the  idea  of  the  end  once 
within  the  circle  of  clearest  consciousness,  thus  forcing 
out  for  the  time  being  all  other  attractive  possibilities.  On 
the  contrary,  protracted  effort  is  often  required  to  hold 
the  idea  fast  in  the  focus  of  attention  while  the  steps 
necessary  for  its  realization  are  serially  thought  of  and 
taken — else  the  idea  of  a  conflicting  aim  will  seize  the 
attention  and  interrupt  the  action  in  its  performance. 
Thus  I  may  have  to  keep  the  idea  of  the  desired  book 
in  the  forefront  of  my  thoughts  until  well  on  the  way 
to  the  library,  lest  the  thoughts  of  the  comforts  of  chair 
and  fire  be  sufficient  to  turn  me  back  before  I  have  passed 
the  door. 

7.  Because  of  Its  Appeal  to  the  Character  of  the 
Agent. — Such  choice  of  an  end  of  action  must  itself  have 
some  cause  or  ground.  Selection  can  occur  only  where 
there  is  some  basis  or  criterion  for  comparing  the  different 
alternatives.  In  voluntary  action  choice  is  determined  by 
the  character  of  the  agent,  as  this  is  reflected  in  his  con- 
sciousness at  the  time  of  decision.  The  conscious  processes 


THE  SUBJECT-MATTER  OF  ETHICS  11 

which  thus  represent  the  character  of  the  agent  in  de- 
termining his  choice  vary  greatly  in  the  degree  of  their 
complexity  and  of  their  adequacy  to  the  character  they 
express.  At  the  one  extreme  we  have  choice  determined 
by  the  simple  memory-image  of  a  past  experience  in  which 
the  individual  sought  and  gained  a  similar  object  with 
pleasant  results  to  himself,  as  a  person  might  select  and 
purchase  a  certain  kind  of  fruit  because  it  had  particularly 
pleased  his  taste  on  a  former  occasion.  The  opposite  ex- 
treme is  given  in  instances  of  selection  based  upon  a  large 
purpose  or  comprehensive  ideal  which  has  been  built  up 
as  the  result  of  years  of  thought  and  experience,  and 
whose  bearing  upon  the  present  situation  is  discovered 
after  a  period  of  deliberation.  The  decision  of  a  man  to 
accept  public  office  at  a  pecuniary  sacrifice,  because  in  his 
ideal  of  life  public  service  stands  higher  than  private  am- 
bition, would  be  an  illustration  in  point.  The  important 
fact  is  that  the  nature  of  the  agent  determines  his  choices. ' 
Hence  if  action  is  really  voluntary  it  is,  as  Aristotle  recog- 
nized, an  expression  of  character — of  some  comparatively 
permanent  disposition  or  attribute  in  the  nature  of  the 
individual  who  performs  it.5  This  is  the  reason  why  we 
are  justified  in  holding  individuals  responsible  for  their 
voluntary  acts.  If  I  decide  to  go  to  the  library  in  search 
of  the  missing  book  the  ground  of  my  choice  must  rest 
in  my  own  nature.  It  may  be  my  interest  in  the  subject 
I  am  studying,  or  a  habit  I  have  formed  of  pursuing  to 
completion  a  task  I  have  undertaken,  or  some  other  trait  or 
disposition  which  influences  my  choice,  but  in  any  case  the 
act,  if  voluntary,  has  its  source  in  myself. 

8.  Which  Gains  Satisfaction  Through  Its  Attain- 
ment.— When  the  end  chosen  is  attained  through  action 
the  tension  between  ideal  aim  and  actual  condition  is  re- 

•ABISTOTLE:  Nioomachean  Ethics,  Bk.  II,  Chap.  Ill  (Welldon's 
trana.,  p.  42). 


12    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

lieved  and  its  unpleasantness  allayed.  The  end  which  is 
thought  of  and  desired  is  made  an  actual  possession  of 
the  agent,  and  thus  unity  and  equilibrium  are  restored  to 
his  consciousness.  This  state  of  unity,  regained  through 
the  inclusion  of  an  object  desired  and  sought  for,  is  itself 
pleasant  and  is  experienced  by  the  agent  as  satisfaction — 
the  pleasant  consciousness  of  success  in  giving  expression 
to  his  character.  With  such  feelings  of  satisfaction  I 
begin  my  work  again  after  returning  from  the  library  with 
the  object  of  my  quest,  pleased  that  I  have  not  allowed 
an  obstacle  which  could  thus  be  removed  to  interfere  with 
the  prosecution  of  my  evening's  labors. 

Finally,  it  should  be  observed  that  the  steps  just  de- 
scribed are  not  in  any  sense  separable  or  independent,  nor 
is  voluntary  action  merely  the  sum  or  sequence  of  them  thus 
conceived.  On  the  contrary,  each  voluntary  act  is  a  vital 
unity  within  which  the  different  steps  or  activities  just 
distinguished  are  joined  in  close  organic  interdependence. 
Each  voluntary  act  is  a  pulsation  in  the  life  of  intelligence, 
a  moment  in  the  expression  of  personality. 

9.  Ethics  Is  Concerned  with  the  Whole  of  Human 
Conduct. — If  conduct,  thus  understood  as  voluntary  action, 
is  taken  for  the  subject-matter  of  Ethics,  then  it  is  obvious 
that  this  science  will  be  limited  in  its  scope  to  the  field 
of  human  action;  for  man  alone  among  living  species  is 
capable  of  acting  in  pursuit  of  a  consciously  chosen  end. 
Within  the  limits  of  human  life,  however,  Ethics  is  con- 
cerned, not  with  a  part,  but  with  the  whole  of  conduct. 
It  is  the  comprehensive  science  of  human  practice,  and, 
since  all  intelligent  life  has  its  source  in  will,  may  be  said 
to  be  the  science  of  human  life  itself.  In  a  real  sense,  then, 
conduct  is  not  a  fraction,  but  the  whole  of  human  life, 
and  all  of  the  activity  by  which  man's  personality  gains 
expression  falls  within  the  field  of  Ethics.  Necessarily, 
Ethics  is  general  in  its  treatment,  leaving  a  detailed  con- 


THE  SUBJECT-MATTER  OF  ETHICS  13 

sideration  of  special  activities  to  subordinate  sciences  and 
confining  itself  to  the  essential  characteristics  and  funda- 
mental principles  of  conduct. 

10.  Objections  to  This  View. — Objections  of  two  dif- 
ferent kinds  may  arise  to  this  view  of  the  subject-matter 
of  Ethics.  According  to  the  first  we  have  made  the  field 
of  Ethics  too  narrow  in  thus  limiting  it  to  voluntary  action. 
For,  it  is  urged,  we  hold  men  responsible  for  actions  that 
clearly  are  not  voluntary.  Acts  done  from  fixed  habit, 
such  as  the  striking  of  a  blow  or  the  utterance  of  an  oath 
when  angry,  might  be  cited  as  examples.  Certainly  such 
acts  are  frequently  without  intention,  and  hence,  when 
considered  in  isolation,  appear  as  involuntary.  They  are 
not  properly  understood  when  thus  isolated,  however;  but 
must  rather  be  conceived  as  the  outcome  of  a  series  of 
acts,  the  first  of  which  were  intended,  and  voluntary,  and 
for  which  the  agent  was  responsible.  The  habit  itself  is 
voluntarily  initiated  if  not  the  single  act,  and  we  properly 
hold  the  agent  responsible  for  it  and  for  all  the  action 
it  entails.  Much  the  same  can  be  said  of  acts  recognized 
as  "  accidental  "  but  for  which  we  hold  the  individual  re- 
sponsible and  inflict  censure  or  punishment.  While  the 
act  itself  is  strictly  unintentional  and  involuntary,  it  results 
from  a  lack  of  care  and  attention  which  has  voluntary 
origin  and  for  which  responsibility  is  justly  incurred. 

The  second  objection  is  of  just  the  opposite  character 
and  rests  upon  the  opinion  that  not  all  voluntary  action 
has  moral  significance.  Hence,  it  is  claimed,  we  make  the 
field  of  Ethics  too  broad  when  we  identify  it  with  the 
sphere  of  voluntary  action.  Herbert  Spencer  was  of  this 
opinion,  and  his  illustration  of  conduct  which  is  ethically 
indifferent  has  become  classic. 

"  As  already  said,  a  large  part  of  ordinary  conduct  is  indifferent. 
Shall  I  walk  to  the  waterfall  to-day?  Or  shall  I  ramble  along 
the  seashore?  Here  the  ends  are  ethically  indifferent.  If  I  go 


14    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

to  the  waterfall,  shall  I  go  over  the  moor  or  take  the  path 
through  the  wood?  Here  the  means  are  ethically  indifferent. 
And  from  hour  to  hour  most  of  the  things  we  do  are  not  to  be 
judged  as  either  good  or  bad  in  respect  of  either  end  or  means."  6 

Professor  Dewey  agrees  with  Spencer  on  this  point.7 
He  believes  that  when  one  end  is  taken  for  granted  and 
out  of  its  connection  with  other  ends,  the  question  of 
the  means  employed  in  its  realization  is  one  of  technique 
rather  than  of  morals.  "  It  is  a  question  of  taste  and  of 
skill  —  of  personal  preference  and  of  practical  wisdom,  or 
of  economy,  expediency.  '  '  Thus  if  the  matter  of  the  after- 
noon walk  stand  alone  and  have  no  bearing  upon,  or  con- 
flict with,  other  aims  or  interests,  then  the  choice  of  a  path 
to  follow  is  an  affair  of  individual  taste  or  practical  ex- 
pediency and  has  no  ethical  significance.  Only  when  the 
value  of  the  proposed  end  is  felt  to  be  incomoatible  with 
that  of  another,  appealing  to  a  different  kind  of  interest 
or  tendency,  do  we  have  a  truly  moral  situation  in  the  view 
of  the  latter  writer.  But,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  ends  can 
be  thus  considered  out  of  relation  to  other  ends,  and  to 
their  ultimate  consequences,  only  by  artifice  and  abstrac- 
tion. All  the  ends  consciously  chosen  by  an  individual, 
along  with  the  activities  they  call  forth,  belong  together, 
since  they  are  expressions  of  a  unitary  personality  and 
are  interwoven  by  threads  of  common  interest  and  mean- 
ing. Thus,  in  Spencer's  illustration,  the  afternoon  walk 
gives  mental  diversion  and  physical  exercise,  and  these  in 
their  turn  are  necessary  to  the  health  of  mind  and  body,  — 
ends  of  high  moral  worth.  As  a  means  to  this  end  the 
walk  itself  possesses  moral  value  and,  since  it  is  difficult 
to  imagine,  that  with  a  given  person  and  at  a  certain  time, 
one  path  would  not  fulfil  the  purposes  of  the  walk  a  little 
better  than  any  other,  we  have  in  the  choice  of  route  a 


Data  of  Ethics,  Chap.  I,  §2. 
»  DEWEY  AND  TUFTS  :  Ethics,  p.  206. 


THE  SUBJECT-MATTER  OF  ETHICS  15 

question  of  real,  although  not  momentous,  moral  signifi- 
cance. Whether  I  shall  have  my  house  painted  white  or 
brown  seems  on  first  thought  merely  a  matter  of  taste  or 
economy  and  to  have  no  ethical  bearing  whatever.  Yet 
further  reflection  shows  me  that  the  painting  of  my  house 
contributes  in  an  important  way  to  the  purposes,  themselves 
of  undoubted  moral  value,  which  the  house  itself  subserves, 
and  that  the  advantage  gained  by  painting  is  measured 
largely  by  my  success  in  selecting  the  "  right  "  color.  As 
the  field  of  conduct  is  thus  a  unity,  the  different  ends  being 
inter-related  and  the  single  acts  connected  in  the  chains 
of  their  consequences  with  the  most  inclusive  purposes, 
it  is  impossible  to  draw  a  line  within  it  which  shall  exclude 
certain  actions  as  morally  indifferent.  Of  course,  it  is  not 
meant  that  ends  are  never  considered  out  of  relationship 
with  other  ends  nor  that  in  every  case  of  choice  we  should 
raise  the  issues  of  eternity  and  try  to  determine  the  ulti- 
mate bearing  of  our  action.  In  many  cases  the  bearing 
of  an  action  upon  the  attainment  of  other  ends — itself  im- 
portant enough — is  thoughtlessly  overlooked  when  it  should 
be  taken  into  consideration.  But  manifestly  time. alone 
forbids  that  the  whole  field  of  conduct  should  be  surveyed 
at  every  instance  of  choice.  Hence,  in  selecting  a  tool  or 
choosing  a  method  for  our  work,  we  follow  approved  techni- 
cal procedure  which,  while  it  is  now  habitual  with  us,  was 
first  adopted  because  representing  what  in  the  experience 
of  the  race  was  the  most  effective  way  of  securing  the  end 
desired. 

REFERENCES 

SPENCEB,  Data  of  Ethics,  Chap.  I. 

DEWEY  AND  TUFTS,  Ethics,  Chap.  X. 

SETH,  Ethical  Principles,  Introduction,  Chap.  I,  §§  1,  2. 

ALEXANDER,  Moral  Order  and  Progress,  Book  I,  Chap.  I. 

ABISTOTLE,     Nicomachean    Ethics,     (Welldon's    trans.),    Book    II, 

Chap.  III. 
GBEEN,  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  Book  II,  Chap.  II. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  METHOD  OF  ETHICS— A  PRACTICAL  AND 
NORMATIVE  SCIENCE 

1.  Ethics  as  a  Practical  Science. — 2.  Ethics  as  a  Normative  Science. 
— 3.  The  Human  Will  the  Ground  of  Moral  Value. — 4.  Other 
Practical  Sciences:  (a)  Technical, — 5.  (6)  Intellectual,  and — 
6.  (c)  ^Esthetic. — 7.  Other  Normative  Sciences. — 8.  Conclusion. 

1.  Ethics  as  a  Practical  Science. — The  method  of 
Ethics  is  consequent  upon  the  character  of  its  subject- 
matter.  As  the  science  of  conduct,  Ethics  is  necessarily  a 
"  practical  "  science.  In  order  to  make  clear  what  is 
meant  by  such  a  practical  science  we  may  contrast  it  in 
aim  and  method  with  theoretical  science,  although — as  will 
appear  later — the  distinctions  we  make  are  only  provisional. 
A  theoretical  science  is  concerned  with  the  knowledge  of 
objects  as  facts.  It  investigates  the  conditions  under  which 
they  exist,  seeking  to  discover  the  other  objects  with  which 
they  are  necessarily  connected.  The  aim  of  such  science 
is  to  ascertain  in  this  way  the  nature  and  connection  of 
all  existing  objects,  explaining  the  existence  of  each  one 
as  a  necessary  consequence  of  the  existence  of  another, 
its  antecedent  or  cause.  Geology  is  a  science  of  this  kind. 
It  seeks  to  know  the  facts  concerning  the  earth 's  structure, 
to  discover  the  order  of  events  in  its  history.  It  explains 
the  existence  of  objects  at  present  observable,  e.g.  sedi- 
mentary rocks,  by  connecting  them  with  other  objects  and 
agencies  which  preceded  them  in  the  past  and  stand  as 
their  causes.  A  practical  science,  on  the  contrary,  is  con- 
cerned primarily  with  the  realization  of  objects  as  ends 
of  action.  To  be  sure,  purposive  action  is  a  fact,  the  con- 

16 


THE  METHOD  OF  ETHICS  17 

ditions  of  whose  existence  may  be  investigated  according 
to  the  method  of  theoretical  science.  The  work  of  Ethics 
is  greatly  aided  by  a  knowledge  of  the  history  of  the 
different  forms  of  conduct  and  of  the  natural  agencies 
that  have  influenced  their  existence  and  development.  But 
such  knowledge  is  only  prefatory  to  ethical  science  proper, 
which  is  interested  in  conduct,  not  as  a  series  of  events 
causally  connected,  but  as  a  means  intelligently  employed 
in  the  realization  of  chosen  ends.  As  a  practical  science, 
then,  Ethics  seeks  to  discover  through  what  actions  the  ends 
of  human  conduct  may  be  realized.  With  the  introduction 
of  objects  as  ends  to  be  realized  a  new  conception  enters, 
of  great  importance  in  all  sciences  of  practice,  i.e.  value. 
Value  is  possessed  by  objects,  not  in  their  mere  exist- 
ence", but  in  their  relation  to  conscious  intelligence.  What- 
ever is  required  to  satisfy  a  need  or  fulfil  a  capacity  ^of 
an  intelligent  being  has  value.  The  fact  that  an  object 
is  chosen  for  pursuit  by  a  voluntary  agent  shows  he  is 
unsatisfied  without  it,  and  that,  in  promising  relief  to  his 
want,  the  object  has  value.  Objects  whose  realization  is 
sought  by  mankind  in  general  may,  therefore,  be  regarded  as 
necessary  for  the  satisfaction  of  the  human  will  and,  hence, 
possessed  of  value.  This  value  is  communicated  to  all 
actions  which  are  required  as  means  to  their  attainment. 
The  work  of  Ethics  as  a  practical  science  may  then  be 
said  to  be  the  discovery  of  what  conduct  thus  has  value 
or,  more  definitely  (although  the  criterion  of  distinction 
has  not  yet  been  supplied),  moral  value.  Ethics  is  a  prac- 
tical science,  therefore,  whose  aim  is  to  discover  what  con- 
duct has  moral  value. 

2.  Ethics  as  a  Normative  Science. — Upon  the  distinc- 
tion between  existence  and  value  hinges  the  difference  in 
method  between  the  descriptive  and  the  normative  sciences. 
Descriptive  sciences  are  composed  of  judgments  of  fact  or 
existence.  These  judgments  are  so  organized  in  each  sci- 


18     ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

ence  that  the  resulting  body  of  knowledge  correctly  reflects 
the  nature  and  connection  of  objects  existing  in  a  certain 
field  of  human  experience.  The  "  natural  "  sciences  thus 
aim  at  a  complete  description  of  the  phenomena  of  nature, 
each  investigating  the  behavior  of  objects  and  the  order  of 
events  in  a  particular  part  of  the  world.  Normative  sci- 
ences are  composed  of  judgments  of  worth.  Their  aim  is 
to  evaluate,  to  appreciate.  They  are  concerned,  not  with 
what  is,  but  with  what  ought  to  be.  They  imply  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  choice  between  objects  differing  in  value,  with 
consequent  obligation  to  choose  the  best.  Now  it  is  possible 
to  estimate  the  worth  of  objects  or  actions  only  when  we 
have  some  standard  to  which  they  should  conform,  by  which 
their  value  may  be  measured.  Indeed,  when  the  true  stand- 
ard of  value  in  a  field  is  once  clearly  defined  its  applica- 
tion is  comparatively  easy.  Hence  the  first  and  most  im- 
portant task  of  any  normative  science  is  to  discover  the 
standard  or  norm  by  which  worth  may  be  estimated  in 
its  field. 

Ethics  belongs  in  the  group  of  normative  sciences.  It 
has  work  of  description  to  accomplish,  to  be  sure,  in  de- 
scribing existent  practices  and  beliefs  of  human  society 
and  explaining  the  manner  of  their  evolution.  But  this 
work  is  of  minor  importance  as  compared  to  the  task  of 
evaluating  conduct,  which  falls  to  the  duty  of  Ethics. 
When  the  normative  method  is  thus  accepted  as  proper  to 
Ethics,  the  question  of  the  standard  of  value  in  the  field 
of  conduct  is  immediately  raised  to  the  greatest  promi- 
nence. For  conduct  cannot  be  evaluated  without  some 
standard  or  criterion  by  which  the  worth  of  different 
actions  may  be  tested.  As  that  to  which  all  actions  should 
conform,  such  a  standard  must  itself  be  some  form  of 
conduct,  or  end,  realized  in  action.  An  end  of  action  in 
order  thus  to  act  as  a  standard  must  itself  possess  full 
value,  that  is,  completely  satisfy  the  will  which  seeks  it. 


THE  METHOD  OF  ETHICS  19 

That  end,  which  in  its  realization  possesses  full  value,  and 
hence  may  be  used  as  a  standard  for  evaluating  conduct, 
is  called  the  Ggod.  To  discover  what  action  or  end  of 
action  may  be  accepted  as  the  Good  or  standard  of  value 
in  the  field  of  conduct,  and  then  to  apply  this  standard, 
judging  those  actions  which  conform  to  the  standard  to 
be  good  and  those  which  do  not  to  be  bad,  is  the  task  of 
Ethics  as  a  normative  science.  In  brief,  it  is  the  science 
of  good  conduct.  This  conception  of  the  task  of  Ethics 
is  essentially  the  same  as  that  reached  when  we  considered 
it  as  a  science  of  practice.  It  has  been  suggested  that  there 
is  a  real  difference  between  the  two  methods,  inasmuch 
as  the  normative  science  is  occupied  exclusively  with  dis- 
covering the  ideal  or  standard,  while  the  practical  science 
is  concerned  only  with  the  conditions  of  its  realization. 
But  this  difference  is  simply  one  of  emphasis ;  the  two  kinds 
of  inquiry  cannot  be  separated.  It  is  impossible  to  de- 
termine how  human  conduct  shall  achieve  its  end  unless 
we  have  adequate  knowledge  of  the  end  itself,  and  a  com- 
plete understanding  of  the  end  includes  knowledge  of  the 
actions  involved  in  its  realization. 

3.  The  Human  Will  the  Ground  of  Moral  Value.— 
Ethics  is  a  practical  and  normative  science,  and  its  business 
is  to  determine  what  conduct  satisfies  the  human  will  and 
hence  is  good,  and  what  conduct  fails  in  this  respect,  and 
is  therefore  bad.  Moral  value  thus  attaches  to  all  vol- 
untary action  and  is  grounded  in  the  will  itself,  the  source 
of  all  such  action.  It  should  be  recognized,  however,  that 
when  in  this  way  we  base  moral  value  upon  the  demands  of 
the  human  will  we  do  not,  as  might  appear,  prejudge  the 
whole  question  of  what  conduct  is  good.  Good  action  may 
be  action  which  promotes  social  welfare,  or  increases  selfish 
pleasure,  or  glorifies  God,  for  all  that  is  known  at  the 
present  stage  of  the  investigation;  the  fact  which  we  now 
emphasize  is  the  fundamental  psychological  one,  that  if 


20    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

any  of  these  objects  is  to  become  an  end  of  action  it  must 
appeal  to  the  human  will.  All  value,  that  is  to  say,  in  the 
whole  field  of  conduct  refers  back  to  that  capacity  of  intelli- 
gent volition  of  which  conduct  itself  is  the  expression.  Now 
we  have  knowledge  of  this  power  of  volition  only  as  it  is 
manifested  in  our  own  human  experience.  Hence  any  scien- 
tific investigation  of  moral  value,  all  empirical  study  of 
Ethics  in  fact,  must  be  based  upon  an  analysis  of  the  needs 
and  capacities  of  the  human  will  and  of  the  conditions  of 
its  expression  in  human  life. 

4.  Other  Practical  Sciences:  (a)  Technical. — In  de- 
scribing Ethics  as  a  practical  science  we  put  it  in  the  class 
of  such  sciences  as  agriculture  and  medicine,  generally 
recognized  as  practical.  It  will  throw  further  light  upon 
the  task  of  Ethics  if  we  consider  its  relation  to  these  other 
sciences  which  are  more  obviously  practical,  or  even  techni- 
cal, in  their  method. 

Since  Ethics  is  concerned  with  the  whole  of  human 
conduct,  it  is  evident  that  the  other  practical  sciences  must 
have  their  fields  within  the  inclusive  domain  of  Ethics. 
Such  is  the  case,  each  of  these  sciences  being  occupied  with 
a  certain  department  of  human  conduct  and  attempting  to 
determine  what  actions  are  necessary  in  order  that  the  ends 
peculiar  to  this  department  of  life  be  realized.  Indeed,  the 
fields  of  all  the  well-known  practical  sciences  fall  within 
one  large  department  of  conduct — that  of  "  practice,"  in 
the  narrow  meaning  which  excludes  both  the  intellectual 
and  the  emotional,  or  esthetic.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  we 
use  the  word  when  we  speak  of  a  person  as  eminently 
"  practical."  We  do  not  mean  that  such  a  person  is 
equally  skilled  in  all  departments  of  life,  in  the  activities 
of  thought  as  well  as  outward  performance.  Our  refer- 
ence is  rather  to  a  particular  kind  of  conduct — to  skill  in 
a  certain  mode  of  activity — that  of  adapting  means  to 
the  ends  of  intelligence.  It  will  prevent  confusion  to  call 


21 

this  mode  of  conduct  the  technical  rather  than  the  "  prac- 
tical." Technical  activity  consists,  not  in  thinking  of  ends 
or  ideals,  nor  in  enjoying  them  in  contemplation,  but  in 
devising  methods,  in  inventing  instruments,  for  their  at- 
tainment. It  is  exercised  chiefly  in  the  outer  world  in 
adapting  the  objects  and  forces  of  nature  to  the  uses  of 
human  intelligence.  The  prominence  of  this  kind  of  ac- 
tivity in  human  life  has  been  so  great  that  it  has  seemed 
to  cover  the  whole  field  of  conduct  itself — "  action  "  and 
"  practice  "  being  identified  with  outward  performance, 
visible  execution.  But  even  technical  activity — not  to  men- 
tion conduct  itself  with  its  still  greater  scope — cannot  be 
limited  to  the  manipulation  of  material  objects  and  physical 
forces  in  the  external  world.  It  is  exercised  in  the  political 
and  social  as  well  as  the  mechanical  spheres.  A  plan  for 
workingmen's  compensation  or  a  system  of  life-insurance 
is  as  much  a  product  of  intelligent  technique  as  a  steam 
engine  or  a  mining  process. 

There  are  many  practical  sciences  concerned  with  the 
use  of  technical  skill  in  the  different  special  fields  of  human 
experience.  These  sciences  aim  to  prescribe  in  detail  the 
rules  which  must  be  followed,  the  methods  which  must  be 
used,  the  agencies  which  must  be  employed,  in  one  special 
field  or  another,  if  the  purpose  appropriate  to  that  field  is 
to  be  realized.  Thus  the  science  of  bridge-building  tells 
of  the  material  which  must  be  employed  and  of  the  plan 
which  must  be  followed  in  construction,  in  order  that  a 
bridge  may  be  built  adapted  to  the  purposes  of  human 
intercourse  and  commerce.  Any  plan  or  device  required 
as  a  means  or  instrument  in  a  special  field — whether  it  be 
a  tool,  or  machine,  a  medicine,  or  a  political  institution — 
has,  of  course,  technical  value.  As  technique  is  a  branch 
of  conduct,  so  technical  value  is  a  species  of  moral  value. 
In  fact  they  are  not  distinguished  in  name,  and  we  speak 
of  a  good  engine  or  a  good  remedy, — that  the  cantilever, 


22    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

say,  is  a  good  bridge  for  this  situation,  when  we  mean 
that  the  device  in  question  is  an  effective  instrument  for 
accomplishing  its  end.  It  would  contribute  to  clearness 
if  we  adopted  a  term  distinctive  of  technical  value,  such 
as  efficiency,  and  spoke  of  an  efficient  engine,  remedy,  law, 
etc.  The  technical  sciences  fall  into  groups  in  accordance 
with  the  fields  to  which  they  are  applied.  In  the  inorganic 
sphere,  the  world  of  matter  and  motion,  we  find  many 
technical  sciences,  all  concerned  with  the  conquest  of  nature 
and  the  employment  of  its  forces  in  the  service  of  man. 
The  science  of  mining  prescribes  the  methods  which  must  be 
followed  if  ores  are  to  be  extracted  from  the  earth  most 
efficiently.  The  science  of  agriculture  tells  how  the  soil 
must  be  treated  if  it  is  to  yield  the  largest  returns.  The 
sciences  of  engineering  are  discovering  how  materials  may 
be  utilized,  and  natural  forces  employed,  for  the  increase 
of  man's  convenience  and  comfort.  Besides  these,  there 
are  others  in  the  same  group  too  numerous  to  mention, 
such  as  carpentry,  bridge-building,  etc.  Coming  into  the 
organic  or  animate  sphere  we  find  the  practical  sciences 
of  animal  husbandry,  which  tell  how  animals  must  be  housed 
and  fed  and  bred  if  they  are  to  be  most  serviceable  to 
man  as  sources  of  food,  carriers  of  burdens,  etc.  In  the 
closely  related  field  of  human  life  are  found  the  sciences, 
of  hygiene  which  prescribes  the  rules  which  man  must 
observe  if  he  is  to  retain  his  health,  and  of  medicine,  which 
indicates  the  remedies  he  must  use  to  cure  disease.  Going 
on  to  the  still  higher  fields  of  society  and  politics,  we  find 
still  another  group  of  technical  sciences — those  of  trade 
and  commerce,  of  the  practice  of  law  and  government,  of 
education,  etc. 

5.  (b)  Intellectual. — Another  department  of  conduct  is 
that  of  thought,  or  intellectual  activity.  We  so  frequently 
contrast  the  theoretical  with  the  practical  that  it  is  difficult 


THE  METHOD  OF  ETHICS  23 

to  think  of  thought  or  theory  as  a  branch  of  practice. 
Yet,  if  by  conduct  is  meant  voluntary  action,  it  is  certainly 
such;  for  ends  are  chosen  and  pursued  in  the  field  of 
thought  and  imagination  as  well  as  in  the  field  of  technique. 
The  work  of  the  scientific  investigator,  who  spends  years 
of  thought  over  a  problem  with  the  purpose  of  discovering 
the  truth  about  it,  and  thus  adding  to  the  sum  of  human 
knowledge,  is  sufficient  proof  of  this.  The  aim  of  intel- 
lectual activity  is  to  gain  ideas  which  ' '  agree  with  reality, ' ' 
i.e.  are  true.  The  end  of  thinking  is  always  the  discovery 
of  truth.  A  practical  science  of  thought  is  needed,  there- 
fore, which  shall  state  the  requirements  to  which  think- 
ing must  conform  if  it  is  to  reach  true  conclusions.  We 
have  such  a  science  in  Logic,  the  science  of  correct  thinking. 
Moreover,  all  of  the  special  sciences,  commonly  designated  as 
theoretical  or  descriptive,  are  in  a  sense  practical,  inasmuch 
as  each  tells  the  conditions  under  which  facts  may  be  ex- 
perienced in  a  particular  field.  Thus  such  a  science  as 
Chemistry,  which  has  been  termed  theoretical  in  contrast  to 
a  practical  science  like  Ethics,  because  its  aim  is  to  describe 
existent  objects  rather  than  to  tell  how  objects  may  be 
realized  as  ends,  may  itself  be  regarded  as  a  practical 
science  in  so  far  as  it  seeks  to  discover  the  ways  in  which 
material  substances  must  be  regarded  in  order  to  reveal  the 
facts  of  their  constitution.  There  are,  of  course,  as  many  of 
such  sciences  as  there  are  different  parts  of  the  experienced 
world,  each  concerned  with  the  discovery  of  truth  in  its 
field.  The  distinction  between  theoretical  and  practical  as 
applied  to  the  method  of  the  sciences  now  appears  neither 
absolute  nor  final.  Theory  turns  out  to  be  a  department  of 
practice,  and  the  theoretical  sciences  to  be  themselves  prac- 
tical sciences  concerned  with  the  attainment  of  a  distinctive 
end — Truth.  The  difference  between_  Ethics  and  the  theo- 
retical sciences  is  not,  consequently,  that  Ethics  is  con- 


24    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

cerned  with  the  realization  of  ends  while  these  sciences  are 
not,  but  rather  that  Ethics  is  concerned  with  all  the.  ends 
required  to  satisfy  the  will  in  every  department  of  its 
activity,  while  they  are  interested  in  the  attainment  of 
one  special  end  alone. 

6.  (c)  ^Esthetic. — A  third  department  of  conduct  is 
the  aesthetic.  The  aim  of  aesthetic  activity  is  the  produc- 
tion of  a  type  of  feeling — not  that  pleasure  which  always 
accompanies  the  attainment  of  desired  objects,  but  pure 
or  disinterested  pleasure.  Such  "  disinterested  "  pleasure 
— and  it  is  the  only  case  where  pure  feeling  is  made  an 
end — is  produced  through  the  contemplation  of  certain 
objects  which  set  the  perceptive  and  imaginative  faculties 
in  free  and  harmonious  play.  Perceptions  and  images 
(mostly  of  sight  and  sound)  able  to  effect  this  end  and 
produce  the  enjoyment  in  question  are  recognized  as  having 
aesthetic  value  and  are  judged  beautiful.  In  order  that 
aesthetic  pleasure  may  be  experienced  it  is  necessary  that 
objects  of  a  definite  character  be  present  and  that  their 
presence  be  accompanied  by  such  subjective  conditions  as 
interest,  attention,  etc.  The  practical  science  of  ^Esthetics 
endeavors  to  determine  the  conditions,  both  objective  and 
subjective,  which  must  be  fulfilled  if  the  "  sense  of  beauty  " 
is  to  be  awakened.  Thus  on  the  side  of  the  object  Esthetics 
investigates,  for  example,  what  proportions  figures  must 
have  to  please  the  eye,  and  how  tones  may  be  combined  to 
give  pleasure  to  the  ear;  while  on  the  subjective  side 
it  studies  the  effect  that  psychic^  conditions,  such  as  love 
for  the  object  and  intimate  knowledge  of  it,  have  upon 
the  aesthetic  experience.  Besides  the  general  science  of 
Esthetics  there  are  many  particular  sciences,  which  pre- 
scribe the  rules  which  must  be  followed  if  the  effect  of 
beauty  is  to  be  produced  in  various  special  fields.  Such 
are  the  sciences  of  Drawing,  of  Music,  of  Architecture, 
etc. 


THE  METHOD  OF  ETHICS 


25 


VOLITION 

Ethics 


Intellectual       Logic 


Technical 


^Esthetic 


Mathematics 

Physics 

Chemistry 

Astronomy 

Geology 

Biology 

Anthropology 

Sociology 

Psychology,  etc. 
Agriculture  and  Mining 
Engineering  and  Manufacturing 
Animal  Husbandry 
Hygiene  and  Medicine 
Trade  and  Commerce 
Law  and  Government 
Education,  etc. 

{Architecture  and  Sculpture 
Drawing  and  Painting 
Music  and  Literature,  etc. 


7.  Other  Normative  Sciences. — The  fact  that  thought 
and  feeling  are  fields  of  conduct  in  which  ends  are  chosen 
and  attained  is  witnessed  by  the  classification  of  norma- 
tive sciences  which  is  generally  adopted.  Besides  Ethics 
two  other  normative  sciences  are  recognized — Logic  and 
./Esthetics — Logic  seeking  to  discover  the  requirements  of 
Truth  as  the  intellectual  ideal  and  to  evaluate  modes  of 
thinking  by  this  standard ;  and  ^Esthetics  in  a  like  manner 
attempting  to  define  the  ideal  of  Beauty  and,  with  this 
criterion,  to  pass  judgment  upon  natural  objects  and  artis- 
tic products.  This  classification  of  normative  sciences  is 
somewhat  misleading,  however,  since  it  places  Ethics  upon 
an  equal  footing  with  Logic  and  ^Esthetics,  and  makes  the 
ideal  of  Goodness  coordinate  with  the  ideals  of  Truth  and 
Beauty.  Thus  man,  as  an  intelligent  being,  is  said  to 
possess  three  capacities,  those  of  Thought  and  Will  and 
Feeling;  intellectual  value  or  Truth  belongs  to  those  ideas 
which  satisfy  him  as  a  thinking  being,  moral  value  or 


Capacity 
Satisfied 

Kind  of 
Value 

Ideal  or 
Standard 

THOUGHT 

Intellectual 

TRUTH 

WILL 

Moral 

GOODNESS 

FEELING 

^Esthetic 

BEAUTY 

26    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

Goodness  belongs  to  those  actions  which  satisfy  him  as 
a  voluntary  agent,  aesthetic  value  or  Beauty  belongs  to 
those  presentations  which  satisfy  him  as  an  emotional 
being. 


HUMAN  j 

PERSONALITY  1 


Such  a  division  of  man's  psychic  capacities,  while  useful 
for  certain  purposes,  has  unfortunate  results  when  applied 
in  the  present  connection.  It  does  not  indicate  the  true 
relation  of  the  fields  of  Logic,  Ethics,  and  Esthetics,  nor 
of  the  ideals  that  govern  in  each  field.  When  will  is  thus 
put  on  an  equal  footing  with  the  other  faculties  it  is 
necessarily  taken  as  exclusive  of  thought  and  feeling,  and 
hence  made  identical  with  action  in  the  narrower  sense. 
The  sphere  of  Ethics  then  becomes  that  of  outward  perform- 
ance, of  what  we  have  called  technical  activity — adjustment 
and  adaptation — and,  in  consequence  of  this  limitation, 
•  its  ideal  of  Goodness  loses  all  authority  over  the  intellectual 
and  aesthetic  fields.  Now  the  truth  is  that  will  is  the 
inclusive  factor;  value  attaches  to  objects  only  as  ends 
of  volition,  and  this  applies  in  the  spheres  of  thought 
and  feeling  as  well  as  that  of  "  action."  Hence  all  value 
is  primarily  moral  value  or  Goodness.  But  volition  is 
exercised  in  different  departments  of  life,  in  the  pursuit 
of  various  classes  of  objects;  there  are,  consequently,  spe- 
cial kinds  of  value,  included  within,  and  subordinated  to, 
moral  value.  In  the  intellectual  sphere  ideas  are  sought 
which  agree  with  reality  and,  to  such  ideas,  intellectual 
value  or  truth  is  attributed ;  in  the  technical  sphere  agencies 
are  sought  which  subserve  the  purposes  of  intelligence  and, 


THE  METHOD  OF  ETHICS  27 

to  such  instruments,  technical  value  or  efficiency  is  at- 
tributed; in  the  aesthetic  sphere  objects  are  sought  which 
in  mere  contemplation  awaken  the  feeling  of  pleasure,  and, 
to  such  objects,  aesthetic  value  or  beauty  is  attributed. 
But  in  each  case  the  value  is  also,  and  primarily,  moral 
value  because  it  attaches  to  the  objects  as  ends  chosen  and 
pursued  by  will.  Goodness  belongs  to  all  objects  which 
as  ends  satisfy  the  capacity  of  volition;  truth  to  those 
ends  which  satisfy  volition  in  its  intellectual  sphere,  and 
beauty  to  those  ends  which  satisfy  volition  in  its  aesthetic 
sphere. 


HUMAN 
PERSONALITY 


Ethics  as  a  normative  science  is  not  coordinate  with 
Logic  and  ^Esthetics,  therefore,  but  comprehensive  of  them ; 
and  the  ideal  of  Goodness  not  of  equal  authority  with  those 
of  Truth  and  Beauty,  but  supreme  over  both. 

8.  Conclusion. — Our  brief  survey  of  the  practical  and 
normative  sciences  other  than  Ethics  has  served  to  em- 
phasize its  inclusive  and  fundamental  character.  Special 
practical  sciences  cover,  as  we  have  seen,  nearly  the  whole 
field  of  conduct  in  its  three  departments  of  thought  and 
feeling  and  action.  The  need  and  importance  of  Ethics  is 
not  due  to  the  fact  that  its  subject-matter  is  new  and  un- 
explored, therefore,  but  to  the  fact  that  to  Ethics  alone 
belongs  the  task  of  investigating  the  field  of  conduct  as  a 
whole,  of  discovering  its  governing  principles,  and  making 
clear  the  relation  of  its  essential  parts.  Ethics  is  the  com- 
prehensive science  of  human  life  itself. 


Capacity 
Satisfied 
VOLITION 

Kind  of 
Value 
MORAL 

Ideal  or 
Standard 
GOODNESS 

f  Thought 
|  Action 
(  Feeling 

i  Intellectual 
Technical 
^Esthetic 

(  Truth 
J  Efficiency 
(  Beauty 

28    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 


REFERENCES 

SETH,  Ethical  Principles,  Introduction,  Chap.  II. 
WUNDT,  Ethics  (English  trans.),  Vol.  I,  Introduction. 
MUIBHEAD,  Elements  of  Ethics,  Book  I,  Chaps.  II,  III. 
PAULSEN,  System  of  Ethics  (English  trans.),  Introduction. 
THILLY,  Introduction  to  Ethics,  Chap.  I. 
SIDGWICK,  Methods  of  Ethics,  Book  I,  Chap.  I. 
MACKENZIE,  Manual  of  Ethics,  Introduction,  Chaps.  I,  II. 
MEZES,  Ethics,  Descriptive  and  Explanatory,  Chap.  I. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  ETHICS— THE  DISCOVERY 
OF  THE  SUMMUM  BONUM 

1.  How  Determine  What  Is  Good  Conduct? — 2.  Many  Ends  Actually 
Sought  Are  Good  only  as  Means. — 3.  To  Satisfy  the  Will  an 
Object  Must  Be  an  End  in  Itself. — 4.  The  Problem  of  the 
Summurn  Bonum. — 5.  The  Summum  Bonum  as  the  Moral  Ideal. 
— 6.  The  Formation  of  the  Moral  Ideal. — 7.  Characteristics  of 
the  Ideal. — 8.  Source  of  the  Power  of  the  Ideal. 

1.  How  Determine  What  Is  Good  Conduct? — The  aim 
of  Ethics  as  a  practical  and  normative  science  is  to  de- 
termine what  conduct  is  good — or,  as  we  now  understand, 
what  conduct  will  completely  satisfy  the  human  will. 
Through  what  line  of  inquiry  may  this  aim  be  most  effec- 
tively achieved?  At  the  outset  it  should  be  noticed  that 
ethical  science  is  not  compelled  to  invent  or  imagine  forms 
of  conduct  that  may  possibly  meet  the  requirements  of 
goodness.  Human  experience  presents  many  types  of  con- 
duct or  (since  actions  are  distinguished  by  the  ends  they 
seek)  many  ends  of  action,  and  it  is  the  business  of  Ethics 
to  scrutinize  these  existing  ideals  and  practices.  Certain 
ends  have  been  pursued  by  men  in  all  periods  of  human 
history;  others  are  characteristic  of  particular  races  and 
times.  Among  these  latter  sharp  rivalry  has  frequently 
existed  and  one  set  of  ideals  has  replaced  another  only 
after  a  bitter  struggle,  as  when  the  ideals  of  Christianity 
replaced  those  of  classical  antiquity.  But  while  Ethics 
should  thus  draw  its  material  from  the  facts  of  human 
experience,  it  is  by  no  means  limited  to  a  description  and 
classification  of  the  various  forms  of  conduct  and  ideals 

29 


30    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

of  action  that  have  figured  in  human  history.  Its  work 
is  to  criticise  these  different  ends,  and  such  criticism  re- 
quires some  knowledge  of  the  nature  and  demands  of  that 
power  of  volition  which  is  seeking  satisfaction  through 
them — requires  the  presence,  at  least  implicitly,  of  some 
standard  of  moral  value.  As  it  becomes  more  explicit,  this 
standard  of  Goodness  will  take  shape  as  the  end  or  ideal 
which  in  its  realization  completely  satisfies  the  human 
will;  and  although  the  elements  which  enter  into  the  con- 
stitution of  this  ideal  may  all  be  drawn  from  existing 
human  conduct,  they  may  be  so  combined  as  to  acquire 
a  new  meaning  and  a  supreme  importance. 

2.  Many  Ends  Actually  Sought  Are  Good  only  as 
Means. — If  we  look  out  on  human  life  we  see  men  engaged 
in  the  pursuit  of  ends  which  appear  infinitely  diverse.  A 
closer  look  will  show,  however,  that  of  chief  ends,  of  leading 
purposes,  a  comparatively  few,  as  Aristotle  observed,  hold 
the  attention  of  the  majority  of  mankind.  Such  popular 
ends  are  money  and  reputation  and  pleasure.  Yet  these 
ends  prove  upon  examination  to  have  value  not  in  them- 
selves, but  only  as  means  to  something  else.  Take  mqney, 
as  an  instance.  It  is  good  only  for  what  it  will  buy,  and 
not  in  itself.  This  is  apparent  to  every  one  except  the 
miser,  to  whom  his  gold  seems  an  end  in  itself  because 
his  thoughts  have  been  perverted  by  ceaseless  efforts  at 
money-getting.  Nor  is  it  otherwise  with  reputation,  in 
the  sense  of  fame  or  popularity.  To  be  widely  known  in 
society,  to  be  favorably  spoken  of  by  one's  fellows,  is  good 
only  if  it  bring  more  real  and  substantial  benefits.  Other- 
wise it  is  but  a  hollow  sham,  an  empty  mockery,  as  many 
who  attain  it  have  testified.  In  the  same  class  are  most 
of  the  objects  which  we  behold  men  pursuing.  Here  a 
man  is  bending  all  his  energies  to  secure  a  home  for 
himself  and  family;  there  one  is  working  early  and  late 
to  win  professional  success.  But  all  such  things  are  good 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  ETHICS  31 

only  as  means  to  other  things  and  not  at  all  in  themselves. 
Hence  while  ends  of  this  class  may  well  be  a  part  of  the 
good,  their  attainment  can  never  represent  the  whole  of 
goodness:  they  can  of  themselves  never  satisfy  the  human 
will,  because  they  ever  point  further  on  to  other  ends 
more  satisfactory  than  themselves. 

3.  To  Satisfy  the  Will  an  Object  Must  Be  an  End  in 
Itself. — In  contrast  to  the  ends  just  mentioned  stands  afl.- 
other  class  of  ^objects  which,  although  not  sought  by  a  large 
proportion  of  mankind,  are  nevertheless  earnestly  pursued 
by  a  few.  These  objects  do  not  appear  as  means  to  further 
ends,  but  as  endsjji_themselves — or_if_they  do  serve  as 
instruments  in  the  attainment  of  other  objects,  then  these 
latter  turn  out  to  be  only  fuller  and  more  complete  ex- 
pressions of  themselves.  Examples  of  this  class  of  ends 
are  the  knowledge  pursued  by  the  scientific_Jnvestigator, 
and  the  welfare  of  country  as  sought  by  the  patriot.  In 
both  these  cases  the  end  seems  to  possess  value  in  itself; 
it  is  difficult  to  imagine  a  further  good  which  would  de- 
mand the  subordination  of  truth  or  of  the  public  welfare. 
Where  the  interests  of  truth  appear  to  be  thus  subordi- 
nated, as  in  the  telling  of  myths  to  children  or  the  de- 
ception of  sick  persons,  it  is  really  done  for  the  sake  of  a 
more  complete  truth.  And  a  sacrifice  of  national  welfare 
is  demanded  only  when  necessary  for  the  good  of  humanity 
with  which  the  larger  interests  of  the  nation  are  identified. 
This  contrast  between  different  classes  of  ends  brings  to 
light  an  important  characteristic  of  the  end  which  is 
entirely  good.  It  must  be  an  end  in  itself,  existing  for 
the  sake  of  no  other  end,  and  so  complete  as  to  require 
the  addition  of  no  other  object.  For  only  such  an  end 
can  in  its  realization  afford  full  satisfaction  to  the  human 
will.  All  other  ends,  while  they  may  afford  a  partial  satis- 
faction, direct  the  will  on  to  the  pursuit  of  other  objects 
to  which  they  are  merely  instrumental. 


32    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

4.  The  Problem  of  the  Summum  Bonum. — This  object, 
which  is  an  end  in  itself,  and  hence  able  to  satisfy  the 
human  will  completely,  is  called,  in  distinction  from  all 
lesser  or  lower  goods,  the  Highest  Good,  or  the  summum 
bonum.     Now  the  discovery  of  the  summum  bonum  may 
be  taken  for  the  chief  problem  of  Ethics.     For  only  con- 
duct which  realizes  this  end  is  good  conduct,  and  all  conduct 
which  does  realize  it  is  entirely  good.     Moreover,  a  thorough 
knowledge  of  this  end  must  include  a  knowledge  of  the 
means  necessary  for  its  realization ;  since  the  supreme  end, 
like  all  other  ends,  is  an  end  of  action,  and  can  exist  only 
as  it  is  realized  in  conduct.     Hence  in   discovering  the 
summum  bonum  we  solve  the  problem  of  what  conduct 
is   good,   and  thus  fulfil  the   aim   of   Ethics.     It   is  not 
strange,  therefore,  that  ethical  inquiry  should  have  centered 
on  this  problem   and  that  most  discussions  of  morality 
should,  since  the  beginning  of  ethical  reflection,  have  borne 
more  or  less  directly  upon  the  question,   "  What  is  the 
summum    bonum  f "      The    fact    that    the    problem,    not 
finally  solved  after  many  centuries,  is  still  discussed,  testi- 
fies both  to  its  great  import  and  many  difficulties.     For 
besides  other  difficulties  the  problem  of  the  Highest  Good 
has  this  one,  peculiar  to  itself,  that  while  the  value  of  other 
ends  is  proved  by  reference  to  the  further  ends  to  which 
they  contribute,  the  summum  bonum  is  a  means  to  no 
further  end  and  its  value  can  be  proved  only  by  a  reference 
back  to  the  will  which  is  its  source,   and  a  demonstra- 
tion of  its  power  to  satisfy  completely  this  capacity  of 
intelligent  volition. 

5.  The  Summum  Bonum  as  the  Moral  Ideal. — Since 
the  summum  bonum  represents  the  maximum  of  human 
attainment  and  thus  the  goal  of  moral  development  for 
man,  it  has  seldom  if  ever  been  realized  in  human  ex- 
perience.    It  is  frequently  realized  in  part,  and  hence  one 
may,  by  a  study  of  the  different  achievements  of  many 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  ETHICS  33 

individuals,  observe  in  actual  existence  a  large  number 
of  its  constituent  elements.  It  is  also  in  process  of  realiza- 
tion by  a  multitude  of  lives  which,  while  they  never  attain 
their  end  in  the  world  of  our  experience,  have  discovered 
the  direction  of  the  goal,  besides  traveling  a  long  distance 
towards  it.  The  summum  bonum  in  its  completeness, 
therefore,  does  not  exist  actually,  but  only  in  thought  and 
imagination — is  thus  an  ideal.  An  ideal  is  a  conception  • 
of  what  is  most  desirable  in  life.  It  is  an  end  the  thought  ' 
of  which  arouses  feeling  and  enthusiasm  because  promising 
largest  satisfaction.  Now  while  there  are  ideals  in  every 
department  of  human  experience;  yet  supreme  over  them 
all  is  the  Moral  Ideal,  the  idea  of  the  summum  bonum. 
By  the  Moral  Ideal  we  mean  that  type  of  conduct  or 
character  which  represents  the  highest  attainment  for  man, 
the  most  complete  fulfilment  of  his  nature,  the  fullest 
satisfaction  of  his  will.  As  such  it  is  none  other  than 
the  Highest  Good  and  identical  with  the  standard  of  moral 
value.  Consequently  ethical  inquiry  is  often  described  as 
a  quest  of  the  Moral  Ideal. 

6.  The  Formation  of  the  Moral  Ideal. — Every  end  is, 
as  we  know,  a  product  of  thought  whose  existence  depends 
upon  the  ability  to  judge  and  generalize.  But  many  ends 
chosen  for  pursuit  are  particular  objects  limited  both  in 
time  and  in  place  to  the  present  environment;  hence  they 
call  only  for  the  most  elementary  activities  of  cognition, 
such  as  those  involved  in  perception  and  the  perceptual 
judgment.  Ideals,  on  the  contrary,  are  of  a  universal 
or  typical  character,  and  are  projected  into  the  distant 
future;  their  formation,  therefore,  requires  a  degree  of 
intellectual  grasp  and  some  constructive  imagination.  One 
might  expect  that  as  a  consequence  of  this  fact  ideals 
would  be  restricted  in  their  existence  and  influence  to  a  com- 
paratively small  fraction  of  mankind,  as  alone  possessing 
the  intellectual  power  requisite  to  their  formation.  Yet 


34    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

such  is  not  the  case;  it  appears  rather  that  the  majority 
of  men  possess  at  some  time  during  their  lives  moral  and 
religious  ideals — forecasts  of  future  attainment,  visions 
of  excellence  they  hope  to  attain.  Proof  of  this  is  fur- 
nished by  the  method  which  revivalists_and  mission-workers 
among  the  submerged  classes  frequently  adopt  and  find 
effective  as  a  means  of  moral  betterment.  They  seek 
by  devices  of  rhetoric  and  music  to  awaken  in  the  minds 
of  their  auditors  memories  of  old  ideals — boyhood  dreams 
of  noble  achievement,  youthful  aspirations  for  honor  and 
integrity.  "With  many,  these  "  ideals  "  seem,  to  be  sure, 
scarcely  more  than  passing  fancies,  fleeting  visions.  Yet 
they  indicate  the  presence  in  the  normal  human  being, 
particularly  during  the  period  of  youth  and  early  maturity, 
of  imaginative  and  intellectual  ability  sufficient  to  the 
formation  of  ideals  which  can  give  direction  to  life  and 
conduct.  Authorities  in  genetic  psychology  x  tell  us  that  the 
period  of  adolescence  is  the  time  in  human  life  when  ideals 
are  most  readily  and  frequently  formed.  It  is  at  this  time, 
when  the  higher  powers  of  intelligence  at  first  develop, 
that  they  play  most  freely  and  spontaneously — that  imagi- 
nation wings  its  loftiest  flight  and  thought  makes  its  widest 
sweep.  At  this  period  the  individual  first  becomes  con< 
scious  of  the  present  in  its  relation  to  the  past  ever  receding 
behind,  and  the  future  stretching  away  before.  Awaken- 
ing also  to  a  sense  of  his  own  selfhood  in  its  connection 
with  other  selves,  he  is  led  almost  inevitably  to  project 
into  the  future  an  idea  of  himself  achieving  what  he  most 
desires,  and  thus  attaining  his  Highest  Good.  Then  it  is 
that  the  boy  sees  himself  in  possession  of  great  wealth  and 
owning  houses  and  lands,  yachts  and  horses ;  or  as  a  states- 
man influencing  the  policies  of  nations ;  or  as  a  physician, 
alleviating  the  ills  of  thousands  of  his  suffering  fellow- 
beings. 

1  STANLEY  HALL:  Adolescence,  Vol.  II,  Chaps.  XI-XVI. 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  ETHICS  35 

7.  Characteristics  of  the  Ideal. — An  ideal  in  order  to 
be  effective  in  moral  development  must  be  an  expression 
of  what  is  latent  in  the  character  of  the  agent  and  within 
the  range  of  his  possible  attainment.  It  must  appeal  to 
the  individual  as  the  legitimate  outcome  of  his  own  nature, 
the  realization  of  the  possibilities  inherent  in  his  own  situa- 
tion, the  fulfilment  of  his  own  deepest  desires.  If  these 
conditions  are  not  fulfilled,  the  ideal  will  either  prove 
unattainable  and  the  agent  in  his  discouragement  will  aban- 
don all  endeavor,  or  its  attainment  will  fail  to  bring  the 
expected  satisfaction  and  he  will  be  rendered  skeptical  of 
all  moral  values.  For  these  reasons  it  is  necessary  that 
each  individual  construct  his  own  ideal.  While  he  may 
be  assisted  in  this  task  by  information  given  and  influence 
wisely  exerted,  yet  when  this  influence  extends  so  far  as 
to  cause  him  to  adopt  as  his  own  an  ideal  which  is  not 
rooted  in  his  own  nature  and  capacities,  it  does  far  more 
harm  than  good.  The  ideal  should  always  represent  the 
unrealized  possibilities  of  the  actual.  As  Professor  Dewey 
says  with  truth:  "  To  set  up  ideals  of  perfection  which 
are  other  than  the  serious  recognition  of  the  possibilities 
of  development  resident  in  each  concrete  situation  is  in  the 
end  to  pay  ourselves  with  sentimentalities,  if  not  with 
words,  and  meanwhile  it  is  to  direct  thought  and  energy 
away  from  the  situations  which  need  and  which  welcome 
the  perfecting  care  of  attention  and  affection. ' ' 2 

Although  it  is  true  that  the  ideal  should  be  based  upon 
the  actual  abilities  of  the  agent  and  be  relative  to  the 
existing  circumstances  of  his  life,  it  is  equally  true  that 
in  order  to  awaken  enthusiasm  and  inspire  effort  the  ideal 
must  be  raisfiiLfar  above  the_actual  and  represent  a  height 
of  attainment  which  appears  impossible  enough  to  all  save 
the  enraptured  idealist.  It  is  this  height  of  the  ideal 
above  the  actual  with  all  its  negations  that  invests  it  with 
J  DEWEY  AND  Tuns :  Ethics,  p.  422. 


36    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

such  fascination  and  glamor — that  makes  the  pursuit  of  it 
a  romantic  adventure.  It  is  indeed  unfortunate  when  a 
human  being  stakes  his  life  upon  the  realization  of  an 
ideal  which  is  altogether  beyond  his  capacity  to  attain 
if  he  had  a  dozen  lives  to  live ;  for  then  a  bitter  disappoint- 
ment, a  crushing  sense  of  failure,  are  the  reward  of  his 
life 's  endeavor.  But  the  fact  never  to  be  forgotten  is  that 
we  cannot  predict  what  is  possible  or  impossible  with  a 
human  individual  before  he  actually  tries  it.  The  greatest 
of  human  achievements  have  been  due  to  the  promptings 
of  ideals  which  sensible,  practical  people  would  have  de- 
nounced as  visionary  and  absurd  in  their  first  adoption. 
If  man  is  really  to  attain,  therefore,  he  must  have  the 
courage  to  venture ;  he  cannot  afford  to  wait  until  assured 
of  success  before  making  his  endeavor.  Emerson 's  familiar 
maxim,  "  Hitch^your  wagon  to  a  star,"  is  sound,  both 
psychologically  and  ethically.  A  lofty  ideal,  even  when 
accompanied  by  no  knowledge  of  how  it  is  to  be  realized, 
may  provoke  enthusiasm  and  effort  sufficient  to  devise  new 
methods,  overcome  old  obstacles,  and  finally  to  place  the 
agent  upon  a  level  of  attainment  far  higher  than  he  would 
have  reached  had  he  chosen  a  lower  ideal,  the  road  to  whose 
realization  lay  open  before  him. 

8.  Source  of  the  Power  of  the  Ideal. — No  intelligent 
student  of  history  can  doubt  the  tremendous  influence  of 
the  Ideal  upon  human  conduct.  The  ancient  ideal  of  civic 
virtue  led  large  numbers  of  Greek  and  Koman  citizens 
to  devote  their  lives  wholly  to  their  country's  welfare. 
The  Christian  ideal  of  service  and  self-sacrifice  has  inflamed 
the  hearts  of  later  thousands  with  missionary  ardor,  caus- 
ing them  to  dedicate  themselves  to  a  life  of  labor  for 
humanity's  good.  The  modern  ideal  of  loyalty  to  Truth 
has  prompted  a  multitude  of  men  to  pursue  scientific 
investigations  with  unflagging  zeal,  and  in  the  face  of 
hardship  and  persecution,  in  order  that,  as  the  result 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  ETHICS  37 

of  their  efforts,  man's  store  of  available  knowledge  should 
be  increased.  The  secret  of  the  power  of  the  Moral  Ideal 
over  the  lives  of  men  lies  in  its  appeal  to  the  larger 
possibilities  of  man  as  a  spiritual  being — ultimately,  in 
these  higher  psychic  capacities  themselves,  which  enlarge 
man's  horizon  beyond  the  limits  of  his  present  situation 
and  organic  needs  and  bring  him  into  touch  with  Universal 
Reality.  The  Ideal  attracts  and  inspires  because  it  rep- 
resents the  complete  fulfilment  of  man's  powers  as  a  vol- 
untary agent — the  attainment  of  the  highest  human  good. 

REFERENCES 

ABISTOTLE,  Nicomachean  Ethics  (Welldon's  trans.),  Book  I. 
MACKENZIE,  Manual  of  Ethics,  Book  I,  Chap.  I. 
SETH,  Ethical  Principles,  Introduction,  Chap.  I,  §§  3-7. 
PALMER,  The  Nature  of  Goodness,  Chaps.  I,  II. 
GBEEN,  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  Book  III,  Chap.  I. 
LESLIE  STEPHEN,  Science  of  Ethics,  Chap.  II. 


CHAPTER  IV 

KNOWLEDGE  OF  THE  GOOD,  OR  CONSCIENCE 

1.  Conscience  Not  a  Separate  Faculty  but  a  Species  of  Judgment. — 
2.  Conscience  as  Judgment  of  Moral  Value. — 3.  The  Ground  of 
Moral  Judgment  Is  Usually  Emotional  Rather  than  Rational. — 
4.  Intuitional  and  Empirical  Theories  of  the  Origin  of  the 
Moral  Sentiments. — 5.  Experience  as  the  Source  of  the  Moral 
Sentiments. — 6.  The  Idea  of  the  Highest  Good  as  the  Rational 
Ground  of  the  Moral  Judgment. — 7.  Moral  Enlightenment. — 8. 
Importance  of  Conscience  in  Human  Life. — 9.  Remorse. 

If  the  Highest  Good  is  to  be  realized  in  human  conduct, 
it  must  (1)  be  known  as  an  object  of  thought,  and  (2) 
appeal  as  an  end  of  action,  under  which  conditions  it  will 
(3)  constitute  the  motive  of  good  conduct.  We  shall,  there- 
fore, consider  in  the  three  chapters  following :  first,  knowl- 
edge of  the  Good,  or  Conscience ;  second,  the  appeal  of  the 
Good,  or  Obligation ;  and,  third,  the  Motive  of  Goodness. 

1.  Conscience  Not  a  Separate  Faculty  but  a  Species 
of  Judgment. — Men  were  for  long  supposed  to  receive 
knowledge  of  good  and  evil  from  a  special  faculty,  Con- 
science, implanted  in  human  nature  for  this  purpose.  To 
Conscience  was  assigned  the  supreme  place  among  the  cog- 
nitive faculties  of  man,  as  the  final  arbiter  in  all  matters 
of  conduct — a  kind  of  oracle,  in  fact,  revealing  the  mind 
of  God  upon  all  questions  of  right  and  wrong.  Such  a 
view  was  possible  only  so  long  as  mind  was  understood  as 
an  assemblage  of  different  faculties,  and  Psychology  re- 
mained a  general  account  of  the  achievements  of  these 
faculties.  When,  however,  Psychology  undertook  a  close, 
detailed  analysis  and  description  of  mental  processes,  no 
evidence  was  found  of  the  existence  of  conscience  as  a 

88 


KNOWLEDGE  OF  THE  GOOD  39 

separate  faculty.  Our  thinking  upon  moral  subjects  in- 
volves the  same  processes  and  follows  the  same  laws  as 
does  our  thinking  upon  other  matters.  Conclusions  which 
pertain  to  questions  of  morality  are  subject  to  the  same 
requirements  of  consistency  and  proof  as  are  imposed  on 
other  conclusions.  Indeed,  moral  judgment  differs  from 
all  other  judgment  only  in  referring  to  a  particular  subject  ' 
which  possesses  distinctive  qualities.  By  conscience  we 
mean,  therefore,  simply  a  species  of  judgment — judgment 
of  moral  value. 

2.  Conscience  as  Judgment  of  Moral  Value. — We  have 
now  to  study  as  carefully  as  possible  the  working  of  con- 
science or  moral  judgment.  Let  us  begin  by  analyzing  a 
concrete  instance  of  moral  judgment,  or  the  action  of 
conscience. 

Suppose  that  a  person,  sitting  by  a  window  facing  the 
street,  sees  a  group  of  boys  approach  a  corner  fruit-stand 
kept  by  an  aged  and  decrepit  woman.  While  one  of  the 
party  engages  the  attention  of  the  woman  with  questions 
concerning  the  price  of  the  fruit,  others  put  a  number 
of  apples  in  their  pockets,  and  then  the  whole  party  goes 
off  laughing  and  shouting.  The  observer  at  the  window, 
who  has  seen  the  performance,  exclaims  indignantly,  ' '  How 
wrong!  "  These  words  give  expression  to  a  moral  judg- 
ment. The  subject  of  this  judgment  is  the  conduct  of 
the  boys.  Since  moral  value  attaches  only  to  voluntary 
action,  the  subject  of  all  moral  judgments  is  conduct.  It 
is  always  upon  the  conduct  of  self  or  the  conduct  of  others 
that  conscience  delivers  its  verdict.  The  quality  attributed 
to  the  conduct  of  the  boys  in  the  above  example — that  of 
"  wrongness  " — is  a  kind  of  moral  value.  Here  again  we 
may  generalize  and  note  that  the  quality  which  as  predicate 
is  affirmed  of  the  subject  (conduct)  in  moral  judgment  is 
always  a  kind  of  moral  value — moral  judgment  thus  being 
an  evaluation  of  conduct.  Now  moral  value  is  of  two 


40    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

opposite  kinds,  and  hence  the  words  which  signify  it  fall 
into  pairs  of  contraries,  as  good  and  bad,  right  and  wrong, 
etc.  The  deliverances  of  conscience  thus  take  the  form 
of  judgments  in  which  the  subject  is  conduct  and  the 
predicate  some  quality  drawn  from  the  class  of  moral 
values. 

T>    ,.     ,  .       Subject  Copula         Predicate 

Particular       I 

Illustration  f  Conduct  of  b°ys  is     wrong. 


[  Conduct  of  self  or  others   is     ^°°1d'  or  bad" 
Statement    )  right,  or  wrong;  etc. 

The  moral  judgment  possesses  the  same  characteristics 
as  other  judgment.1  When  seriously  affirmed  moral  judg- 
ment will  not  admit  itself  to  be  mere  individual  opinion, 
(but  claims  to  be  true,  to  hold  universally.  As  in  the  case 
of  all  other  judgments,  the  universal  validity  claimed  by 
moral  judgment  appears  as  a  consequence  of  its  necessity  — 
that  the  particular  judgment  made  had  to  be  thus  and  so, 
and  could  not  have  been  different,  because  certain  other 
facts  (themselves  expressed  in  judgments)  compelled  it  to 
take  just  this  form.  Thus  in  all  our  thinking  our  con- 
clusions seem  to  be  necessitated  by  antecedent  facts  or 
conclusions  whose  truth  has  been  accepted.  Now  these 
antecedent  facts  or  propositions  upon  which  the  truth  of 
a  judgment  appears  to  rest  are  known  as  its  grounds. 
Hence  we  are  accustomed  to  challenge  a  judgment  with  the 
question,  "  What  are  its  grounds?  Its  reasons?  "  This 
question  is  as  legitimate  with  the  moral  judgment  as  with 
any  other,  and  conscience  must  be  prepared  to  answer 
satisfactorily,  if  its  conclusions  are  to  be  accepted  as  true. 

Imagine,  then,  that  we  asked  the  onlooker  in  our  ex- 
ample, who  judged  the  behavior  of  the  boys  to  be  wrong, 

1  In  further  explanation  of  the  essential  features  of  judgment, 
cf  .  CBEIGHTON  :  Introduction,  Logic,  Chap.  XXII.  "  Main  Character- 
istics of  Judgment." 


KNOWLEDGE  OF  THE  GOOD  41 

the  question,  Why?  "  Why  do  you  think  their  conduct 
wrong?  "  He  would  probably  answer,  "  Because  it  is 
stealing,  of  course."  The  ground  of  his  judgment  would 
therefore  be  another  judgment  which,  completely  expressed, 
would  be,  "  All  stealing  is  wrong."  The  instance  is  again 
typical.  The  ground  of  a  particular  moral  judgment  is  usu- 
ally one  of  a  set  of  judgments  of  a  more  general  nature 
whose  truth  is  already  accepted,  and  which  assign  moral 
values  to  certain  classes  of  actions.  Of  such  nature  are  the 
familiar  judgments,  "  Stealing  is  wrong,"  "  Murder  is 
wrong,"  "  Kindness  is  right,"  etc.  If  it  is  true  that  the 
moral  values  mentioned  belong  to  these  general  classes  of 
action,  then  of  course  they  will  attach  to  all  particular 
actions  that  fall  within  the  classes.  Now  a  conclusion  taken 
in  connection  with  the  grounds  on  which  it  rests  is  known 
as  an  inference.  So  moral  judgment,  becoming  conscious 
of  the  other  judgments  which  constitute  its  ground,  expands 
into  moral  inference  or  reasoning.  Referring  again  to  our 
example,  and  using  James's  well-known  formula,2  the  be- 
havior of  the  boys  represents  the  subject-matter  of  thought, 
S.  From  this  behavior  as  a  whole  the  onlooker  singles 
out  one  feature  that  appears  to  him  essential  and  most 
important — the  feature,  that  is,  of  stealing,  M.  Now  this 
feature  enters  into  many  forms  of  conduct  and  is  recog- 
nized to  possess  certain  properties,  among  them  that  of 
being  wrong,  P.  Since  P  attaches  to  M  and  M  belongs 
to  S,  P  is  attributable  to  S.  The  feature  of  theft  is  thus 
the  connecting  link  or  middle  ground  between  the  behavior 
of  the  boys  and  the  quality  of  wrongness. 

S M    P 


This  act  is  stealing  and  therefore  wrong. 

Or,  putting  the  inference  in  the  traditional  form  of  the 

syllogism. 

1  JAMES  :  Psychology,  Chap.  XXII,  "  Reasoning." 


42    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

M   P 

S    M 


S 


All  stealing  is  wrong. 
This  act  is  stealing. 
(Therefore)  This  act  is  wrong. 

3.  The  Ground  of  the  Moral  Judgment  Is  Usually 
Emotional  Rather  than  Rational. — But  the  question  of 
the  ground  of  moral  judgment  is  by  no  means  settled  when 
we  explicitly  refer  the  particular  act  to  a  class  of  actions 
previously  judged  to  be  good  or  bad.  This  prior  judgment 
itself  needs  support  and  the  question  is  quite  legitimate, 
on  what  ground  do  we  hold  general  forms  of  conduct  such  as 
lying,  stealing,  courage,  or  kindness  to  be  right  or  wrong? 
For  these  judgments  if  true  must  themselves  be  necessary 
consequences  of  other  facts  or  considerations.  Suppose 
now  that  we  asked  the  observer  at  the  window,  who  had 
indignantly  pronounced  the  conduct  of  the  boys  to  be  wrong 
because  it  was  stealing,  the  further  question,  "  Why  is 
stealing  wrong?  "  If  he  exemplified  the  average  man  he 
would  probably  show  signs  of  surprise  and  impatience 
at  the  question,  and  reply, ' '  Why  is  stealing  wrong  ?  Why 
— because  it  is  wrong !  "  or  in  some  such  words.  That  is, 
the  great  majority  of  human  beings  do  not  carry  their 
reasoning  on  moral  matters  back  further  than  the  judgment 
that  certain  forms  of  conduct,  such  as  e.g.  courage  and 
honesty  and  kindness,  are  right,  and  other  forms,  such  as 
stealing  and  lying  and  murder,  are  wrong.  Actions  be- 
longing to  these  recognized  classes  excite  strong  feelings — 
of  approval  in  the  former  group  and  disapproval  in  the 
latter.  Hence  whenever  an  action  is  encountered  which 
falls  within  such  familiar  class,  it  is  greeted  immediately 
by  feelings  of  approval  or  the  reverse,  and  thus  its  moral 
value,  whether  good  or  bad,  appears  self-evident.  The 


KNOWLEDGE  OF  THE  GOOD  43 

binding  force  of  conscience,  Mill  says,  "  consists  in  the 
existence  of  a  mass  of  feeling  which  must  be  broken  through 
in  order  to  do  what  violates  our  standard  of  right,  and 
which,  if  we  do  nevertheless  violate  this  standard,  will 
probably  have  to  be  encountered  afterwards  in  the  form  of 
remorse. ' ' 3  These  moral  feelings  seem  to  justify  them- 
selves and  to  require  no  further  explanation.  It  is  true, 
therefore,  that  with  the  greater  number  of  mankind  the 
ultimate  ground  of  moral  judgment  is  emotional  rather 
than  rational*  Of  course  this  is  not  the  case  with  the 
moral  judgment  alone.  The  average  man  has  reasons  for 
comparatively  few  of  the  conclusions  he  maintains.  He 
nevertheless  regards  them  as  true,  since  they  awaken  the 
sentiment  of  belief  in  him.  In  this  way  the  uneducated 
man  feels  that  the  claim  of  his  political  party  or  the  doc- 
trines of  his  church  are  necessarily  true,  and  resents  the 
challenge  to  furnish  proof.  Perhaps  the  facts  with  refer- 
ence to  the  moral  judgment  are  most  concisely  stated  when 
we  say  that  in  the  minds  of  those  who  have  never  reflected 
upon  questions  of  morality  and  who  make  up  of  course 
the  great  bulk  of  mankind,  the  ground  of  all  moral  judg- 
ments is  a  set  of  moral  sentiments.  By  a  moral  sentiment 
is  meant  a  judgment  of  moral  value,  accompanied  by  feel- 
ings of  pleasure  if  the  conduct  is  judged  good,  and  dis- 
pleasure if  found  bad.5  A  group  of  such  sentiments,  ap- 
proving of  some  forms  of  conduct  and  disapproving  of 
others,  is  present  in  the  minds  of  most  men,  and  constitutes 
the  basis  of  their  moral  judgments. 

4.  Intuitional  and  Empirical  Theories  of  the  Origin  of 
Moral  Sentiments. — The  existence  of  moral  sentiments 
similar  in  character  among  civilized  peoples,  and  hence 

*  MILL:    Utilitarianism,  Chap.  III. 

•THILLY:  Introductory  Ethics,  Chap.  Ill,  pp.  77-79. 

1  For  a  good  description  of  the  various  sentiments,  intellectual, 
moral,  and  religious,  in  their  relation  to  other  mental  processes,  cf. 
TTTCHENEB:  Primer  of  Psychology,  Chap.  XII. 


44    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

familiar  to  us  all,  has  now  to  be  explained.  Two  conflicting 
theories  as  to  their  origin  have  arisen  in  the  course  of 
ethical  reflection.  The  Intuitional  theory  regards  these 
sentiments  as  fundamental  intuitions  of  mind.  They  are, 
the  Intuitionist  maintains,  a  part  of  our  innate  mental 
endowment — a  property  essential  to  the  mind  itself.  Some 
Intuitionists  have  emphasized  the  intellectual  factor  in 
moral  sentiment,  declaring  that  we  have  an  inborn  ability 
to  distinguish  good  from  bad,  whose  deliverances  bear  the 
mark  of  self-evident  truth.  Other  Intuitionists  have  con- 
sidered the  emotional  element  as  more  important,  and  have 
held  that  man  possessed  an  innate  "  moral  sense,"  a  fac- 
ulty which  reacts  with  feelings  of  liking  and  approval  to 
certain  forms  of  conduct,  and  with  feelings  of  dislike  and 
disapproval  to  others.  The  Empirical  theory,  on  the  other 
hand,  explains  existing  moral  sentiments  as  wholly  the 
product  of  experience.  This  experience  is  both  racial  and 
individual.  The  results  of  the  experience  of  the  race  in 
discovering  that  certain  kinds  of  action  are  advantageous 
are  inherited  by  the  individual  in  the  form  of  a  sentiment 
approving  of  this  type  of  action.  The  experience  of  the 
individual  himself — the  circumstances  of  his  life,  the  in- 
fluences to  which  he  has  been  subjected — is  also  a  cause 
for  the  moral  sentiments  which  he  possesses,  according  to 
the  Empirical  view. 

Of  these  two  positions  the  Intuitional  is  the  more  difficult 
to  maintain.  The  Intuitionist  proposes  an  explanation  of 
the  origin  of  the  moral  sentiments  which  is  clearly  in- 
applicable to  other  sentiments  of  a  similar  character.  For 
of  course  it  is  not  his  moral  judgments  alone  that  the 
ordinary  man  feels  to  be  necessary,  without  adequate 
reasons.  The  case  is  exactly  the  same  with  the  most  of 
his  judgments  on  social,  political,  and  religious  matters. 
No  one  would  think  of  asserting,  however,  that  sentiments 
on  these  subjects,  no  matter  how  widespread  among  the 


KNOWLEDGE  OF  THE  GOOD  45 

inhabitants  of  a  country,  were  fundamental  intuitions  of 
the  human  mind.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  a  commonplace 
observation  that  most  men  derive  their  political  opinions, 
their  religious  belief,  and  their  social  outlook,  from  their 
parentage  and  early  training.  The  Intuitionist  proposes 
now  to  make  an  exception  of  the  moral  sentiments,  and 
because  these  possess  a  strength  and  authority  which  cannot 
be  justified  on  rational  grounds,  to  assign  to  them  a  unique 
origin,  as  innate  properties  of  the  mind  itself.  It  is  con- 
sistent with  this  general  standpoint  to  conceive  of  the 
moral  sentiments  as  "  divinely  implanted  "  in  human  na- 
ture, after  the  same  manner  of  thinking  that  regards  con- 
science as  the  voice  of  God  in  the  human  soul.  In  fact, 
the  theory  that  the  moral  sentiments  are  intuitions  innate 
in  the  mind  of  man  is  closely  affiliated  with  the  '  special 
faculty  '  view  of  conscience,  both  leaning  toward  a  super- 
natural explanation  of  morality. 

Moreover,  the  Intuitional  theory  has  an  important  im- 
plication which  we  cannot  at  present  accept.  If  the  moral 
sentiments  are  an  essential  part  of  the  mental  endowment 
of  man  we  should  expect  to  find  them  present  in  the  minds 
of  men  of  all  races  and  times.  Or  even  if  we  admit  that 
the  higher  sentiments  are  at  first  present  potentially,  and 
only  come  to  clear  consciousness  in  the  course  of  human 
history  and  development,  it  is  nevertheless  a  necessary  im- 
plication of  the  Intuitional  view  that  the  existing  senti- 
ments of  mankind  as  they  concern  such  fundamental  forms 
of  conduct  as  murder  and  stealing  and  lying  must  agree. 
Intuitionists  soon  recognized  this  implication  and  felt  the 
crucial  importance  of  the  point  which  it  raised.  Hence  the 
defense  of  Intuitionism  has  consisted  largely  of  an  attempt 
on  the  part  of  its  advocates  to  prove  that  there  is  an 
agreement  in  the  moral  sentiments  of  mankind.  Champions 
of  the  opposing  school  summoned  all  the  facts  at  their 
command  to  show  that  not  unanimity  but  radical  disagree- 


46    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

ment  has  prevailed  among  different  peoples  in  matters  of 
morality.  Thus  the  controversy  continued.  Now  it  is  not 
difficult  to  prove  that  there  is  a  substantial  agreement  in 
moral  sentiment  among  men,  if  we  confine  ourselves  to 
civilized  or  comparatively  civilized  peoples  of  our  own 
time.  As  long,  then,  as  continents  containing  savage  or 
barbarous  races  remained  unexplored  and  there  was  little 
or  no  knowledge  of  the  early  history  of  human  society,  the 
Intuitionist  was  able  to  uphold  his  side  of  the  controversy 
with  a  fair  degree  of  success.  But  since  the  world  has  been 
thoroughly  explored  and  its  various  peoples  studied,  and 
in  particular  since  the  discovery  of  evolution  has  given  such 
an  impetus  to  all  ethnological  and  anthropological  investi- 
gation, a  mass  of  facts  relative  to  human  morality  has 
been  collected  which  makes  the  Intuitional  view  utterly 
untenable.  Such  studies  of  the  evolution  of  human  moral- 
ity as  those  recently  made  by  Westermarck 6  and  Hob- 
house  7  show  a  disagreement  in  moral  belief  and  practice 
among  different  peoples  and  periods  which  cannot  be  recon- 
ciled with  the  theory  of  moral  intuitions.  If  there  is  a 
duty  that  is  fundamental  it  would  seem  to  be  that  of  re- 
specting the  life  of  fellow-man.  Yet  we  find  that  in  early 
stages  of  human  society  no  rights  at  all  attach  to  the 
human  being  as  such.8  The  stranger  may  be  killed  or 
tortured  at  pleasure,  and  the  life  of  fellow-clansman  is  re- 
spected not  because  he  is  recognized  as  possessing  any  rights 
as  a  human  individual,  but  because  his  interest  is  identified 
with  that  of  the  agent.  A  moral  sentiment  which  is  wide- 
spread and  might  seem  to  be  universal  is  that  disapproving 
of  stealing ;  yet  among  some  peoples  theft  is  not  regarded  as 
dishonorable,  and  among  others  is  even  admired  as  a  clever 
trick.9  The  disapproval  of  lying  is  sufficiently  general  to 

•  WESTEBMABCK  :   Origin  and  Development  of  Moral  Ideas. 
THoBHOUSE:    Morals  in  Evolution. 

•HoBHOUSE:   Op.  cit.,  Vol.  I.  p.  240. 

•  HOBHOUSE  :  Op.  cit.,  Vol.  I,  p.  334. 


KNOWLEDGE  OF  THE  GOOD  47 

suggest  that  it  is  based  upon  an  intuition  inherent  in  the 
human  mind;  yet  in  certain  tribes,  authorities  inform 
us,  a  successful  lie  is  a  matter  of  popular  admiration.10 
In  fact,  we  find  diversity  almost  without  limit  in  the  moral 
sentiments  of  mankind.  To  be  sure,  the  same  investiga- 
tions which  have  revealed  such  widespread  divergence  in 
the  opinions  and  customs  of  men  in  matters  of  morality, 
have  also  shown  the  presence  in  human  conduct  of  a  ten- 
dency to  develop — of  an  evolution  in  morals,  in  fact,  which 
has  a  definite  goal  and  is  governed  by  universal  principles.11 
But  such  tendency  toward  a  consistent  and  regular  de- 
velopment indicates  that  human  morality  is  the  expression 
of  a  single  unitary  power  or  capacity  rather  than  that  it 
rests  upon  a  set  of  ready-made  intuitions. 

5.  Experience  as  the  Source  of  Moral  Sentiments. — 
We  are  forced  by  these  facts  to  believe  that  the  moral 
sentiments  of  the  vast  majority  of  men  have  their  origin 
in  experience,  as  the  Empiricist  has  maintained.  They 
are  in  a  true  sense  the  product  of  conditions  of  life,  of 
influences  of  environment,  as  these  have  acted  upon  the 
individual  and  the  race.  Of  course  the  presence  in  man 
of  an  ability  to  adapt  himself  to  the  conditions  of  social 
existence,  and  that  with  constantly  increasing  intelligence, 
must  be  presupposed.  But  the  special  beliefs  and  customs 
called  forth  by  the  requirements  of  social  life  under  human 
conditions  find  their  explanation  in  the  particular  cir- 
cumstances that  evoked  them  rather  than  in  this  general 
capacity  of  voluntary  intelligence.  The  fact  that  the  moral 

10  WESTEBMABCK  :  Op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  p.  72. 

"Hobhouse  believes  that  "Thus,  amid  all  the  variety  of  social 
institutions  and  the  ebb  and  flow  of  historical  change,  it  is  possible 
in  the  end  to  detect  a  double  movement  marking  the  transition  from 
the  lower  to  the  higher  levels  of  civilized  law  and  custom."  This 
'  double  movement '  is  that  in  which  humanity  both  in  the  sense  of 
the  whole  human  rare  and  of  the  human  nature  in  each  one  of  U8 
is  progressively  realized. — HOBHOUSE:  Op.  cit.,  Vol.  I,  Summary, 
pp.  367-68. 


48    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

sentiments  which  exist  at  any  time  are  the  result  of  the 
experience  of  the  race,  or  of  a  considerable  fraction  of  it, 
acquired  during  ages  previous,  is  of  great  importance  in 
explaining  the  agreement  of  moral  sentiment  among  differ- 
ent members  of  human  society  and  also  the  authority  which 
these  sentiments  possess  over  the  individual.  Indeed, 
Spencer  thinks  that  when  we  see  our  moral  judgments,  as 
the  result  of  the  experience  of  remote  ancestors  transmitted 
to  their  progeny  by  physical  heredity,  and  thus  become 
part  of  our  native  endowment,  we  both  recognize  the  large 
amount  of  truth  contained  in  the  view  of  Intuitionism 
that  the  moral  sentiments  are  innate  properties  of  mind, 
and  at  the  same  time  reconcile  this  view  with  that  of  Em- 
piricism.12 Spencer  himself  finds  no  difficulty  in  believing 
that  opinions  and  practices  acquired  by  the  human  indi- 
vidual during  his  life-time  may  be  inherited  by  his  de- 
scendants and  finally  become  ingrained  in  the  stock  or  race 
as  fixed  instincts.  But  since  his  time  biologists  have  found 
good  reason  for  disbelieving  that  such  acquisitions  are  ever 
transmitted  through  the  channels  of  natural  inheritance. 
Hence  we  cannot  depend  upon  physical  heredity  to  explain 
the  perpetuation  of  moral  sentiments,  nor  is  it  legitimate 
to  consider  them  as  instincts  formerly  acquired  but  now 
inborn. 

It  is  quite  possible  to  account  for  the  development  and 
conservation  of  the  moral  experience  of  the  race  through 
the  operation  of  another  factor,  however — "  social  _hered- 
ity. ' '  By  social  heredity  is  meant  the  transmission  through 
the  instrumentality  of  language,  imitation,  and  suggestion, 

11  "  For  as  the  doctrine  of  innate  forms  of  intellectual  intuition 
falls  into  harmony  with  the  experiential  doctrine  when  we  recognize 
the  production  of  intellectual  faculties  by  inheritance  of  effects 
wrought  by  experience;  so  the  doctrine  of  innate  powers  of  moral 
perception  becomes  congruous  with  the  utilitarian  doctrine  when 
it  is  seen  that  preferences  and  aversions  are  rendered  organic  by 
inheritance  of  the  effects  of  pleasurable  and  painful  experiences  in 
progenitors." — SPENCEB:  Data  of  Ethics,  §45. 


KNOWLEDGE  OF  THE  GOOD  49 

of  the  accumulated  experience  of  the  race  to  each  suc- 
cessive generation  of  individuals.  Through  this  channel, 
by  means  of  instruction  and  training,  the  moral  tradi- 
tion of  a  society  is  communicated  to  its  youthful  members. 
This  explanation  makes  it  evident  that  the  individual's 
own  experience  is  the  source  of  his  social  and  religious 
sentiments — the  home  and  the  school  existing  as  special 
agencies  for  influencing  him  during  his  earliest  and  most 
susceptible  years,  and  producing  in  him  those  beliefs  and 
convictions,  those  habits  and  dispositions,  which  are  ap- 
proved by  the  society  of  which  he  is  a  member. 

We  are  hence  reduced  to  the  individual's  own  experience 
— the  circumstances  of  his  early  life,  his  home  training, 
his  education  at  school,  his  associates  and  friends,  and  the 
other  numberless  influences,  social  and  economic,  that  have 
acted  upon  him  during  his  formative  period — as  the  main 
source  of  his  moral  sentiments.  This  explanation  may  seem 
utterly  inadequate  when  we  think  of  the  absolute  authority 
claimed  by  the  deliverances  of  conscience,  of  the  peculiar 
dignity  and  even  sanctity  they  possess,  of  the  sense  of 
reverence  they  awaken.  Yet  if  we  consider  for  a  moment 
the  character  of  this  experience, — how  well  it  is  adapted  to 
produce  just  such  results, — it  will  not  seem  so  insufficient 
as  a  source  of  authoritative  moral  sentiment.  The  child 
has  the  current  moral  distinctions  brought  home  to  him 
at  a  very  early  age.  Every  device  is  used  to  impress  his 
sensitive  feelings  and  imagination.13  Parents  and  nurse 
agree  in  regarding  certain  acts  with  frowns  and  looks  of 
horror,  while  others  are  greeted  with  smiles  and  expressions 
of  pleasure.  Punishments  begin  to  follow  actions  of  the 
former  class — with  threats  of  penalties  still  more  dire  for 
one  who  persists  in  striking  or  lying  or  stealing.  The 
growing  love  of  the  child  is  appealed  to,  he  being  told  that 
parents  can  continue  to  love  and  cherish  only  children 

"TniLLY:    Op.   cit.,   Chap.   Ill,   §8,   "Genesis   of   Conscience." 


50    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

who  are  obedient,  truthful,  etc.  Then  the  religious  factor 
is  often  introduced,  and  God  is  alluded  to  as  a  Mysterious 
Being  who  is  particularly  interested  in  these  matters  of 
right  and  wrong,  and  Who,  having  an  eye  which  is  all- 
seeing,  and  a  power  which  knows  no  limit,  will  finaHy 
inflict  dreadful  penalties  upon  those  who  continue  to  do 
wrong,  and  bestow  corresponding  rewards  upon  the  go  d 
and  obedient.  The  terrors  of  the  law  are  frequently  in- 
voked, and  the  prison  referred  to  as  the  place  where  the 
dishonest,  the  untruthful,  the  violent,  are  confined.  In 
the  school  the  boy  or  girl  encounters  another  authority 
able  to  enforce  the  same  set  of  distinctions  by  sanctions 
of  its  own.  Finally  he  meets  the  all-powerful  influence 
of  public  opinion  which  visits  social  opprobrium  and  ostra- 
cism upon  the  head  of  the  individual  who  dares  to  dis- 
regard conventional  standards  or  transgress  approved  cus- 
toms. Small  wonder,  then,  that  the  moral  sentiments  tra- 
ditional in  a  society  acquire  an  almost  hypnotic  power  over 
its  members — such  principles  as  "  Stealing  is  wrong," 
"  Lying  is  wrong,"  having  acquired  through  early  associa- 
tions, vague  memories,  and  a  bias  given  in  childhood  to  the 
whole  nature,  a  greater  power  over  the  attention  than 
objects  which  awaken  the  strongest  natural  desires. 

6.  The  Idea  of  the  Highest  Good  as  the  Rational 
Ground  of  Moral  Judgment. — Are  we  to  conclude,  because 
the  moral  sentiments  of  most  human  beings  have  their 
source  in  experience  and  not  in  reflective  reason,  that, 
therefore,  the  moral  judgment  can  have  no  rational  ground  ? 
By  no  means.  The  moral  judgment  can  have  as  secure  a 
basis  in  reason  as  any  other  judgment  and  may  lay  claim 
to  the  same  objective  validity.  For  the  moral  judgment 
is  essentially  a  judgment  of  value — a  particular  kind  of 
value  called  moral.  Now  this  value  is  possessed  by  all 
objects  capable  of  fulfilling  the  demands  of  volition.  But 
the  summum  bonum  is  by  definition  that  end  which  is  able 


KNOWLEDGE  OF  THE  GOOD  51 

to  satisfy  completely  the  capacity  of  human  volit:on. 
Hence  when  the  Highest  Good  is  discovered  it  will  furnish 
the  rational  ground  of  moral  judgment;  since  whatever 
action  can  be  shown  to  be  a  means  to  its  attainment  will 
be  proved  to  have  positive  moral  value  or  goodness,  while 
every  action  which  hinders  its  attainment  will  in  a  like 
manner  be  proved  bad.  To  be  sure,  the  connection  between 
a  particular  act  and  the  attainment  of  the  Good  is  not 
always  apparent.  At  this  point,  then,  deliberation  must 
enter;  the  consequences  of  the  proposed  action  must  be 
followed  out  in  imagination  until  its  bearing  upon  the 
attainment  of  the  Good  is  ascertained.  Thus  a  number  of 
considerations  are  introduced  which  serve  to  connect  the 
moral  judgment  finally  rendered  with  its  ultimate  ground. 
Keverting  to  our  previous  illustration  and  assuming  for  the 
sake  of  argument  that  Social  Welfare  is  the  Good,  moral 
reflection  might  take  the  following  course:  "  This  act  is 
stealing;  stealing  violates  the  rights  of  private  ownership; 
the  institution  of  private  property  is  necessary  to  social 
welfare;  this  act  is  thus  opposed  to  social  welfare,  and 
therefore  wrong."  In  this  way  the  reasons  for  any  moral 
judgment  are  exhibited  in  full  and,  granting  that  the 
summum  bonum  is  correctly  understood,  the  argument  ia 
valid  and  the  conclusion  true  for  all  persons. 

Inasmuch  as  the  summum  bonum  constitutes  the  ultimate 
ground  of  moral  judgment  it  may  be  said  to  furnish  con- 
science with  a  standard  or  criterion  of  moral  value.  It 
stands  for  perfect  goodness  in  human  conduct,  and  by 
reference  to  it,  consequently,  the  pretensions  of  any  act 
to  be  good  can  be  tested.  We  secure  in  this  way  no  magic 
oracle  of  right  or  wrong,  however;  for  after  the  Good  is 
discovered  its  use  as  a  standard  of  moral  value  will  be 
beset  by  many  difficulties.  Its  relation  to  a  particular 
action  may  be  very  hard  to  make  out,  the  situation  calling 
for  most  painstaking  analysis  and  careful  study.  Suppose 


52    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

that  the  act  under  consideration  is  that  of  telling  a  friend 
of  certain  faults  he  possesses.  In  the  present  circumstances, 
will  it  be  right  or  wrong,  my  duty  or  not?  Let  us  say 
further  that  the  Highest  Good  is,  in  our  opinion,  the 
Weil-Being  of  Humanity.  This,  then,  must  constitute  our 
standard  of  moral  value.  Is  it  easily  applied?  Is  it  a 
simple  matter  to  ascertain  the  bearing  of  telling  my  friend 
a  disagreeable  truth — upon  human  welfare?  Obviously 
not,  yet  it  is  a  task  which  reason  must  undertake  and  dis- 
charge to  the  best  of  its  powers.  The  possibility  of  wound- 
ing my  friend's  feelings,  destroying  our  friendship,  and 
thus  perhaps  lessening  the  social  efficiency  of  us  both,  must 
be  considered.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  it  must  not  be 
forgotten  that  a  word  from  me  may  lead  him  to  overcome 
his  fault,  with  great  increase  of  his  own  happiness  and 
his  serviceability  to  his  fellow-men.  Then  the  effect  of 
candor  in  social  relations  generally  might  be  considered, 
and  account  taken  of  the  help  which  an  individual  derives 
from  the  frank  and  kindly  criticism  of  his  fellows.  To 
be  sure,  the  same  opportunity  for  slips  and  errors  exists 
here  as  in  all  other  reasoning,  and  the  individual  who 
thinks  out  moral  problems  for  himself  is  liable  to  frequent 
mistake.  At  least,  however,  he  is  determining  his  conduct 
in  a  manner  befitting  the  dignity  of  an  intelligent  being — 
freely,  and  in  accordance  with  conclusions  of  his  own 
reason. 

7.  Moral  Enlightenment. — Thus  to  substitute  rational 
insight  as  the  basis  of  moral  judgment,  for  feelings  pro- 
duced by  experience  and  training,  is  to  enlighten  con- 
science and  rationalize  morality.  It  is,  as  we  know,  just 
the  aim  of  Ethics  to  evaluate  conduct  rationally,  i.e.  in 
accordance  with  the  demands  of  the  Moral  Ideal.  The 
necessity  for  constant  exertion  to  secure  means  of  sub- 
sistence has  left  the  vast  majority  of  mankind — up  to  the 
present — neither  the  time  nor  the  strength  for  ethical 


KNOWLEDGE  OF  THE  GOOD  53 

reflection.  Doubtless,  for  a  long  period  in  the  future  as 
well,  most  men  will  be  compelled  to  receive  their  moral 
sentiments  ready  made  through  various  influences  of  cus- 
tom and  tradition.  Yet  an  increasing  number  are  gaining 
the  education  and  leisure  requisite  for  systematic  reflection 
upon  the  problems  of  conduct.  With  such,  the  conven- 
tional moral  sentiments  inculcated  in  childhood  are  sure 
to  lose  their  authority.  The  individual  will  challenge  the 
right  of  the  accepted  moral  code  to  rule  over  him  and 
summon  it  to  appear  for  examination  before  the  bar  of  his 
own  reason.  Then  indeed  is  the  crisis,  when  the  tradi- 
tional moral  sentiments  must  justify  themselves  to  reason 
or  suffer  entire  repudiation  in  favor  of  some  plan  of  life 
original  with  the  individual.  It  is  at  this  juncture  that 
Ethics  may  be  especially  useful  in  guiding  the  thought 
of  the  individual  when  he  endeavors  for  himself  to 
evaluate  different  forms  of  conduct  and  alternative 
ends,  and,  the  larger  grow  the  numbers  of  individuals 
undertaking  to  think  for  themselves  upon  matters  of 
morality,  the  more  general  will  be  the  need  of  ethical 
instruction. 

Fortunately,  however,  moral  enlightenment  does  not  nec- 
essarily, or  even  frequently,  entail  the  wholesale  abandon- 
ment of  conventional  beliefs  and  practices.  Nor  should  we 
expect  that  it  would,  when  we  remember  that  conventional 
morality  expresses,  in  general  at  least,  what  the  experience 
of  mankind  has  found  to  contribute  most  to  the  welfare 
of  human  society.  Moral  enlightenment  does  not  mean, 
therefore,  that  all  moral  judgments  previously  accepted 
should  at  present  be  abandoned,  but  rather  that  they  should 
now  gain  a  new  and  higher  authority — the  authority  of  • 
reason  in  place  of  that  of  custom  and  tradition.  The 
duties  of  current  morality  are  seen  to  derive  their  authority 
from  their  relation  as  means  to  some  end  of  attested  value, 
and  not  to  be  ends  in  themselves,  both  arbitrary  and 


54    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

absolute.  Thus  in  the  case  of  telling  my  friend  a  dis- 
agreeable truth  about  himself,  conventional  morality  would 
exact  a  rigid  and  mechanical  obedience  to  the  rule,  Tell 
the  truth,  with  the  result  that  the  friend  might  become 
estranged  from  me,  while  his  fault  remained  uncorrected. 
Rational  morality,  on  the  other  hand,  is  more  flexible  and 
can  be  adapted  to  the  requirements  of  differing  cases;  it 
would  permit  me  to  study  the  case  of  my  friend  and 
would  pronounce  good  that  action  which  I  concluded  would 
be  for  his  best  welfare  and  the  promotion  of  the  highest 
human  good.  But  while  moral  enlightenment  thus  re- 
quires us  to  establish  our  morality  upon  a  new  foundation, 
it  by  no  means  renders  valueless  the  early  training  in 
approved  moral  practices  or  the  acquisition  of  the  con- 
ventional moral  sentiments.  For,  after  these  beliefs  and 
practices  have  secured  a  new  basis  in  reason,  it  is  still  of 
incalculable  benefit  to  have  them  already  ingrained  in  the 
nervous  system  in  the  form  of  fixed  habits.  It  is  this 
tremendous  boon  that  moral  training  confers  upon  the 
individual,  and  that  makes  this  training  worth  all  the 
efforts  which  parents  and  teachers  can  put  into  it.  What 
if  moral  enlightenment  does  lead  the  individual  to  re- 
nounce one  practice  out  of  ten  learned  in  early  childhood? 
Surely  less  effort  is  required  to  break  this  one  habit  than 
to  form  the  other  nine  entirely  new. 

8.  Importance  of  Conscience  in  Human  Life. — Since 
Conscience  represents  man's  Highest  Good,  either  as  dis- 
covered by  him  through  reflection  or  expressed  for  him 
in  the  customs  of  his  race,  it  is  not  strange  that  it  should 
have  been  given  an  exalted  position  among  human  faculties. 
Conscience  is  only  a  particular  manifestation  of  the  power 
of  human  intelligence,  to  be  sure ; 14  but  it  is  human  in- 

14  In  his  System  of  Ethics,  Eng.  trans.,  pp.  363-68,  Paulsen 
protests  eloquently  and  effectively  against  the  idea  that  the  adop- 
tion of  the  historico-psychological  in  place  of  the  supernatural 
theory  of  conscience  will  destroy  its  authority  and  sanctity. 


KNOWLEDGE  OF  THE  GOOD  55 

telligence  in  the  most  important  of  its  many  fields  of  ex- 
ercise, when  it  deals,  not  with  this  interest  or  that,  but 
with  the  satisfaction  of  the  whole  of  man's  will,  latent  as 
well  as  actual — the  fulfilment  of  all  his  possibilities  as  a 
voluntary  agent.  As  Professor  Royce  says:  "  Your  con- 
science is  simply  that  ideal  of  life  which  constitutes  your 
moral  personality.  In  having  your  conscience  you  become 
aware  of  your  plan  of  being  yourself  and  nobody  else. 
Your  conscience  presents  to  you  this  plan,  however,  in 
so  far  as  the  plan  or  ideal  in  question  is  distinct  from 
the  life  in  which  you  are  trying  to  embody  your  plan. 
Your  life,  as  it  is  lived,  your  experiences,  feelings,  deeds, — 
these  are  the  embodiments  of  your  ideal  plan,  in  so  far 
as  your  ideal  plan  for  your  own  individual  life  as  this  self, 
gets  embodied  at  all."  15  If  conscience  is  not  the  voice  of 
God  in  the  mind  of  man  it  at  least  speaks  for  those  powers 
in  human  nature  which  raise  him  above  the  animals  and 
link  him  to  what  is  highest  in  reality — his  comprehensive 
intelligence,  his  free  will. 

The  insight  which  we  have  gained  into  the  function  of 
conscience  in  human  life  compels  us  now  to  qualify  some- 
what the  statement  formerly  made  that  in  most  human 
beings  conscience  is  determined  in  its  decisions  by  custom 
and  training  and  not  by  any  real  understanding  of  the 
Good.  While  it  is  true  that  the  moral  sentiments  which 
direct  the  conduct  of  the  majority  must  be  referred  to  these 
sources  rather  than  to  their  own  intelligent  understanding 
of  the  issues  involved,  it  is  also  true  that  the  operation 
of  these  sentiments  is  accompanied  by  a  consciousness, 
more  or  less  vague,  that  they  stand  for  the  larger  good 
of  the  self.  Even  when  the  particular  moral  judgments 
of  an  individual  are  wholly  determined  by  custom,  the 
compulsion  which  he  feels  to  bring  his  acts  under  general 
rubrics  for  purposes  of  moral  evalution  is  itself  a  dim 
18  ROYCE:  Philosophy  of  Loyalty,  p.  175. 


56    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

recognition  of  the  existence  of  a  Good  authoritative  over 
all  actions  because  representing  the  satisfaction  of  man's 
larger  will.  Then  there  are  the  suggestions  of  the  Ideal, 
confused  but  never  forgotten,  and  hopes  inarticulate  but 
ever-stirring,  which,  even  in  the  least  intelligent  and  aspir- 
ing of  men,  connect  themselves  with  the  duties  of  con- 
ventional morality  and  cause  them  to  appear  as  means  to 
a  higher  personal  good. 

9.  Remorse. — After  performing  the  action  which  con- 
science pronounces  right,  particularly  if  it  be  in  the  face 
of  strong  opposing  inclination,  a  sense  of  profound  satis- 
faction is  felt.  For  the  wrong  desire,  expressing  a  merely 
temporary  need,  has  in  retrospect  lost  its  appeal,  while 
the  relatively  permanent  good  secured  by  conscience  con- 
tinues to  give  satisfaction.  Contrariwise,  when  conscience 
is  thwarted  for  the  sake  of  present  desire,  a  feeling  of 
great  dissatisfaction  may  arise.  For  the  Good,  as  repre- 
sented by  Conscience,  is  enduring  in  its  appeal,  and  thus 
while  momentary  desire  once  gratified  is  destroyed,  this 
appeal  of  Goodness,  disregarded  and  unrealized,  continues, 
and  awakens  in  the  consciousness  of  the  wrongdoer  an 
overwhelming  sense  of  guilt  and  misery.  This  feeling  of 
sorrow  and  distress,  which  frequently  follows  the  doing 
of  evil,  is  called  remorse.  Darwin,  who  finds  the  beginning 
of  conscience  in  the  phenomena  of  remorse,  explains  the 
origin  of  this  latter  experience  in  biological  terms. 

"  At  the  moment  of  action  man  will  no  doubt  be  apt  to  follow 
the  stronger  impulse;  and  though  this  may  occasionally  prompt 
him  to  the  noblest  deeds,  it  will  more  commonly  lead  him  to 
gratify  his  own  desires  at  the  expense  of  other  men.  But  after 
their  gratification,  when  past  and  weaker  impressions  are  judged 
by  the  ever-enduring  social  instinct,  and  by  his  deep  regard  for 
the  good  opinion  of  his  fellows,  retribution  will  surely  come. 
He  will  then  feel  remorse,  repentance,  regret,  or  shame;  this 
latter  feeling,  however,  relates  almost  exclusively  to  the  judgment 
of  others.  He  will  consequently  resolve  more  or  less  firmly  to 


KNOWLEDGE  OF  THE  GOOD  57 

act  differently  for  the  future;  and  this  is  conscience;  for  con- 
science looks  backward  and  serves  as  a  guide  for  the  future. " 18 

"While  the  conception  of  instinct  as  here  used  by  Darwin 
to  explain  the  beginnings  of  morality  is  clearly  inadequate, 
yet  as  far  as  the  relation  of  the  factors  involved  is  con- 
cerned, his  explanation  of  remorse  is  fundamentally  true. 
Conscience  has  charge  of  man's  larger  social  and  personal 
good,  and  one  who  violates  its  dictates  in  order  to  gratify 
momentary  desire  or  to  further  selfish  interest,  betrays 
himself,  is  a  traitor  to  the  larger  possibilities  of  his  own 
nature  as  a  man.  He  sells  his  birthright  as  a  rational 
being  for  the  pottage  of  present  pleasure.  Because  wrong- 
doing is  thus  a  betrayal  of  the  whole  human  self,  an  evil 
deed,  in  itself  appearing  trivial,  may  awaken  in  the  agent 
a  sense  of  degradation  that  seems  to  affect  his  whole  nature. 
Literature  gives  us  many  examples,  imaginary  but  not  ex- 
aggerated, of  such  soul-rending  remorse  with  its  agony 
over  lost  opportunities  for  good  and  its  torment  by  evil 
that  cannot  be  undone — suffering  so  great  that  the  un- 
fortunate individual  is  driven  to  sacrifice  his  life  in  an 
attempt  at  expiation  or  to  destroy  himself  in  the  depth 
of  his  despair. 

REFERENCES 

THILLY,  Introduction  to  Ethics,  Chaps.  Ill,  IV. 

ALEXANDER,  Moral  Order  and  Progress,  Book  II,  Part  I,  Chap.  III. 

ROYCE,  Philosophy  of  Loyalty,  Chap.  IV. 

MABTINEAU,  Types  of  Ethical  Theory,  Part  II,  Book  I,  Chap.  I. 

LESLIE  STEPHEN,  Science  of  Ethics,  Chap.  VIII. 

MACKENZIE,  Manual  of  Ethics,  Book  II,  Chaps.  V,  VI. 

16DABWIN:  Descent  of  Man,  Chap.  IV. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  APPEAL  OF  THE  GOOD  OR  MORAL  OBLIGATION 

1.  Objects  Appeal  to  the  Will  Through  the  Feelings  They  Arouse. — 
2.  Appeal  of  the  Good  as  Inclination. — 3.  Appeal  of  the  Good 
as  Obligation. — 4.  Conditions  Under  Which  Feeling  of  Moral 
Obligation  Arises. — 5.  Significance  of  the  Feeling  of  Moral 
Obligation. — 6.  Kant's  View  of  Moral  Obligation. — 7.  Goodness 
Not  Always  Different  from  Inclination. — 8.  The  Duties  of 
Morality  Command  Not  as  Categorical  but  as  Teleological  Im- 
peratives.— 9.  The  Summum  Bonum  Alone  has  the  Authority 
of  a  Categorical  Imperative. 

1.  Objects  Appeal  to  the  Will  Through  the  Feelings 
They  Arouse. — Knowledge  that  an  end  is  good  does  not 
insure  its  choice  and  pursuit.  We  may  know  that  an 
action  is  right  and  still  not  perform  it.  To  be  realized 
as  an  end  of  action  an  object  must  make  a  certain  appeal 
to  the  self.  It  must  engage  and  hold  the  attention — i.e.  be 
attractive,  possess  interest.  Now  the  interest  or  attractive- 
ness of  an  object  is  measured  by  the  feelings  which  it 
arouses.  These  feelings  color  or  tone  the  object  when 
thought  of,  and,  as  they  endue  it  with  life  and  influence, 
are  sometimes  called  its  dynamic  or  motive-power.  The 
character  of  these  feelings  seems  to  vary  considerably. 
When  very  hungry,  the  idea  of  food  which  attracts  me,  as 
an  end  to  be  sought,  is  altogether  pleasant.  The  feeling 
aroused  is  one  of  simple,  although  very  intense,  pleasure, 
and  I  should  describe  my  feeling  as  one  of  strong  liking 
or  desire  for  food.  The  idea  of  having  a  tooth  filled,  which 
as  an  end  prompts  me  to  go  to  the  dentist's,  is  not  thus 
simply  pleasant.  Of  course  the  idea  of  having  the  tooth 
repaired  and  thus  saved  from  further  decay  pleases  me, 

68 


THE  APPEAL  OF  THE  GOOD  59 

else  it  would  have  no  power  over  my  attention,  no  attractive 
influence.  Yet  there  are  closely  associated  with  it  other 
ideas  of  the  discomfort  and  pain  of  the  filling  process, 
which  are  very  unpleasant.  These  fears  and  apprehensions 
will  divert  me  from  my  original  intention  unless  by  con- 
tinuous effort  I  hold  my  attention  on  the  course  decided 
upon.  Such  effort  involves  strain,  which  is  unpleasant. 
Hence  the  feeling  aroused  by  the  end  in  question  is  one 
of  mingled  pleasantness  and  unpleasantness,  which  I  de- 
scribe as  a  feeling  of  compulsion,  saying  that  I  do  not 
like  to  go  to  the  dentist's,  but  feel  that  I  must.  Again 
when  an  audience  at  the  close  of  an  address  is  led  to  rise 
and  join  in  singing  the  national  anthem  it  is  impelled  to 
the  deed  by  still  another  emotional  complex  of  which  the 
feelings  of  "  enthusiasm  "  and  "  reverence  "  are  perhaps 
the  chief  components.  Since  such  variation  exists  in  the 
feelings  which  propel  us  to  action  it  is  next  in  order  to 
ask  what  constitutes  the  interest  or  appeal  of  good  con- 
duct. 

2.  Appeal  of  the  Good  as  Inclination. — First  let  us  take 
a  simple  case.  A  man  who  is  thinking  of  how  he  shall 
occupy  several  hours  of  leisure  happens  to  remember  a 
friend  who  is  ill  and  whom  he  has  not  seen  for  several 
days.  "  It  is  only  decent  that  I  should  go  to  see  him  and 
cheer  him  up  a  bit  on  this  holiday,"  he  says  to  himself. 
No  reason  why  he  should  not  go  occurs  to  his  mind,  nor 
does  any  contrary  impulse  arise.  He  thereupon  takes  hat 
and  coat  and  sets  out  for  the  friend 's  house  with  a  thorough- 
going sense  of  spontaneity,  of  "  doing  just  what  he  likes." 
Evidently,  then,  conduct  which  conscience  pronounces  good 
sometimes  arouses  simple  feelings  of  pleasure  and  its  appeal 
is  the  appeal  of  inclination. 

Besides  action  of  this  kind  which  proceeds  from  a  moral 
judgment,  although  of  an  abbreviated  type,  are  others  which 
result  from  unreflecting  impulse  and  seem  to  involve  no 


60    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

activity  of  conscience  whatever.  I  might  act  thus  in  pur- 
chasing a  paper  or  magazine,  the  illustrated  cover  of  which 
catches  my  eye  when  passing  a  shop  window.  Many  of 
these  acts  of  thoughtless  inclination  must  be  considered 
as  in  their  own  slight  way  good.  Often  a  moral  judgment 
is  implied  in  a  recognition,  dim  but  present  in  the  margin 
of  consciousness,  that  the  conduct  in  question  does  not 
fall  within  any  of  the  prohibited  classes  of  actions.  The 
agent  if  challenged  would  immediately  state  this  fact  and 
then  perhaps  go  on  to  show  how  the  action  contributed 
to  some  approved  end.  Again,  an  inclination  is  followed 
without  thought  because  it  has  been  so  often  followed  in 
the  past — its  immunity  from  criticism  or  disapproval  dur- 
ing that  time  constituting  a  kind  of  moral  validation. 
Habit  of  course  enters  as  an  important  factor  here.  It 
causes  actions,  at  first  performed  only  after  careful  thought 
f  and  long  deliberation,  to  be  done  with  the  promptness  and 
simplicity  of  mere  impulse.  It  even  makes  conduct,  which 
at  first  was  exceedingly  difficult  and  opposed  by  urgent 
desire,  as  easy  and  effective  as  the  expression  of  natural 
inclination. 

3.  Appeal  of  the  Good  as  Obligation. — But  such  a  case 
as  the  first  mentioned,  where  conscience  and  inclination 
are  in  perfect  agreement,  impresses  one  as  the  exception 
rather  than  the  rule.  More  frequently  the  appeal  of  good- 
ness is  opposed  as  obligation  to  inclination,  as  what  one 
ought,  in  contrast  to  what  one  inclines,  to  do.  To  keep  our 
thought  in  close  touch  with  the  facts  of  moral  experience, 
let  us  take  another  commonplace  illustration.  Suppose  that 
a  young  man  employed  as  a  clerk  is  left  for  several  weeks 
in  charge  of  his  employer's  business  while  the  latter  is 
away  from  home.  He  promises  his  employer  that  he  will 
be  faithful  in  his  attendance  at  the  office  during  the  stated 
hours.  But  on  a  warm  summer's  afternoon,  when  there 
is  no  prospect  of  a  client's  appearing,  he  is  urged  by  friends 


61 

to  accompany  them  to  see  a  ball  game  or  boat  race.  Being 
very  fond  of  sport  he  is  exceedingly  anxious  to  go,  but 
is  restrained  by  the  thought  that  such  action,  in  violating 
a  promise  made  to  his  employer,  would  be  wrong.  There 
is  no  doubt  in  this  instance,  which  certainly  exemplifies 
a  large  class,  that  inclination  and  conscience  are  in  sharp 
conflict.  He  inclines  "  with  all  his  heart  "  to  join  in  the 
afternoon's  sport,  yet  is  deterred  by  a  feeling  still  stronger 
than  his  inclination  which  enforces  the  conduct  judged 
right  by  conscience.  This  is  the  feeling  of  obligation  or 
"  oughtness,"  which  stands  contrasted  to  that  of  inclina- 
tion as  a  feeling  of  constraint,  of  coercion.  The  individual 
who  feels  moral  obligation  feels  constrained  to  certain  acts 
by  a  power  or  authority  external  to  himself.  The  Good 
in  this  guise  of  authority  over  the  inclinations  of  the  in- 
dividual is  known  as  the  Moral  Law,  a  rule  imposed  upon 
the  actions  of  all  individuals.  But  while  obligation  differs 
thus  widely  from  inclination  on  the  one  hand,  it  differs 
as  widely  from  real  compulsion  on  the  other.  For  since 
the  individual  is  always  conscious  of  freedom  to  choose 
or  not  to  choose  the  right,  he  recognizes  that  in  another 
sense  this  is  not  an  external  authority,  but  one  created  by 
himself.  He  describes  his  experience  after  this  manner, 
"  I  wanted  to  do  thus,  but  my  duty  required  me,  my  con- 
science compelled  me,  to  do  otherwise. ' ' 

As  far  as  its  essential  characteristics  are  concerned,  the 
feeling  of  moral  obligation  is  the  same  whether  the  con- 
duct to  which  it  attaches  is  judged  good  on  rational  or  on 
emotional  grounds.  In  conventional  morality  this  feeling 
is  aroused  by  those  forms  of  conduct  which  the  individual 
has  learned  through  his  training  and  experience  to  approve, 
—to  the  familiar  "  duties  of  life  "  in  fact.  The  tendency 
to  feel  the  deliverances  of  conscience  as  the  exactions  of 
a  foreign  power  is  increased  by  their  association  in  cus- 
tomary morality  with  the  commands  of  authority — divine, 


62    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

civil,  parental.  The  moral  law  is  thought  to  have  its  source 
in  the  highest  of  all  authorities,  the  will  of  God.  Yet 
even  here,  a  consciousness  of  freedom  to  obey  or  disobey, 
leads  men  to  distinguish  the  requirements  made  by  con- 
science from  the  actual  compulsion  exercised  by  the  forces 
of  nature  or  the  civil  authorities.  In  rational  morality  the 
feeling  of  obligation  attaches  primarily  to  the  idea  of  the 
Good  itself,  and  secondarily  to  the  actions  believed  to  be 
means  to  its  attainment.  It  would  perhaps  appear  that 
Goodness  must  lose  somewhat  in  authority  through  the  en- 
lightenment of  conscience — being  dissociated  from  thoughts 
of  the  Divine  Omnipotence,  and  the  Day  of  Judgment  with 
its  rewards  and  penalties,  and  associated  only  with  the 
satisfaction  of  the  human  will.  But  while  unenlightened 
morality  may,  through  its  appeal  to  the  instinct  of  self- 
preservation,  arouse  the  intenser  emotions  of  fear  and 
dread,  rational  morality,  through  its  appeal  to  higher  in- 
terests and  capacities,  awakens  feelings  of  inspiration  and 
enthusiasm  more  permanent  and  reliable  as  the  motive- 
power  of  conduct.  On  this  point  Mackenzie  says,  with 
true  ethical  insight:  "  The  more  we  advance  in  the  de- 
velopment of  the  moral  life,  the  less  possible  does  it  become 
to  point  to  any  single  rule  that  seems  to  carry  its  own 
authority  with  it,  to  any  law  that  stands  above  us  and  says 
categorically,  You  must  do  this.  What  we  find  is,  more 
and  more,  only  the  general  principle  that  says,  You  ought 
to  do  what  you  find  to  be  best.  And  what  is  best  njay 
vary  very  much  in  its  external  form,  and  even  in  its  inner 
nature,  with  changing  conditions.  But  this  does  not  in 
any  way  destroy  the  absoluteness  of  the  moral  standard. 
It  remains  as  true  as  ever  that  we  are  bound  to  choose 
the  right  '  in  the  scorn  of  consequence,'  though  it  may 
be  more  difficult  for  us  to  say  at  any  given  point  what 
precisely  is  right.  The  authority,  indeed,  must  come  home 
to  us  with  a  far  more  absolute  power,  when  we  recognize 


THE  APPEAL  OF  THE  GOOD  63 

that  it  is  our  own  law,  than  when  we  regard  it  as  an 
alien  force. ' ' 1 

4.  Conditions  Under  Which  the  Feeling  of  Moral 
Obligation  Arises. — It  is  not  difficult  to  explain  why  so 
remarkable  a  feeling  as  that  of  moral  obligation,  which 
is  at  once  a  feeling  of  coercion  by  an  external  authority 
and  of  attraction  by  a  dosired  end,  should  arise  in  such 
cases  as  we  are  now  discussing.  As  far  as  present  action 
is  concerned,  the  agent  is  faced  by  two  alternatives,  one 
pleasant  and  attractive,  the  other  unpleasant  and  hence 
unattractive.  The  youth  in  our  illustration  is  confronted 
by  the  alternative  possibilities  of  an  afternoon  of  sport 
and  pleasure  in  the  open-air  or  one  of  monotony  and  dis- 
comfort in  a  hot  and  dusty  office.  Now  had  the  two  pos- 
sible courses  of  action  no  further  connections  or  conse- 
quences in  the  conduct  of  the  individual,  he  must  perforce 
choose  that  which  in  itself  is  pleasanter  and  more  desirable. 
Our  clerk  would  not  hesitate  a  moment  to  abandon  the 
routine  of  his  employer's  office  for  the  freedom  of  the 
water  and  the  field.  Yet  he  does  hesitate,  and  finally 
resolves  to  remain  at  his  post.  It  is  a  fact  of  moral  ex- 
perience familiar  to  us  all  that  we  do  often  select  the 
unpleasant  alternative,  the  hard  and  unattractive  course — 
that  we  do  select  what  we  do  not  like  or  desire.  Now 
this  undoubted  fact  that  we  choose  the  less  pleasant  course 
shows — paradoxical  as  it  may  sound — that  it  is  not  the  less 
but  the  more  pleasant  after  all.  Since  it  does  not  possess 
interest  and  attraction  in  its  own  right,  it  must  derive 
them  from  other  sources.  This  is  precisely  what  it  does. 
While  the  idea  of  being  shut  up  within  the  four  walls 
of  an  office  during  a  bright  summer's  afternoon  is  not 
attractive,  that  of  fulfilling  the  pledge  to  the  employer,  or 
of  rising  in  business  or  profession  is  so,  and  these  future 
ends,  these  more  remote  interests,  transmit  some  of  their 

1  MACKENZIE:   Manual  of  Ethics,  Bk.  II,  Chap.  VT,  §8. 


64    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

attractiveness  to  the  action  which  is  seen  to  be  the  present 
means  to  their  attainment,  more  than  counter-balancing  its 
own  unpleasantness.  Thus  constantly  does  the  pleasure 
which  attaches  to  the  thought  of  performing  the  recognized 
duties  of  conventional  morality,  or  attaining  the  Good  dis- 
covered by  moral  reflection,  communicate  itself  to  actions 
in  themselves  unpleasant  and  make  possible  their  per- 
formance "  contrary  to  inclination."  But  in  such  cases 
the  agent  identifies  himself  with  the  object  of  present  desire 
and  treats  these  larger  ideal  considerations  enforced  by 
conscience  as  external  influences,  the  exactions,  in  fact,  of 
a  foreign  authority  which  he  must  obey.  When,  therefore, 
Goodness  requires  the  pursuit  of  some  larger  end  extending 
tojthe  future  or  including  the  welfare  of  others,  and  this 
contrary  to  present  inclination  or  selfish  interest,  its  appeal 
is  that  of  obligation. 

Our  view  must  encompass  still  another  case  in  which 
moral  obligation  is  felt  before  we  can  hope  to  reach  any 
generalization  concerning  its  essential  significance  which 
will  apply  universally.  Again  let  us  avail  ourselves  of 
the  help  of  an  illustration.  A  man  is  giving  his  afternoons 
to  the  systematic  study  of  a  certain  subject  with  the  in- 
tention of  writing  a  book  about  it  eventually.  He  hears 
of  a  series  of  concerts  to  be  given  two  afternoons  a  week 
in  his  town.  He  has  no  particular  liking  for  music  and 
is  disinclined  to  spare  two  afternoons  a  week  from  his 
study.  Yet  he  feels  that  he  ought  to  cultivate  his  taste  for 
music  and  to  develop  a  liking  for  it  if  possible.  Hence, 
led  by  a  sense  of  duty,  and  with  a  consciousness  of  con- 
trary desire,  he  purchases  a  ticket  and  attends  the  concerts. 
Now  in  this  case — and  there  are  many  resembling  it — both 
of  the  conflicting  ends  are  in  the  future ;  if  there  is  any 
difference  the  end  of  inclination  (writing  the  book)  is  more 
remote  than  the  end  of  obligation  (cultivating  the  musical 
taste).  How  does  it  happen,  then,  that  the  latter  appals 


THE  APPEAL  OF  THE  GOOD  65 

as  the  command  of  an  external  power,  the  former  as  the 
fulfilment  of  the  agent's  own  nature?  The  answer  to  this 
question  reveals  the  fact  that  in  last  analysis  the  difference 
between  obligation  and  inclination  hinges,  not  upon  the 
distinction  of  future  from  present,  or  of  social  from  selfish, 
ends,  but  in  a  difference  in  the  relation  of  the  end  to  the 
human  will  itself.  In  the  example  used,  the  one  end — 
of  writing  the  book — although  its  attainment  might  be 
postponed  to  the  far  future,  was  already  adopted,  had  been 
for  a  time  pursued,  and  was  thus  in  a  measure  identified 
with  the  will  of  the  individual.  The  other  end,  on  the 
contrary,  was  entirely  new  and  untried.  It  represented 
new  territory  to  him,  a  field  unexplored.  Hence  its  appeal, 
in  contrast  to  that  of  the  end  already  tried  and  so  far 
found  satisfactory,  is  that  of  an  external  authority  which 
commands  the  agent  "  against  his  will."  And  so  in  a 
sense  it  does ;  for  his  will,  finding  satisfaction  in  the  pursuit 
of  an  object  already  chosen,  is  disinclined  at  first  to  re- 
linquish it  in  order  to  seek  another  object  whose  nature 
is  not  well  known  and  whose  capacity  to  yield  satisfaction 
is  untried. 

5.  Significance  of  the  Feeling  of  Moral  Obligation. — 
The  feeling  of  obligation  proves,  therefore,  to  be  a  necessary 
accompaniment  of  all  activity  of  volition.  The  human  will, 
in  order  to  gain  the  satisfaction  it  seeks,  must  go  forward  , 
from  achievement  to  achievement.  It  cannot  afford  to  re- 
main content  with  any  end  already  attained,  but  must  ever 
press  on  to  the  attainment  of  larger  and  more  adequate 
ends,  until  its  own  possibilities  for  achievement  and  satis- 
faction are  exhausted.  When  the  pursuit  of  such  new  and 
untried  ends  requires  the  sacrifice  of  objects  able  to  yield 
present  satisfaction,  the  feeling  of  obligation  arises.  In 
its  essence  this  feeling  is  unique,  unanalyzable,  irreducible 
— an  original  and  necessary  factor  in  the  process  of  voli- 
tion. It  is  the  call  which  the  human  will  makes  upon  itself 


66    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

to  venture  into  new  and  unknown  fields,  at  the  expense  of 
satisfactions  already  achieved.  It  is  the  imperious  com- 
mand which  intelligent  volition  lays  upon  its  own  nature 
to  seek  a  larger  and  more  comprehensive  good.  And  like 
the  appeal  of  the  trackless  ocean  to  the  adventurous  ex- 
plorer, this  feeling  contains  something  of  fascination  in 
the  alluring  prospects  of  achievement  held  forth,  something 
of  fear  in  the  hardships  and  perils  suggested,  and  some- 
thing of  pain  in  the  thought  of  the  comfortable  home  left 
behind. 

6.  Kant's  View  of  Moral  Obligation. — Among  moral- 
ists Immanuel  Kant  has  given  the  most  illuminating  in- 
terpretation of  the  facts  of  moral  obligation.  We  are  now 
in  a  position  to  understand  his  famous  theory — both  to 
appreciate  the  profundity  of  his  thought  and  to  detect 
some  of  the  errors  which  it  contains. 

In  Kant's  view  the  Good  always  presents  itself  in  the 
form  of  Duty.  Duty  is  the  obligation  to  act  from  reverence 
to  law.2  That  is,  good  action  is  action  whose  end  is  obedi- 
ence to  the  Moral  Law.  But  the  Moral  Law  as  an  end 
appeals  to  the  human  will  through  the  feeling  of  reverence 
which  it  awakens.  In  good  conduct,  therefore,  the  will  is 
determined  objectively  by  the  Moral  Law  itself  and  sub- 
jectively by  pure  reverence  for  the  law  as  a  principle  of 
action.  Now  since  conduct  is  good  only  when  prompted 
by  pure  reverence  for  the  Moral  Law  it  follows  that  action 
done  from  natural  inclination  can  have  no  moral  value. 
This  Kant  explicitly  maintains.  Even  in  the  case  of  an 
action  which  is  in  accordance  with  duty — such  as  for  in- 
stance safeguarding  one's  life — if  it  is  not  done  for  the 
sake  of  duty,  but  from  natural  inclination,  it  has  no  moral 
worth  whatever.  Duty  is  a  principle  which  is  not  de- 
pendent upon  natural  inclination,  but  overmasters  it,  or 

1  The  abstract  of  Kant's  thought  given  in  this  paragraph  is  based 
upon  the  Metaphysic  of  Morality,  Sec.  1.  Translation  by  Wataon. 


THE  APPEAL  OF  THE  GOOD  67 

at  least  allows  it  to  have  no  influence  whatever  in  de- 
termining the  course  of  action. 

The  sense  of  obligation  thus  signifies  the  constraint  ex- 
ercised by  the  Moral  Law  over  the  human  will  in  opposition 
to,  or  regardless  of,  inclination.3  This  constraint  appears 
to  thought  as  a  command,  a  command  which,  when  ex- 
pressed in  words,  takes  the  form  of  an  imperative*  Hence 
it  follows  that  the  duties  of  morality  come  to  us  as  im- 
peratives. "  Now  all  imperatives  command  either  hypo- 
thetically  or  categorically.  A  hypothetical  imperative  states 
that  a  thing  must  be  done  if  something  else  which  is  willed 
or  at  least  might  be  willed,  is  to  be  attained.  The  cate- 
gorical imperative  declares  that  an  act  is  in  itself  or 
objectively  necessary,  without  any  reference  to  another 
end."5  All  men  by  a  natural  necessity  seek  happiness. 
Certain  actions  are  generally  recognized  by  human  in- 
telligence to  be  productive  of  happiness.  To  these  actions, 
then,  when  chosen  as  a  means  to  happiness,  a  hypothetical 
imperative  attaches.  They  are  valued  for  the  sake  of 
the  happiness  they  are  expected  to  bring.  But  "  there  is 
an  imperative  which  directly  commands  an  action,  with- 
out presupposing  as  its  condition  that  some  other  end 
is  to  be  attained  by  means  of  that  action.  It  has  to  do, 
not  with  the  matter  of  an  action  and  the  result  expected 
to  follow  from  it,  but  simply  with  the  form  and  principle 
from  which  the  action  itself  proceeds.  The  action  is  essen- 
tially good  if  the  motive  of  the  agent  is  good,  let  the  con- 
sequences be  what  they  may.  This  imperative  may  be 
called  the  imperative  of  morality."9  Here  we  have  before 
us  Kant's  celebrated  doctrine  of  duty  as  the  Categorical 

*  Critique  of  Practical  Reason,  Bk.  I,  Chap.  Ill   (Abbott's  trans., 
p.  165). 

*  This  account  of  Kant'a  doctrine  of  the  Categorical  Imperative  is 
drawn  from  the  Metaphysic  of  Morality,  Sec.  2. 

*  Ibid. 
•Ibid. 


68    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

Imperative.  This  imperative,  which  bids  us  obey  without 
any  regard  for  consequences,  attaches  to  the  Moral  Law. 
Every  duty  as  a  categorical  imperative  is  an  end  sufficient 
in  itself  and  never  a  means  to  anything  else. 

7.  Goodness  Not  Always  Different  from  Inclination. — 
Kant  is  certainly  in  error  in  believing  that  acts  done  from 
inclination  never  possess  moral  value.  It  is  indeed  little 
less  than  absurd  to  hold  that  the  conduct  of  a  person  who, 
gladly  and  from  a  sympathetic  inclination,  helps  another 
in  distress,  possesses  no  moral  value,  while  the  conduct 
of  one  who  renders  the  same  assistance  reluctantly  and 
from  a  hard  sense  of  duty  deserves  to  be  called  good.  To 
be  sure  there  are  acts  done  from  thoughtless  impulse  which, 
although  productive  of  good,  possess  a  minimum  of  moral 
value,  as  when  a  man  from  kindly  impulse  tosses  a  coin 
to  a  beggar  who  importunes  him,  without  a  thought  as  to 
whether  the  recipient  is  deserving  or  undeserving,  or 
whether  the  money  will  go  for  food  or  intoxicant.  But,  on 
the  other  hand,  there  are  actions  which,  once  performed 
with  a  feeling  of  obligation  and  contrary  to  inclination, 
have  through  long  habit  become  a  ' '  second  nature, ' '  and  are 
now  done  gladly  and  from  desire,  as  in  the  case  of  a  public- 
spirited  citizen  who  in  earlier  years  becomes  so  used  to 
subordinating  private  interest  to  public  concern  that  in 
later  life  he  turns  from  the  pursuit  of  his  own  ambition 
to  the  service  of  his  country  gladly,  and  with  no  sense 
of  hardship.  Such  conduct,  while  it  involves  no  conflict 
with  desire  and  hence  is  accompanied  by  no  feeling  of 
obligation,  is  superior  in  moral  value  to  that  which  is 
prompted  by  the  constraint  of  duty,  because  it  represents 
a  higher  level  of  attainment.  The  saint,  from  the  stand- 
point of  morality,  is  the  person  who  having,  through  long 
years  of  painful  self-denial  and  heroic  struggle,  subdued 
the  flesh  and  overcome  the  world,  finds  the  pursuit  of  good- 
ness his  only  desire. 


THE  APPEAL  OF  THE  GOOD  69 

Nevertheless,  the  facts  of  the  moral  life  justify  in  a 
large  measure  the  view  of  Kant.  Obligation,  not  inclina- 
tion, is  the  characteristic  form  in  which  the  Good  appeals 
to  the  human  will.  Moral  obligation  is  temporary  in  the 
sense  just  explained  that  the  regular  performance  of  duty 
creates  a  new  disposition  which  in  time  makes  the  practice 
easy  and  natural.  But  when  this  new  interest  is  thus  in- 
corporated in  the  character  of  the  agent,  still  further  ends 
arise  which  forbid  him  to  remain  satisfied  with  what  he  has 
already  achieved.  Hence  again  the  constraint  of  duty  and 
the  suppression  of  inclination.  As  long  as  possibilities  of 
attainment  open  before  man's  will  which  require  the  sac- 
rifice of  present  satisfaction,  the  pressure  of  obligation  will 
be  felt  by  the  human  individual.  And  such  possibilities 
will  be  exhausted  only  when  the  Good  itself  is  attained 
and  the  goal  of  moral  development  reached. 

8.  The  Duties  of  Morality  Command  Not  as  Categor- 
ical but  as  Teleological  Imperatives. — It  is  also  a  mistake 
to  maintain  that  duty  as  we  usually  understand  it  has  the 
authority  of  a  categorical  imperative.  The  recognized 
duties  of  morality,  as  important  as  they  are,  are  not  ends 
in  themselves.  If  they  were,  why  then,  to  be  sure,  we 
should  tell  the  truth  "  if  the  heavens  fall  "  or  (what  is 
more  likely)  we  needlessly  wound  the  feelings  of  our  ac- 
quaintances and  create  continual  irritation  and  discord ;  we 
should  be  honest  even  if  the  food  and  clothing  which  we 
will  not  take  without  the  owner's  permission  would  restore 
self  and  relieve  suffering  comrades;  we  should  be  brave 
even  if  in  entering  the  burning  building  injuries  were  to  be 
received  that  cause  suffering  and  expense  to  self  and  family 
far  outweighing  the  value  of  the  articles  we  were  able  to 
save.  But  in  truth  these  duties  possess  value  only  as  means 
to  higher  ends,  to  human  happiness  and  well-being — ulti- 
mately to  the  full  satisfaction  of  the  human  will.  They 
have  no  authority  in  their  own  right,  but  derive  what  they 


70    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

possess  from  the  summum  bonum,  the  supreme  and  only 
authority  in  the  field  of  conduct.  Only  in  conventional 
morality  does  obedience  to  these  approved  modes  of  action 
appear  as  an  end  in  itself;  reflection  discovers  it  to  be 
instrumental  to  the  attainment  of  further  ends.  The  im- 
perative of  duty  is  therefore  not  a  categorical,  but  a  teleo- 
logical,  imperative. 

9.  The  Summum  Bonum  Alone  Has  the  Authority  of 
a  Categorical  Imperative. — "When  we  turn  to  the  summum 
bonum  itself,  to  the  realization  of  which  the  duties  of  con- 
ventional morality  are  but  instruments,  we  find  that  which 
in  truth  is  an  end  in  itself  and  a  means  to  nothing  else. 
The  value  of  the  summum  bonum  does  not  depend  upon 
its  ability  to  lead  us  to  some  further  end,  but  resides  in  its 
direct  appeal  to  the  human  will  itself — its  own  compelling 
attraction.  The  summum  bonum,  therefore,  and  that  alone, 
possesses  absolute  authority  over  human  conduct.  And 
since  the  summum  bonum  must  always  be  construed  in 
terms  of  the  conduct  required  to  realize  it,  the  absolute 
authority  denied  to  the  several  duties  in  their  independence 
is  extended  to  them  so  far  as  they  prove  necessary  to  the 
attainment  of  the  Good.  In  this  way,  the  whole  of  the 
moral  life  is  invested  with  the  dignity  and  sublimity  which 
aroused  such  noble  enthusiasm  in  Kant. 

"Duty!  Thou  sublime  and  mighty  name  that  dost  embrace 
nothing  charming  or  insinuating,  but  requirest  submission,  and 
yet  seekest  not  to  move  the  will  by  threatening  aught  that  would 
arouse  natural  aversion  or  terror,  but  merely  boldest  forth  a 
law  which  of  itself  finds  entrance  into  the  mind,  and  yet  gains 
reluctant  reverence  (though  not  always  obedience),  a  law  before 
which  all  inclinations  are  dumb,  even  though  they  secretly  counter- 
work it;  what  origin  is  there  worthy  of  thee,  and  where  is  to  be 
found  the  root  of  thy  noble  descent  which  proudly  rejects  all 
kindred  with  the  inclinations;  a  root  to  be  derived  from  which 


THE  APPEAL  OF  THE  GOOD  71 

is  the  indispensable  condition  of  the  only  worth  which  men  can 
give  themselves."  7 

The  Good  is  indeed  worthy  of  all  the  reverence  which 
Kant  claimed  for  it — as  an  ideal  it  has  drawn  men  upward 
with  promise  of  a  larger  life  and  a  deeper  satisfaction,  as 
an  authority  it  has  exacted  obedience  and  sacrifice,  as 
possessed  in  part  it  has  yielded  the  most  perfect  happiness 
which  man  has  experienced. 

REFERENCES 

KANT,  Metaphysics  of  Morality  (Abbott's  trans.). 
PAULSEN,  System  of  Ethics,  Book  II,  Chap.  V. 
MACKENZIE,  Manual  of  Ethics,  Book  II,  Chap.  III. 
SPENCEB,  Data  of  Ethics,  Chap.  VII. 
THILLY,  Introduction  to  Ethics,  Chap.  V. 
MUIBHEAD,  Elements  of  Ethics,  Book  II,  Chap.  II. 
GBEEN,  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  Book  III,  Chap.  II. 
MILL,  Utilitarianism,  Chap.  III. 

TKANT:  Critique  of  Practical  Reason,  Bk.  I,  Chap.  Ill  (Abbott's 
trans.,  p.  180). 


CHAPTER  VI 
THE  MOTIVE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

1.  The  Appeal  of  the  Bummum  Bonum  as  the  Motive  of  Good  Con- 
duct.— 2.  Possible  Discrepancy  Between  the  Intention  and  the 
Consequences  of  Conduct. — 3.  Good  Intentions  When  Accom- 
panied by  Adequate  Knowledge  Are  Usually  Productive  of 
Good  Consequences. — 4.  Good  Consequences  in  Most  Cases  In- 
dicate Corresponding  Degree  of  Goodness  in  Intention. — 5.  But 
Good  Motive  Does  Not  Absolutely  Insure  Good  Consequences 
Because  of  Inability  of  Reason  to  Foresee  Future  Developments. 

1.  The  Appeal  of  the  Summum  Bonum  as  the  Motive 
of  Good  Conduct. — Motive,  psychologically  speaking,  is 
the  conscious  condition  of  action.  The  motive  of  voluntary 
action — with  which  alone  Ethics  is  directly  concerned — is 
the  desire  of  an  object  as  end.  We  may  now  go  a  step 
further  and  return  answer  to  the  question:  What  is  the 
motive  of  good  conduct?  The  motive  of  good  conduct  is 
the  idea  of  the  Highest  Good  in  its  appeal  to  the  will  of 
an  intelligent  being.  In  this  motive  we  have  distinguished 
and  considered  separately  two  aspects,  an  intellectual  and 
an  emotional.  On  the  one  hand  there  is  the  conception  of 
the  object  to  be  sought,  the  inducement  of  action;  on  the 
other  are  the  feelings  of  interest  or  obligation  aroused  by 
thought  of  this  object,  the  incentive  to  act.  Both  of  these 
factors  are  necessary  as  constituents  of  the  motive ;  only 
through  their  cooperation  is  it  able  to  discharge  its  office 
in  the  determination  of  conduct.  The  motive  of  good  con- 
duct is  then  composed  of  thought  and  feeling  joined  in  an 
effective  unity — it  is  the  idea  of  the  Good  become  dynamic, 
converted  into  a  living  force  for  the  creating  of  conduct, 
the  constructing  of  character. 

72 


THE  MOTIVE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT  73 

The  statement  that  all  good  conduct  has  for  its  motive 
the  attainment  of  the  summum  bonum  does  not  imply  that 
every  act  which  is  truly  good,  results  from  conscious  thought 
of,  and  has  explicit  reference  to,  the  summum  bonum.  This 
need  only  from  time  to  time  be  so  attentively  studied  and 
clearly  understood  by  the  agent  that  he  is  constantly  aware 
of  the  general  principles  which  its  progressive  attainment 
imposes  on  his  daily  conduct,  and  that  its  appeal  to  him 
shall  be  so  strong  that  a  feeling  of  compelling  obligation 
is  communicated  to  these  principles  of  conduct.  When 
this  is  the  case  and  such  principles  determine  human  con- 
duct, either  operating  consciously  as  motives,  or  having 
done  so  in  the  past  and  now  governing  through  habit, 
the  conception  of  the  summum  bonum  is  in  verity  discharg- 
ing its  proper  function  as  the  motive  of  good  conduct. 

2.  Possible  Discrepancy  Between  Intention  and  Con- 
sequences of  Conduct. — Thus  far  we  have  assumed  that 
an  action  which  aims  at  the  Highest  Good  will,  within  the 
limits  of  its  own  field,  result  in  its  attainment.  No  account 
has  been  taken  of  a  possible  discrepancy  between  intention 
and  performance,  motive  and  consequences.  The  possibil- 
ity of  such  disagreement  has  impressed  many  writers  on 
Ethics  as  so  real  and  important  that  it  has  affected  their 
whole  conception  of  goodness.  They  have  felt  obliged  to 
choose  either  intention  or  consequences,  the  one  to  the 
exclusion  of  the  other,  as  determining  the  moral  value  of  an 
act.  Either  it  is  only  the  intention  that  counts  in  morality 
and  the  consequences  do  not  matter,  or  it  is  the  actual 
consequences  which  make  an  act  good  or  bad,  without 
regard  for  the  motive  of  the  agent.  Kant  is  the  leading 
representative  of  the  former  extreme.  He  held  that ' '  Noth- 
ing in  the  whole  world,  or  even  outside  of  the  world,  can 
possibly  be  regarded  as  good  without  limitation  except  a 
good  will.  ...  A  man's  will  is  good,  not  because  the 
consequences  which  flow  from  it  are  good,  nor  because  it  is 


74    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

capable  of  attaining  the  end  which  it  seeks,  but  it  is  good  in 
itself,  or  because  it  wills  the  good."  x  J.  S.  Mill  and  others 
of  the  Utilitarian  school  take  the  opposite  view,  believing 
that  the  consequences  of  an  act,  in  increasing  or  diminish- 
ing the  sum  total  of  human  happiness,  make  it  right  or 
wrong.2  Thus  Mill  says :  ' '  Utilitarian  moralists  have  gone 
beyond  almost  all  others  in  affirming  that  the  motive  has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  morality  of  an  action,  though  much 
with  the  worth  of  the  agent.  He  who  saves  a  fellow- 
creature  from  drowning  does  what  is  morally  right,  whether 
his  motive  be  duty  or  the  hope  of  being  paid  for  his 
trouble :  he  who  betrays  the  friend  that  trusts  him  is  guilty 
of  a  crime,  even  if  his  object  be  to  serve  another  friend 
to  whom  he  is  under  greater  obligations. ' ' 3 

Everyday  human  experience  gives  ample  warrant,  one 
may  think,  for  thus  contrasting  the  intention  with  the 
consequences  of  action.  It  is  proverbial  that  good  inten- 
tions often  go  with  poor  performance.  Persons  who  mean 
well,  but  do  ill  are  easily  found  in  every  community.  We 
are  all  acquainted  with  men  and  women  who,  although 
working  with  best  intention  for  others'  welfare,  neverthe- 
less do  harm  and  mischief  among  them  through  ignorance 
of  their  needs,  their  abilities,  and  the  conditions  under 
which  they  live.  Such  well-intentioned  altruists  are  fre- 
quently condemned  as  meddlesome  busy-bodies.  Con- 
versely human  life  and  history  can  show  us  many  cases 
of  good  consequences  issuing  from  intentions  either  bad 
or  indifferent.  Excellent  laws — laws  that  do  much  to  ad- 
vance human  welfare — are  sometimes  enacted  through  the 
influence  of  political  leaders  who  seek  only  party  success 

*KANT:  Metaphysic  of  Morality,  Sec.  1. 

*MlLL:    Utilitarianism,  Chap.  II. 

*  The  distinction  made  by  Mill  and  other  Utilitarians  between 
intention  and  motive  is  ignored  here  as  tending  to  produce  needless 
perplexity  in  the  mind  of  the  student.  Intention  is  here  con- 
trasted, according  to  popular  usage,  with  actual  results, — conse- 
quences. 


THE  MOTIVE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT  75 

and  personal  preferment.  Many  a  war  undertaken  from 
love  of  conquest  and  plunder  has  in  its  outcome  increased 
human  liberty  and  happiness. 

3.  Good  Intentions  When  Accompanied  by  Adequate 
Knowledge  Are  Usually  Productive  of  Good  Conse- 
quences.— Does  the  logic  of  our  view  compel  us  to  hold 
that  any  act  whose  motive  is  the  attainment  of  the  Highest 
Good  is  itself  good,  no  matter  what  its  consequences  may 
be?  Before  giving  a  final  answer  to  this  question  let  us 
consider  whether  the  possibility  of  a  real  discrepancy  be- 
tween the  intention  and  the  outcome  of  action  is  as  great 
as  it  has  been  made  out  to  be — whether  it  is  possible  for 
the  inner  and  outer  aspects  of  conduct  to  enter  into  such 
sharp  conflict.4  In  the  first  place,  good^jintentions  which 
result  in  evil  do  so  usually  because  the  agent  is  ignorant 
of  the  conditions  in  which  he  acts,  of  the  true  character 
of  the  situation.  The  ultimate  end  conceived,  the  final 
object  aimed  at,  is  good,  but  there  is  almost  complete  igno- 
rance of  the  means  which  must  be  employed  in  its  attain- 
ment. In  such  circumstances  can  the  intention  be  said 
to  be  altogether  good?  Scarcely.  Conduct  is  good  in  in- 
tention when  it  intends  the  attainment  of  the  summum  ' 
bonum.  But  the  summum  bonum  is  an  object  of  action,  to 
be  realized  in  conduct.  Hence,  if  the  agent  is  truly  to 
understand  the  Highest  Good,  he  must  see  it  in  its  bearing 
upon  his  own  situation,  as  the  outcome  of  his  own  conduct, 
the  expression  of  his  own  will.  In  other  words,  for  the 
Good  fully  to  determine  an  action  as  motive,  it  must  be 
known,  notjibstractly  as  the  faraway  goal  of  endeavor,  but 
concretely  in  terms  of  the  conduct  required  to  attain  it. 
To  make  an  intention  good,  then,  it  does  not  suffice  that 
it  have  goodness  for  its  final  end,  that  it  aim  at  human 

4  For  further  light  upon  the  subjects  discussed  in  the  remainder 
of  this  chapter,  cf.  Professor  Dewey's  able  discussion  (DEWEY  Ain> 
TUFTS:  Ethics,  pp.  246-54). 


76    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

happiness  or  social  welfare, — it  must  also  include  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  means  necessary  for  its  realization.  On  the 
other  hand,  when  these  conditions  are  fulfilled,  and  an 
action  has  for  its  motive  the  realization  of  the  Good, 
accompanied  by  a  knowledge  of  the  means  requisite  to  this 
end,  we  may  reasonably  expect  that  its  consequences  will 
be  good  also.  Thus  far,  at  least,  do  good  motives  guarantee 
good  consequences. 

The  objection  must  arise  at  this  point  that,  in  many 
cases,  a  person  is  not  responsible  for  his  ignorance  of  means 
and  methods  whereby  to  realize  his  ideals.  Where  it  has  not 
been  possible  for  the  agent  to  gain  the  needed  knowledge, 
should  his  lack  of  it  affect  the  moral  value  of  his  intention  ? 
Certainly,  in  judging  of  moral  values,  care  should  be  ex- 
ercised to  distinguish  between  cases  where  opportunities 
for  acquiring  the  information  in  question  have  been  neg- 
lected and  those  in  which  no  opportunity  has  apparently  ex- 
isted, and  to  make  due  allowance  in  cases  of  the  latter  sort. 
Yet  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  a  motive  can  be  regarded  as 
altogether  good  when  not  accompanied  by  as  much  knowl- 
edge as  human  experience  can  furnish  as  to  the  ways  and 
means  by  which  the  ends  of  Goodness  are  realized.  Cer- 
tainly intelligent  public  opinion  is  growing  more  unwilling 
to  accept  "  good  intentions  "  in  the  ordinary  sense  as  an 
excuse  for  ignorance  of  actual  conditions  that  brings  dis- 
astrous consequences.  We  tend  more  and  more  to  hold  the 
engineer  responsible  for  his  ignorance  of  the  conditions 
of  his  air-brakes  which,  failing  to  work,  caused  the  accident 
— the  physician  responsible  for  his  ignorance  of  the  in- 
jurious after-effects  of  the  medicine  he  prescribes — the 
orator  or  publicist  responsible  for  ignorance  of  the  mis- 
leading and  inflammatory  character  of  certain  doc- 
trines when  accepted  by  unenlightened  and  prejudiced 
minds. 


THE  MOTIVE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT  77 

4.  Good  Consequences  in  Most  Cases  Indicate  a  Cor- 
responding Degree  of  Goodness  in  Intention. — Much  less 
frequently  than  is  popularly  supposed — we  find  upon  ex- 
amination— is  there  any  wide  difference  in  moral  value  be- 
tween the  intention  and  the  consequences  of  action.  Given 
a  good  intention,  accompanied  by  all  available  information 
as  to  how  it  may  be  carried  out,  i.e.  given  an  intention  that 
is  altogether  good,  and  good  consequences  may  be  expected 
to  follow.  Moreover,  when  we  move  in  the  reverse  direc- 
tion, from  consequence  back  to  intention,  we  find  agreement, 
not  discrepancy,  the  rule.  In  the  vast  majority  of  cases  \ 
good  consequences  indicate  good  intentions.  In  order 
properly  to  understand  the  situation  here  one  must  make 
an  allowance  for  a  natural  tendency  to  exaggerate  the  good- 
ness of  those  results  which  do  seem  in  any  degree  good, 
when  the  intention  behind  them  is  believed  to  be  bad. 
Our  surprise  is  so  great  to  find  goodness  produced  in 
this  way  by  an  evil  motive  that  we  incline  almost  irre- 
sistibly to  heighten  the  contrast  and  thus  exaggerate  the 
amount  of  resulting  good.  We  tend,  for  instance,  to  over- 
estimate the  amount  of  good  resulting  to  Europe  from 
Napoleon's  campaigns  of  conquest,  when  once  our  atten- 
tion is  caught  by  the  fact  that  good  did  result.  Now 
when  we  do  make  this  allowance  and  reduce  the  con- 
sequent good  to  its  true  proportions,  we  usually  discover 
that  the  intention  is  good  in  a  corresponding  degree.  The 
scheming  politician  secures  the  passage  of  good  laws,  say 
you,  in  order  that  his  party  may  remain  in  public  favor 
and  he  may  retain  office  and  influence?  Yes,  but  since 
he  is  clear-headed  enough  to  understand  that  fame  and 
fortune  will  come  to  him  only  as  he  proves  a  loyal  servant 
of  his  party,  and  that  his  party  can  retain  its  power  only 
so  long  as  it  obeys  the  popular  will  and  secures  the  general 
welfare,  is  his  motive  altogether  selfish  ?  He  seeks  his  own 
interest,  to  be  sure,  but  is  shrewd  enough  to  see  that  it 


78    ETHICS  AS  THE  SCIENCE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT 

is  inseparably  bound  up  with  the  success  of  party  and  the 
welfare  of  country ;  hence  he  seeks  these  also.     The  conduct 

I  of  the  man  who  gives  to  charity  in  order  to  advertise  his 
business  is  probably  as  good  in  intention  as  it  is  in  result. 
That  also  springs  from  an  insight  into  the  connection  of 
private  interest  with  public  welfare,  which  possesses  moral 
value  in  degree  probably  equal  to  the  amount  of  actual 
good  which  is  likely  to  result  from  such  forms  of  charity. 
5.  But  Goodness  of  Motive  Cannot  Absolutely  Insure 
Good  Consequences  Because  of  Inability  of  Reason  to 
Foresee  All  Future  Developments. — Returning  now  to  the 
question  whether  the  moral  value  of  conduct  is  not  de- 
termined wholly  by  the  motive,  and  not  at  all  by  conse- 
quences, we  see  that  its  difficulties  have  been  largely  re- 
moved. There  is  no  possibility  of  such  radical  discrepancy 
between  intention  and  consequences  as  would  compel  us  to 
choose  one  and  ignore  the  other  in  evaluating  conduct. 
The  two  are  inseparably  joined  in  the  unitary  process  of 
volition,  where  they  reciprocally  determine  one  another. 

1  When  the  motive  is  good,  therefore,  it  is  entirely  probable 
that  the  consequences  will  be  also. 

Can  we  not  go  still  farther  and  assert  without  reserva- 
tion that  where  the  motive  is  good  the  consequences  must 
be  good?  Suppose  the  motive  were  good  in  that  complete 
sense  suggested  above — an  excellence  of  motive  not  often 
attained,  it  must  be  confessed.  Imagine  an  individual  seek- 
ing the  summum  bonum  with  all  the  knowledge  that  human 
experience  has  been  able  to  gather  as  to  means  and  methods 
of  pursuit,  concerning  conditions  to  be  met,  and  contin- 
gencies apt  to  arise.  Would  such  a  motive  necessarily 
and  without  the  possibility  of  exception  produce  conse- 
quences of  the  same  degree  of  goodness  ?  Or  might  fate  or 
accident  still  intervene  to  frustrate  expectation,  set  plans 
at  naught,  and  bring  evil  out  of  good  ?  The  whole  problem 

'  turns  upon  the  ability  of  human  knowledge,  when  as  com- 


THE  MOTIVE  OF  GOOD  CONDUCT  79 

plete  as  possible,  tq_  anticipate  the  future.  Is  a  knowledge 
even  theoretically  possible  that  will  enable  one  to  foresee 
every  contingency  that  may  arise  in  prospective  action? 
It  is  true  that  knowledge  enables  us  in  an  astonishing 
manner  to  foresee  and  to  predict.  But  this  very  knowledge, 
now  the  possession  and  advantage  of  the  race,  was  gained 
through  experiments  of  which  no  one  knew  the  outcome 
until  it  occurred.  Action  has  not,  then,  followed  a  pro- 
gram prescribed  by  thought;  thought  has  rather  recorded  - 
and  systematized  the  results  of  action.  Volition  is  the 
primary,  the  original,  capacity;  intellect  is  secondary  and 
derived.  Hence  it  is  impossible  that  knowledge  should 
ever  foresee  in  detail  all  the  possibilities  of  achievement, 
or  anticipate  every  emergency  which  a  voluntary  agent 
may  have  to  meet.  Entirely  novel  situations  arise;  the 
totally  unexpected  happens.  New  discoveries  are  made, 
fresh  developments  occur,  which  upset  every  human  cal- 
culation. The  best  of  motives  may,  through  such  a  novel 
turn  of  events,  have  results  in  action  which  are  not  wholly 
good.  In  such  case  the  agent  is  only  responsible  for  his 
motive — for  aiming  at  the  Good  with  the  fullest  informa-) 
tion  human  experience  can  furnish.  For  the  consequences, 
so  far  as  they  are  determined,  not  by  his  will,  but  by  the 
new  and  unexpected  course  of  events,  he  is  not  responsible 
except  in  future  actions,  when  the  new  facts  which  at  first 
surprised  him  and  upset  all  calculation  can  be  foreseen 
and  provided  for. 

REFERENCES 

MACKENZIE,  Manual  of  Ethics,  Book  I,  Chap.  II. 

DEWEY  AND  TUFTS,  Ethics,  Chap.  XII,  §§  1,  2. 

MILL,  Utilitarianism,  Chap.  II. 

LESLIE  STEPHEN,  Science  of  Ethics,  Chap.  II. 

ALEXANDEB,  Moral  Order  and  Progress,  Book  I,  Chap.  II,  §§  1, 2, 3. 


PART  TWO 
THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD— CONDUCT  05 
CHARACTER 

1.  The  Supreme  Importance  of  the  Subject. — 2.  The  Good  as  De- 
termined by  Custom. — 3.  The  Good  as  Discovered  by  Reflec- 
tion.— 4.  Socrates'  View  of  the  Good. — 5.  Merits  of  the 
Socratic  Conception  of  the  Good. — 6.  Defects  of  the  Socratic 
Conception  of  the  Good. — 7.  The  Good  as  Action  or  the  End 
of  Action. — 8.  The  Good  as  Conduct  or  Character. — 9.  The 
Good  as  Duty  or  Virtue. 

1.  The  Supreme  Importance  of  the  Subject. — What  is 
the  Good?  This  is  the  question  which  must  now  engage 
our  attention;  for  we  have  seen  that  all  other  questions 
of  Ethics  lead  up  to  this  one,  and  upon  its  successful 
solution  depends  the  possibility  of  a  rational  morality. 
By  the  Good  is  meant  that  form  of  life  which  is  re- 
quired to  satisfy  completely  the  human  will.  When  the 
Good  is  thus  understood  it  is  easy  to  see  why  the  question 
of  its  nature — fundamental  to  all  ethical  inquiry — is  the 
supremely  important  problem  of  human  thought.  Placed 
beside  it,  all  questions  of  business  profit  and  loss,  of  social 
order  and  adjustment  sink  into  insignificance.  Such  ques- 
tions as  these  latter  may  in  themselves  be  important  enough, 
touching  thousands  of  lives  in  a  vital  and  essential  man- 
ner. But,  after  all,  they  concern  only  single  departments 
of  human  life,  while  the  problem  of  the  Good  concerns 
the  whole  nature  of  man  as  an  active  being.  Hence  a 
question  of  economics  or  politics,  of  education  or  of  art, 
interests  only  a  comparatively  small  number  of  persons, 
while  the  moral  problem  has  interest  for  all  human  beings 
in  virtue  of  their  common  humanity.  And  for  this  reason 

88 


84  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

— because  fundamental  in  character  and  universal  in  in- 
terest— the  question  of  the  Good  is  of  greatest  practical 
moment,  and  its  solution  of  highest  practical  value.  Be- 
fore an  individual  can  practise  an  art  or  profession  he  must 
learn  its  principles  and  be  drilled  in  its  methods.  If  he 
is  properly  to  determine  his  conduct  as  a  free  agent,  must 
he  not  then  learn  the  principles  of  human  nature  and  the 
methods  of  obtaining  satisfaction  for  it  ?  And  if  it  is  worth 
while  to  spend  four  years  in  studying  the  principles  and 
methods  of  a  profession,  is  it  not  more  worth  while  to  spend 
a  little  time  in  studying  the  nature  and  requirements  of 
human  life  itself  ?  Ethics  is  the  science  of  human  life  and 
•  human  conduct,  and,  as  such,  underlies  all  the  practical 
sciences.  Compared  with  that  of  the  highest  human  good, 
all  other  concerns  have  small  value  indeed.  "  For  what 
shall  it  profit  a  man,"  said  our  greatest  moral  and  re- 
ligious teacher,  "if  he  shall  gain  the  whole  world  and 
lose  his  own  soul  ? "  x 

2.  The  Good  as  Determined  by  Custom. — So  important 
a  problem  is  this  of  the  highest  good  that  in  the  earlier 
stages  of  moral  development  its  solution  is  not  left  to 
the  reason  of  the  individual.  Instead  it  is  settled  for 
him  by  the  customs  of  his  race.2  These  customs  are  rules 
of  conduct  which  prescribe  what  a  man  must  do  if  his 
conduct  is  to  meet  with  approval  among  his  fellows.  In 
general  they  serve  to  impose  such  restraint  upon  the  in- 
stincts and  appetites  of  the  individual  as  is  required  to 
make  group-life  possible  and,  as  conditions  of  social  ex- 

'Mark  viii,  36   (A.  V.). 

*  The  superiority  of  custom  to  reason  as  an  agency  for  securing 
actions  demanded  by  s.ocial  welfare  is  remarked  upon  by  Lafcadio 
Hearn  in  his  letters  bearing  on  Japanese  life.  He  alludes  to  prac- 
tices required  for  hygienic  purposes  or  necessary  to  an  orderly  com- 
munity life  which  have  been  easily  enforced  by  tradition  and  super- 
stition, but  which  would  be  very  difficult  to  enforce  on  grounds  of 
reason  except  among  the  most  highly  civilized  peoples.  ("Japanese 
Letters  of  Lafcadio  Hearn,"  I,  Atlantic  Monthly,  December,  1909, 
p.  727.) 


CONDUCT  OR  CHARACTER  85 

istence,  are  handed  down  from  generation  to  generation 
in  the  form  of  a  race  tradition.  All  custom  in  the  field 
of  morality  has  two^  aspects ;  a  subjective,  in  the  belief  that 
actions  of  a  certain  kind  are  good,  and,  an  objective,  in 
the  practices  which  flow  from  this  belief.  Thus  the  cus- 
toms of  a  people  lay  down  the  conditions  which  the  indi- 
vidual must  fulfil  if  he  is  to  deserve  the  title  of  "  good 
man  " — that,  for  instance,  he  must  be  a  brave  warrior,  a 
successful  hunter,  the  father  of  several  sons,  a  worshiper 
of  the  tribal  deities,  etc. 

The  system  of  customs  which  constitutes  the  morality 
of  primitive  man  is  not  the  result  of  his  reflection  upon 
the  question  of  the  highest  human  good;  these  customs 
owe  their  origin  and  perpetuation  largely  to  forces  and 
agencies  purely  natural.  No  doubt  chance  or  "  luck  " 
plays  a  large  part  in  the  origin  of  custom.  Some  action 
happens  to  precede  or  accompany  a  piece  of  great  good 
fortune  to  the  tribe,  such  as  unparalleled  success  in  the 
hunt  or  complete  victory  in  warfare.  This  action  is  there- 
fore regarded  as  lucky  and  is  perpetuated  as  a  custom  long 
after  the  original  circumstances  have  been  forgotten.3 
With  the  continued  existence  of  customs  the  law  of  natural 
selection,  acting  between  societies,  has  much  to  do.  Those 
tribes  whose  customs  are  such  as  to  make  them  more  efficient 
in  hunting  and  warfare,  survive  in  the  struggle  for  life 
and  their  customs  are  continued,  while  tribes  whose  cus- 
toms tend  in  the  opposite  direction — towards  disintegration 
and  inefficiency — are  exterminated. 

But  while  primitive  morality  owes  its  existence  so  largely 
to  causes  that  are  non-rational,  its  customs  are  by  no  means 
on  a  level  with  the  set  of  instincts  by  which  life  is  organ- 
ized in  an  animal  society,  such  as  a  community  of  ants  or  of 

*  For  a  brief  statement  of  the  factors  which  enter  into  the  origin 
of  custom,  and  of  the  means  whereby  customs  are  enforced,  consult 
DEWET  AND  TUFTS:  Ethics,  Chap.  IV. 


86  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

bees.  The  operation  of  custom  in  the  most  primitive  human 
society  calls  for  the  exercise  of  intelligence  and  volition 
on  the  part  of  the  individuals  concerned.4  A  man  must 
possess  the  power  of  thinking  in  general  terms — of  con- 
ceptual thought — before  he  can  understand  the  require- 
ments of  a  custom.  He  must  be  able  to  conceive  of  general 
modes  of  acting — of  marrying  within  or  without  the  clan, 
for  instance — if  the  custom  concerns  marriage.  Then 
the  obligation  that  is  felt  to  obey  the  custom  implies  the 
power  of  choice  and  selection.  The  individual  must  be 
able  to  represent  to  himself  a  certain  form  of  conduct — 
say,  marrying  without  the  clan — as  a  possibility  of  action, 
and  to  contrast  it  with  other  modes  of  action.  Thus  only 
can  he  feel  an  obligation  to  pursue  one  alternative  in  action, 
an  obligation  which  is  neither  the  desire  of  a  particular 
object  on  the  one  hand,  nor  the  sense  of  external  compulsion 
on  the  other.  Nor  can  we  doubt  that  the  intelligence  and 
volition  required  for  the  understanding  and  obeying  of 
customs  have  in  an  increasing  degree  influenced  their 
origination  and  continuance.  The  necessity  of  teaching 
the  traditional  customs  of  the  race  to  the  rising  generation 
would  set  men  to  thinking  of  their  meaning  and  value. 
Thus  thoughts  of  possible  changes  and  innovations  would 
naturally  arise.  In  result  a  new  feature  would  be  occa- 
sionally introduced  into  the  tribal  customs  through  the 
influence  of  some  powerful  individual.  These  changes, 
though  slight  enough  in  any  one  generation,  would  have 
cumulative  effect  and,  as  moral  evolution  proceeded,  serve 
more  and  more  to  rationalize  the  existing  morality. 

3.  The  Good  as  Discovered  by  Reflection. — But  the 
time  comes  in  the  history  of  the  race,  as  of  the  indi- 
vidual, when  man  is  no  longer  willing  to  have  the  nature 

•  A  full  and  illuminating  account  of  the  psychological  factors  in- 
volved in  custom  is  contained  in  WUNDT'S  Ethics,  Eng.  trans.,  Vol.  I, 
"The  Facts  of  the  Moral  Life,"  pp.  127-34. 


CONDUCT  OR  CHARACTER  87 

of  his  good  determined  for  him  by  the  customs  of  his 
race.  He  insists  upon  applying  his  own  reason  to  the 
solution  of  the  problem.  The  resulting  reflection  may  seem 
at  first  productive  of  evil  rather  than  good;  for  while 
general  enlightenment  follows  upon  the  exercise  of  thought 
by  individuals,  it  is  generally  accompanied  also  by  skep- 
ticism or  doubt  of  the  existence  of  any  universal  standards 
of  truth  or  goodness,  and  individualism  or  the  further 
conclusion  that  the  good  for  every  individual  is  identical 
with  his  own  advantage. 

The  most  notable  instance  in  history  of  such  an  over- 
throw of  customary  morality  occurred  in  Greece  in  the 
fifth  century  B.C.  This  revolt  against  the  morality  of 
custom  and  tradition  among  the  Greeks  is  especially  im- 
portant because,  in  the  systematic  reflection  which  grew 
out  of  it,  we  have  the  beginnings  of  ethical  science  among 
European  peoples. — Victory  in  the  Persian  wars  had  in- 
creased the  wealth  and  the  commerce  of  the  Greek  states. 
Thus  their  citizens  were  given  more  leisure  for  study  and 
reflection,  and  an  increasing  acquaintance  with  the  beliefs 
and  customs  of  other  peoples.  The  rise  of  democracy  gave 
greater  importance  and  scope  to  action  and  initiative  on 
the  part  of  the  individual,  and  the  frequent  changes  in 
government  tended  to  weaken  his  respect  for  established 
law  and  institution.  "When  we  add  to  these  influences  the 
fact  that  philosophic  speculation  during  the  century  pre- 
vious had  practically  destroyed  the  old  mythology  and 
undermined  the  foundations  of  the  national  religion,  it 
is  not  surprising  to  find  the  moral  customs  and  traditions 
of  the  Greek  people  losing  their  authority  and  falling  into 
disrespect.5  This  spirit  of  revolt  against  authority  in  all 
departments  of  life  finds  expression  in  the  teachings  of 

1  For  a  description  of  the  influences  that  cooperated  to  bring  about 
the  Greek  enlightenment,  and  an  explanation  of  the  main  tenets 
in  the  teachings  of  the  Sophists,  cf.  WINDELBAND:  History  of  Philos- 
ophy, Eng.  trans,  by  TTJFTS,  pp.  66-70. 


88  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

the  Sophists.  The  Sophists  came  into  prominence  at  this 
time  as  itinerant  teachers,  first  of  rhetoric  and  public 
speaking,  and  then,  extending  the  scope  of  their  instruction, 
of  the  whole  conduct  of  life.6  The  effect  of  their  teaching 
was  to  encourage  the  individual  to  disregard  all  accepted 
standards  and  established  authority  in  the  pursuit  of  his 
own  interest.  They  denied  that  there  were  any  absolute 
standards  of  truth  and  goodness  which  could  claim  author- 
ity "over  all  men.  Hence  they  maintained  that  the  in- 
dividual's  opinion  was  truth  for  him,  and  that  his  advan- 
tage was  his  good.  The  Sophists  were  therefore  skeptics — 
in  the  field  of  thought  defenders  of  subjectivism,  and  in 
the  sphere  of  conduct  advocates  of  individualism. 

4.  Socrates'  View  of  the  Good. — The  general  accept- 
ance of  this  individualistic  doctrine  meant  the  dissolution 
of  all  moral  standards  among  the  Greek  people  and  the 
reduction  of  their  social  order  to  a  chaos  of  contending 
desires  and  ambitions.  To  prevent  this  disastrous  result 
there  was  need  for  a  man  to  appear  with  a  mind  keen 
enough  to  see  more  deeply  into  the  problem  than  did 
the  Sophists,  and  a  personality  sufficiently  vigorous  to 
impress  his  views  upon  the  thought  of  his  age.  Such 
a  man  was  Socrates,  who  is  justly  esteemed  as  one  of 
the  great  ethical  teachers  and  moral  heroes  of  history.7 
Socrates  sought  to  reestablish  the  authority  of  the  old 
standards  of  justice  and  courage  and  temperance, — not 

•  First  and  most  prominent  among  the  Sophists  was  Protagoras 
of  Abdera,  born  about  480  B.C.  He  taught  for  forty  years  through- 
out Greece,  and  with  great  success.  He  is  the  leading  figure  in 
the  celebrated  dialogue  of  Plato's  bearing  his  name.  Other  Sophists 
were  Gorgias,  Prodicus,  and  Hippias. 

1  Socrates  was  born  in  470  B.C.  His  father  was  Sophroniscus,  a 
sculptor.  He  was  trained  in  his  father's  profession.  This  he  aban- 
doned in  response  to  what  he  regarded  as  a  divine  call  to  his 
peculiar  mission.  His  mission  he  understood  as  the  moral  in- 
struction of  the  Greek  people.  As  a  moral  teacher  he  followed  the 
indirect  method  of  question  and  answer.  By  skilful  questioning  he 


CONDUCT  OR  CHARACTER  89 

by  appealing  to  the  authority  of  tradition  and  the  past, 
however,  but  by  carrying  still  further  that  reflection  on 
ethical  subjects  begun  by  the  Sophists.  He  maintained 
that  if  men  would  not  be  content  with  mere  feeling  and 
opinion,  but  would  take  the  trouble  to  think  systematically 
on  the  subject  of  human  conduct,  they  would  discover  what 
is  man's  true  good  and  see  that  its  attainment  imposes 
on  all  men  certain  fundamental  obligations.  He  declared, 
in  fact,  that  virtue  or  goodness  is  knowledge.  For  by  a 
necessity  of  his  nature  every  man  seeks  "his  own  interest. 
If  he  does  wrong,  this  shows  that  he  is  ignorant  of  what 
his  true  interest  is.  Conversely,  if  he  gains  knowledge  of 
his  true  interest  he  cannot  help  pursuing  it,  and  hence 
must  do  right.  This  knowledge,  which  for  man  is  identical 
with  virtue,  is  primarily  a  knowledge  of  himself,  of  the 
needs  and  capacities  of  his  human  nature.  It  is  also  a 
knowledge  of  the  conditions  under  which  the  individual 
can  find  self-satisfaction  in  human  life  and  society.  Such 
knowledge,  leading  the  individual  to  consider  the  future 
as  well  as  the  present,  and  revealing  the  community  of 
interest  among  fellow-citizens,  will  convince  him  of  the 
necessity  of  discharging  the  commonly  recognized  duties 
as  conditions  of  his  own  happiness.  Thus  that  true  knowl- 
edge which  is  identical  with  virtue  is  shown  to  be  a  means 
to  happiness.  Socrates  is  able,  therefore,  by  a  change  of 
emphasis  to  define  virtue  as  happiness — the  true  happiness 
attained  through  the  control  of  action  by  reason. 

forced  his  hearers  into  confusion  and  self-contradiction.  Thus  they 
were  made  to  convict  themselves  of  ignorance,  and  the  way  was 
opened  for  Socrates  to  suggest  the  truth.  In  his  own  life  and 
conduct  Socrates  was  a  pattern  of  piety,  patriotism,  and  justice. 
His  frankness  in  exposing  hypocrisy,  his  devotion  to  truth  with  an 
utter  disregard  of  popular  opinion,  made  him  many  enemies.  As 
a  result  of  a  conspiracy  of  these  he  was  tried,  sentenced  to  death, 
and  forced  to  drink  the  hemlock  in  the  year  399  B.C. 

For  an  interesting  character-study  of  Socrates,  cf.  C.  M.  BAKE- 
WELL:  "The  Unique  Case  of  Socrates,"  International  Journal  of 
Ethics,  October,  1909. 


90  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

5.  Merits  of  the  Socratic  Conception  of  the  Good. — 
The   value   of    Socrates'    contribution   to   the    science    of 
Ethics  can  scarcely  be  over-estimated.     He  was  the  first 
to  offer  a  positive  solution  for  the  ethical  problem;  since 
he  was  the  first  to  find  ground  in  human  nature  for  a 
Good  which  was  the  same  for  all  men  and  would  conse- 
quently unite  them  in  the  bonds  of  a  common  moral  obliga- 
tion.    Although  designed  to  refute  the  individualism  of 
the  Sophists,  Socrates'  view  has  not  the  one-sidedness  which 
usually  condemns  a  doctrine  developed  in  the  heat  of  con- 
troversy.    "While  it  upholds  the  authority  of  duty  it  pro- 
vides for  the  satisfaction  of  the  individual.     In  fact,  Soc- 
rates' conception  of  the  Good  is  a  synthesis  of  two  ele- 
ments which  often  appear  in  open  conflict.     It  contains, 
first,  the  rationalistic  principle  that  sense-impulse  and  pres- 
ent desire  should  be  subjected  to  the  conceptions  and  pur- 
poses of  reason.    But  we  find,  in  the  second  place,  the 
hedonistic  doctrine  that  the  exercise  of  reason  should  in 
its  turn  be  a  means  to  the  satisfaction  and  happiness  of 
the   individual.    Virtue  is  knowledge,   but  knowledge   is 
happiness. 

6.  Defects  of  the  Socratic  Conception  of  the  Good. 
— Just   this    synthetic    character,    which    is   the    strength 
of  Socrates'  view  of  the  Good,  is  also  the  source  of  its 
weakness.     For  it  is  a  synthesis  too  easily  achieved.     If 
knowledge  of  one's  true  interest  necessarily  involved  action 
in  accordance  with  it,  we  should  have  here  a  final  solution 
of  the  moral  problem.     But  such  is  not  the  case.     "  For 
the  good  that  I  would,  I  do  not ;  but  the  evil  which  I  would 
not,  that  I  do,"  says  Paul,8  and  the  facts  of  our  moral 
experience  are  in  accord  with  the  statement  of  the  Chris- 
tian apostle  rather  than  the  view  of  the  Athenian  sage. 
Socrates'  error  seems  to  have  arisen  from  an  imperfect 
understanding  of  the  working  of  the  human  will.    In  the 

•Romans  vii,  19  (A.  V.). 


CONDUCT  OR  CHARACTER  91 

process  of  volition  the  idea  which  reason  connects  with 
one's  true  interest  does  not  automatically  and  inevitably 
translate  itself  into  action  and  accomplishment.  I  may 
be  thoroughly  convinced  that  two  hours'  exercise  in  the 
open  air  every  afternoon  is  required  for  my  own  best 
welfare,  yet  sit  quiet  in  my  office  or  study  during  every 
afternoon  of  the  week.  Besides  the  thought  of  the  object 
and  the  feeling  of  satisfaction  in  its  attainment,  a  third 
factor  enters  into  volition  whose  significance  Socrates  did 
not  appreciate.  This  is  the  effort,  the  activity,  with  which 
volition  proper  is  often  identified.  This  effort  is  mental — 
that  activity  of  attention  required  to  keep  an  idea  steadily 
in  mind  despite  distracting  influences,  while  the  steps  nec- 
essary to  its  realization  are  duly  taken.  Now  the  amount 
of  attention  which  any  idea  is  able  to  command  is  not 
determined  by  rational  considerations  solely.  (The  most 
reasonable  alternative  is  not  always  the  most  attractive 
one.)  Rather  is  it  in  a  large  measure  the  result  of  the 
individual 's  tendencies  and  habits — tendencies  which  are  in- 
nate and  habits  which  have  been  developed  through  past 
action  and  experience.  In  the  development  of  such  habits 
the  "  training  "  of  the  will  consists.  And  in  order  that 
an  individual  shall  pursue  his  true  interest  it  is  necessary, 
not  only  that  his  intellect  be  enlightened  as  to  its  character, 
but  also  that  his  will  be  trained  in  its.  performance.  Not 
only  moral  instruction,  therefore,  bu.t  also  moral  training 
is  required  if  a'  man  is  to  act  for  his  own  good.  For  the 
habituation  in  a  course  of  action,  which  results  from  train- 
ing in  its  performance,  makes  the  idea  of  it  attractive, 
and  powerful  over  the  attention.  These  considerations  lead 
to  a  position  the  very  opposite  of  that  taken  by  Socrates — 
and  one  that  sounds  paradoxical  enough  when  first  stated — 
that  one  can  know  an  idea  fully  only  after  he  has  acted 
upon  it.  Without  attempting  at  this  point  to  clear  up 
the  perplexities  involved,  we  may  acknowledge  that  this 


92  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

last  statement  contains  sufficient  truth  to  disprove  the 
Socratic  doctrine  that  virtue  is  knowledge.  It  is  un- 
doubtedly true  that  in  many  cases  one  can  learn  that  an 
object  is  a  part  of  his  own  good  only  by  seeking  and 
attaining  it.  He  must  have  sufficient  courage  to  make  the 
trial,  and  then  he  will  be  convinced  by  the  results  of  his 
action  that  the  object  which  he  sought  is  part  of  his  own 
good.  Thus  it  is  only  by  pursuing  another's  good  at  the 
expense  of  our  own  that  we  learn  the  extent  of  our  own 
interest — that  it  includes  the  welfare  of  others. 

7.  The  Good  as  Action  or  the  End  of  Action. — 
The  difficulties  in  the  Socratic  conception  show  clearly 
that  no  theory  of  the  Good  can  be  accepted  as  final  which 
neglects  the  conditions  under  which  it  is  realized  in  action. 
The  reason  for  this  is  plain.  By  definition  the  Good  is 
that  which  completely  satisfies  intelligent  volition.  Voli- 
tion is  action  in  pursuit  of  a  chosen  end.  Thus  whatever 
else  it  may  or  may  not  be  the  Good  must  certainly  be  some 
form,  or  end,  of  action.  Mr.  Alexander  states  this  fact 
with  emphasis  in  his  Moral  Order  and  Progress:  "  Hence 
the  object  of  morality  cannot  be  a  passive  state  like  pleasure 
or  the  possession  of  knowledge.  When  these  are  the  objects 
of  will,  what  is  willed  is  not  the  feeling  or  the  state  by  them- 
selves, but  their  production.  It  would  be  infinitely  tedious 
to  be  obliged  always  to  say  so,  but  the  condition  is  always 
implied. " 9  To  admit  the  truth  of  this  is  not  by  any 
means  to  decide  the  question  of  the  Good  in  favor  of  some 
form  of  voluntarism.10  The  Good  may  still  be  a  passive 
state — a  condition  of  agreeable  feeling  or  of  complete  knowl- 
edge. Or  it  may  be  the  extinction  of  all  individual  activity 
— as  in  the  Buddhist  Nirvana.  But  these  conditions  of 
being  or  non-being  will  nevertheless  be  objects  which  are 

•  Moral  Order  and  Progress,  ed.  of  1889,  p.  165. 

10  The  theory,  that  is,  that  the  Good  is  found  in  the  process  or 
activity  of  willing  itself  rather  than  in  any  object  or  end  attained  by 
will. 


CONDUCT  OR  CHARACTER  93 

actively  pursued.  The  happiness  must  be  sought  after, 
the  knowledge  must  be  obtained,  and  even  the  Nirvana  of 
the  Buddhist  must  be  achieved  by  long  and  persistent  effort. 
In  short  the  Good  must  be  some  form  of  conduct ;  for  only 
in  conduct  can  the  will  find  expression. 

8.  The  Good  as  Conduct  or  Character. — Thus  to  con- 
ceive of  the  Good  as  a  form  of  conduct  is  not  to  identify 
it  with  outward  and  visible  action  in  contrast  with  inner 
and  essential  nature.  Such  an  antithesis  of  conduct  and 
character  is  possible  only  on  a  false  view  of  the  human 
self.  According  to  this  view — held  by  a  Psychology  now 
antiquated — the  self  or  soul  is  an  entity  or  ' '  thing  ' '  which 
possesses  a  nature  permanent  and  in  a  large  degree  in- 
dependent of  outward  act  and  condition.  This  view  per- 
mitted of  a  sharp  distinction  being  made  between  character 
as  pertaining  to  this  inner  and  unchanging  principle  of 
human  selfhood  and  conduct  as  belonging  to  the  outward 
world  of  visible  and  changing  events.  Modern  Psychol- 
ogy, however,  is  dynamic,  not  static;  it  understands  the 
self  as  a  sum  total,  or  better,  an  organized  unity  of 
conscious  activities.  From  this  standpoint  it  is  impossible 
to  make  any  hard  and  fast  distinction  between  conduct 
and  character.  For  conduct  does  not  consist  of  a  series 
of  unrelated  acts;  these  acts  are  acjs_ji£_ will,  and  rep- 
resent so  many  choices.  A  series  of  such  choices  tends 
to  produce  a  habit,  and  out  of  these  habits  are  formed 
those  dispositions  and  capacities  which  constitute  the  char- 
acter of  a  person.  Character  in  its  turn  does  not  consist 
of  passive  qualities  which  exist  apart  from  the  sphere  of 
action.  Rather  it  is  made  up  of  the  dispositions  and  atti- 
tudes of  the  individual — dispositions  to  act  and  attitudes 
towards  objects  of  action.  But  it  is  in  just  these  modes 
of  activity  that  the  individual's  conduct  consists.  Thus 
conduct  and  character  resolve  Jhemselves  into  two  sides, 
outer  and  inner,  of  a  unitary  subject,  the  active  self  or 


94  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

personality.11  What  a  man  is  is  manifest  in  what  he  does, 
and  what  he  does  is  an  expression  of  what  he  is.  If  it  is 
legitimate  to  define  the  Good  as  a  form  of  conduct,  it  is 
equally  legitimate  to  describe  it  as  a  species  of  character. 

9.  The  Good  as  Duty  or  Virtue. — The  relation  is 
identical  when  we  consider  whether  the  Good  consists  in 
the  performance  of  duty  or  the  acquisition  of  virtue. 
By  duty  we  understand  a  mode  of  aption  which  is  mor- 
ally approved.  A  virtue,  on  the  other  hand,  is  an  at- 
tribute or  disposition  of  character  which  is  judged  good. 
Now  the  moral  ideal  may  be  formulated  in  terms  of 
either  of  these  two  conceptions.  The  Greeks  preferred 
the  latter — explaining  goodness  as  the  acquisition  of  cer- 
tain virjtues.  Thus  the  greatest  Greek  moralists,  Plato 
and  Aristotle,  discuss  at  length  those  virtues  which  are 
requisite  to  goodness,  the  so-called  cardinal^virtues  of  tem- 
perance, courage,  justice,  etc.  Christian  Ethics  has  in  the 
main  adopted  the  former  conception,  understanding  right 
living  to  consist  in  the  performan£e-_of  certain  duties. 
Hence  Christian  moralists  have  laid  greatest  stress  upon 
a  code  of  duties  which  are  conceived  as  laws  prescribing 
the  conduct  of  the  good  man.  The  Ten  Commandments 
are  often  cited  by  these  moralists  as  constituting  the  fun- 
damental code  of  duty,  proceeding  directly  from  God,  the 
source  of  the  moral  law.  These  two  conceptions  of  good- 
ness as  duty  and  as  virtue  have  been  frequently:  contrasted 
as  if  they  were  in  essential  opposition  and  exclusive  of  one 
another.12  The  Greek__view  of  the  Good  as  virtue  has 
been  charged  with  making  morality  self-centered,  while 
the  Christian__conception  of  goodness  as  duty  has  been 
accused  of  making  it  external  ajjcLiormal.  Such  a  con- 
trast is  made  possible  only  by  that  abstract  and  false 

11  This  point  is  briefly  but  clearly  put  by  SETH:    Ethical  Prin- 
ciples, ed,  of  1908,  p.  5. 

12  Sidgwick  emphasizes  this  point  of  difference  between  Greek  and 
Christian  Ethics  in  his  Outline  of  the  History  of  Ethics,  Chap.  III. 


CONDUCT  OR  CHARACTER  95 

separation  of  conduct  and  character  which  has  just  been 
condemned.  As  conduct  and  character  are  two  sides,  outer 
and  inner,  of  one  unitary  personality,  so  duty  and  virtue 
are  two  aspects,  outer  and  inner,  of  the  expression  of  this 
personality.  Whether  we  conceive  of  goodness  in  terras 
of  one  or  of  the  other  is  altogether  a  matter  of  emphasis ; 
for  one  cannot  exist  without  the  other.  A  man  can  acquire 
or  possess  no  quality  of  soul  which  does  not  manifest  itself 
in  action,  nor  can  he  perform  any  intelligent  action  without 
affecting  and  modifying  his  essential  nature.  The  Good 
may  therefore  be  conceived,  equally  well,  as  the  perform- 
ance of  duty  or  as  the  acquisition  of  virtue. 

REFERENCES 

ALEXANDER,  Moral  Order  and  Progress,  Book  I,  Chap.  II,  §§  4,  5. 
DEWEY  AND  TUFTS,  Ethics,  Chaps.  IV  and  XIII,  §8  3,  4. 
MACKENZIE,   Manual  of  Ethics,  Book  I,   Chap.   Ill,   and   Book  II, 

Chap.  I. 

WUNDT,  Ethics,  Vol.  I,  Chap.  III. 
WINDELBAND,  History  of  Philosophy  (Eng.  trans.),  Part  I,  Chap.  II, 

§7. 
BAKEWELL,  Source-book  in  Ancient  Philosophy,  Chaps.  VIII,  IX,  X. 


CHAPTER  II 
THEORIES  OF  THE  GOOD— HEDONISM 

1.  Pleasure  as  the  Good. — 2.  Cyrenaicism. — 3.  Element  of  Truth  in 
Cyrenaicism. — 4.  The  Inadequacy  of  Cyrenaicism. — 5.  Epicure- 
anism.— 6.  Value  of  the  Epicurean  Theory  of  the  Good. — 7. 
Arguments  in  Support  of  Hedonism. — 8.  Error  of  Psychological 
Hedonism. — 9.  Criticism  of  Ethical  Hedonism. — 10.  Transition 
to  Rationalism. 

1.  Pleasure  as  the  Good. — There  is  reason  to  believe 
that  all  actions  whose  results  are  beneficial  to  animal  life 
are  accompanied  by  pleasure,  while  harmful  actions  are 
attended  by  pain.  As  human  beings,  we  know  that  ac- 
tions which  tend  to  conserve  health  and  physical  well- 
being  are,  generally  speaking,  pleasurable,  while  actions 
whose  effect  is  to  diminish  health  and  lessen  bodily  vigor 
are  usually  painful.1  Advancing  from  the  biological  to 
the  psychological  sphere,  we  find  it  true  that  the  unin- 
terrupted and  successful  exercise  of  our  mental  faculties 
is  accompanied  by  a  pleasant,  affective  glow,  as  in  ob- 
servation, thought,  and  imagination.  Here,  too,  the  re- 
verse condition  of  frustrated  thought  and  interrupted 
imagination  is  essentially  unpleasant,  as  in  doubt,  per- 
plexity, and  confusion.  In  fact,  psychologists  tell  us  that 

1  "  From  the  biological  point  of  view,  then,  we  see  that  the  con- 
nections between  pleasure  and  beneficial  action  and  between  pain 
and  detrimental  action,  which  arose  when  sentient  existence  began, 
and  have  continued  among  animate  creatures  up  to  man,  are  gen- 
erally displayed  in  him  also  throughout  the  lower  and  more  com- 
pletely organized  part  of  his  nature;  and  must  be  more  and  more 
fully  displayed  throughout  the  higher  part  of  his  nature,  as  fast 
as  his  adaptation  to  the  conditions  of  social  life  increases." — • 
SPENCEB-.  Data  of  Ethics,  Chap.  VI,  §  35. 

96 


HEDONISM  97 

success  in  attaining  the  end  of  action  always  brings  pleasure 
in  result,  and  failure  causes  pain.2  In  view  of  these  facts, 
it  is  not  surprising  that  in  the  sphere  of  morals  the  theory 
of  Hedonism, — the  view  that  the  Good  is  Pleasure, — has 
appealed  strongly  to  men 's  minds.  For  is  not  pleasure  the 
unfailing  index  of  our  success  in  attaining  those  objects 
which  we  as  voluntary  agents  strive  after?  If  we  pursue 
pleasure  do  we  not  therefore  seek  that  satisfaction  which 
our  natures  demand,  and,  if  we  obtain  the  greatest  possible 
pleasure,  do  we  not  obtain  the  maximum  of  satisfaction  for 
that  faculty  of  will  which  is  the  source  of  all  our  action? 
2.  Cyrenaicism. — Early  in  the  history  of  ethical  reflec- 
tion Hedonism  was  proposed  as  a  theory  of  the  Good.  It 
was  first  definitely  enunciated  by  Aristippus,  who  had 
been  a  disciple  of  Socrates  and  professed  to  derive  this 
view  from  the  teachings  of  his  master.  Socrates'  concep- 
tion of  the  Good  had,  it  will  be  remembered,  two  sides. 
According  to  the  one,  the  Good  was  happiness,  and  reason 
was  but  a  means  to  the  highest  human  happiness.  Aristip- 
pus was  deeply  impressed  with  this  aspect  of  Socrates' 
teachings  and  developed  it  to  an  extreme,  neglecting  the 
rationalistic  element  which  offset  it  in  his  master's  con- 
ception, and  thus  destroying  the  balance  and  unity  of  the 
latter.  He  taught  that  the  Good  is  pleasure  and,  since 
the  past  is  gone  and  the  future  is  uncertain,  the  pleasure 
of  the  presejat_moment.  Thus  man  achieves  his  Good  when, 
with  skill  and  care,  he  extracts  the  greatest  possible  en- 
joyment from  each  passing  moment.  This  theory,  that  the 
Good  consists  in  the  enjoyment  of  present  pleasure, — called 
Cyrenaicism  3 — is,  of  course,  not  merely  a  feature  of  the 
history  of  Ethics.  It  is  the  view  of  all  those  in  every 
age  who  consciously  prefer  the  enjoyment  of  present  pleas- 
ure because  they  regard  the  future  as  at  best  incalculable 

2  STOUT:  Manual  of  Psychology,  Bk.  Ill,  Div.  I,  Chap.  Ill,  §  3. 
8  From   Gyrene,  the  birthplace  and  home  of  Aristippus. 


98  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

and  uncertain — believing  it  wise  to  "  eat,  drink,  and  be 
merry,  for — to-morrow — we  die." 

3.  Element  of  Truth  in  Cyrenaicism. — Cyrenaicism  is 
so  obviously  impossible  as  a  final  solution  of  the  ethical 
problem  that  it  is  easy  to  overlook  the  element  of  in- 
dubitable truth  which  it  contains.  Even  the  animals  go 
beyond  this  standpoint,  it  may  be  said;  since  they  forego 
present  pleasure  to  provide  for  future  need — as  when  food 
is  hoarded  for  the  coming  winter.  It  must  not  be  for- 
gotten, however,  that  animals  are  prompted  to  such  action 
by  instinct — an  inherited  nervous  modification  that  makes 
it  pleasanter  for  the  individual  so  to  act  in  the  present 
as  to  conserve  future  welfare.  Man  himself  possesses  an  in- 
stinct of  self-preservation  which  causes  him  to  take  present 
precautions  to  avoid  future  pain, — and  the  possession  of  this 
instinct  renders  it  easy  and  natural  for  him  to  resist  the 
pressure  of  momentary  feeling.  But,  it  may  be  asked, 
has  not  man  an  overwhelming  advantage  in  the  possession 
of  his  reason,  which  enables  him  to  foresee  the  future 
clearly,  and  plan  for  it?  This  is  of  course  true,  yet  it  is 
also  true  that  this  very  faculty  reveals  to  man  a  fact  of 
which  the  animals  are  not  cognizant — that  the  future  of 
any  living  being  is  essentially  uncertain  and  incalculable. 
Or,  to  express  the  same  truth  in  other  words,  reason  has 
decided  limitations  in  its  ability  to  foresee  the  future. 
In  an  important  sense  reason  is  limited  to  the  familiar, 
is  compelled  to  interpret  the  future  in  the  light  of  past 
experience.  Life,  on  the  contrary,  presents  what  is  essen- 
tially new,  is  ever  revealing  novel  and  unexpected  aspects. 
In  comparison,  therefore,  with  a  future  which  must  remain 
to  a  large  degree  uncertain,  the  present  has  actuality,  and 
this  actuality  gives  it  a  genuine  importance  and  rightful 
claim  for  consideration.  It  is  in  t1  is  emphasis  upon  the 
rights  of  the  present  moment  as  al  ne  Actual  that  the  truth 
of  Cyrenaicism  consists.  After  all,  life  is  constituted  of 


HEDONISM  99 

a  succession  of  present  moments,  and  always  to  sacrifice 
the  now  present  to  the  future  is  to  rob  it  of  attainment 
and  satisfaction  all  along  its  course.*  American  life  has 
been  justly  criticised  because,  intent  upon  the  pursuit  of 
wealth  or  the  fulfilment  of  ambition,  it  fails  to  find  any 
true  joy  or  satisfaction  along  the  way,  and  hence  becomes 
hard  and  barren  and  mechanical. 

4.  The  Inadequacy  of  Cyrenaicism. — While  we  thus 
do  justice  to  the  truth  in  Cyrenaicism,  its  inadequacy  as 
a  theory  of  the  Good  can  be  made  clear  in  a  very  few 
words.  To  assert  that  the  human  will  finds  satisfaction  in 
the  enjoyment  of  present  pleasure  only,  is  to  admit  that 
it  has  no  scope  beyond  the  confines  of  the  present,  no 
extension  beyond  the  limits  of  the  single  moment,  and 
is,  in  effect,  to  deny  that  human  life  has  any  real  unity 
or  is  more  than  a  succession  of  unrelated  moments.  It 
is,  to  be  sure,  a  fact — a  deplorable  fact — that  many  human 
lives  fail  to  attain  any  unitary  meaning  or  significance; 
they  remain  but  a  succession  of  impulses  which  yield 
pleasure  or  pain,  according  as  they  succeed  or  fail  of 
gratification.  We  think  however  that  such  lives  miss  the 
dignity  of  the  truly  human,  and  resemble  in  character  the 
animal  existence.  In  many  cases  this  enslavement  to  pres- 
ent desire  is  due  to  mental  deficiency — the  individual  be- 
ing unable  to  imagine  the  future  or  think  of  its  connection 
with  the  present  with  sufficient  clearness  and  coherence 
to  make  it  a  determining  factor  in  present  action.  An 
extreme  instance  of  such  deficiency  is  seen  in  the  case  of 
those  constant  offenders  who  fall  repeatedly  into  the  clutches 
of  the  law  because  they  seem  unable  to  represent  to  them- 
selves the  consequences  of  their  actions.  Yet,  as  we  have 
seen,  knowledge  of  the  future  does^  not  insure  adequate 
provision  for  it  in  the  present.  Moreover,  reason,  although 

*  Hoffding  brings  out  the  point — of  the  right  of  the  present  moment 
to  have  its  claims  duly  considered — in  his  Ethik. 


100  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

it  may  forecast  the  future  cannot  guarantee  it.  To  ad- 
just present  action  to  the  needs  of  the  future  requires, 
therefore,  the  exercise  of  a  faculty  which  transcends  even 
reason — that  is,  faith — faith  in  one's  future  and  faith  in 
.  one's  self.  It  calls  for  the  exercise  of  will,  the  will  to 
be  a  self,  which  includes  many  present  moments  and  joins 
them  in  a  significant  unity.  That  the  will  has  this  power 
to  transcend  the  limits  of  the  present  can  only  be  learned 
by  the  exercise  of  it :  yet  its  exercise  is  absolutely  necessary 
if  the  will  is  to  find  adequate  expression  in  human  life 
and  conduct. 

5.  Epicureanism. — When  it  is  thus  seen  that  in  order 
to  derive  the  greatest  pleasure  from  life  we  must  take 
into  account  the  future  as  well  as  the  present  we  adopt  a 
second  form  of  Hedonism,  Epicureanism.  Of  this  version 
of  Hedonism  the  author  is  Epicurus,  a  Greek  philosopher, 
who  lived  and  taught  in  AthenlTa  century  after  the  time 
of  Aristippus.  He  gathered  about  him  a  company  of  de- 
voted disciples  who  perpetuated  his  teachings  after  his 
death  in  a  school  which  continued  for  six  centuries,  and 
always  held  the  name  and  writings  of  its  founder  in  greatest 
reverence.  Epicurus  remained  true  to  the  fundamental 
tenet  of  Hedonism,  that  pleasure  is  the  only  absolute  good 
in  human  life.  Differing  from  the  Cyrenaics,  however, 
he  held  that  it  was  not  present  enjoyment,  but  the  happi- 
ness of  a  life-time  which  is  the  summum  bonum.  Now 
if  man  is  to  gain  the  greatest  pleasure  from  his  life  as 
a  whole  it  is  clear  that  he  must  often  forego  a  present 
pleasure  in  order  to  secure  a  greater  pleasure  in  the  future 
or  to  avoid  a  pain  which  will  more  than  outweigh  the 
present  enjoyment.  Epicurus  saw  the  necessity  for  this 
and  urged  his  followers  to  exercise  strict  self-control  in 
all  their  enjoyments.  He  preached  temperance  particu- 
larly in  the  case  of  the  bodily  pleasures  ami,  always,  a 
prudent  regard  for  the  future.  He  even  went  so  far  as 


HEDONISM  101 

to  recommend  that  intellectual^  pleasures  be  preferred  to 
those  arising  from  the  gratification  of  physical  appetites — 
and  did  so,  on  the  strictly  hedonistic  ground,  that  the  in- 
tellectual enjoyments,  although  less  intense,  were  more  per- 
manent and  less  exhausting.  Epicurus  also  dwelt  upon 
the  pleasures  of  friendship,  and  of  friendly  intercourse  with 
a  circle  of  congenial  acquaintances.  In  his  own  practice 
he  sought  a  life  of  quiet  contentment,  having  few  de- 
sires, and  satisfying  these  with  strict  temperance,  and  find- 
ing solace  chiefly  in  the  intellectual  enjoyment  of  philo- 
sophic contemplation  and  friendly  intercourse. 

6.  Value  of  the  Epicurean  Theory  of  the  Good. — As  a 
theory  of  the  Good,  Epicureanism  cannot  be  dismissed  as 
easily  as  was  Cyrenaicism.5  No  justification  can  be  found 
in  its  doctrine  for  a  debauched  or  licentious  life,  for  an 
idle  dallying  with  present  pleasure  at  the  cost  of  future 
well-being.  He  who  would  obtain  the  maximum  of  pleasure 
in  life  must  vigilantly  guard  his  health,  and  this  alone, 
the  careful  conservation  of  health  and  bodily  vigor,  re- 
quires the  strictest  temperance.  Nor  does  Epicurean- 
ism excuse  such  absorption  in  the  pleasures  of  sense  as 
will  exclude  the  higher  satisfactions  which  come  from  the 
exercise  of  our  spiritual  capacities.  Rather  it  enjoins  us 
not  to  look  solely  at  the  present  intensity  of  a  pleasure, 
but  also  at  the  length  of  its  endurance  and  its  possibilities 
as  a  source  of  future  enjoyment.  Such  reckoning,  if  hon- 
estly made,  will  usually  lead  the  consistent  Epicurean  to 
seek  such  "  intellectual  "  pleasures  as  those  given  by  read- 
ing, music,  or  conversation,  rather  than  the  "  physical  ' 
enjoyments  of  eating,  drinking,  etc.  Nor,  again,  does  Epi- 
cureanism recommend  that  the  individual  pursue  his  own 
selfish  pleasure  with  a  ruthless  disregard  of  others'  rights 

8  The  good  points  in  Hedonism  are  well  stated  by  President  Hyde 
in  his  Five  Great  Philosophies  of  Life,  Chap.  II,  "  The  Epicurean 
Price  of  Happiness." 


102  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

and  happiness.  On  the  contrary,  a  survey  of  human  life 
and  the  conditions  of  its  maintenance  teaches  the  individual 
how  largely  his  own  happiness  is  dependent  upon  his  rela- 
tions to  his  fellows  and  their  good-will  towards  him.  More- 
.  over,  one  of  the  purest  and  most  lasting  pleasures  of  human 
'  existence  is  that  arising  from  friendly  intercourse  and 
companionship.  Hence  the  true  follower  of  Epicurus  will 
sedulously  cultivate  a  circle  of  congenial  friends,  and  take 
pains  to  preserve  a  good  reputation  among  a  larger  number 
of  pleasant  acquaintances.  When  consistently  carried  out, 
therefore,  Epicureanism  as  a  theory  of  the  Good  is  by  no 
means  to  be  despised.  It  produces  an  orderly  life  and  one 
yielding  much  genuine  satisfaction.  It  develops  a  type 
of  character  dignified  by  many  virtues.  The  true  Epicu- 
rean will  be  temperate  and  law-abiding,  industrious,  saving, 
and  prudent,  a  man  quite  content  with  simple  pleasures, 
the  enjoyment  of  which  is  enhanced  by  being  shared  with 
congenial  friends. 

7.  Arguments  in  Support  of  Hedonism. — When  we 
come  to  criticise  Epicureanism  the  larger  question  of  the 
truth  in  Hedonism  is  naturally  suggested;  for  Epicurean- 
ism may  be  taken  as  the  standard  form  of  Hedonism.6 
Considering  the  matter  in  this  more  general  way  we  find 
that  arguments  advanced  in  support  of  Hedonism  fall  into 
two  main  classes.  The  first  is  psychological  and  consists  in 
the  assertion  that  all  men  do  pursue  pleasure  always, 
whether  aware  of  it  or  not.  The  nature  of  the  human  will 

'  In  modern  times  another  form  of  Hedonism  has  arisen  called 
Utilitarianism,  which  contends  that  the  Good  is  not  the  happiness 
of  the  Individual  but  the  happiness  of  society,  the  "  greatest  happi- 
ness of  the  greatest  number."  This  extension  of  pleasure  as  the 
Good,  beyond  the  individual  to  society,  is  possible,  as  Sidgwick  has 
shown,  only  through  an  appeal  to  reason.  Thus  the  Hedonistic 
doctrine  is  complicated  and  obscured.  Indeed,  it  is  doubtful  if 
Utilitarianism  is  a  true  species  of  Hedonism,  since  Hedonism  finds 
the  Good  in  a  state  of  feeling,  and  feeling  is  essentially  subjective 
and  individual,  while  the  introduction  of  reason  in  Utilitarianism 
gives  it  a  predominantly  objective  and  social  reference. 


HEDONISM  103 

is  such  that  man  can  seek  but  one  object  and  this  his  own 
pleasure.  In  fact,  to  "  desire  "  and  to  seek  pleasure  are 
identical.  In  the  words  of  J.  S.  Mill  we  have  a  classic 
statement  of  this  view: 

"  It  results  from  the  preceding  considerations  that  there  is 
in  reality  nothing  desired  except  happiness.  Whatever  is  de- 
sired otherwise  than  as  a  means  to  some  end  beyond  itself  and 
ultimately  to  happiness,  is  desired  as  itself  a  part  of  happiness, 
and  is  not  desired  for  itself  until  it  has  become  so.  Those  who 
desire  virtue  for  its  own  sake  desire  it  either  because  the  con- 
sciousness of  it  is  a  pleasure  or  because  the  consciousness  of 
being  without  it  is  a  pain  or  for  both  reasons  united :  as  in  truth 
the  pleasure  and  pain  seldom  exist  separately,  but  almost  always 
together,  the  same  person  feeling  pleasure  in  the  degree  of 
virtue  attained  and  pain  in  not  having  attained  more.  If  one 
of  these  gave  him  no  pleasure  and  the  other  no  pain,  he  would 
not  love  or  desire  virtue,  or  would  desire  it  only  for  the  other 
benefits  which  it  might  produce  to  himself  or  to  persons  whom 
he  cared  for.  We  have  now,  then,  an  answer  to  the  question 
of  what  sort  of  proof  the  principle  of  utility  is  susceptible. 
If  the  opinion  which  I  have  now  stated  is  psychologically  true — 
if  human  nature  is  so  constituted  as  to  desire  nothing  which 
is  not  either  a  part  of  happiness  or  a  means  to  happiness — 
we  can  have  no  other  proof,  and  we  require  no  other,  that  these 
are  the  only  things  desirable.  If  so,  happiness  is  the  sole  end 
of  human  action,  and  the  promotion  of  it  the  test  by  which  to 
judge  of  all  human  conduct;  from  whence  it  necessarily  follows 
that  it  must  be  the  criterion  of  morality,  since  a  part  is  included 
in  the  whole,"  7 

If  it  is  true  that  all  men  do  pursue  pleasure,  and  if, 
moreover,  they  do  so  because  they  must  from  a  compulsion 
of  their  nature,  why  of  course  the  whole  question  is  settled 
and  further  debate  concerning  the  summum  bonum  is  un- 
necessary and  futile.  The  Good  is  pleasure ;  for,  since  the 
human  will  can  seek  nothing  else,  in  this  it  must  find 
satisfaction.  There  remains  for  Ethics  only  the  task  of 
T  Mm. :  Utilitarianism,  Chap.  VL 


104 

determining  what  forms  of  conduct  yield  the  most  pleasure. 
The  second_Jype  of  argument  in  support  of  Hedonism 
while  not  claiming  that  the  psychology  of  volition  proves 
Hedonism  by  making  all  other  theories  impossible,  maintains 
its  position  on  strictly  ethical  grounds.  Without  holding 
that  all  men  do  pursue  pleasure  he  may  assert  for  given 

.  reasons  that  all  men  ought  to  pursue  pleasure.  Various 
reasons  are  given  why  happiness  is  the  only  end  whose 
attainment  completely  satisfies  human  nature.  Perhaps  the 
most  convincing  are  those  suggested  in  the  opening  para- 
graph of  this  chapter.  Since  pleasure  results  from  all  sue- 

|  cessful  endeavor,  it  signifies  the  satisfaction  of  the  will 

1  which  initiated  the  action.  The  ultimate  end  of  human  con- 
duct cannot  be  objective  in  the  sense  of  being  external  to 
the  conscious  life  of  man.  It  must  rather  be  subjective,  a 
state  of  human  consciousness.  Now  the  only  state  of  con- 
sciousness desirable  for  its  own  sake  is  that  which  is  pleas- 
ant, or  pleasure.  Therefore  pleasure  is  the  highest  human 
good. 

8.  Error  of  Psychological  Hedonism. — Whether  or  not 
pleasure  is  the  sole  and  necessary  end  of  all  intelligent 
action  is  a  question  of  fact  which  psychology  must  decide. 
Psychology  has  given  its  decision  and  this  is  adverse  to 
the  claims  of  Hedonism.  Pleasure,  the  psychologist  tells 

«  us,  is  by  no  means  the  sole  and  only  aim  of  voluntary 
action.8  To  be  sure,  we  frequently  seek  pleasure — the  idea 
of  the  pleasure  to  be  enjoyed  being  unmistakably  the  end 
of  our  action.  But  we  do  not  always  do  so.  In  fact,  it 
is  not  usual  for  us  to  act  with  any  subjective  state,  pleasur- 
able or  painful,  in  mind  as  the  end  we  seek  to  attain. 
Rather  do  we  ordinarily  pursue  objects.  Of  course,  in 
any  case,  the  end  of  an  action  is  an  idea,  but — the  point 
is — not  usually  the  idea  of  a  subjective  state  which  we 
wish  to  produce,  but  of  an  object  which  we  seek  to  attain. 
•JAMES:  Psychology,  Vol.  II,  Chap.  XXVI,  pp.  556-57. 


HEDONISM  105 

Intelligent  action  normally  has  this  objective  reference — a 
reference  beyond  subjective  states  and  individual  feelings.9 
Thus  the  hungry  man  desires,  not  the  pleasure  of  satiety, 
but  a  beefsteak  or  some  other  article  of  food.  Even  the  man 
having  a  holiday  is  not  intent  upon  producing  the  feeling  of 
zest  or  invigoration  which  comes  from  this  or  that  exercise 
or  sport,  but  upon  catching  fish,  or  shooting  ducks,  or  play- 
ing golf.  Indeed,  so  obvious  do  the  facts  appear  that  one 
wonders  why  a  view  that  contravenes  them  could  gain  so 
wide  an  acceptance.  This  question  may  be  answered  by  a 
brief  reference  to  one  most  important  consideration  which 
explains  why  psychological  Hedonism  has  won  the  assent 
of  so  many  minds. 

The  plausibility  of  the  doctrine  that  pleasure  is  always 
the  end  of  action  depends  upon  an  ambiguity  in  the  terms 
which  are  usually  employed  in  discussing  the  subject.  Is 
it  true  or  false  that  man  always  seeks  that  which  most 
pleases  him?  It  depends  entirely  upon  what  is  meant  by 
these  words.  If  one  means  that  man  always  chooses  and 
pursues  the  object  or  action  whose  idea  is  pleasantest  to 
him — most  strongly  suffused  or  colored  by  pleasant  feeling 
— it  is  true.  In  this  sense,  the  person  about  to  have  a 
tooth  extracted,  the  mother  going  to  nurse  a  child  sick 
with  some  very  dangerous  and  communicable  disease,  the 
martyr  going  to  the  stake,  are  all  of  them  doing  what 
pleases  them  most.  But  this  tells  nothing  about  the  end, 
the  motive,  of  their  action.  To  say  that  man  in  his  con- 
duct always  follows  the  pleasantest  course  is  merely  to 
recognize  that  the  end  chosen  and  pursued  is  the  end  most 
interesting,  most  attractive,  to  the  agent  who  chooses  and 
acts.  In  this  first  sense,  therefore,  the  statement  that  man 

*HOFFDING:  Outlines  of  Psychology,  p.  323: — "Because  the  end 
or  object  of  the  impulse  is  something  that  excites  or  seems  to  excite 
pleasure,  it  need  not  necessarily  be  the  feeling  of  pleasure  itself. 
The  impulse  is  essentially  determined  by  an  idea,  is  a  striving  after 
the  content  of  this  idea." 


106  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

always  seeks  the  object-which.  jtnpst _pleas.e,s  him  is  true,  but 
is  entirely  irrelevant  to  the  question  at  issue,  which  con- 
cerns only  thejsfld  of  action.  If,  in  the  second  place,  this 
statement  is  understood  to  mean  that  man  always  seeks 
the  object  which  promises  to  yield  him  the  most  pleasure, 
it  is  quite  false.  The  mother  does  not  undertake  to  nurse 
the  sick  child  because  she  expects  to  derive  pleasure  from  it, 
but  because  the  idea  of  the  child  in  pain  and  danger  fills 
her  mind,  and  then  the  further  idea  of  relieving  his  pain 
and  preserving  his  life  appeals  to  her  with  overwhelming 
force.  The  martyr  does  not  go  to  the  stake  moved  by 
the  thought  of  the  pleasure  he  expects  to  enjoy  during 
the  experience  or,  later,  in  Heaven,  but  in  order  to  uphold 
the  principles  to  which  he  has  devoted  himself,  to  defend 
the  cause  to  which  he  has  consecrated  his  life.  To  maintain 
in  these  cases  that  men  act,  not  in  order  to  realize  objects 
— to  save  a  stricken  child  or  to  defend  an  honored  cause, 
but  to  produce  certain  subjective  states  in  themselves — 
is  to  do  violence  to  the  plainest  facts  of  human  experience. 
Thus  we  see  that  the  dictum  on  which  the  Hedonist  relies 
to  prove  his  case  is  capable  of  two  interpretations.  Accord- 
ing to  the  one,  it  is  true,  but  irrelevant  to  the  question; 
according  to  the  other,  it  is  relevant,  but  untrue.  Un- 
doubtedly many  have  been  convinced  by  the  arguments  of 
Hedonism  because  they  thought  that  such  a  statement  in 
the  same  sense  in  which  it  was  true  was  also  relevant. 

9.  Criticism  of  Ethical  Hedonism. — The  argument  that 
all  men  ought  to  pursue  pleasure  is  not  as  easy  to  disprove. 
Many  objections  have  been  brought  against  it  in  the  long 
controversy  over  Hedonism ;  but  not  all  of  these  objections 
have  weight.  For  instance,  the  fact  alluded  to  that  the 
will  normally  directs  itself  upon  objects  and  objective  con- 
ditions rather  than  subjective  states  may  be  urged  as  an 
objection  to  making  any  state  of  feeling  the  Good.  While 
it  is  true  that  single  acts  of  will  have  normally  this  ob- 


HEDONISM  107 

jective  reference  it  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  the 
Good  is  an  end  sought  in  no  single  act,  but  in  all  the  ', 
voluntary  activity  of  the  individual.  In  order  that  the 
summum  bonum  may  be  thus  universal  and  include  all 
particular  goods,  it  may  be  helpful  to  conceive  of  it — in 
contradistinction  to  them — as  a  subjective  state.  Thus  we 
secure  a  common  denominator  to  which  to  reduce  them 
all,  measuring  their  value  and  importance  by  the  amount 
of  pleasure  they  yield.  Again  Hedonism  is  charged  with 
being  impracticable  because  it  involves  the  idea  of  a  sum- 
total  of  pleasure.  Pleasures  cannot  be  thus  added,  it  is 
said,  nor  the  effect  of  doing  or  refraining  from  a  certain 
act,  in  increasing  or  lessening  the  sum-total  of  pleasure, 
be  calculated  with  strict  mathematical  precision.  This  is 
true,  but  the  Hedonist  may  answer  that  he  is  compelled 
to  make  no  such  exact  mathematical  calculation.  No  theory 
of  the  Good  can  furnish  a  standard  whereby  the  worth 
of  each  particular  object  or  act  may  be  determined  with 
absolute  quantitative  exactitude.  On  the  other  hand,  to 
endeavor  to,  increase  the  sum-total  of  pleasure  in  life  is 
as  practicable  as  a  guiding  principle  in  our  conduct  as 
to  endeavor  to  increase  the  amount  of  intellectual  activity 
or  aesthetic  appreciation. 

Nor  does  the  fault  of  Hedonism  lie  in  anything  positive 
which  it  leads  the  individual  to  do  or  accomplish.  "We 
have  seen  that,  so  far  from  recommending  a  life  of  excess 
or  profligacy,  it  enforces  the  very  opposite.  The  man  who 
obtains  the  most  pleasure  from  life  must  maintain  himself 
in  health,  comfort,  and  security.  To  do  this  he  must  ac- 
cumulate property,  win  reputation,  and  provide  exercise 
for  his  natural  impulses  in  family  and  social  life.  Thus 
Hedonism  secures  for  man  many  objects  that  are  required 
to  satisfy  his  will  and  are  thus  good.  But  the  fatal. ob- 
jection to  the  theory  is  that  it  is  limited  to  just  these 
objects  and  hence  prevents  the  complete  satisfaction  of 


108  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

human^yolition  through  the  attainment  of  larger  ends. 
The  consistent  Hedonist  is  limited  in  his  choice  to  those 
objects  which  his  experience,  past  or  present,  assures  him 
will  add  to  his  life's  enjoyment.  Hence  Hedonism  can 
furnish  no  justification  for  real  heroism  or  true  self-sacri- 
fice ;  since  heroism  and  self-sacrifice  consist  essentially  in 
surrendering  objects  known  by  the  individual  to  promote 
his  happiness  for  the  sake  of  other  larger  objects  which 
promise  to  make  no  equal  return  to  him  in  comfort  or 
pleasure.  But  the  moral  experience  of  man  demonstrates 
that  such  sacrifice  and  heroism  are  necessary  if  those  more 
comprehensive  objects,  ideal  and  social,  are  to  be  attained 
which  are  required  to  satisfy  completely  intelligent  volition. 
The  fatal  defect  of  Hedonism  lies,  therefore,  in  the  limita- 
tion which  it  imposes  on  man's  will — limiting  him  to  a 
circle  of  objects  which  his  experience  proves  will  add  to 
his  comfort  and  happiness,  and  shutting  him  away  forever 
from  those  larger  ends  and  loftier  ideals  whose  pleasure 
yielding  capacity  must  remain  uncertain  until  the  indi- 
vidual by  effort  and  sacrifice  has  achieved  them.10  The 
Hedonist  may  be  industrious  and  frugal,  saving  his  pennies 
for  a  rainy  day,  but  he  can  never  sell  all  his  goods  and 
feed  the  poor,  even  in  order  to  save  his  soul.  The  Hedonist 
may  be  honest  and  good-tempered,  checking  his  ambition 
and  bridling  his  tongue,  in  order  to  preserve  a  good  repu- 
tation among  his  fellows,  yet  he  could  never  invite  death 
by  entering  a  plague-stricken  locality,  even  to  relieve  suffer- 
ing or  perchance  discover  some  saving  remedy.  The  Hedon- 
ist may  be  obliging  and  companionable,  going  to  much 
trouble  to  retain  a  friendship,  yet  he  could  never  lay  down 
his  life,  even  for  the  sake  of  a  friend. 

"  Rogers  makes  the  same  criticism  of  Hedonism  when,  in  dis- 
cussing Epicureanism  in  his  Student's  History  of  Philosophy, 
Chap.  I,  §  14,  3,  he  describes  it  as  essentially  commonplace  and 
unheroic. 


HEDONISM  109 

10.  Transition  to  Rationalism. — If  the  human  will  is 
to  obtain  complete  satisfaction,  therefore,  man  must  tran- 
scend the  standpoint  of  Hedonism,  subordinating  the  life 
of  sense  and  feeling  to  the  ideals  of  reason  and  the  imagi- 
nation.  It  may  seem  inconsistent  with  statements  already 
made  thus  to  base  the  distinction  between  Hedonism  and 
the  more  adequate  theory  upon  an  opposition  of  feeling 
to  thought.  For,  on  the  one  hand,  have  we  not  seen  that 
thought  plays  an  important  part  in  all  Hedonistic  theories 
that  go  beyond  momentary  feeling  and  consider  the  hap- 
piness of  a  lifetime?  And,  on  the  other  hand,  was  it  not 
shown  that  reason  alone  is  incapable  of  justifying  abso- 
lutely the  surrender  of  present  pleasure  for  the  sake  of 
future  happiness,  not  to  mention  the  greater  sacrifice  of 
individual  well-being  to  ideal  or  social  purposes?  Certain 
it  is,  most  assuredly,  that  the  man  who  seeks  as  his  good  the 
greatest  pleasure  in  life  must  exercise  his  reason  in  con- 
sidering the  exigencies  of  the  future  and  in  forming  those 
general  purposes  whose  realization  in  the  course  of  a  life- 
time produce's  the  maximum  of  agreeable  feeling.  Yet  such 
an  exercise  of  thought  is  limited  in  range  and  need  not 
extend  far  beyond  the  field  of  sense  perception.  The 
Cyrenaic,  of  course,  considers  only  the  objects  of  present 
perception  and  seeks  to  find  in  them  gratification  for  the 
impulse  momentarily  uppermost.  He  seeks  now  an  article 
of  food,  now  a  form  of  exercise,  now  a  mode  of  com- 
panionship, etc.,  etc.  The  Epicurean  is  not  limited  thus 
to  particular  objects  and  actions.  He  generalizes  upon  his 
experiences,  substituting  for  particular  wishes  and  impulses 
general  desires  and  purposes.  He  seeks,  not  specific  ob- 
jects, like  an  article  of  food  or  clothing,  but  more  general 
and  comprehensive  ones,  such  as  food,  better  health,  or 
more  property.  Now  these  general  purposes  are  the  work 
of  thought,  and  as  such  are  not  limited  to  the  present,  but 
extend  into  the  future,  and  their  successful  realization  in 


no  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

the  course  of  time  requires  the  denial  of  present  desire. 
But  while  such  ideas  as  health,  wealth,  etc.,  standing  for 
the  natural  goods  of  man,  are  concepts  of  thought  they 
nevertheless  represent  only  classes  of  sense-objects.  Hence 
they  do  not  rise  far  above  the  sphere  of  sense-perception 
and  leave  as  the  distinguishing  feature  of  Hedonism  its 
emphasis  upon  the  natural  feelings  of  the  individual.  Now 
turning  to  the  second  difficulty,  it  is  admittedly  true  that  in 
cases  where  individual  happiness  is  sacrificed  to  larger  ends 
reason  cannot  demonstrate  in  advance  of  the  act  of  sac- 
rifice that  the  result  will  be  a  larger  and  fuller  satisfaction. 
Such  satisfaction  can  come  only  after  the  character  of  the 
individual  has  been  transformed  by  the  voluntary  sacrifice, 
and  cannot  be  imagined  previously,  just  because  the  trans- 
formation has  not  taken  place.  If  reason  could  assure  the 
individual  of  a  larger  satisfaction,  of  course  there  would 
be  no  real  sacrifice,  no  genuine  heroism.  The  fact  that  the 
human  will  has  capacity  for  a  fuller  satisfaction  than  that 
found  in  individual  comfort  and  happiness  can  only  be 
proved  by  exercising  this  will  in  resisting  the  claims  of 
present  desire  and  the  appeal  of  purposes  whose  realization 
past  experience  shows  to  be  productive  of  pleasure,  and 
turning  to  larger  objects  whose  significance  extends  beyond 
the  natural  pleasure  and  well-being  of  any  individual.  But 
— and  this  is  the  point  to  be  noticed — such  objects,  objects 
which  promise  fuller  and  more  adequate  expression  to  man 's 
capacity  of  volition,  are  products  of  thought  and  imagina- 
tion. They  result,  not  from  a  mere  generalizing  upon  the 
facts  of  experience,  but  from  the  exercise  of  free-ranging 
thought  and  constructive  imagination,  which  take  the 
materials  of  past  experience  and  combine  them  in  new 
and  highly  significant  forms.  Thus  ideals  of  spiritual 
achievement  and  social  betterment  come  into  existence. 
Think  of  the  case  of  a  man  who  sacrifices  his  reputation 
and  standing  in  the  community  in  order  to  prepare  the 


HEDONISM  111 

way  for  some  social  reform  which  he  sees  coming  in  the 
distant  future.  The  objects  which  he  sacrifices  are  such 
as  appeal  to  his  senses  and  arouse  his  feelings — the  smiles 
and  compliments  of  acquaintances,  social  opportunities  and 
diversions,  increase  of  wealth,  etc.  The  object  which  he 
seeks  to  further  is,  on  the  contrary,  nowhere  visible  and 
tangible — it  is  a  social  arrangement  which  as  yet  exists 
only  in  the  imagination  of  its  advocates,  and  can  be  brought 
to  pass  only  in  the  far  future.  When  we  thus  come  to 
see  the  necessity  for  sacrificing  the  demands  of  sense  and 
feeling  to  the  principles  and  conceptions  of  reason  and 
the  imagination,  we  advance  to  the  position  of  Rationalism. 

REFERENCES 

SETH,  Ethical  Principles,  Part  I,  Chap.  I. 

HICKS,  Stoic  and  Epicurean,  Chaps.  V,  VI,  VII. 

ZELLEB,  Stoics,  Epicureans  and  Sceptics   (Eng.  trans.),  Part  III. 

WAKNEB  FITE,  Introductory  Study  of  Ethics,  Part  I. 

THILLT,  Introduction  to  Ethics,  Chaps.  VI,  VIII. 

MACKENZIE,  Manual  of  Ethics,  Book  II,  Chap.  IV. 

SPENCER,  Data  of  Ethics,  Chap.  III. 

SIDQWICK,  Methods  of  Ethics,  Book  II. 

HYDE,  Five  Great  Philosophies  of  Life,  Chap.  I. 


CHAPTER  III 
THEORIES  OF  THE  GOOD— RATIONALISM 

1.  The  Standpoint  of  Rationalism. — 2.  Extreme  and  Moderate  Ra- 
tionalism.— 3.  Cynicism. — 4.  Stoicism. — 5.  The  Truth  of  Ra- 
tionalism: Reason  (a)  as  a  Distinctively  Human  Faculty, — 6. 
(6)  As  Extending  the  View  of  Man  to  Include  a  World  of 
Objects  and  Events, — 7.  (c)  As  Enlarging  the  Experience  of 
Man  to  Embrace  the  Lives  and  Personalities  of  Others. — 8.  The 
Faults  in  Rationalism:  (a)  It  Encourages  Injurious  Asceti- 
cism,— 9.  (b)  It  Justifies  Extreme  Intellectualism, — 10.  (c)  It 
Is  Individualistic  in  Tendency. 

1.  The  Standpoint  of  Rationalism. — Rationalism  finds 
the  Good  in  the  exercise  and  development  of  Reason. 
As  an  ethical  theory  it  appears  as  the  opponent  of  Hedon- 
ism and  its  view  of  the  Good  as  rational  activity  is  denned 
and  accentuated  by  contrast  with  the  Hedonistic  view  of 
the  Good  as  pleasant  feeling.  In  fact,  the  two  theories 
are  the  great  antagonists  in  the  ethical  field,  and  the  his- 
tory of  Ethics  is  largely  a  record  of  the  controversy  be- 
tween them.  Affiliated,  the  one  with  the  real  and  the  other 
with  the  ideal,  the  one  with  the  natural  and  the  other 
with  the  spiritual,  Hedonism  and  Rationalism  are  twp_ 
poles  between  which  ethical  speculation  swings  and  with 
an  inclination  almost  irresistible  towards  one  or  the  other. 
But  while  they  are  thus  contrary,  and  appear  as  mutually 
exclusive  alternatives,  the  relation  between  Hedonism  and 
Rationalism  is  not  merely  that  of  opposition.  Rather  does 
Rationalism  represent  a  further  stage  in  the  development 
of  ethical  theory  in  which  the  standpoint  of  Hedonism  is 
transcended  and  its  limitations  overcome.  It  is  a  step 
onward  towards  the  final  solution  of  the  problem  of 
Ethics. 


RATIONALISM  113 

2.  Extreme  and  Moderate  Rationalism. — Just  because 
Rationalism  is  an  attempt  to  surpass  and  supersede  Hedon- 
ism, it  must  retain  as  essential  to  its  own  position  an  atti- 
tude of  protest  against  the   Hedonistic  doctrine.    When 
the  Rationalist  recommends  thejife  of  reason  as  the  highest 
human  good  he  inevitably  thinks  of  this  intellectual  activity 
as  superior  to  feeling  and  sensation.     He  is  bound  to  insist, 
therefore,  that  the  demands  of  feeling  and  sense  be  strictly 
subordinated  to  the  requirements  of  reason.     The  extent 
of  this  antagonism  to  the  emotional  side  of  man's  nature 
varies  with  the  different  types  of  Rationalism  and  affords 
a    convenient    basis    for    classifying    them.     Theories    of 
Rationalism  may  be  called  extreme  when  holding  that  a  free 
exercise  of  reason,  in  which  the  highest  human  good  con-   . 
sists,  requires  the  complete  suppression  of  all  those  desires 
and  impulses  through  which  man  naturally  seeks  pleasure. 
Such  theories  demand   the  practical  annihilation  of  the 
feeling  and  emotional  life  of  man.     In  moderate  Ration- 
alism, on  the  other  hand,  the  Good  is  found,  not  in  the  com- 
plete suppression,  but  in  the  regulation  and  control,  of  sense 
and  feeling  by  reason.    Thus  feelings  and  emotions  are  per- 
mitted to  enter  the  good  life,  but  only  in  a  subordinate  role. 

3.  Cynicism. — The  theory  of  Rationalism,  like  that  of 
Hedonism,  was  originally  derived  from  the  teachings  of 
Socrates.     Indeed,  its  relation  to  the  spirit  of  Socrates' 
doctrine  is  much  closer  than  that  of  its  rival.     Of  the  two 
sides  of  Socrates'  teaching  the  rationalistic  was  certainly 
the  more  prominent.     He  proposed  that  individual  impulse 
and  opinion  be  submitted  to  the  rule  of  reason,  because 
reason  is  the  one  faculty  in  human  nature  whose  dictates 
are  authoritative  for  all  individuals.     Soon  after  Socrates' 
death  this  element  in  his  teaching  was  appropriated  by  a 
school  of  thinkers  called  Cynics  and  was  developed  by  them 
into  an  extreme  form  of  Rationalism.     The  founder  of  the 
Cynic  school,  Antisthenes,  was  particularly  impressed  by 


114  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

Socrates'  independence  of  character,  his  courage  in  time  of 
danger,  and  his  self-possession  in  every  emergency.  These 
qualities  constituting,  in  the  opinion  of  Antisthenes,  the 
very  highest  type  of  virtue,  are  developed,  he  believed,  only 
(  when  a  man  suppresses  his  natural  desires  and  appetites  en- 
tirely and  devotes  himself  to  intellectual  pursuits.  For  our 
natural  desires  and  appetites  require  objects  to  gratify 
them,  such  as  food,  drink,  clothing,  houses,  furniture,  etc. 
He  who  seeks  pleasure  in  such  gratifications  is  dependent 
upon  the  possession  of  these  objects  and  hence  becomes  a 
slave  of  external  conditions — of  every  circumstance  that 
may  threaten  his  possessions  or  destroy  them  altogether, 
leaving  him  destitute  and  miserable.  The  exercise  of  reason, 
on  the  contrary,  is  in  no  such  way  dependent  upon  external 
conditions  and  influences.  The  man  who  finds  satisfaction 
in  intellectual  activity  has  resources  within  himself  and  he 
is  freed  entirely  from  control  by  such  circumstances  as 
unpopularity,  poverty,  sickness,  slavery.  These  are  evils 
only  if  we  allow  them  to  be  such.  If  we  root  out  the 
desires  for  wealth,  health,  reputation,  and  the  like,  we  shall 
no  longer  suffer  from  the  lack  of  their  objects.  In  such 
freedom  is  the  highest  type  of  virtue  and  the  dignity  of  a 
life  truly  human.  The  Cynics  carried  their  hostility  to 
the  life  of  feeling  and  the  pursuit  of  pleasure  to  the  farthest 
extreme,  Antisthenes  declaring  that  he  would  rather  be 
mad  than  pleased.  They  attacked,  not  merely  the  enervat- 
ing luxury  and  extravagance  of  their  time,  but  all  con- 
ventions and  institutions  of  civilization  as  useless  para- 
phernalia which  encumbered  man  and  hindered  him  from 
attaining  the  freedom  of  a  rational  being. 

4.  Stoicism. — Rationalism  was  amplified  and  developed 
in  ancient  times  by  a  second  school,  the  Stoic,  which  was 
contemporary  with  the  Epicurean.1  Stoicism  may  be  re- 

1  The  founder  of  Stoicism  was  Zeno,  born  about  342  B.C.  in  a 
Greek  city  of  Cyprus  having  a  considerable  Phoenician  population. 


RATIONALISM  115 

garded  as  the  typical  Rationalism  and,  as  such,  it  confronts  . 
the  typical  Hedonism  of  Epicurus.  In  Stoicism,  as  with 
the  Cynics,  the  Good  is  found  in  the  exercise  of  reason, 
or  knowledge.  The  Stoics — especially  in  the  beginning — 
relaxed  little  of  the  rigor  and  severity  of  the  earlier  school 
in  their  attitude  towards  the  life  of  sense  and  feeling.  They 
condemned  all  feeling  and  emotion  as  producing  intellectual 
confusion  and  leading  to  a  slavish  dependence  on  external 
conditions.  Such  unselfish  emotions  as  sympathy  and  pity 
were  included  in  this  condemnation,  and  the  destruction 
of  all  feeling  was  therefore  urged.  The  ideal  state  was 
declared  to  be  that  of  apathy  or  non-reeling,  the  state  most 
favorable  to  the  exercise  of  reason.  Now  while  the  Stoics 
thus  agreed  with  the  Cynics  in  identifying  the  Good  with 
the  exercise  of  reason  and  the  suppression  of  feeling,  they 
were  able  to  give  a  new  interpretation  to  the  "  life  accord- 
ing to  reason, ' '  which  in  its  turn  communicated  a  new  and 
more  positive  meaning  to  their  conception  of  freedom,  and 
finally  served  to  soften  and  humanize  their  whole  doctrine. 
According  to  this  new  insight,  man's  reason  is  merely  an 
expression  of  the  Universal  Reason,  that  rational  principle 
which  pervades  the  universe  and  determines  the  meaning 
and  purpose  of  everything  within  it.  In  obeying  his 
reason  man  is  but  conforming  to  the  rational  order  of 
the  world:  he  is  playing  his  part  in  the  universal  scheme 
of  things.  Life  according  to  reason  thus  means  life  accord-) 
ing  to  nature.  The  freedom  that  man  gains  through  the 
exercise  of  reason  is  not  merely  negative,  a  relief  from 
domination  by  external  objects  and  forces,  it  is  positive 
freedom,  the  freedom  of  self-expression  and  self-develop- 
ment. For  as  much  reality  as  a  man  possesses  he  derives 

Zeno  had  Phoenician  blood,  which  is  thought  by  some  historians  to 
account  partially  for  the  ascetic  tendency  in  his  philosophy.  He  went 
to  Athens  at  the  age  of  twenty-two  and  became  a  pupil  of  the  Cynic, 
Crates.  Later  on  he  founded  a  school  of  his  own,  which,  because 
of  its  meeting-place,  the  Stoa  Pcecile,  was  called  the  Stoic  School. 


116  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

from  the  universe.  Hence  in  the  degree  to  which  the 
human  individual  discharges  the  part  assigned  to  him  in  the 
Universal  Purpose  he  achieves  reality  himself  and  furthers 
his  own  development.  Thus  the  Stoics  were  led  to  believe 
that  every  person  has  a  duty  to  perform  in  the  world,  and 
this  belief  tended  to  counteract  the  self-centered  and  ex- 
clusive character  of  their  intellectualism.  Moreover,  if  all 
men  are  expressions  of  the  Universal  Reason  they  are  in 
an  important  sense  equal  in  worth  and  dignity.  This  was 
recognized  particularly  in  later  Stoicism,  where  we  have 
the  principle  of  human  brotherhood,  if  not  explicitly  real- 
ized, at  least  clearly  suggested,  in  the  lofty  conception  of 
a  city  of  God  which  should  unite  all  humanity  in  the  bonds 
of  a  common  citizenship.  This  increasing  humanitarianism 
served  to  soften  the  earlier  harshness  and  severity  of  the 
school,  developing  a  sense  of  justice  and  toleration,  and 
producing  in  its  later  development  such  upright  and  noble 
characters  as  Epictetus  and  Marcus  Aurelius.  While  often 
the  Stoic's  "  city  of  humanity  "  was  to  him  but  a  vision, 
to  be  realized — if  ever — only  in  some  world  to  come,  yet 
this  vision  did  not  fail  to  influence  his  conduct  in  the 
present  world.  Hence  Stoicism  was  the  most  potent  force 
working  for  moral  and  social  improvement  in  the  Roman 
Empire,  and  it  aided  in  effecting  many  important  reforms, 
particularly  in  ameliorating  the  condition  of  classes  that 
were  oppressed,  such  as  slaves  and  subject-peoples. 

5.  The  Truth  of  Rationalism:  Reason  (a)  As  a  Dis- 
tinctively Human  Faculty. — The  question  now  arises  con- 
cerning the  truth  in  Rationalism;  for  as  a  theory  of  the 
Good  it  must  be  subjected  to  the  same  critical  scrutiny 
as  was  Hedonism.  Such  a  critical  study  will  justify  the 
conclusion  that  Rationalism,  if  not  the  whole  truth  re- 
garding the  sum/mum  bonum,  is  at  least  a  large  part  of  it. 
In  the  first  place,  it  creates  a  presumption  in  favor  of 
Rationalism  that  it  finds  man's  good  in  the  exercise  and 


RATIONALISM  117 

development  of  a  faculty  distinctively  human.  The  animals 
possess  the  same  senses  that  man  does  and  they  have,  we 
believe,  similar  sensations.  The  animals  also  experience 
the  fundamental  feelings  and  emotions,  seeking  to  prolong 
those  which  are  pleasant  and  to  avoid  the  painful.  But 
man  alone  among  living  species  possesses  the  faculty  of 
reason,  the  power  of  self-conscious  intelligence,  with  the 
ability  to  judge  and  to  generalize,  to  imagine  and  to  infer. 
The  possession  of  this  rational  faculty  has  been  rightly 
regarded  as  a  distinguishing  mark  of  the  human  species. 
Is  it  not  reasonable  then  to  conclude  that  the  Good  which 
must  completely  satisfy  human  nature  will  consist  primarily 
of  the  exercise  and  development  of  this  faculty  ?  Certainly 
the  argument  of  Aristotle  on  this  point  has  lost  none 
of  its  force.  Man's^Gfbod,  he  maintains,  must  reside  in 
the  exercise  of  his  proper  function  as  man.  What  is  the 
proper  function  of  man?  It  cannot  be  mere  life,  involving 
the  processes  of  nutrition  and  reproduction;  since  these 
activities  are  shared  by  plants  as  well  as  animals,  and 
man 's  proper  function  must  be  peculiar  to  himself.  Neither 
can  it  lie  in  sensation;  for  the  life  of  sense  and  feeling 
is  shared  with  the  animal.  It  must  therefore  reside  in 
the  exercise  of  that  capacity  which  man  alone  possesses, 
his  Reason.  "  The  function  of  man  then  is  an  activity 
of  soul  in  accordance  with  reason, ' ' 2  and  his  Good  is  a 
life  that  is  virtuous  because  controlled  by  reason. 

Aristotle 's  reasoning  here  is  wholly  sound  and  a  sufficient 
refutation  of  views  at  present  widespread  which  find  in 
the  fact  of  evolution  a  justification  for  Naturalism  and 
Hedonism  in  Ethics.  Because  man  is  the  result  of  a  long 
evolution  from  the  lower  forms  of  life  and  has  the  same 
origin  as  they — so  the  argument  runs — the  part  of  his 
nature  which  he  shares  in  common  with  the  other  animal 

1  Nicomachean  Ethics  of  Aristotle,  trans,  by  Wclldon,  Bk.  I,  Chap. 
VI,  p.  16. 


118  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

species  is  the  essential  part.  His  Good  will  then  consist 
in  the  satisfaction  of  these  primary  instincts  which  express 
his  fundamental  organic  needs,  for  food,  drink,  shelter, 
clothing,  offspring,  etc.  This  reasoning  is  fallacious  from 
the  standpoint  of  evolution  itself.  For  how  does  a  species 
evolve — through  the  accentuation  of  what  is  common  to 
it  and  other  lower  species  from  which  it  has  sprung,  or 
of  what  is  peculiar  to  it  and  serves  to  distinguish  it  from 
these  lower  forms?  Certainly  the  latter;  and  as  it  is  in 
evolution  universally,  so  it  is  with  man.  If  he  is  to 
continue  his  evolution,  to  progress  still  farther  on  the 
upward  road  that  has  already  elevated  him  above  all 
living  species,  it  must  be  by  the  exercise  and  development 
of  those  powers  of  intellect  and  will  peculiar  to  himself. 
In  this  connection  it  is  curious  to  observe  persons  interested 
in  the  doctrine  of  socialism  attempting  to  find  a  scientific 
basis  for  the  ideal  of  human  brotherhood  in  the  biological 
fact  that  all  men  are  the  outcome  of  the  same  evolutionary 
process  and  have  in  common  the  same  fundamental  in- 
stincts and  impulses.  Such  thinkers  seem  to  forget  that 
as  a  creature  of  instinct  man,  like  the  other  natural  species, 
is  subject  to  the  law  of  natural  selection,  and  his  evolution 
is  accomplished  through  ruthless  competition  and  the  sur- 
vival of  the  fittest.  Furthermore,  it  is  only  through  the 
increasing  power  and  efficacy  of  his  reason  that  man  is 
-  able  to  substitute  for  the  blind  action  of  natural  selection 
with  its  tremendous  waste  the  intelligent  action  of  social 
selection  which  has  for  its  conscious  aim  the  highest  human 
welfare.  Human  evolution,  both  social  and  moral,  demands 
that  we 

"Arise  and  fly 

The  reeling  faun,  the  sensual  feast, 
Move  upward,  working  out  the  beast 
And  let  the  ape  and  tiger  die."  3 

*  TENNYSON  :  In  Memoriam,  CXVIII. 


RATIONALISM  119 

6.  (b)  As  Extending  the  View  of  Man  to  Include  a 
World  of  Objects  and  Events. — Keason  is  thus  important 
in  human  life  because  it  extends  the  view  of  man  beyond 
the  present,  to  embrace  both  past  and  future  within  a 
unified  experience.  "While  the  animal  is,  we  suppose,  con- 
fined almost  exclusively  to  the  sensation  of  the  moment, 
man  may  survey  his  life  as  a  whole,  seeing  the  present 
as  the  outcome  of  the  past,  and  the  future  as  the  result 
of  them  both.  We  may  therefore  count  it  as  the  second 
point  in  favor  of  Rationalism  that  it  is  man's  intellect 
which  introduces  him  into  a  new  and  larger  world  of  per- 
manent objects  in  fixed  and  necessary  relationships.  For 
man's  view  is  extended  to  past  and  future  only  through 
his  capacity  to  revive  by-gone  events  and  experiences  in 
the  form  of  ideas,  seeing  these  in  their  connection  with 
each  other  and  with  the  present  situation.  Our  thought 
is  not  content,  moreover,  to  accept  every  connection  of 
events  as  it  happens  to  be  given,  but  seeks  to  discover  what 
connections  are  fixed  and  necessary.  Thus  we  gain  an 
insight  into  the  causes  of  things  which  holds  for  the  future 
as  well  as  for  the  past  and  present,  enabling  us  to  predict 
with  much  certainty  what  the  future  has  in  store,  and  to 
act  accordingly.  Through  the  work  of  thought  the  con- 
scious life  of  man  gains  a  totally  new  significance.  His 
present  experience  and  surroundings  are  seen  as  part  of 
an  orderly  world  of  objects  and  events,  of  persons  and 
forces,  which  are  interacting  and  interdependent.  To  the 
animal  a  famine  means  only  certain  present  sensations, 
such  as  hunger  and  weakness.  But  man  through  his  power 
of  thought  sees  it  in  the  light  of  past  experience  and  pre- 
vious knowledge  as  an  event  in  a  complex  system,  the 
result  of  drouth,  perhaps,  whose  more  frequent  occurrence 
is  due  to  the  denudation  of  watersheds,  which  in  its  turn 
is  a  result  of  careless  or  corrupt  administration — and  so 
on  through  a  net-work  of  causes  which  has  no  end,  but 


120  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

which  if  followed  far  enough  would  include  all  the  forces 
and  factors  in  the  universe. 

Now  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  if  we  as  voluntary  agents 
are  to  gain  any  true  satisfaction  from  life,  we  must  culti- 
vate and  develop  that  power  of  intelligence  within  us  which 
shows  us  our  position  as  permanent  individuals  in  an 
orderly  universe,  and  our  relations  to  other  individuals 
and  objects  included  within  the  system.  Thus  only  can 
we  hope  to  achieve  our  aims,  choosing  those  objects  as 
means  which  are  bound  in  the  nature  of  things  to  produce 
the  ends  we  desire.  Spencer,  himself  a  Hedonist  of  the 
evolutionary  school,  shows  appreciation  of  the  importance 
of  reason  in  this  capacity  of  guide  to  action  when  he 
says  that  the  evolution  of  conduct  has  been  throughout 
I  accompanied  by  an  increasing  control  of  "  presentative  " 
(by  "  representative  "  feelings.  "  Throughout  the  ascent 
from  low  creatures  up  to  man,  and  from  the  lowest  types 
of  man  up  to  the  highest,  self-preservation  has  been  in- 
creased by  the  subordination  of  simple  excitations  to  com- 
pound excitations — the  subjection  of  immediate  sensations 
to  the  ideas  of  sensations  to  come — the  overruling  of  pre- 
sentative feelings  by  representative  feelings,  and  of  repre- 
sentative by  re-representative  feelings.  As  life  has  ad- 
vanced the  accompanying  sentiency  has  become  increas- 
ingly ideal;  and  among  feelings  produced  by  the  com- 
pounding of  ideas,  the.  highest,  and  those  which  have  evolved 
latest,  are  the  re-compjmjndecL. -Q.? .-doubly  ideal.  Hence  it 
follows  that  as  guides  the  feelings  have  authorities  pro- 
portionate to  the  degrees  in  which  they  are  removed  by 
their  complexity  and  their  ideality  from  simple  sensations 
and  appetites."4 

But  reason,  in  its  work  of  organizing  human  experience, 
is  not  limited  to  tracing  the  necessary  sequence  of  events, 
and  thus  to  the  discovery  of  causes  and  effects.     It  also 
4  SPENCEB:  Data  of  Ethics,  Chap.  VII,  §  42. 


RATIONALISM  121 

takes  cognizance  of  the  likenesses  and  differences  of  things, 
and  classifies  them  on  this  basis.  This  work  of  catalogu- 
ing objects  on  ground  of  their  qualitative  similarity  is 
in  general  of  great  importance  to  conduct;  for  thereby  we 
systematize  our  world  and  are  able  to  deal  effectively  with 
the  endless  diversity  of  things  which  it  contains.  One  of 
its  applications  has,  however,  a  peculiar  and  far-reaching 
significance  for  Ethics.  In  this  case,  man  himself  becomes 
the  subject  of  classification.  Through  his  own  thought  man 
sees  himself  as  a  member  of  the  class  of  human  beings,  as 
one  human  individual  among  many.  Thus  he  is  enabled 
to  view  himself  objectively,  impartially.  When  he  passes 
judgment  on  himself  so  considered,  as  merely  a  human 
person,  an  individual  man,  this  judgment  will  apply  equally 
to  all  other  human  beings,  it  will  be  valid  universally. 
Now  if  we  are  to  make  the  most  of  our  given  human 
capacities  in  a  world  of  fixed  conditions  and  definite  facts, 
clearly  we  must  often  take  the  impartial  and  objective 
attitude  towards  ourselves,  and  reach  conclusions  concern- 
ing our  conduct  which  are  universally  true.  But  such  ob- 
jectivity and  universality  can  only  be  attained  if  we  sub- 
stitute for  the  warmth  of  feeling  and  the  color  of  sense 
the  "  dry,  white  light  of  reason  " — if  we  quiet  the  clamor 
of  impulse,  while  we  seek  in  the  clarity  of  thought  to  view 
our  case  "  steadily  and  view  it  whole."  It  was  this  fact, 
that  only  through  reason  do  we  reach  precepts  and  prin- 
ciples that  are  valid  universally,  which  profoundly  im- 
pressed Immanuel  Kant,  the  leading  Rationalist  of  modern 
times.  Inclination  and  desire  he  regarded  as  essentially 
subjective,  since  their  objects  are  sought  as  means  to  indi- 
vidual happiness.  The  Good,  on  the  contrary,  consists  in 
the  conformity:  of  the  human  will  to  the  law  of  reason 
which,  in  contrast  to  inclination,  is  valid  universally  and  is 
always  an  end  in  itself,  never  a  means  to  anything 
else. 


122  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

7.  (c)  As  Enlarging  the  Experience  of  Man  to  Em- 
brace the  Lives  and  Personalities  of  Others. — Reason 
performs  another  valuable  service  which  deserves  mention 
as  a  third  consideration  in  favor  of  the  theory  which  finds 
man's  chief  good  in  intellectual  activity.  Reason  enables 
the  individual  to  interpret  the  action  and  expression  of 
others,  and  thus  to  gain  an  insight  into  their  personal 
characteristics — theirs  aims,  motives,  and  abilities.  We 
often  overlook  the  part  played  by  reason  and  imagination 
in  all  altruistic  action.  The  sole  requisite  for  such  action 
— we  are  apt  to  think — is  the  proper  state  of  "  will  "  and 
feeling,  the  willingness  to  lend  a  helping  hand,  and  the 
feeling  of  sympathy  and  fellowship.  As  for  the  needs 
and  abilrtws»4j£  others,  can  we  not  observe  them  clearly 
and  easily  ?  Yet  this  is  precisely  what  we  cannot  do.  We 
cannot  observe  directly  the  conscious  life  or  personality 
of  another  human  being  besides  ourselves.  The  actions, 
words,  and  facial  expressions  of  others  may  be  thus  ob- 
served, but  not  their  motives,  ambitions,  or  sentiments.  The 
individual  must  interpret  what  he  sees  others  do,  and  hears 
them  say,  in  terms  of  his  own  conscious  experience,  and  thus 
arrive  at  an  understanding  of  their  personal  attributes  and 
abilities.  This  work  of  interpreting  the  inner  and  unseen 
from  its  outward  and  visible  manifestation  can  be  done  only 
by  reason  and  imagination.  Such  interpretation  is  neces- 
sary, however,  if  there  is  to  be  any  genuine  cooperation 
or  real  helpfulness  among  men  in  society.  For  how  is  one 
man  to  serve  another  unless  he  knows  his  needs,  and  how 
cooperate  with  him  unless  he  understands  his  nature? 

Failure  to  recognize  this  necessity — that  of  understand- 
ing the  thoughts  and  feelings  of  others — has  caused  many  a 
well-meant  act  of  kindness  to  go  astray  and  do  harm  rather 
than  good.  Persons  whose  intentions  are  of  the  best  are 
often  condemned  as  meddlesome  and  officious  because,  hav- 
ing no  knowledge  of  others'  desires  and  sentiments,  they 


RATIONALISM  123 

ride  rough-shod  over  them.  If  one  is  to  do  as  he  would 
be  done  by,  he  must  make  the  intellectual  effort  to  put  him- 
self in  another's  place.  This  requires  thought — to  under- 
stand the  otter's  conditions  and  surroundings — and  imagi- 
nation, to  represent  what  his  thoughts  and  feelings  are  in 
these  circumstances.  And  not  only  is  it  necessary  that  we 
in  this  way  project  ourselves  into  others '  lives,  interpreting 
them  in  terms  of  our  own  conscious  experience,  but  it  is 
equally  necessary  that  we  make  due  allowance  for  differ- 
ences between  ourselves  and  them.  This  puts  a  still  greater 
tax  upon  our  powers  of  intelligence.  Sufficient  regard  must 
be  paid  to  the  essential  identity  between  self  and  others  as 
fellow- workers  or  fellow-citizens,  or  even  like  human  beings, 
and  at  the  same  time  recognition  must  be  made  of  differ- 
ences of  race,  age,  sex,  and  finally,  most  critical  of  all,  of 
individuality.  The  non-observance  of  these  differences  of 
personal  character  and  standpoint  is  a  frequent  source  of 
misunderstanding  and  discord  in  social  relations.  This  is 
particularly  noticeable  in  domestic  relations,  where  the  hus- 
band, notwithstanding  kindness  of  intention  and  genuine 
affection,  offends  and  alienates  the  wife  through  failure  to 
recognize  that  her  sex  gives  her  a  standpoint  fundamen- 
tally different  from  his  own,  and  the  parent  becomes  es- 
tranged from  the  child  because  of  a  failure  to  remember 
that  youth  has  its  own  thoughts  and  desires,  its  own  code 
of  honor  and  attitude  toward  the  world.  Merely  to  under- 
stand one's  friends  and  acquaintances  with  their  varying 
characteristics  sets  a  severe  task  for  the  rational  and  imagi- 
native faculty.  But  only  reason  can  accomplish  it,  and 
hence  should  be  trained  for  the  task.  A  recent  writer 
urges  that  such  training  be  made  a  part  of  the  moral 
instruction  of  youth.  He  says:  "It  is  of  highest  im- 
portance to  recognize  the  place  filled  by  imagination  in 
moral  development.  Although  no  doubt  this  power  may 
be  used  as  an  instrument  of  self-interest,  it  is  in  its  nature 


124  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

antagonistic  to  egoism.  We  cannot  easily  look  forward 
without  letting  our  vision  stray  on  one  side  or  the  other 
of  the  track  of  our  own  immediate  personality.  While 
selfish  desires  may  be  pursued  with  a  minimum  of  pre- 
vision, even  the  rudiments  of  sympathetic  feelings  are  im- 
possible without  a  considerable  measure  of  representative 
activity.  The  first  task  of  the  moral  instructor,  then,  is 
clearly  to  feed  the  springs  of  imaginative  sympathy  to 
enable  the  child  to  put  himself  in  the  place  of  all  those 
whom  his  actions  may  affect."6 

8.  The  Faults  of  Rationalism:  (a)  It  Encourages  In- 
jurious Asceticism. — Since  reason  is  the  faculty  which 
raises  man  above  the  lower  orders  by  revealing  to  him  his 
place  as  a  conscious  individual  in  a  world  of  inter-related 
objects  and  events,  and  by  giving  him  an  insight  into  the 
lives  and  characters  of  his  fellow-men,  it  is  not  surprising 
that  many  moralists  have  found  the  summum  bonum  in 
its  exercise  and  development.  Just  because  so  much  may 
be  said  in  favor  of  Rationalism,  however,  our  criticism  must 
be  particularly  searching  and  severe  that  its  many  merits 
may  not  blind  us  to  its  possible  shortcomings. 

We  have  already  seen  that  in  the  logic  of  ethical  de- 
velopment Rationalism  arises  as  a  protest  against  the  con- 
tinued domination  of  feeling  and  sense  over  human  con- 
duct. Hence  the  Rationalist  thinks  of  intellectual  activity 
as  essentially  opposed  to  the  life  of  pleasure  and  sensuous 
gratification.  Now  no  one  can  deny  that  the  suppression 
of  unruly  passion  and  the  regulation  of  wayward  impulse 
is  the  indispensable  condition  of  all  moral  attainment. 
Natural  appetites  and  animal  desire  are  strong  within  us, 
and  there  is  no  hope  for  the  development  of  spiritual 
capacities  unless  these  are  curbed  and  controlled.  Moral 
development  is  achieved  through  struggle,  and  he  has  but 

•JAMES  OLJPHAKT:  "Moral  Instruction,"  International  Journal 
of  Ethics,  July,  1906,  p.  408. 


RATIONALISM  125 

a  superficial  understanding  of  its  nature  who  would  min- 
imize the  importance  in  it  of  self-development  and  self- 
denial.  The  strictest  control  or  even  complete  suppression 
of  natural  impulse  is  justified  if  required  to  give  intelli- 
gence a  hearing.  Even  when  there  is  no  such  special  need 
it  may  be  wise  to  practise  self-denial  and  to  discipline  our 
natural  appetites  so  that  our  control  over  them  may  be 
greater  in  case  of  emergency.  In  this  sense  of  spiritual 
exercise,  of  moral  athletics,  asceticism  is  to  be  highly  com- 
mended. Thus  Professor  James,  in  an  oft-quoted  passage, 
advises  us  to  keep  the  faculty  effort  alive  in  us  by  a 
little  gratuitous  exercise  every  day.6 

But  when  an  ethical  theory  makes  such  opposition  to 
man's  natural  desires  and  appetites  its  absorbing  interest, 
and  treats  the  suppression  of  feeling,  not  as  a  means,  but 
as  an  end,  the  situation  alters.  Rationalism  has  shown  a 
constant  tendency  to  go  to  this  length — to  condemn  all  the 
pleasures  of  sense  and  to  concentrate  itself  upon  the  de- 
struction of  natural  feeling  and  emotion.  Thus,  in  spite 
of  its  many  merits  which  one  should  not  fail  to  recognize,  it 
has  been  primarily  negative,  not  positive,  in  its  attitude, 
being  characterized,  not  by  what  it  enjoined  men  to  do,  but 
to  refrain  from  doing.  Now,  no  theory  whose  recommenda- 
tions are  mainly  negative  can  be  accepted  as  the  final  solu- 
tion of  the  ethical  problem.  It  is  necessarily  limited  by  its 
negation — being  driven  by  its  opposition,  to  a  view  nearly  as 
extreme  and  untenable  as  that  of  its  opponent.  It  is  not 
unfair  to  say  that  there  is  inherent  in  Rationalism  the  ten- 
dency toward  such  an  extreme — an  extreme  of  asceticism 
which  condemns  all  the  natural  desires  and  gratifications 
of  human  life  as  unworthy  and  evil,  and  which,  when  fully 
developed — as  in  the  Middle  Ages — is  as  false  in  theory 
and  as  injurious  in  practice  as  any  form  of  Hedonism 
could  be.  It  is  this  kind  of  asceticism  which  Spencer 
•  JAMZS:  Principles  of  Psychology,  Vol.  I,  p.  126. 


126  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

attacks,  calling  it  a  product  of  devil-worship — of  the  wor- 
ship of  deities  who  are  thought  to  take  pleasure  in  human 
privation  and  suffering.7 

The  fact  that  such  injurious  asceticism  is  recommended 
by  Rationalism  of  the  extreme  type  and  encouraged  by  its 
moderate  forms  must  count  as  a  serious  charge  against 
the  theory.  The  mind  of  the  present  rightfully  disapproves 
of  the  hostility  to  nature,  the  contempt  for  the  flesh,  that 
is  implied  in  this  asceticism.  An  attitude  of  this  kind 
can  be  justified  only  by  a  philosophy  which  holds  matter 
and  the  material  to  be  essentially  evil.  But  such  a  view 
is  impossible  to  the  thought  of  to-day  which  has  accepted 
the  evolutionary  interpretation  of  the  universe.  From  this 
standpoint  all  of  human  nature  is  the  product  of  the  evolu- 
tionary process.  Some  of  man's  faculties  he  received  al- 
ready developed  from  animal  progenitors:  others  existed 
only  in  germ  in  the  lower  forms,  their  development  being 
peculiar  to  man.  But  this  fact  furnishes  no  ground  for 
making  an  absolute  separation  between  the  two,  condemning 
the  former  as  material  and  exalting  the  latter  as  spiritual. 
Instead  we  must  regard  all  as  alike  natural  and  their  differ- 
ence one  of  degree  only.  Now  as  natural,  man's  sensuous 
.impulses  and  "  fleshly  "  desires  may  rightfully  claim  a 
share  of  his  attention  and  a  measure  of  gratification.  The 
desire  for  food  and  drink  and  play,  the  impulse  of  sex 
and  parenthood — all  these  are  part  of  normal  human 
nature.  Hence  the  attainment  of  their  objects  is  a  neces- 
sary part  of  the  satisfaction  of  man 's  will ;  and  without  it 
human  volition  will  go  unsatisfied.  Moreover,  certain  of 
these  sensuous  impulses  constitute  the  roots  from  which 
spring  some  of  the  most  esteemed  "  spiritual  "  gifts.  Thus 
the  instincts  of  sex  and  sympathy  are  the  source  of  altruis- 
tic qualities  that  distinguish  the  finest  character.  The  in- 
stinct of  combat  is  the  source  of  those  tendencies  to  rivalry 
T  SPENCEB:  Data  of  Ethics,  §§14,  38. 


RATIONALISM  127 

and  emulation  which  in  their  higher  forms  make  the  most 
effective  spurs  to  personal  achievement.  One  who,  in  mis- 
taken moral  zeal,  exterminates  any  of  these  impulses  does 
a  double  wrong  to  his  human  nature — he  mutilates  it  by 
depriving  it  of  one  of  its  natural  means  of  expression,  and 
also  stunts  its  future  growth  by  destroying  forces  germinal 
to  further  development.  Finally  it  is  worth  noting  that 
such  asceticism  usually  fails  of  its  aim  to  remove  from 
the  mind  all  sensuous  desire.  The  very  effort  to  "  crucify 
the  body, "  to  ' '  mortify  the  flesh, ' '  results  in  over-attention 
to  the  pleasures  of  sense — not  the  normal  and  wholesome 
desire  that  is  present  at  times  and  then  gives  place  to  other 
interests — but  a  morbid  and  unwholesome  lingering  of  the 
mind  upon  the  details  of  joys  at  once  repugnant  and  fas- 
cinating. One  of  the  most  unpleasant  chapters  in  the 
literature  of  monasticism  is  that  telling  of  the  visions  of 
carnal  pleasure  and  sensuous  delight  which  were  constantly 
tantalizing  monk  and  hermit  when  alone  in  the  cell  to 
which  they  had  fled  to  secure  relief  from  the  distractions 
of  the  world  and  opportunity  for  uninterrupted  prayer 
and  meditation. 

9.  (b)  It  Justifies  Extreme  Intellectualism. — Rational- 
ism maintains  that  man  finds  his  highest  good  in  withdraw- 
ing his  attention  from  those  objects  of  sense  that  give  him 
present  pleasure  and  directing  it  upon  the  principles  and 
conceptions  of  reason.  Now  these  ideals  of  reason  and 
imagination  pertain  to  the  future  and  the  larger  world  of 
persons  and  principles.  Hence  they  are  different  from  the 
objects  of  sense  and  feeling  which  are  confined  to  the  pres- 
ent state  or  past  experience  of  the  individual.  The  Ration- 
alist accentuates  this  difference  by  opposing  the  freedom 
and  range  of  thought  to  the  strict  limitations  of  feeling. 
But  the  objects  of  sense  and  feeling,  if  limited  in  their 
scope,  at  least  possess  actuality.  And  here  also  the  con- 
trast which  the  Rationalist  makes  between  feeling  and 


128  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

thought  holds  in  all  its  severity.  The  principles  and  con- 
ceptions of  thought,  although  their  range  may  be  as  wide 
as  the  universe,  do  not  possess  this  actuality.  They  may 
represent  a  condition  better  and  more  satisfactory  than 
the  actual  but,  as  thoughts  and  ideas,  they  merely  repre- 
sent it,  they  do  not  realize  it.  Thought  and  imagination 
soar  free  from  the  limitations  of  the  present  and  the  actual, 
but  the  penalty  they  pay  is  that  the  world  they  inhabit 
is  unactual  and,  in  a  sense,  unreal.  Thus  the  man  who 
finds  his  Good  simply  in  thinking  about  the  ideal,  in  reason- 
ing out  plans  for  his  own  betterment,  is  justly  criticised 
as  a  mere  idealist,  or  even  condemned  as  a  visionary.  He 
is  dwelling  in  a  world  of  his  own  thought  and  imagination 
and  failing  to  give  his  nature  the  satisfaction  it  demands 
in  actual  experience.  Moreover,  when  this  absorption  in  in- 
tellectual activity  is  carried  beyond  a  certain  point  it  seems 
definitely  hostile  to  any  actual  attainment ;  for  it  seeks,  as 
the  condition  most  favorable  to  its  own  existence,  seclusion 
from  the  world  of  practical  affairs  and  human  intercourse. 
Thus  the  individual  finds  his  Good  in  the  life  of  secluded 
contemplation.  That  Rationalism  encourages  absorption  in 
thought  at  the  expense  of  actual  attainment  must  be  reck- 
oned a  grave  fault.  And  there  can  be  no  question  but 
that  the  logic  of  the  theory  leads  towards  such  a  barren 
intellectualism.  The  historical  development  of  Rationalism 
in  ancient  and  mediaeval  times  abundantly  proves  it.  Plato, 
with  his  artist's  soul  and  dislike  of  extremes,  despite  a 
feeling  for  the  beauty  of  a  harmonious  and  symmetrical 
development  of  human  nature,  was  impelled  by  his  rational- 
istic premises  to  praise  most  highly  the  life  of  the  philoso- 
pher who,  removed  from  the  distractions  of  the  world,  pur- 
sues without  interruption  his  philosophic  meditations.  The 
same  premise,  that  man's  Good  lies  in  the  supremacy  of 
reason  in  his  life,  leads  Aristotle,  notwithstanding  his  nota- 
ble good  sense  and  sagacity  in  dealing  with  all  matters 


RATIONALISM  129 

of  practical  morality,  to  esteem  most  worthy  the  speculative 
life.  The  greatest  defect  in  Stoicism  was  that  it  encouraged 
aloofness  from  the  world  ancTself-absorption.  The  monas- 
ticism  of  the  Middle  Ages  found  justification  in  a  rational- 
istic philosophy  which  condemned  the  material  world  and 
the  desires  of  the  flesh  as  evil  and  sought  salvation  in  medi- 
tation and  prayer,  rather  than  in  the  teachings  of  Jesus.  It 
is  this  tendency  of  Rationalism — the  tendency  to  oppose  to 
the  doctrine  which  finds  the  Good  in  the  pleasure  of  present 
attainment,  another  doctrine  equally  abstract  and  one-sided 
which  asserts  that  the  Good  lies  in  thinking  about  larger 
ends  and  aims  to  be  achieved  in  the  future, — which  Hegel 
roundly  condemns  in  his  Logic.  The  larger  ends  and  ideals 
of  reason  constitute  "  that  ought-to-be  on  the  strength 
of  which  reflection  is  vain  enough  to  treat  the  actual  pres- 
ent with  scorn  and  to  point  to  a  scene  beyond — a  scene 
which  is  assumed  to  have  place  and  being  only  in  the 
understanding  of  those  who  talk  of  it. "  8  The  Rationalistic 
position  is  a  striking  example  of  the  false  infinite  which 
exists  as  merely  the  negative  of  the  finite,  and  hence  is 
always  limited  by  it.  Rationalism  is  limited  by  its  opposi- 
tion to  Empiricism  or  Hedonism.  Against  it  the  latter 
may  always  maintain  "  the  great  principle  that  whatever 
is  true  must  be  in  the  actual  world  and  present  to  sensa- 
tion." "  Yet  what  may  be  called  the  laziness  of  thought, 
when  dealing  with  this  Supreme  Idea,  finds  a  too  easy 
mode  of  evasion  in  the  ought-to-be;  instead  of  the  actual 
realization  of  the  ultimate  end  it  clings  hard  to  the  dis- 
junction of  the  notion  from  reality."9 

10.  (c)  It  Is  Individualistic  in  Tendency. — Rational- 
ism, as  has  been  seen,  recommends  an  asceticism  which 
cuts  the  individual  off  from  social  relationships  and  human 
intercourse.  It  also  encourages  an  intellectualism  which 

•HEGEL:  Shorter  Logic,  §38  (Wallace's  trans.,  pp.  77-78). 
•Op.  tit.,  §55,  p.  112. 


130  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

causes  him  to  seek  the  seclusion  favorable  to  continued 
thought  and  study.  The  result  of  these  two  tendencies  is 
to  encourage  a  self-centered  life  which  feels  no  social  re- 
sponsibility and  discharges  no  political  obligation.  Thus 
Rationalism  is  as  individualistic — as  selfish,  if  you  please — 
in  its  final  implications  as  is  Hedonism.  We  are  all  familiar 
with  a  certain  type  of  intellectual  culture  which  shrinks 
from  the  ordinary  human  relationships  as  if  fearing  con- 
tamination, and  avoids  the  performance  of  social  duty,  lest 
its  own  refinement  should  be  diminished  thereby.  Such  a 
type  of  character  is  the  legitimate  offspring  of  Rationalism ; 
for  when  we  make  intellectual  activity  man's  chief  good, 
then  it  becomes  right  for  him  to  seek  the  most  favorable 
conditions  for  its  exercise.  These  conditions  will  not  lie 
in  the  busy  walks  of  life,  in  the  adjustments  and  readjust- 
ments of  the  family  relation,  in  the  wear  and  tear  of  social 
intercourse,  but  in  the  quiet  of  some  secluded  and  com- 
fortable retreat  from  which  the  world  may  be  viewed  as  a 
passing  show. 

Thus  in  conclusion  it  is  interesting  to  behold  the  theories 
of  Hedonism  and  Rationalism,  extreme  opposites  though 
they  are,  brought  by  their  equal  one-sidedness  into  a  kind 
of  identity.  Hedonism  recommends  a  well-planned  and 
prudent  life  in  which  mainly  intellectual  pleasures  are 
sought  because  they  endure  the  longer  and  have  less  pain 
in  after-effect.  Rationalism  advises  the  exercise  of  reason 
in  a  life  freed  from  the  pressure  of  social  obligations  in 
order  to  afford  the  most  favorable  conditions  for  intellectual 
activity  and  culture.  The  Rationalist  will  be  more  austere 
and  less  sympathetic,  the  Hedonist  more  amiable  but  less 
resolute,  while  the  lives  of  both  will  incline  to  be  equally 
narrow  and  self -centered. 

REFERENCES 

SETH,  Ethical  Principles,  Part  I,  Chap.  II. 
HICKS,  Stoic  and  Epicurean,  Chaps.  I,  II,  III,  IV. 


RATIONALISM  131 

ZELLEB,  Stoics,  Epicureans  and  Sceptics,  Part  II. 

FITE,  Introductory  Study  of  Ethics,  Part  II. 

SIDOWICK,  History  of  Ethics,  Chap.  II,  §§  13-20. 

BAKEWELL,   Source-book  in  Ancient  Philosophy,   Chaps.  XVII,  XX, 

XXI. 

SIDQWICK,  Methods  of  Ethics,  Book  III. 
HYDE,  Five  Great  Philosophies  of  Life,  Chap.  II. 


CHAPTER  IV 

VOLITION  AS  AN  ORGANIZING  AGENCY 

1.  Volition  as  an  Organizing  Agency. — 2.  Volition  as  the  Synthetic 
Activity  Comprehensive  of  Feeling  and  Thought. — 3.  Develop- 
ment of  Volition:  Involuntary  Action, — 4.  Voluntary  Action: 
(a)  From  Desire, — 5.  (6)  From  Purpose, — 6.  (c)  From  Ideal. 
— 7.  Volition  as  Creative  of  Self-conscious  Personality. — 8.  Vo- 
lition Does  Not  Always  Effect  Complete  Organization, — 9.  But 
to  That  Extent  Is  Not  Fully  Developed. 

1.  Volition  as  an  Organizing  Agency. — The  leading 
ethical  theories,  Hedonism  and  Rationalism,  have  now  been 
reviewed  and  the  problem  of  the  Good  is  still  unsolved. 
Neither  theory  when  followed  out  provides  for  the  com- 
plete satisfaction  of  the  human  will.  Only  one  way  is  open 
to  us,  therefore, — that  of  approaching  our  problem  directly, 
seeking  first  to  discover  the  essential  character  of  volition 
and  then  to  infer  from  its  character  as  thus  disclosed  what 
is  required  for  its  complete  satisfaction.1 

When  we  approach  the  problem  in  this  way  our  study 
of  Hedonism  and  Rationalism  proves  to  have  been  far  from 
fruitless.  Both  of  these  theories  throw  light  upon  the 
character  of  volition,  for  both  reflect  essential  aspects 
of  this  activity.  Hedonism  expresses  its  demand  for  suc- 
cess in  present  attainment,  but  would  secure  such  success 
at  the  cost  of  limiting  strictly  the  objects  which  it  seeks 
to  attain.  Rationalism  voices  its  demand  for  a  larger  range 
of  objects  to  pursue,  but  at  the  expense  of  making  these 
objects  mere  thoughts  and  leaving  them  unrealized.  How 
can  these  two  demands  be  met  without  the  corresponding 
disadvantages?  How  can  the  will  be  assured  of  enjoying 

1  Compare  Part  I,  Chap.  II,  §  3. 
132 


VOLITION  AS  AN  ORGANIZING  AGENCY         133 

the  success  of  present  achievement  without  restricting  itself 
to  objects  which  present  perception  or  past  experience 
guarantee  will  furnish  such  satisfaction?  And  how  can 
the  will  overcome  this  restriction  and  direct  itself  upon  the 
larger  objects  of  thought  and  imagination  without  aban- 
doning the  actual  world  for  the  realm  of  the  ideal  and 
merely  possible?  Clearly,  only  when  it  takes  a  third  step 
and  endeavors  to  convert  the  ideal  into  actuality.  This 
is  accomplished  by  making  the  present  act  a  means  to  the 
realization  of  the  principles  and  conceptions  of  reason.  The 
realization  may  be  distant  and  the  present  act  contribute 
but  little  toward  it,  yet  the  two,  actual  present  and  ideal 
future,  are  joined  in  a  close  and  vital  connection.  This, 
the  third  aspect  of  voluntary  activity,  is  therefore  a  syn- 
thesis of  the  other  two,  which  transcends  and  at  the  same 
time  unites  them.  Present  achievement  is  rendered  more 
satisfactory  because  it  is  no  longer  restricted  in  its  range 
as  to  object,  but  extends  to  the  most  inclusive  and  far- 
reaching  ends.  On  the  other  hand,  our  knowledge  of  these 
larger  aims  and  ideals  is  increased  and  made  more  definite 
by  our  experience  in  progressively  realizing  them.  The 
two  aspects  of  will  which  at  first  appeared  to  conflict,  its 
demand  for  present  attainment,  and  its  demand  for  the 
greatest  range  of  choice  among  objects,  now  prove  to  be 
complementary  and  inter-dependent.  All  this  is  evidence 
that  we  now  behold  volition  with  its  nature  fully  expressed. 
As  thus  viewed,  it  reveals  itself  as  an  activity  of  adjust- 
ment, by  which  the  various  activities  of  the  individual 
are  adjusted,  or  correlated,  with  one  another — or,  bet- 
ter, an  organizing  agency,  whereby  the  successive  acts 
of  the  self  are  related  as  means  to  deliberately  chosen 
ends. 

2.  Volition  as  the  Synthetic  Activity  Comprehensive 
of  Feeling  and  Thought. — Let  us  consider  a  little  further 
this  organizing  activity  of  will,  with  particular  reference 


134  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

to  the  part  played  in  it  by  feeling  and  thought.  An  ordi- 
nary instance  of  volition  will  illustrate  clearly  how  its  or- 
ganizing work  is  carried  on.  Suppose  that  a  young  man 
is  intending  to  devote  an  evening  to  amusement  in  such 
company  as  he  knows  will  furnish  good-fellowship  and 
pleasure.  He  happens  to  think,  however,  of  a  leading  pur- 
pose of  life,  to  prepare  himself  for  a  certain  profession  in 
which  he  hopes  to  win  distinction,  and,  as  he  thinks,  he 
begins  to  wonder  uneasily  if  he  is  making  his  evenings 
contribute  as  they  might  to  the  realization  of  his  purpose. 
In  this  connection  there  occurs  to  his  mind  the  notice  he 
has  seen  of  a  lecture  to  be  given  this  very  evening  upon 
a  subject  relating  to  his  proposed  profession.  He  recog- 
nizes that  attendance  upon  this  lecture  would  further  his 
life-purpose,  and  hence,  contrary  to  inclination,  he  gives 
his  attention  wholly  to  the  idea  of  it,  goes,  and  remains 
an  interested  listener.  The  consequence  of  his  thus  acting 
in  accordance  with  his  larger  purpose  is  that  he  gains  new 
knowledge  which  makes  this  purpose  clearer  and  more 
effective  in  his  life,  besides  the  encouragement  which  results 
from  having  taken  a  step  in  its  actual  realization.  We 
see,  then,  that  the  young  man — and  the  case  is  of  course 
typical  of  all  volition — through  the  exercise  of  will  takes 
his  evening's  action  out  of  its  isolation  and  makes  it  a 
means  to  the  attainment  of  a  larger  end  which  he  has 
chosen  to  pursue.  To  adjust  actions  as  means  to  larger 
'•ends,  in  this  way,  is  to  organize  conduct.  The  particular 
act  is  given  meaning  through  its  subordination  to  the  ruling 
purpose,  while  the  purpose  is  made  real  through  the  instru- 
mentality of  the  particular  act. 

When  volition  is  thus  conceived  as  an  organizing  agency, 
it  appears  as  the  all-comprehensive  activity  of  intelligent 
life,  including  within  its  unity  both  feeling  and  thought, 
and  assigning  to  each  its  proper  place.  Feeling  is  subjec- 
tive and  expresses  the  actual  state  of  the  self,  a  state  of 


VOLITION  AS  AN  ORGANIZING  AGENCY         135 

pleasure  when  in  possession  of  sought-for  objects.2  Thought 
is  objective  and  represents  the  ideal  conditions  of  a  larger 
life  in  the  conception  of  objects  as  yet  unattained.  These 
two  factors  come  into  conflict  and  opposition.  Thought,  by 
representing  new  and  greater  possibilities  of  achievement, 
destroys  the  unity  and  equilibrium  signified  by  pleasant 
feeling.  Then,  through  action,  the  new  objects  thought  of 
are  attained  and  the  unity  of  the  self  is  felt  to  be  restored 
and  increased  by  the  possession  of  a  greater  variety  of 
objects.  Volition  is  the  synthetic  activity  which  includes 
within  its  scope  all  these  lesser  activities  of  feeling,  thought, 
and  action.  These  minor  factors  exist  only  in  so  far  as 
they  contribute  to  the  main  work  of  organization.  Hence 
we  see  that  it  is  absurd  to  regard  volition  as  subordinate 
either  to  feeling  or  to  thought.  Volition  is  not  the  servant 
of  feeling,  limited  to  seeking  those  objects  whose  possession 
is  sure  to  increase  pleasure.  For  the  circle  of  such  objects 
is  small,  and,  to  obtain  satisfaction,  volition  must  go  beyond 
it  in  pursuit  of  objects  whose  pleasure-yielding  capacity  is 
doubtful  and  uncertain.  Neither  is  volition  the  servant  of 
thought,  limited  to  the  idea  of  larger  achievement,  or  to 
the  mechanical  reproduction  of  a  program  of  action  pre- 
viously thought  out  in  every  detail.  For  thought,  as 
thought,  does  not  communicate  actuality  to  its  objects,  nor 
can  it  anticipate  with  exactness  the  actual  future.  But 
volition  demands  actual  achievement  and  must  therefore 
advance  on  its'  own  initiative  to  grapple  with  a  future 
uncertain  both  as  to  feeling  and  fact.  Volition  is  essentially 
a  venture — a  venture  into  the  unknown.  To  a  degree  reason 

1 "  Hence  in  the  case  of  happiness  the  subject  takes  the  first  place, 
in  the  case  of  truth  the  object;  there  we  have  a  vigorous  con- 
centration, here  an  unlimited  expansion,  there  an  expression,  here 
a  repression  of  vital  emotion.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the  desire 
for  happiness  the  struggle  for  truth  may  easily  appear  cold  and  life- 
less, while  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  latter  the  former  may  appear 
narrow  and  selfish.  — EucKEN:  Philosophy  of  Spirit,  Eng.  trans., 
1909,  p.  276. 


136  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

may  direct,  and  feeling  impel,  but  never  to  the  extent 
of  absolutely  pre-determining  what  shall  come  to  pass. 
The  individual  must  surrender  objects  which  assure  him 
satisfaction  in  order  to  seek  other  more  remote  and  far- 
reaching  ends.  It  is  true  that  these  ends  when  achieved 
may  afford  a  fuller  satisfaction  than  those  sacrificed  to 
them,  but  this  can  be  ascertained  only  by  making  the  sac- 
rifice— by  taking  the  venture.  An  element  of  uncertainty 
is  bound  to  remain,  and  from  this  fact  it  follows  that,  not 
pure  reason,  but  rational  faith,  an  effort  of  will  guided 
by  intelligence  but  transcending  the  limits  of  proof  or 
demonstrable  certainty,  is  the  primary  requisite  of  intelli- 
gent life  and  action.  Every  act  of  will  brings  an  ex- 
perience that  is  entirely  fresh  and  unique  and  yields  some 
results  that  possess  absolute  novelty.  The  occurrence  of 
what  is  absolutely  new,  and  hence  cannot  be  anticipated  is 
a  distinguishing  characteristic  of  all  life.  From  it  springs 
the  necessity  for  faith  in  one's  self  and  the  courage  to 
venture,  and  upon  it  rests  the  possibility  of  real  spiritual 
growth  and  achievement  through  such  exercise  of  volition. 

3.  Development  of  Volition — Involuntary  Action,  In- 
stinctive and  Impulsive. — If  further  evidence  is  needed 
to  prove  that  volition  is  essentially  an  organizing  agency, 
it  is  furnished  by  a  survey  of  the  different  forms  which 
this  activity  takes  in  the  course  of  human  development. 

The  earliest  actions  of  the  human  individual  are  not 
voluntary  if  we  understand  action  to  be  voluntary  which 
is  directed  towards  a  consciously  chosen  end.3  They  have 
not  even  a  conscious  motive.  Man  is  born  with  certain 
instincts — modifications  of  his  nervous  system  which  cause 
him  to  react  in  a  definite  manner  to  specific  stimuli.  Some 

*  For  the  account  given  of  the  development  of  volition  in  this 
and  the  following  sections  the  writer  is  indebted  to  the  standard 
psychologies  of  James,  Titchener,  and  Stout,  but  is  under  special 
obligations  to  HOFFDING:  Outline  of  Psychology,  and  BALDWIN: 
Social  and  Ethical  Interpretations  in  Mental  Development. 


object  or  influence  of  the  outer  world  is  usually  the  stimulus 
to  which  the  instinct  is  keyed,  and  the  action  by  which 
the  organism  responds  to  such  stimulation  is  called  in- 
stinctive. When  a  pencil  or  the  handle  of  a  rattle  is  laid 
in  the  hand  of  a  very  young  infant,  and  the  tiny  fingers 
move  and  close  around  the  object,  we  have  an  example  of 
such  instinctive  action.  The  infant  does  not  perceive  the 
pencil  or  rattle,  much  less  act  with  the  intention  of  grasp- 
ing it.  Instinctive  action  is  then  originally  without  con- 
scious motive.  But  with  its  repetition — and  as  the  result 
of  it — comes  a  growing  consciousness  of  the  object.  The 
numerous  pressures  and  strains  that  accompany  the  in- 
stinctive movement,  and  the  pleasure  or  pain  which  is 
consequent  upon  it,  associate  themselves  with  the  group 
of  sensations  set  up  by  the  original  stimulus,  cause  them 
to  be  distinguished  from  the  confused  contents  of  conscious- 
ness, and  finally  to  be  given  meaning  as  a  definite  object. 
Thus  the  babe  comes  to  perceive  the  rattle  or  colored  pencil 
and,  when  he  puts  out  his  hand  for  it,  his  movement  is 
prompted  by  an  idea  of  the  object.  His  action  now  has 
a  conscious  impulse. 

Action  which  is  thus  initiated  by  the  perce_2tifln_jaiLJunage 
of  an  object  may  be  called  impulsive.  The  number  of 
objects  which  are  thus  perceived  and  may  become  motives 
of  action  rapidly  increases  in  the  early  period  of  mental 
development.  Each  of  the  instincts  dominant  at  this  time 
leads  to  the  perception  of  a  class  of  articles  constituting 
its  objective  stimuli.  Thus  the  different  kinds  of  food,  a 
variety  of  playthings,  etc.,  are  consciously  recognized  and 
induce  action.  Then  besides  these  instincts  which  are 
directed  upon  objects  of  a  specific  nature,  there  is  the  in- 
stinct of  imitation,  whose  stimulus  is  any  movement  of  any 
object,  but  particularly  the  movements  of  other  individuals. 
Through  the  operation  of  this  instinct  the  child  learns  to 
distinguish  different  people  by  their  characteristic  behavior 


138  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

which  he  has  imitated,  and  from  this  imitation  comes  also  to 
know  something  of  his  own  strength  and  capacity.  More- 
over, in  addition  to  an  increasing  knowledge  of  the  nature  of 
objects,  we  find  at  this  period — as  Baldwin  points  out — an 
increasing  sense  of  their  worth.  The  pleasure  or  pain  which 
results  from  seeking  an  object  attaches  to  the  idea  of  this 
object  and  determines  its  power  as  an  incentive  to  action. 
Objects  are  sought  in  the  degree  to  which  their  suggestions 
are  pleasurable,  and  avoided  to  the  extent  in  which  they 
have  painful  associations. 

While  impulsive  action  has  a  conscious  motive,  it  is 
nevertheless  not  truly  voluntary.  It  is  action  in  pursuit 
of  a  consciously-perceived  object.  But  it  is  not  action  in 
pursuit  of  a  consciously  chosen  end.  In  true  volition  the 
object  is  not  merely  known,  but  known  as  the  end  of  action. 
This  is  not  the  case  with  impulsive  action.  The  impulse 
is  only  the  instinct  raised  to  clear  consciousness,  and  is  still 
dominated  by  the  object.  As  Baldwin  remarks  concerning 
this  type  of  action  in  the  child,4  "  The  object  before  him 
fills  up  his  consciousness;  he  thinks  nothing  about  it,  he 
simply  thinks  it.  His  action  goes  out  in  channels  of  in- 
herited tendency,  directly  upon  the  object. " 5  In  order 
that  an  object  be  a  "  chosen  end,"  as  in  voluntary  action, 
it  must,  in  contrast  to  this,  first  be  distinguished  as  ideal 
and  future  from  what  is  actual  and  present,  and,  second, 
be  distinguished  from  other  ideal  possibilities  as  the  one 
required  to  satisfy  the  self.6  Green  says,  speaking  of 
desire,  to  him  the  typical  form  of  volition,  "  The  common 
characteristic  of  every  such  desire  is  its  direction  to  an 
object  consciously  presented  as  not  yet  real  and  of  which 
the  realization  would  satisfy,  i.e.  extinguish  the  desire."7 

•BALDWIN:  Mental  Development:  Social  and  Ethical  Interpreta- 
tions, p.  369. 

•Op.  of*.,  p.  366. 

*HOFFDING:   Outline  of  Psychology,  Eng.  trans.,  p.  322. 

» GREEN:  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  §  131. 


VOLITION  AS  AN  ORGANIZING  AGENCY         139 

Before  volition  can  arise,  therefore,  there  must  be  ability 
to  distinguish  between  the  present  and  actual,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  ideal  and  merely  possible,  on  the  other.  In 
contrast  to  the  world  of  actual  objects  present  to  percep- 
tion with  nature  and  relations  fixed,  there  must  exist  an 
ideal  order,  a  world  of  free  ideas  in  which  the  thought  of 
the  individual  can  range  at  will.  This  world  of  ideas,  as 
it  develops,  represents  the  experience,  abilities,  and  inter- 
ests of  the  individual  himself  as  distinguished  from  all 
objective  conditions.  Its  development  means  the  growth 
of  self-consciousness  and  selfhood.  With  its  appearance 
comes  the  possibility  of  acting  to  realize  an  end — an  ideal 
chosen  from  among  other  ideal  possibilities  because  the 
most  satisfactory  to  the  self — and  thus  of  rising  to  the 
dignity  of  a  voluntary  agent. 

The  distinction  between  ideal  and  actual  is,  like  all  men- 
tal achievements,  the  result  of  a  gradual  process  of  growth. 
Ideal  elements  enter  very  soon  into  the  experience  of  the 
individual  in  the  form  of  memory-images.  These  images 
may  constitute  impulses  to  action  just  as  do  perceptions. 
Thus  the  clinking  of  spoon  and  glass  calls  up  an  image 
of  the  nursing  bottle  to  the  infant  consciousness  and 
prompts  the  same  actions  that  the  actual  sight  of  the  bottle 
would.  If  the  prompting  of  an  idea  inwardly  aroused 
(in  distinction  from  a  perception)  sufficed  to  make  an  act 
voluntary,  we  should  have  volition  very  early  in  mental 
development.  Animals  are  frequently  moved  to  action  by 
images  rather  than  by  perceptions,  as  when  the  dog  which 
has  been  fed  two  mornings  from  the  step  behind  the 
house  begins  to  leap  and  bark  when  he  sees  the  door 
opened  on  the  third  morning.  But  it  is  requisite  to  volition 
that  the  idea  be  recognized  as  in  its  ideality  different 
from  the  perception,  and  at  first  this  does  not  occur; 
the  images  simply  fuse  with  the  perceptions.  As  devel- 
opment proceeds,  however,  this  fusion  becomes  less  close 


140  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

and  complete — at  least  in  the  experience  of  the  human  in- 
dividual.8 The  image  when  revived  brings  with  it  numer- 
ous associated  images  which,  continuing  for  an  interval  of 
time,  serve  to  interrupt  and  dislocate  the  regular  order 
and  sequence  of  perceptions  from  the  outer  world.  Thus 
the  two  series,  inner  and  outer,  ideal  and  actual,  each  hav- 
ing its  own  order  and  relation,  tend  to  break  apart  and 
run  separately.  But,  as  Hoffding  believes,  probably  the  dis- 
tinction between  idea  and  actuality  is  fUst  consciously  made 
as  the  result  of  the  unpleasant  experience  of  finding  that 
an  idea,  when  acted  upon  as  always  in  the  past,  does  not 
have  the  same  result  in  the  present,  owing  to  change  in 
actual  conditions.  Thus  the  child  seeing  the  whiteness  of 
the  snow  has  an  image  of  sugar  called  up,  and,  acting  upon 
it,  fills  his  mouth  with  the  cold  substance.  Such  experi- 
ences, with  their  unpleasantness,  teach  him  effectually  the 
distinction  between  ideas  or  memories  and  actual  objects 
and  conditions.  Thus  "  the  first  basis  is  laid  of  the  con- 
trast between  possibility  and  actuality.  Then  only  the  free 
ideas  enter  into  a  relation  of  definite  contrast  to  sensation 
and  percept."0 

With  this  distinction  once  made  the  individual  becomes 
capable  of  voluntary  action,  i.e.  action  in  pursuit  of  a 
consciously  chosen  end.  When  the  implications  of  volition 
are  thus  drawn  out  and  stated,  it  may  seem  to  be  an  in- 
volved and  complicated  activity.  Yet  in  its  actual  exercise 
it  is  direct  and  simple  enough.  The  three-year-old,  who 
leaves  his  play  out  of  doors,  enters  the  house,  and,  disre- 
garding everything  else,  goes  to  his  mother  and  says,  "  I 
want  an  apple  to  eat,"  fulfils  in  his  behavior  all  the  re- 
quirements of  true  volition.  The  object  of  his  action,  the 
apple,  he  distinguishes  as  ideal  from  all  actual  objects 

*  Hoffding  gives  a  full  and  illuminating  account  of  the  growth 
of  the  distinction  between  ideal  and  actual  in  his  Outline  of  Psy- 
chology, Eng.  trans.,  pp.  122-33. 

•HOFFDING:  Op.  oit.,  p.  133. 


VOLITION  AS  AN  ORGANIZING  AGENCY        141 

present  to  his  perception,  and  he  disregards  them  for  it. 
He  also  distinguishes  this  idea  and  prefers  it  as  an  end 
to  all  other  ideal  possibilities — it  is  the  apple  he  desires, 
not  bread,  or  sweet-meats,  or  any  other  eatable.  In  the 
formation  of  this  ideal  order  which  the  individual  learns 
to  distinguish  from  the  actual  world  and  to  identify  with 
himself,  two  factors  deserve  especial  mention.  The  first 
is  that  of  imitation.  Through  imitating  others  the  indi- 
vidual acquires,  in  addition  to  his  ideas  of  objects  that 
give  pleasure,  conceptions  of  various  activities  which  yield 
him  satisfaction.10  The  second  is  language.  The  human 
individual  is  able  in  the  manner  indicated  to  construct 
an  ideal  order  which  has  permanence  and  unity  largely 
because  of  the  faculty  of  language  which  he  possesses. 
Through  the  use  of  words  he  gives  body  and  definition  to 
ideas  which  otherwise  would  be  too  tenuous  to  persist  in 
memory  and  too  shifting  to  enter  into  any  permanent  re- 
lationships. 

4.  Voluntary  Action:  (a)  From  Desire. — The  first 
stage  in  the  development  of  volition  is  that  of  desire. 
Action  from  desire  has  for  its  end  the  present  attainment 
of  some  single  object.11  An  idea  of  the  object  in  question 
has  been  produced  by  past  experience  in  the  mind  of  the 
individual.  That  idea  has  acquired  interest  and  value  be- 
cause in  the  past  its  object  has  given  satisfaction  to  some 
need  or  capacity.  That  idea  now  becomes  an  end  of  action 
which  the  individual  consciously  seeks  to  realize.  The 
object  of  desire,  although  single,  may  vary  greatly  in  its 
meaning  and  importance.  The  apple  sought  by  the  child 
in  the  simple  illustration  just  used  and  the  rare  book  or 
picture  sought  by  the  art  collector,  the  flower  by  the  road- 
side, and  the  great  mansion  are,  equally,  in  their  way,  ob- 
jects of  desire.  Action  from  desire  differs  from  instinctive 

18  BALDWIN:  Op.  cit.,  p.  34. 

"BALDWIN:  Op.  tit.,  p.  372,  and  HOFFDING:  Op.  tit.,  p.  323. 


142  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

or  impulsive  action  not  so  much  in  the  nature  of  the  object 
as  in  the  relation  of  the  object  to  the  self.  Previous  to 
the  appearance  of  desire,  the  action  of  the  individual  is 
determined  by  the  objects  and  forces  of  the  environment, 
as  they  play  upon  his  different  instincts  and  impulses. 
Not  the  individual  is  acting,  but  the  forces  of  nature  are 
acting  through  him.12  But  in  desire,  the  first  form  of 
voluntary  action,  all  this  is  changed.  The  individual  seeks 
an  object  thought  of  as  an  end  to  be  realized,  and,  conse- 
quently set  in  sharp  opposition  to  the  world  of  objects, 
actually  existing.13  He  resists  the  appeal  of  externally 
existent  objects  to  his  instincts  in  order  to  pursue  this  end, 
which,  of  all  the  ideal  possibilities  of  the  situation,  appeals 
most  to  himself.  Through  effort  he  overcomes  the  opposi- 
tion between  ideal  and  actual,  by  making  the  ideal  actual, 
by  realizing  his  end.1*  Thus  actual  objects  and  conditions 
are  determined  by  the  self  and  not  vice  versa.  The  effect 
of  desire  is  to  release  the  actions  of  the  human  individual 
from  their  subservience  to  various  external  objects  and  to 
make  them  means  to  ends  chosen  by  himself.  Thus  the 
different  acts  are  all  made  instrumental  to  self-expression, 
and  the  first  step  is  taken  in  the  organization  of  conduct. 
5.  (b)  Action  from  Purpose. — "With  the  growth  of  in- 
telligence single  objects  are  grouped,  according  to  their 
affinities,  into  more  or  less  comprehensive  classes;  general 
ideas  or  concepts  are  formed  which  include  a  number  of 
particuTa~r~pefceptions.15  Volition,  in  the  next  stage  of  its 

"GBEEN:  Op.  tit.,  §  91.  "Ibid.,  §  131. 

14  Alexander  in  his  account  of  desire  emphasizes  the  conflict 
which  it  involves  between  ideal  and  actual,  ideal  end  and  actual 
conditions.  He  describes  desire  as  consisting  in  "  a  feeling  of  ten- 
sion which  may  be  described  as  a  sense  of  disparity  between  the 
ideal  object  and  the  actual  state  of  the  agent."  ( ALEXANDER: 
Moral  Order  and  Progress,  Bk.  I,  Chap.  I,  §3,  p.  22.) 

IBAs  Alexander  says,  while  each  desire  is  a  single  particular 
in  mental  history,  in  content  it  includes  many  qualities  which  as 
universals  serve  to  connect  it  with  the  content  of  other  desires. 
(Op.  tit.,  p.  65,  also  p.  100.) 


VOLITION  AS  AN  ORGANIZING  AGENCY        143 

development,  has  for  its  end  the  attainment  of  such  classes 
of  objects,  the  realization — that  is — of  these  general  ideas. 
For  the  sake  of  clearness  in  distinction,  desire  has  been 
defined  as  action  whose  end  is  the  attainment  of  a  single 
object.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  no  hard  and  fast 
distinction  can  be  made  between  actions  whose  object  is 
particular  and  those  whose  object  is  general.  Since  it  is  a 
case  of  development  the  difference  is  always  one  of  degree. 
The  child  who  desires  "  something  to  eat  "  or  "  something 
to  play  with  "  is  well  on  his  way  to  the  formation  of  gen- 
eral purposes.  Such  purposes  appear,  clearly  conceived, 
as  soon  as  infancy  is  passed  and  childhood  fairly  entered. 
The  resolves  of  the  boy  to  stand  well  in  school,  to  gather 
bird's-eggs  or  stamps,  or  to  learn  to  throw  curves  with  a 
ball,  are  examples  of  such  purposes.  The  boy  who  adopts 
one,  seeks  not  a  particular  object  to  be  attained  in  the 
present,  but  a  group  or  series  of  objects  whose  attainment 
is  prolonged  into  the  future.  Indeed,  the  object  of  present 
desire,  in  its  relation  to  such  a  comprehensive  group  or 
series,  becomes  but  one  of  many  particulars.  Like  all  par- 
ticulars it  is  reduced  to  a  subordinate  position  within  the  in- 
clusive whole.  Thus  the  eventual  attainment  of  the  larger 
end  may  mean  the  denial  or  limitation  of  present  desire. 
This  influence  of  the  general  over  the  particulars  is  soon 
manifest — for  instance,  in  the  case  of  the  purpose  to  avoid 
punishment  which,  when  once  taken,  imposes  a  strict  limit 
on  the  gratification  of  present  desire. 

The  second  stage  in  the  development  of  volition  we  may 
thus  call  purposive  action.  It  is  action  in  pursuit  of  a 
group  of  objects  to  be  realized  in  the  course  of  future  time, 
rather  than  in  pursuit  of  a  single  object  to  be  realized  now. 
The  object  in  purposive  action  is  always  general,  but  may 
vary  greatly  in  the  range  of  its  generality,  the  extent  of  its 
inclusiveness.  One  purpose,  such  as  to  do  one's  morning's 
work  well,  may  embrace  a  comparatively  few  acts  and 


144  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

extend  over  a  little  time;  another — such  as  to  preserve 
one's  health — may  extend  over  the  whole  of  a  lifetime 
and  include  thousands  of  acts.  The  purpose  to  secure  wealth 
is  representative.  Its  end  is  a  general  idea  standing  for 
a  large  group  of  objects — money,  land,  houses,  clothing, 
jewels,  etc.  Its  attainment  usually  occupies  a  period  of 
time — often  a  lifetime.  It  requires  the  individual  to  re- 
strict many  of  his  particular  desires  for  food,  drink,  cloth- 
ing, amusement,  and  the  like, — the  attainment  of  the  gen- 
eral purpose  necessitating  the  strict  subordination  of  all 
the  particular  acts.  What,  then,  is  the  procedure  of  voli- 
tion in  purposive  action?  It  is  first  to  check  the  action 
of  present  desire  and  to  turn  the  attention  of  the  individual 
from  the  particular  object  he  now  craves  to  the  more 
general  object  he  purposes  in  the  future  to  attain.  The 
bearing  of  this  larger  purpose  upon  the  present  action  is 
next  considered,  and  finally  the  original  desire  is  allowed 
just  that  degree  of  gratification  which  is  consistent  with 
the  realization  of  the  ruling  purpose.  Thus,  through  pur- 
pose, the  second  form  of  volition,  the  successive  acts  of  the 
individual  are  taken  out  of  their  isolation  as  expressive  of 
a  variety  of  particular  desires,  and  are  related  as  means 
to  the  attainment  of  several  general  purposes, — the  second 
step  being  thereupon  taken  in  the  organization  of  human 
conduct. 

6.  (c)  Action  from  Ideal. — But  thought  can  go  beyond 
the  ideation  that  yields  the  object  of  desire  and  the  gen- 
eralization that  furnishes  the  object  of  purpose.  It  can 
take  the  material  of  experience,  analyze  it  into  its  elements, 
and  then  by  synthesis  construct  from  it  a  new  and  sig- 
nificant conception.  It  is  this  constructive  activity  of 
thought,  more  or  less  freely  exercised,  that  produces  the 
Ideal,  which  constitutes  the  object  of  the  next  and  highest 
form  of  volition.  Through  free  ranging  thought  and  imagi- 
nation an  end  is  created  more  comprehensive  than  the 


VOLITION  AS  AN  ORGANIZING  AGENCY        145 

particular  object  of  desire  or  the  general  object  of  purpose. 
This  end  extends  in  its  scope  beyond  the  limits  of  the 
individual's  life,  and  involves  the  effort  and  cooperation  of 
many  individuals.  It  is  a  cause  to  which  the  individual 
devotes  himself  rather  than  an  object  which  he  desires  or 
a  purpose  which  he  pursues.  It  serves  to  identify  him 
with  his  fellows  and  to  make  his  very  existence  itself  a 
means  to  the  realization  of  universal  ends.  The  discovery 
of  truth  is  an  example  of  such  a  cause  or  ideal  to  which 
many  men  in  modern  times  have  devoted  themselves.  Natu- 
rally these  ideals  appear  later  in  mental  development  than 
do  desire  and  purpose;  for  while  their  growth  may  be  en- 
couraged by  teaching,  they  can  become  effective  as  ends 
of  action  only  after  the  individual  is  able  to  interpret  them 
in  terms  of  his  own  experience  and  apply  them  to  his  own 
life.  Hence  they  are  only  anticipated  in  early  years — 
perhaps  in  the  boy's  passing  fancy  of  himself  as  doing 
some  noble  work  as  President  or  Premier.  The  subsequent 
period  of  youth  and  adolescence  is  the  great  flowering  time 
of  ideals,  when  the  young  man  sees  himself  serving  human- 
ity as  patriot  or  explorer,  artist  or  inventor,  physician, 
lawyer,  or  teacher. 

Through  the  adoption  of  an  ideal  as  the  ultimate  end 
of  action,  volition  completes  the  organization  of  conduct. 
Since  the  ideal  is  all-comprehensive  and  includes  the  in- 
dividual himself,  it  also  embraces  all  his  life-purposes. 
These  purposes  are  adjusted  as  means  to  the  realization 
of  the  supreme  ideal,  just  as  previously  the  various  desires 
were  made  means  to  the  attainment  of  these  larger  pur- 
poses. Indeed,  such  a  supreme  end  is  needed  as  the  final 
court  of  appeal  between  the  conflicting  claims  of  different 
purposes.  In  the  specific  instance  the  attainment  of  one 
ruling  purpose  might  require  the  denial  of  a  desire,  the 
attainment  of  another  its  gratification,  and  what  is  to  decide 
between  the  two  unless  a  still  larger  end  exists  to  which 


146  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

the  purposes  themselves  are  subordinated?  When  this  is 
done,  and  the  particular  act  performed  with  a  view  not 
merely  to  the  attainment  of  a  life-purpose  of  the  individual, 
but  also  to  the  realization  of  his  supreme  ideal,  we  have 
volition  in  its  fullest  development.  Here  choice  is  pre- 
ceded by  full  deliberation  in  which  the  consequences  of 
alternative  lines  of  action  are  carefully  traced  out  and 
thus  their  bearing  upon  leading  purposes  of  the  individual 
is  ascertained.  The  relation  of  these  ruling  purposes  to 
the  supreme  ideal  is  next  considered ;  and  finally,  returning 
from  the  universal  to  the  particular,  that  act  is  chosen 
which  promises  to  further  the  purpose  most  in  harmony 
with  the  ideal. 

7.  Volition  as  Creative  of  Self-conscious  Person- 
ality.— Volition  proves  to  be,  then,  the  formative  and  sus- 
taining activity  of  conscious  selfhood,  or  personality. 
Thinkers  of  to-day  are  agreed  that  the  self  is  not  a  spiritual 
substance  or  entity  which  has  permanent  existence  apart 
from  the  succession  of  mental  states.  Rather  it  is  just 
the  unity  of  these  conscious  states,  the  inter-relation  of 
our  different  experiences,  which  gives  to  them  unity  and 
coherence  as  a  whole.16  Now  it  is  volition  that  originates 
this  unity  among  the  contents  of  consciousness  and  main- 
tains it  through  the  appropriation  and  assimilation  of  new 
objects.  In  the  initial  period  of  mental  development  the 
materials  of  personality  are  accumulated  in  the  form  of 
memory-images  of  objects  and  activities.  But  these  mem- 
ories do  not  constitute  a  self  until  they  are  distinguished 
as  ideal  from  the  actual  world,  and,  through  the  exercise 
of  will,  are  made  actual  possessions  of  the  self;  for  it  is 
only  through  the  realizing  of  its  different  ideas  that  the 
self  becomes  real.  Then  these  various  objects  of  desire 
are  connected  and  inter-connected  as  means  to  ends,  being 
thus  subordinated  to  more  comprehensive  purposes.  Finally 

li BALDWIN:  Op.  cit.,  pp.  8,  374. 


VOLITION  AS  AN  ORGANIZING  AGENCY         147 

all  the  contents  of  consciousness  are  woven  into  one  organ- 
ized system  when  these  purposes  are  made  themselves  in- 
strumental to  the  realization  of  a  supreme  and  all-inclusive 
ideal. 

Thus  the  process  through  which  the  self  develops  is  that 
followed  by  all  life  in  its  growth — evolution.  Like  all  gen- 
uine evolutions,  this  organization  of  personality  by  volition 
has  two  aspects,  differentiation  and  integration.  When  an 
object  is  chosen  as  an  end  of  action,  difference  is  intro- 
duced into  the  life  of  the  self.  Inasmuch  as  the  object  is 
an  end  for  the  self  it  exists  within  the  unity  of  self-con- 
sciousness; but  in  so  far  as  it  is  unattained  it  is  at  the 
same  time  external  and  opposed  to  the  self  in  actual  exist- 
ence. Hence  tension  arises  in  the  self  and  even  pain,  the 
pain  of  unsatisfied  desire.  This  tension  is  relieved  and  the 
pain  changed  into  pleasure  when,  through  action  and  effort, 
the  object  is  attained.  In  integration,  the  coordinate 
aspect,  the  difference  is  overcome  and  the  object  is  appro- 
priated by  the  self.  Thus  the  unity  of  the  self  is  restored, 
but  with  a  richer  and  more  varied  content.  In  this  way 
the  development  of  the  self  proceeds  through  the  agency  of 
volition — ever  expanding  its  boundaries  to  receive  new  ob- 
jects, and  by  this  very  process  strengthening  and  perfect- 
ing its  own  unity. 

8.  Volition  Does  Not  Always  Effect  Complete  Or- 
ganization.— To  the  statement  that  volition  is  essentially 
an  organizing  agency  the  objection  may  be  made  that  it 
does  not  in  all  cases  actually  manifest  itself  as  such.  In 
the  conduct  of  the  majority  of  men,  volition  fails  signally 
to  effect  complete  organization.  The  action  of  many  never 
passes  the  first  stage  of  unregulated  desire,  while  compara- 
tively few  ever  reach  the  final  stage,  where  all  action  is 
governed  by  a  few  controlling  purposes  which  are  them- 
selves subordinated  to  a  supreme  ideal.  If  volition  does 
not  inevitably  and  of  necessity  pass  through  these  successive 


148  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

stages,  what  right  have  we  to  assert  that  a  law  inherent  in 
its  nature  causes  it  to  follow  this  development,  effecting 
a  more  and  more  complete  organization  of  conduct?  To 
this  objection  the  reply  may  be  made  that  there  can  be 
no  doubt  of  the  fact  that  in  actual  life  volition  often 
fails  to  organize  action  completely.  The  only  question  is: 
How  serious  a  difficulty  does  this  fact  constitute  for  the 
view  that  volition  is  in  its  essential  nature  an  organizing 
activity?  The  difficulty,  such  as  it  is,  is  really  but  a  par- 
ticular aspect  of  a  more  general  problem  upon  which  Paul- 
sen  17  remarks,  as  confronting  all  theories  which  identify  the 
Highest  Good  with  the  full  expression  of  the  human  will. 
If  the  normal  human  will  finds  complete  and  natural  ex- 
pression in  the  thoughtful  and  well-regulated  action  which 
we  usually  call  good,  how  does  it  happen  that  the  actual 
will  of  man  seems  usually  to  rebel  against  such  action? 
Can  organization  and  adjustment  be  regarded  as  the  truest 
manifestations  of  will  when  it  appears  most  nourishing  and 
vigorous  in  the  demand  for  unlimited  power  and  unre- 
stricted gratification? 

9.  But  to  That  Extent  Is  Not  Fully  Developed.— The 
difficulty  is  not  great  in  the  present  case,  however.  If  we 
are  seeking  to  discover  the  essential  nature  of  volition, 
surely  we  must  base  our  conclusions  upon  its  fully  de- 
veloped form,  and  not  upon  phases  of  incomplete  develop- 
ment. For  only  in  its  completed  development  shall  we  find 
the  true  character  of  volition  revealed.  In  earlier  stages  of 
growth  this  remains  largely  latent  and  concealed.  Now 
such  is  just  the  case  when,  in  the  lives  of  men,  conduct 
remains  unorganized.  In  that  degree  their  wills  fail  of 
their  normal  development.  To  that  extent,  in  fact,  volition 
is  absent  from  their  lives.  Such  individuals,  we  correctly 
say,  fail  to  "  exercise  their  wills."  And  not  being  exer- 
cised their  wills  fail  to  display  the  larger  possibilities  they 
1T  Cf.  System  of  Ethics,  Bk.  II,  Chap.  I 


possess.  Such  cases  of  arrested  development  are  sometimes 
due  to  external  causes,  but  oftener  to  the  individuals  them- 
selves. VoliiioiL,ds_att  -activity,  .self-initiated  and  self-con- 
trolled. Its  exercise  and  development  require  effort,  the 
effort  of  close  attention,  studious  thought,  and  discriminat- 
ing selection.  Whether  or  not  this  effort  is  made  depends 
for  the  most  part  on  the  self.  Of  course  the  individual's 
capacity  for  such  effort  may  itself  be  referred  back  to  his 
will,  his  ' '  will-power. ' '  But  not  in  such  a  way  as  to  make 
the  lack  of  organization  in  his  life  fairly  chargeable  to  the 
inherent  nature  of  his  will  and  not  to  himself.  For  the 
whole  point  of  the  matter  is  that  the  individual's  capacity 
for  "  effort,"  his  "  will-power,"  is  not  fixed,  having  its 
amount  pre-determined  by  his  heredity  or  some  other  cause 
outside  his  control.  Rather  is  his  exercise  of  the  power 
of  volition,  and  the  increase  in  this  power  which  follows 
upon  its  exercise,  determined  by  himself  alone.  It  is,  in 
fact,  identical  with  the  power-to-be-a-self  which,  once  pres- 
ent in  germ,  can,  like  all  vital  principles,  be  maintained 
and  strengthened  only  from  within.  But  upon  the  actual 
effort  put  forth  depends  the  development  of  volition  into 
the  fullness  of  its  capacity  as  an  organizing  agency,  and 
upon  this  hangs  the  moral  destiny  of  the  human  individual. 
As  Professor  James  says  in  a  celebrated  passage:  "  Thus 
not  only  our  morality,  but  our  religion,  so  far  as  the  latter 
is  deliberate,  depend  upon  the  effort  we  can  make.  '  Will 
you  or  won't  you  have  it  sof  '  is  the  most  probing  question 
we  are  ever  asked ;  we  are  asked  it  every  hour  of  the  day, 
and  about  the  largest  as  well  as  the  smallest,  the  most 
theoretical  as  well  as  the  most  practical  things.  We  answer 
by  consents  or  non-consents  and  not  by  words.  What 
wonder  that  these  dumb  responses  should  seem  our  deepest 
organs  of  communication  with  the  nature  of  things !  What 
wonder  if  the  effort  demanded  by  them  be  the  measure 
of  our  worth  as  men!  What  wonder  if  the  amount  we 


150  THE  NATUEE  OF  THE  GOOD 

accord  of  it  be  the  one  strictly  original  contribution  which 
we  make  to  the  world!  "18 


REFERENCES 

SETH,  Ethical  Principles,  Introduction,  Chap.  III. 
HOFFDING,  Outlines  of  Psychology   (Eng.  trans.),  Chap.  VII. 
BALDWIN,  Social  and  Ethical  Interpretations  in  Mental  Development, 

Chap.  IX. 

JUDO,  Psychology,  Chap.  XIII. 
STOUT,  Manual  of  Psychology,  Chap.  X. 
GREEN,  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  Book  II,  Chap.  II. 

11  JAMES:  Psychology,  Vol.  II,  p.  579. 


CHAPTER  V 
THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION  OB  FREEDOM 

1.  The  Good  aa  Self-Realization. — 2.  Self-Realization  Through  the 
Instrumentality  of  Volition:  (a)  The  Present  Self, — 3.  (6) 
The  Natural  Self, — 4.  (c)  The  Personal  Self.— 5.  The  Possi- 
bilities of  Selfhood  as  Actualized  by  Volition. — 6.  Self-Realiza- 
tion Identical  with  Self-Determination. — 7.  Libertarianism. — 8. 
Determinism. — 9.  Freedom  as  Self-Determination. — 10.  Objec- 
tions to  This  View. 

1.  The  Good  as  Self-Realization. — The  nature  of  voli- 
tion has  been  investigated  with  the  hope  that  knowledge 
of  this  subject  would  furnish  a  key  to  the  fundamental 
ethical  problem  of  the  Good;  for  insight  into  the  true 
character  of  volition  should  enable  us  to  answer  the  further 
question  as  to  the  form  of  conduct  required  for  its  complete 
satisfaction.  Volition  has  upon  investigation  proved  itself 
to  be  in  essential  nature  an  organizing  agency.  Can  we 
not  infer  from  this  fact  what  is  man 's  highest  Good  ?  This 
query  receives  at  once  an  affirmative  reply;  for  the  truth 
lies  open  before  us,  as  a  moment's  examination  of  what  is 
implied  in  the  idea  of  organization,  will  show. 

"What  is  the  work  of  an  organizing  agency?  What  is 
meant  by  organization  ?  Clearly,  to  organize  is  to  establish 
a_relation  of  inter-dependence  and  cooperation  among  the 
parts  within  any  whole.  This  inter-dependence  is  the  most 
thorough,  this  cooperation  is  the  closest,  that  is  possible. 
So  thorough  is  the  inter-dependence  that  every  part  has  its 
nature  altogether  constituted  by  its  connection  with  the 
other  parts  of  the  system,  and  ceases  to  exist  in  independ- 
ence of  it.  So  close  is  the  cooperation  that  every  part  has 

J51 


152  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

its  life  altogether  determined  by  the  office  it  discharges 
within  the  system,  and  ceases  to  act  independently.  Organ- 
ization means,  therefore,  such  a  relation  within  a  system 
that  the  whole  finds  expression  in  every  part,  and  to  organ- 
ize is  to  establish  this  relation.  Thus  it  is  with  the  living 
body  which,  because  such  a  relation  obtains  among  its 
parts,  is  called  an  organism.  The  members  are  so  related 
that  each  has  its  nature  wholly  determined  by  its  function 
within  the  whole.  This  is  what  social  organization  means, 
too, — such  cooperation  among  the  different  individuals  that 
each  finds  expression  for  his  own  individuality  in  the  dis- 
charge of  his  specific  office  in  society.  To  organize  a  busi- 
ness or  industry  involves  such  a  distribution  and  adjust- 
ment of  its  various  activities  that  each  department  shall 
work  with  maximum  efficiency  in  the  interest  of  the  whole. 
Nor  is  it  otherwise  hi  the  organization  of  human  conduct 
through  the  instrumentality  of  volition, — to  organize  is  to 
relate  the  different  activities  of  the  individual  so  that  each 
may  promote  most  effectively  the  exercise  of  all — and  or- 
ganization means  that  the  sum-total  of  the  individual's 
tendencies  and  capacities  shall  find  conscious  expression 
in  each  single  act.  Now  the  sum-total- of  the  individual's 
active  tendencies  and  capacities,  expressed  in  their  conscious 
\unity,  constitute,  as  we  have  seen,  his  selfhood  or  per- 
sonality. Consequently,  the  complete  organization  of  con- 
duct, the  goal  which  volition  strives  to  attain,  and  which  is 
required  to  satisfy  it  fully,  is  identical  with  complete  self- 
expj^ession — or,  in  the  more  familiar  phrase,  self-realization. 
Self-realization  is  therefore  the  summum  bonum,  the  highest 
human  good,  which  we  have  been  seeking  to  discover.  It 
is  that  form  of  conduct  wherein  each  single  act  is  made 
contributory  to  the  welfare  of  the  whole  self  and,  con- 
versely, the  whole  self  is  given  expression  in  every 
act. 


THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION  153 

2.  Self-Realization  Through  the  Instrumentality  of 
Volition :  (a)  The  Present  Self  .—The  Good  is  Self-realiza- 
tion, because  volition  is  an  organizing  agency,  and  complete 
self-organization  is  identical  with  complete  self-realization. 
This  is  the  conclusion  to  which  the  argument  as  thus  far 
pursued  has  led  us.  Volition,  whose  demands  for  satis- 
faction are  expressed  in  the  Moral  Ideal,  now  appears  as 
the  faculty  through  whose  instrumentality  the  self  is  real- 
ized. How  this  result  is  accomplished  through  the  exercise 
of  will  becomes  clearer  if  we  glance  back  at  the  successive 
stages  in  the  development  of  volition  and  see  what  is  the 
effect  of  each  upon  the  existence  and  nature  of  the  self. 

A  person  or  a,  self  is,  as  Royce  remarks,  a  life  lived 
according  to  a  plan.1  Now  such  purposiveness  or  aim  is 
introduced  into  human  consciousness  through  the  work  of 
volition  in  its  earliest  and  simplest  form — that  of  desire. 
In  action  from  desire  a  number  of  experiences  are  united 
as  means  to  an  end,  the  attainment  of  an  object.  The 
consciousness  of  the  child  who  desires  a  toy,  and  hence 
goes  in  search  of  it,  acquires  a  unity  which  it  did  not 
possess  when  he  acted  from  instinct  or  impulse.  In  instinc- 
tive or  impulsive  action  his  successive  experiences  might 
be  united  by  the  fact  that  they  were  all  adapted  to  produce 
a  single  result,  but  he  would  not  be  conscious  of  this  unity, 
and  it  is  hi  a  consciousness  of  the  unity  of  different  ex- 
periences that  selfhood  or  personality  consists.  Since 
through  desire  unity  is  first  brought  to  the  individual's 
consciousness  from  within,  this  first  form  of  volition  may 
be  said  to  establish  the  existence  of  the  self.  Of  course  the 
unity  introduced  is  not  extensive  or  thorough-going.  A 
desire  does  not  embrace  a  class  of  objects  and  hence  unite 
the  experiences  of  the  individual  over  any  considerable 
span  of  time.  Instead  it  is  directed  upon  a  single  object 
and  the  measures  which  must  be  taken  for  its  present  attain- 
1  ROYCE:  Philosophy  of  Loyalty,  p.  168. 


154  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

ment.  Hence  the  self  that  is  realized  in  desire  is  not  the 
whole  self,  nor  even  a  large  part  of  the  self — it  is  the  self 
in  form  most  limited  and  circumscribed,  the  self  of  the 
present  moment. 

This  present  self  is  realized,  then,  through  the  pursuit 
and  attainment  of  the  object  of  momentary  desire.  Its 
character,  even  at  the  moment  of  its  inception,  is,  to  be 
sure,  largely  the  outcome  of  past  experience.  The  idea 
of  the  object,  now  the  end  of  conscious  desire,  has  been 
produced  by  past  experience,  when  the  same  object 
prompted  to  instinctive  and  impulsive  action.  Even  when 
the  desire  is  for  an  object  of  present  perception  it  is  not 
for  the  object  merely  as  perceived,  but  for  the  perceived 
object  thought  of  as  an  end  of  action,  i.e.  a  means  of 
self-satisfaction,  and  the  perceived  object  could  be  thus 
regarded  only  as  the  result  of  previous  experience  with 
it.  Thus  it  might  be  said  that  in  desire,  not  the  self  of 
the  present  simply,  but  that  of  the  past  as  well,  is  realized. 
While  this  is  to  an  extent  true,  desire  does  not  allow  of 
any  conscious  reflecting  or  generalizing  upon  past  experi- 
ence with  a  view  to  determining  present  conduct.  For  such 
use  of  the  past  involves  the  subordination  to  it  of  the 
present  as  of  a  particular  instance  to  a  general  class,  and 
this  is  action  from  purpose  and  not  from  desire. 

3.  (b)  The  Natural  Self. — Through  action  from  pur- 
pose a  more  inclusive  unity  is  established  within  the  in- 
dividual consciousness.  Objects  of  like  nature,  desired  and 
sought  in  many  different  moments,  are  now  grouped  to- 
gether and  pursued  as  a  class.  Such  purposes  show  by 
their  generality  that  they  are  not  confined  in  their  scope 
to  the  present.  Including  many  particulars,  they  arise  only 
out  of  the  accumulated  experiences  of  the  past  when  these 
particular  objects  have  been  singly  desired,  and  can  be 
fulfilled  only  in  the  course  of  future  time,  when  these  same 
specific  objects  are  serially  attained  as  parts  of  an  inclusive 


THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION  155 

end.  Thus  purposive  action  unites  experiences  past,  pres- 
ent, and  future,  relating  a  succession  of  acts  as  means 
to  the  attainment  of  an  end  embracing  them  all.  By  its 
instrumentality  the  boundaries  of  the  self  are  therefore 
extended  beyond  the  limits  of  the  present  moment  to  in- 
clude past  and  future.  A  larger  self  is  realized — how  large 
depending  upon  the  scope  of  the  purpose.  Some  purposes 
are  restricted  to  a  particular  period,  or  place,  or  under- 
taking,— as  the  purposes  of  youth  or  of  old  age,  or  the 
purpose  of  a  man  starting  upon  a  journey.  But  the  typical 
purpjpse  extends  in  its  scope  over  the  natural  lifetime  of 
the  individual — the  period  of  his  physical  existence.  An 
instance  would  be  the  purpose  to  win  favorable  recogni- 
tion from,  to  be  "  liked  by,"  one's  fellows.  Formed  as  the 
result  of  many  agreeable  experiences  of  pleasing  others, 
this  purpose  is  pursued  throughout  the  remainder  of  life 
and  runs  like  a  binding  thread  to  the  very  end,  tying 
together  diverse  actions  which  would  otherwise  appear  iso- 
lated and  discrepant.  Since  the  typical  purpose  extends 
over  the  natural  lifetime,  we  may  call  the  self  which  is  ) 
realized  through  purposive  action  the  natural  self.  It  is 
the  self  as  natural  individual  whose  existence  covers  a 
definite  period  of  years  and  is  cut  short  by  death. 

4.  (c)  The  Personal  Self,  Individual  and  Social. — By 
the  third  and  highest  form  of  volition,  action  from  ideal,  a 
unity  is  produced  which  transcends  even  the  limits  of  ? 
natural  individuality  and  physical  existence.  The  ends 
sought,  the  ideals  of  Truth  and  Honor,  of  Justice  and 
Beauty,  are  such  as  involve  the  cooperation  of  many  per- 
sons in  a  community  of  intelligence  and  endeavor.  Hence 
they  include  the  natural  self  with  its  purposes,  reduced 
now  to  the  rank  of  means  to  a  more  comprehensive  end. 
The  self  which  is  realized  through  the  attainment  of  these 
ideals  is  therefore  not  the  natural  self,  the  particular 
individual  external  to,  and  exclusive  of,  others,  but  rather 


156  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

the  self  in  its  universal  aspect,  the  human  person  as 
such.  In  this  the  culminating  stage  of  self-realization  the 
existence  and  action  of  the  natural  individual  are  made 
instrumental  to  the  expression  of  the  powers  and  capacities 
of  human  personality.  This  largest  self  may,  therefore, 
be  called  the  personal  self.  The  development  of  the  per- 
sonal self  through  voluntary  action  follows  two  lines,  which 
may  be  clearly  distinguished,  although  they  are  in  close 
and  constant  connection.  It  may  be  achieved  through  the 
pursuit  of  such  ideals  as  the  discovery  of  truth  or  the 
conquest  of  some  department  of  nature — ideals  which,  while 
they  implicate  and  refer  to  other  persons,  still  concern 
primarily  the  individual  person  and  his  relation  to  ob- 
jective reality.  Or  it  may  be  achieved  through  the  pursuit 
of  such  ideals  as  those  of  patriotism  and  humanitarianism, 
in  which  the  welfare  of  other  selves  is  sought  directly  and 
explicitly.  In  this  way  the  social  person  is  developed.  The 
two  modes  of  personal  expression,  individual  and  social, 
although  distinguishable  in  direction,  are  really  two  aspects 
of  a  unitary  development,  and  hence  are  complementary 
and  inter-dependent. 

5.  The  Possibilities  of  Selfhood  as  Actualized  by 
Volition. — Through  the  exercise  of  volition  in  its  succes- 
sive stages,  therefore,  the  self  is  created,  developed,  and 
brought  to  full  realization.  The  effect  of  the  organizing 
activity  of  will  is  to  extend  the  limits  of  the  self  over  a 
larger  and  larger  field.  In  action  from  desire  the  unity 
of  selfhood  is  manifested  only  in  a  grasp  of  the  possibilities 
of  the  present  situation.  Through  purposive  action  this 
unity  is  expanded  to  include  events  past  and  future  and 
finally  to  include  within  its  scope  the  whole  of  a  natural 
lifetime.  Action  from  ideal  pushes  the  boundaries  of  per- 
sonality out  still  farther  until  the  lives  of  others  and  the 
whole  of  the  real  universe  are  brought  within  its  unity. 
Thus  voluntary  action,  when  continued,  discloses  the  pos- 


THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION  157 

sibilities  of  that  selfhood  which  we  all  possess.  Our  self- 
hood or  personality  is  an  ideal  unity,  capable  of  infinite 
expansion,  from  a  mere  point  in  the  present  back  into  the 
pastTand  out  into  the  future  until  the  period  of  natural 
existence  is  covered,  and  then  in  a  wider  sweep  embracing 
the  lives  of  fellow-men,  the  epochs  of  human  history,  and 
finally  comprehending  the  vast  process  of  universal  evolu- 
tion. Each  self  is  capable  of  becoming  an  epitome  of  the 
universe — in  truth,  a  microcosm.  That  these  potencies  shall 
be  made  actual,  that  the  possibilities  of  selfhood  shall  be 
fulfilled,  requires  only  that  volition  be  exercised  in  the 
fullness  of  its  powers.  Absolutely  correct,  then,  was  the 
statement  that  the  goal  of  volition  as  an  organizing  agency 
is  full  self-realization.  Equally  true  is  it,  also,  that  only 
in  such  complete  self-realization  can  volition  find  complete 
satisfaction,  and  that  herein,  consequently,  lies  the  highest 
good  for  man. 

6.  Self-Realization  Identical  with  Self-Determina- 
tion. — The  process  of  self-realization,  which  now  becomes 
a  subject  of  especial  study,  is  equivalent  to  an  increasing 
control  by  the  self  of  its  own  action — in  other  words,  to 
growing  power  of  self-determination.  The  power  of  self- 
determination,  the  ability  of  the  individual  to  direct  and 
control  his  own  conduct  in  accordance  with  his  own  wishes, 
is  a  faculty  peculiar  to  man.  It  is  not  possessed  in  any 
degree  by  the  lower  animals,  whose  action  results  from  the 
interplay  of  forces  of  the  environment,  with  certain  fixed 
instincts  present  in  the  individual  as  part  of  his  race  in- 
heritance— for  example,  the  actions  of  birds  in  nest-building 
are  due  to  the  influence  of  external  conditions  connected 
with  season,  locality,  etc.,  which  stimulate  a  highly  devel- 
oped and  powerful  instinct.  The  action  of  the  animal  can- 
not then  be  said  to  be  in  any  true  sense  self-determining  or 
spontaneous;  the  individual  remains  a  part  of  the  great 
system  of  nature,  acting  out  its  laws  and  expressing  its 


158  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

forces.  With  man,  the  first  actions  are,  like  those  of  the 
animals,  instinctive;  the  actions  of  the  individual  are  not 
directed  by  himself  but,  instead,  only  register  the  effect 
of  external  objects  upon  his  nervous  mechanism.  \Vith  the 
entrance  of  volition  all  this  is  changed,  however,  and  self- 
determination  begins.  Action  from  desire  is  not  elicited 
by  an  external  object  which  stimulates  a  fixed  instinct; 
it  is  prompted  by  an  ideal  object  which  the  individual 
takes  for  his  own  good.  Such  action  may  be  properly  re- 
garded as  an  expression  of  the  individual  himself.  But 
while  the  act  expresses  what  the  individual  now  desires — 
his  present  self,  that  is — its  performance  may  serve  to 
prevent  the  gratification  of  a  desire  equally  strong  in  the 
future.  In  this  case,  the  act  does  not  express  the  future 
self,  but  goes  counter  to  it.  It  is  not  determined  by  the 
entire  self,  therefore ;  it  is  not  wholly  self-controlled.  How 
can  the  control  of  the  self  over  such  acts  of  desire  be  in- 
creased? Clearly  not  by  the  absolute  denial  of  desire  or 
cessation  from  action.  Rather  by  relating  the  different 
objects  of  desire  and  comprehending  them  within  more 
extensive  ends  which  represent  the  good  of  the  self  in  the 
future  as  well  as  the  present.  This  work  of  relating  single 
actions  to  larger  aims  and  more  general  purposes  is  carried 
forward  by  volition  in  its  higher  stages  until,  finally,  pres- 
ent conduct  is  made  instrumental  to  the  attainment  of 
that  ideal  end  expressing  the  good  of  the  whole  self,  present 
and  future,  natural  and  personal,  individual  and  social. 
Then,  and  then  only,  action  becomes  entirely  self-deter- 
mined— expressing  the  self,  the  whole  nature  of  the  self, 
pnd  nothing  else.  Now  this  process  of  self-determination 
is  of  course  the  identical  process  of  self-organization  or 
jelf-realization  that  we  have  been  discussing.  But  it  is 
.important  to  notice  their  identity;  for  self-determination 
i«  in  its  turn  identical  with  true  freedom.  The  correctness 
ci  this  last  statement  will  appear  if  we  compare  this  con- 


THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION  159 

ception  of  freedom  with  the  opposing  views  which  have 
long  and  vainly  contended  for  supremacy  in  the  field.  We 
shall  see  that  the  progressive  self-realization,  which  we  have 
agreed  is  man's  highest  good,  is  equally  the  attainment 
of  absolute  freedom. 

7.  Libertarianism. — As  one  extreme  among  possible 
views  of  human  freedom  is  Libertarianism.  According  to 
the  Libertarian  view  man's  will  is  free  in  the  sense  that 
it  is  wn-determined,  that  it  acts  without  a  cause.  Of  course 
the  Libertarian  does  not  deny  that  our  will  is,  in  a  way, 
influenced  by  our  motives  and  tendencies.  The  field  of 
choice  is  limited  by  the  knowledge  and  experience  of  the 
individual  and  the  possibilities  of  action  that  they  suggest 
to  him.  But  when  it  comes  to  actually  choosing  between 
courses  of  action  open,  the  Libertarian  believes  that  the 
human  will  is  uncontrolled  by  any  influence  whatsoever. 
In  this  crisis  no  one  motive  is  stronger  in  its  influence  upon 
the  will  than  any  other.  All  motives  are  reduced  to  a 
common  level,  in  fact,  since  all  are  equally  powerless  to 
control  the  will.  Hence,  as  far  as  the  ability  to  choose  is 
concerned,  it  is  a  matter  of  absolute  indifference  to  the 
will  which  of  the  possible  courses  shall  be  taken.  Any 
possibility  may  with  equal  readiness  be  chosen  or  rejected. 

In  the  course  of  the  long  controversy  upon  the  subject, 
many  considerations  have  been  advanced  in  favor  of  this 
and  the  opposing  view.  The  leading  arguments  on  both 
sides  may  perhaps  be  summarized  under  three  heads.  The 
Libertarian,  with  whose  argument  we  are  now  concerned, 
claims  that  his  view  is  supported  by  facts  of  the  following 
classes.  (1)  Psychological.  Men  are  generally  conscious 
of  freedom  in  the  sense  just  explained.  They  are  conscious 
before  acting  of  the  ability  to  choose  with  equal  ease  any 
one  of  the  alternatives  offered,  and,  after  acting,  of  the 
fact  that  they  might  have  chosen  otherwise  than  they  did. 
(2)  Ethical.  Only  if  men's  wills  are  undetermined  can 


160  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

we  justly  hold  them  responsible  for  their  actions.  For 
if  the  human  will  is  strictly  determined  no  man  can  prevent 
his  conduct's  being  what  it  is.  He  should  not  be  punished 
for  what  he  cannot  help.  (3)  Metaphysical.  Only  if  man's 
will  is  thus  uncaused  is  he  freed  from  the  chain  of  natural 
causation  and  given  power  and  dignity  as  a  spiritual  being. 
8.  Determinism. — The  other  extreme  in  the  free-will 
controversy  is  occupied  by  the  Determinists.  They  hold 
that  volition  is  strictly  determined  in  its  activity.  Every 
choice  is  the  result  of  a  conflict  of  motives  or  tenden- 
cies in  which  the  strongest  always  wins.  Being  thus 
the  necessary  resultant  of  certain  fixed  forces  no  choice 
could  be  other  than  it  is.  Hence  the  act  of  will — so  far 
from  being  arbitrary  or  uncertain — is,  like  all  other  events, 
the  inevitable  effect  of  definite  causes.  In  defense  of  his 
position  the  Determinist  has  on  his  side  many  arguments. 
The  most  important  are  the  following,  grouped  under  the 
three  heads  used  above.  (1)  Psychological.  Study  of  the 
psychology  of  choice  shows  us  that  the  strongest  motive 
does  win.  The  idea  is  acted  upon  which  succeeds  better 
than  all  others  in  holding  the  attention.  Now,  in  this 
struggle  of  ideas  for  command  of  the  attention,  the  victory 
is  bound  to  go  to  the  one  which  is  inherently  most_attrac- 
trye,  i.e.  most  pleasant  to  the  individual  with  his  character 
and  disposition  such  as  they  are.  (2)  Ethical.  Only  if 
action  is  the  necessary  outcome  of  the  character  of  the  agent 
can  we  hold  him  responsible  for  it.  If,  in  the  final  choice, 
the  will  acts  in  entire  independence  of  all  the  motives  and 
tendencies  of  the  agent,  the  act  cannot  fairly  be  regarded  as 
his,  nor  can  he  with  justice  be  punished  for  it.  (3)  Meta- 
physical. Nowhere  in  the  world  of  our  experience  do  we 
find  action  without  a  cause.  Science  has  proved  that 
the  uniformity  of  law  and  the  necessary  sequence  of  cause 
and  effect,  prevail  throughout  nature.  To  suppose  that  the 
human  will  acts  without  a  cause  is  to  introduce  an  arbitrary 


THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION  161 

and  lawless  factor  into  the  system  of  nature  and  thus  to 
contradict  the  fundamental  principle  of  science. 

9.  Freedom  as  Self-Determination. — The  conception  of 
freedom  as  self-determination  goes  to  neither  of  these  ex- 
tremes, but  in  a  sense  stands  between  them,  and  thus  in- 
cludes the  truth  in  each.  This  conception  makes  freedom, 
as  Paulsen  says,  a  "  real,  positive  property  of  human  na- 
ture."2 It  is  the  ability  to  seek  an  object  chosen  by  one's 
self;  hence  the  power  to  direct  one's  own  conduct.  So 
understood,  the  animals  do  not  possess  freedom;  for  they 
act  as  they  are  compelled  to  act  by  instinct  or  impulse. 
Freedom  is  exhibited,  however,  by  all  men  who  act  volun- 
tarily, i.e.  in  pursuit  of  a  consciously  chosen  end.  In  this 
sense,  it  is  sometimes  called  psychological  freedom,  since 
it  is  a  property  of  developed  intelligence  and  is  possessed 
by  all  men  of  normal  mental  faculties.  It  is  sufficient  for 
responsibility,  moreover ;  because,  even  though  the  act  pro- 
ceed from  momentary  desire,  it  is  nevertheless  an  expression 
of  the  self.  But  in  action  from  momentary  desire  we  have 
not  an  expression  of  the  whole  self,  but  only  a  part,  a 
fractional  part,  the  self  of  the  present  moment.  Hence 
the  act  is  not  wholly  self-determined.  Neither  is  it  entirely 
free.  This  fact  is  recognized  when,  for  instance,  we  con- 
demn a  man  for  being  a  "  slave  to  his  desire,"  as  in  the 
case  of  the  drunkard  or  the  glutton.  The  drunkard  is  free, 
when  he  returns  to  the  drink,  inasmuch  as  his  act  expresses 
himself.  But  since  he  acts  from  momentary  desire  and 
in  spite  of  good  resolutions  to  the  contrary,  he  is  not  free 
inasmuch  as  the  strength  of  present  appetite  thwarts  and 
prevents  the  expression  of  his  permanent  self.  Action  is 
entirely  free,  therefore,  only  when  it  is  determined  by  the 
whole  self.  This  requires  such  a  complete  organization  of 
conduct  that  each  single  act  shall  be  an  expression  of  the 
total  self.  Freedom  in  this  meaning,  often  termed  moral 
*  PAULSEX  :  System  of  Ethics,  p.  476. 


162  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

freedom,  is  not  a  natural  possession  of  man,  but  is  a  con- 
dition to  be  attained.  Its  attainment  is  equivalent  to  reach- 
ing the  goal  of  moral  development,  full  self-realization. 
For  only  he  who  realizes  in  his  conduct  all  the  possibilities 
of  his  nature  is  entirely  free. 

If  we  understand  that  the  true  meaning  of  freedom  is 
self-determination  we  are  able  to  perceive  how  far  both 
Libertarianism  and  Determinism  are  right,  and,  at  the 
same  time,  to  detect  the  errors  in  each.  Our  consciousness 
of  freedom,  emphasized  by  the  Libertarian,  is  no  illusion. 
Man  is  free  in  the  sense  that  he  is  subject  to  no  external 
compulsion  in  his  conduct,  but  can  direct  his  own  action. 
Moreover,  since  it  is  the  individual  himself  who  decides 
in  any  instance  of  choice,  it  may  with  truth  be  said  that 
all  the  alternatives  remain  open  until  he  himself  makes 
up  his  mind.  But  this  does  not  imply  that  in  the  final 
ichoice  the  will  acts  in  equal  independence  of  all  the  ten- 
dencies and  characteristics  of  the  individual  that  have  been 
in  play,  or  that,  with  the  aspect  of  the  self  that  was  upper- 
most at  the  culminating  moment,  the  decision  could  have 
been  other  than  it  was.  Determinism  is,  therefore,  right 
in  maintaining  that  the  strongest  motive  always  wins.  But 
it  is  wrong  in  treating  the  motives  as  if  they  were  forces 
separate  from  the  self  and  acting  upon  it  from  without. 
Instead  they  are  all  expressions  of  the  self,  and  to  say  that 
the  strongest  wins  is  simply  to  say  that  the  dominant  aspect 
of  the  self  determines  the  action.  Again  the  Libertarian 
is  right  in  asserting  that  the  individual  cannot  be  held 
responsible  if  his  act  is  the  necessary  resultant  of  forces 
within  him  which  he  cannot  control.  But  he  is  wrong 
in  his  further  conclusion  that  responsibility  attaches  only 
to  those  choices  in  which  the  will  acts  in  independence 
of  disposition  and  character.  Rather  is  the  view  of  the 
Determinist  correct — that  a  man  is  responsible  only  for 
those  actions  which  are  an  expression  of  his  character. 


THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION  163 

Only  we  must  not  think  of  character  in  this  connection 
as  a  factor  given,  fixed,  or  ready-made,  but  rather  as  sub- 
ject to  constant  direction  and  development  at  the  initiative 
of  the  self.  Finally,  we  agree  with  the  Libertarian  that 
man  can  claim  the  dignity  of  independent  personality  only 
in  so  far  as  he  is  relieved  from  the  constraint  of  mechanical 
necessity  and  left  to  be  master  of  his  own  destiny.  But 
this  does  not  require  us  to  exalt  to  the  supreme  place  in 
his  nature  a  perfectly  arbitrary  and  lawless  will.  It  only 
requires  that  the  laws  by  which  this  will  acts  should  be 
grounded  deep  in  the  nature  of  the  self.3 

10.  Objections  to  This  View. — It  is  not  supposed  that 
the  foregoing  paragraphs  remove  every  difficulty  connected 
with  the  vexed  problem  of  free-will;  but  only  that  they 
indicate  the  general  direction  in  which  present  thought 
is  moving  toward  a  solution  of  this  problem.  Many  diffi- 
culties remain.  For  instance,  the  Libertarian  may  object 
that  the  view  just  advanced  provides  for  no  genuine  free- 
dom. Action  is  said  to  be  always  the  necessary  expression 
of  character,  while  character  is  admitted  to  be,  at  the  time 
of  action,  fixed,  itself  the  necessary  result  of  past  actions 
and  influences.  "Why  speak  as  if  the  individual  had  any 
real  freedom  of  choice  when,  in  every  case,  the  very  bent 
of  his  will — i.e.  its  power  and  direction — is  fixed  and  de- 
terminate as  a  part  of  his  character?  In  answer  to  this 
objection  two  things  should  be  said.  In  the  first  place, 
it  is  a  mistake  to  think  of  a  man's  character  as  something 
distinct  from  himself  which  acts  upon  him  from  without, 
and,  as  an  external  force,  constrains  him  to  behave  thus 
and  so.  This  is  a  false  abstraction.  Rather  is  his  char- 
acter just  himself,  and,  when  it  determines  his  action,  He 
is  determining  it.  In  the  second  place,  it  is  wrong  to 
conceive  of  the  character  of  the  individual  as  if  it  were 
once  for  all  fixed  and  defined  by  agencies  quite  beyond 
•GBEEN:  Op.  tit.,  §§  98,  105. 


164  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

his  control.  The  fact  is  that  his  character,  and  particularly 
his  tendencies  and  dispositions  of  will,  are  subject  to  con- 
stant modification  and  development.  And  this  modifica- 
tion and  development  is  largely  under  the  control  of  the 
individual  himself,  so  that  he  is  responsible  for  the  present 
state  of  his  character.  The  amount  of  ' '  will-power  ' '  which 
he  possesses  in  the  present  emergency  is  in  a  great  measure 
the  result  of  efforts  which  he  has  made  to  exercise  his 
will  in  the  past.  Man  may  thus,  if  he  chooses,  train  and 
form  his  own  will,  building  up  such  habits  as  he  judges 
will  be  beneficial,  taking  thought  to  avoid  situations  that 
will  serve  to  awaken  a  desire  that  is  excessive,  or  reducing 
the  strength  of  such  a  desire  by  more  drastic  measures  of 
repression  and  denial. 

But,  it  may  be  urged,  this  is  merely  to  push  the  difficulty 
a  little  further  back  and  not  to  remove  it.  For  is  not  the 
individual's  ability  thus  to  develop  his  own  character,  to 
train  his  own  will,  the  necessary  resultant  of  causes  which 
lie  altogether  beyond  his  own  choice  or  control — of  his 
heredity,  that  is,  and  the  influences  of  his  environment? 
Eace,  sex,  and  family  stock  all  combine  to  produce  in  the 
individual  through  heredity  certain  definite  characteristics 
and  capacities.  Age,  country,  and  local  habitation  have 
an  inevitable  effect  upon  his  nature.  One  man  inherits  a 
taste  for  liquor,  another  is  endowed  with  marked  inventive 
ability.  The  spirit  of  one  age  leads  men  in  great  numbers 
to  enter  upon  religious  crusades,  that  of  another  makes 
the  pursuit  of  art  equally  popular.  Is  not,  then,  the 
individual's  ability  to  form  and  develop  that  character, 
which  in  any  particular  case  determines  his  action,  itself 
the  result  of  forces  outside  his  own  will  ?  In  the  last  analy- 
sis, therefore,  is  not  the  human  will  determined  by  external 
influences  ? 

At  this  point  it  will  be  necessary  to  inquire  how  these 
influences,  particularly  heredity  and  environment,  operate 


THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION  165 

in  determining  the  will.  Obviously,  what  they  do  is  to 
determine  the  comparative  attractiveness  of  different  ob- 
jects to  different  individuals.  Thus  from  hereditary  ten- 
dency one  man  is  attracted  to  wealth,  pursues  it,  and  be- 
comes a  millionaire ;  another  man  is  attracted  to  machinery, 
studies  it,  and  becomes  a  great  engineer.  But  in  what 
lies  the  attractiveness  given  to  these  objects  by  heredity 
and  surroundings  ?  Is  it  that  in  consequence  of  hereditary 
constitution  more  pleasure  results  from  the  pursuit  and 
attainment  of  these  objects  than  any  others?  In  this  case 
human  freedom  is  not  destroyed;  for  we  have  seen  that 
the  will  is  not  determined  by  a  necessity  of  its  nature 
always  to  seek  the  greatest  pleasure.  Does  not  the  influ- 
ence of  heredity  and  environment  consist  rather  in  deter- 
mining for  the  individual  how  pleasant,  how  interesting 
certain  objects  shall  be  when  they  are  represented  as  ends 
of  action?  Now  there  is  no  doubt  that  these  factors  do 
wield  a  momentous  influence  over  the  will  in  just  this 
way;  since  the  pleasantness  of  any  object  is  the  measure 
of  its  command  over  the  attention,  and  hence  its  power 
over  the  will.  The  fact  that  a  certain  desire  is  by  heredity 
especially  strong  in  a  man  means  that  its  object  is  much 
pleasanter  to  him  than  to  most  other  men,  and  that,  con- 
sequently, an  unusually  strong  purpose  will  be  required  t 
to  overrule  it  and  reduce  it  to  proper  submission.  The 
idea  of  being  a  prosperous  and  useful  citizen  must  be 
especially  attractive  and  appealing  if  it  is  to  hold  the 
attention  and  be  pursued  as  a  purpose  by  a  man  with  an 
inherited  craving  for  liquor.  We  must  admit,  therefore, 
that  heredity,  and  environment  too,  do  influence  the  will 
in  its  expression  and  development,  by  determining  the 
natural  or  inherent  attractiveness  of  different  objects  for 
it.  And  if  the  will  were  merely  a  faculty  whereby  par- 
ticular objects  are  sought  and  obtained,  its  acts  would 
simply  reflect  the  varying  attractiveness  of  these  different 


166  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

objects  and  thus  be  determined  exclusively  by  the  two  fac- 
tors above  mentioned.  But  will  is  more  than  this:  it  has 
a  positive  nature  of  its  own.4  In  essential_character  will  is 
an  organizing  agency,  and  this  fact  means  that  whenever 
it  is  exercised  and  to  the  extent  in  which  it  is  exercised,  the 
pleasantness  of  the  larger  and  more  inclusive  object  is  in- 
creased. Hence  it  is  always  possible  for  man  by  an  effort 
of  will  to  overcome  the  strength  of  hereditary  tendency  and 
environmental  influence  and  act  in  accordance  with  his 
own  larger  good.  And  this  exertion  of  the  will  is  de- 
pendent on  nothing  but  the  will  itself.  In  the  exercise  of  its 
own  peculiar  power,  therefore,  it  is  an  independent  and  orig- 
in^L  source  of  spiritual  energy.  Thus  while  heredity  and 
environment  often  influence  the  action  of  the  will,  in  some 
cases  setting  practical  limits  to  its  expression  by  making 
some  desire  so  strong  that  its  subjection  requires  a  dispropor- 
tionate and  exhausting  effort,  it  is  inconceivable  that  the  will 
•should  be  completely  controlled  by  these  external  factors. 
The  Determinist  may  now,  in  his  turn,  accuse  us  of  re- 
instating the  idea  of  will  as  an  "  uncaused  cause,"  5  as  the 

4  The  ultimate  question  in  this  matter  of  human  freedom  appears 
to  be  this, — Is  the  individual  an  original  source  of  spiritual  power 
the  amount  of  which  is  undetermined  and  hence  may.  by  effort,  be 
self-augmented?  This  question  must  receive  an  affirmative  answer, 
it  seems,  if  there  is  to  be  any  genuine  self-determination.  Paulsen, 
in  his  System  of  Ethics,  asserts  that  freedom  as  the  power  of  self- 
determination  is  a  positive  property  of  human  nature.  The  actions 
of  the  human  individual  are  determined  by  his  tendencies  and  pre- 
dispositions, he  holds,  and  these,  constituting  his  character,  are  deter- 
mined by  the  various  influences,  natural  and  social,  that  affect  him 
(p.  457).  But,  he  further  maintains,  man  may,  by  the  exercise  of 
thought  and  the  discipline  of  impulse,  form  his  character,  educate 
his  will  (p.  469).  Yet  he  admits,  still  further,  that  he  cannot  do 
this  unless  the  formative  principle  in  sufficient  strength  is  native 
•within  him  (p.  470).  And  if  this  power  exists  in  an  amount  fixed 
by  hereditary  endowment  in  the  individual  it  is  difficult  to  attach 
much  positive  meaning  to  his  capacity  for  self-determination.  Does 
not  true  freedom  imply,  as  James  suggests,  the  presence  in  human 
nature  of  a  power  not  fixed  in  amount  but  an  "  independent  variable, 
among  the  fixed  data  of  the  case,  our  motives,  character,  etc."? 

*  GBEEN  :  Op.  cit.,  p.  100. 


THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION  167 

one  faculty  of  man  which  acts  in  absolute  independence 
of  other  tendencies  in  human  nature  and  of  the  forces  in 
the  outer  world.  This  conception  of  will,  he  may  say,  has 
been  already  discarded,  as  false  to  the  facts  of  psychology, 
and  without  any  ethical  value.  In  answering  this  charge 
it  is  perhaps  sufficient  to  say  that  the  phrase,  "  uncaused 
cause,"  does  not  in  the  least  apply  to  the  self-determining 
will  as  it  has  been  described  in  the  previous  paragraphs. 
This  will  is  not  conceived  as  the  one  member  of  a  group  of 
forces  that  is  out  of  relation  to  all  the  rest,  the  single 
event  in  a  causal  series  that  is  itself  undetermined.  We 
have  seen  that  it  is  volition  as  an  organizing  agency  which 
establishes  the  unity  of  human  experience  and  assigns  place 
to  every  object  and  interest  therein.  It  is  therefore  the 
source  of  the  self  and  all  its  acts — or,  better,  it  is  the  self 
acting  in  its  unity.  Every  act  and  every  tendency  of  the 
self  is  an  expression  of  will,  for  will  is  just  the  power  of 
the  self  in  all  its  acts.  How  is  it  possible,  then,  to  suppose 
that  will  is  determined  and  limited  by  one  of  these  dis- 
positions or  tendencies  which  are  but  minor  expressions 
of  itself?  As  easily  suppose  that  the  power  and  potency 
of  life  is  limited  and  defined  by  the  various  species  which 
it  has  already  produced.  And  the  independence  and  ini- 
tiative which  we  thus  ascribe  to  will  is  only  a^fuller  mani- 
festation of  that  power  to  originate  new  forms  and  initiate  / 
new  activities  which  is  admitted  to  belong  to  all  life  and 
which  is  the  condition  of  all  development  and  evolution. 
The  explanation  of  freedom  is  self-determination,  the  ex- 
planation of  self-determination  is  development — the  reali- 
zation of  the  latent  and  often  unknown  possibilities  of 
human  nature. 

REFERENCES 

STOUT,  Manual  of  Psychology,  Book  TV.  Chap.  VTT. 
BALDWIN,  Social  and  Ethical  Interpretations  in  Mental  Development, 
Chap.  VII. 


168  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

GBEEN,  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  Book  II,  Chap.  I. 

PAULSEN,  System  of  Ethics,  Book  II,  Chap.  IX. 

SETH,  Ethical  Principles,  Part  III,  Chap.  I. 

LESLIE  STEPHEN,  Science  of  Ethics,  Chap.  VII,  §  2. 

ROGERS,  The  Religious  Conception  of  the  World,  "The  Problem  of 

Freedom." 

JAMES,  Psychology,  Chap.  XXVI. 
MACKENZIE,  Manual  of  Ethics,  Book  II,  Chap.  V. 
SIDQWICK,  Methods  of  Ethics,  Book  I,  Chap.  V. 


THE  CONDITIONS  OF  SELF-REALIZATION  IN 
HUMAN  LIFE 

1.  Form  and  Content  in  Self-Realization. — 2.  The  Incidental  and  the 
Essential  in  Human  Nature. — 3.  Man  as  a  Natural  Being,— 4. 
His  Native  Instincts. — 5.  Man  as  a  Conscious  Self, — 6.  His 
Spiritual  Capacities. — 7.  Necessary  Stages  in  Self-Realization: — 
8.  (a)  Individual, — 9.  (6)  Social, — 10.  (c)  Universal. 

1.  Form  and  Content  in  Self-Realization. — The  Good 
is  now  defined  as  the... full  realization  of  the  human  self. 
This  conception  of  self-realization  is  of  supreme  import- 
ance in  the  science  of  Ethics.  But  its  establishment  does 
not  mark  the  complete  solution  of  the  ethical  problem; 
it  only  provides  a  necessary  basis  for  further  inquiry. 
Highly  significant  as  it  is,  the  conception  of  self-realization 
as  thus  far  developed  is  an  abstract  principle  of  little  value 
in  solving  the  practical  problems  of  conduct.  To  be  genu- 
inely helpful  and  illuminating  it  must  be  made  concrete. 
We  must  know  something  of  the  actual  nature  of  the 
human  self  whose  realization  is  the  summum  bonum — of 
what  capacities  it  is  constituted,  through  what  activities 
it  is  expressed.  Only  through  such  knowledge  can  the 
principle  of  self-realization  furnish  guidance  and  direction 
to  human  conduct. 

Or,  to  put  the  matter  in  other  words,  our  study  up 
to  the  present  point  has  revealed  to  us  the  form  of  the 
Good.  An  analysis  of  the  activity  of  volition  has  proved 
that  conduct,  in  order  to  satisfy  this  faculty  of  will  and 
hence  deserve  to  be  called  "  good,"  must  be  completely 
organizejd  in  form,  that  is,  realize  the  whole  self.  But 


170  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

the  student  of  Ethics  cannot  be  content  with  a  principle 
that  is  merely  formal.  He  must  know  the  content  of  the 
Good  as  well  as  its  form.  What  are  the  activities  that  go 
to  make  up  a  completely  organized  life?  "What  are  the 
qualities  and  characteristics  of  the  self  whose  nature  is 
completely  realized  ?  If  mere  organization  is  the  Good,  will 
not  every  life  in  which  the  different  acts  are  all  strictly 
subordinated  to  a  ruling  purpose — even  though,  as  in  the 
case  of  the  criminal,  this  purpose  is  a  cruel  and  sinister 
one — be  morally  approved  ?  Suppose  a  boy  is  reared  in  the 
belief  that  it  is  his  chief  duty  to  avenge  the  death  of  a 
murdered  father.  As  he  grows  to  manhood  such  vengeance 
becomes  his  ruling  purpose, — perhaps  connecting  itself  with 
an  ideal  of  personal  honor.  In  finally  gaining  his  revenge 
he  himself  meets  death.  Is  not  his  life  completely  organ- 
ized? Does  he  not — or  does  he — fully  realize  himself? 
Such  an  example  shows  the  necessity  of  going  beyond  the 
formal  principle  of  organization  and  discovering  what  defi- 
nite^ characteristics  and  capacities  are  displayed  by  all  nor- 
mal human  beings  in  the  course  of  their  development. 

2.  The  Incidental  and  the  Essential  in  Human  Na- 
ture.— The  task  now  before  us  is  to  ascertain  what  are  the 
fundamental  characteristics  of  the  human  self  and  to  see 
how  these  are  expressed  in  the  process  of  self-realization. 
Now  while  the  form  of  the  Good  was  discovered  by  an  in- 
vestigation of  the  faculty  of  volition,  which  is  the  source 
of  all  conduct,  this,  the  content,  can  be  determined  only 
by  a  study  of  the  facts  of  human  nature  and  human  ex- 
perience. The  effects  of  such  a  study — especially  a  first 
general  survey — are  discouraging.  The  facts  are  many 
and  complicated,  and  the  variations  of  character  between 
men  of  different  races  and  ages  are  apparently  endless  and 
certainly  bewildering.  It  seems  that  all  men  possess  in 
common  only  the  bare  faculties  of  thought  and  action,  while 
the  many  ideas  and  beliefs  which  spring  from  the  one,  and 


THE  CONDITIONS  OF  SELF-REALIZATION       171 

the  varied  tendencies  and  dispositions  which  pertain  to  the 
other,  are  different  in  each  individual  case.  What  charac- 
teristics have  the  Norse  viking,  the  medieval  recluse,  and 
the  modern  man  of  business  in  common?  To  what  extent 
will  the  course  of  self-realization  for  the  Kaffir,  the  Es- 
quimo,  and  the  European  be  identical?  Or  even  within 
a  modern  civilized  state,  how  many  activities  are  shared 
equally  by  street-sweeper,  stock-broker,  and  charities- 
worker  ? 

The  activities  involved  in  self-realization  must  neces- 
sarily differ  with  the  time,  race,  sex,  and  occupation  of 
the  self.  In  fact,  self-realization  is  bound  to  have  a  differ- 
entjneaning  for  each  separate  individual;  since  each  pos- 
sesses certain  attributes  and  abilities  peculiar  to  himself, 
which  enter  into  his  self-realization.  Despite  this  infinite 
diversity  among  men  there  are,  nevertheless,  certain  char- 
acteristics which  are  essential  to  human  nature  as~such. 
They  are  consequently  possessed  by  all  normal  human  in- 
dividuals, and  serve  to  direct  the  course  of  self-realization 
in  each.  In  fact,  these  essential  characteristics  determine 
the  activities  which  all  men  must  put  forth  as  conditions 
of  their  self-realization.  They  may  hence  be  said  to  pre- 
scribe the  laws  of  self-realization,  valid  universally  within 
the  field  of  human  conduct.  Before  we  proceed  to  a  con- 
sideration of  those  essential  characteristics  of  human  nature 
which  constitute  the  universal  and  necessary  conditions  of 
self-realization  in  the  life  of  man,  a  question  must  be  an- 
swered which  will  naturally  arise  at  this  point.  To  what 
extent  can  such  a  process  as  self-realization  which,  as  we 
have  seen,  is  the  expression  of  the  free  agency  of  volition, 
an  original  and  spontaneous  power,  have  its  course  pre- 
determined by  any  influence  whatever? 

The  mere  idea  that  it  is  possible  by  reflection  to  discover 
conditions  of  moral  development  which  hold  for  all  men, 
and  hence  pre-determine  the  course  of  self-realization  in 


172  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

human  life,  may  seem  in  direct  contradiction  to  the  pre- 
vious assertion  that  the  future  must  always  contain  for 
the  voluntary  agent  an  element  of  uncertainty  which 
reason  can  never  eliminate,  and  that  consequently  human 
conduct  must  ever  remain  a  venture  in  which  the  surprising 
and  unexpected  are  constantly  encountered.  If  this  latter 
assertion  be  true, — it  will  be  urged, — it  is  manifestly  im- 
possible that  the  course  of  self-realization  should  be  pre- 
determined or  its  successive  stages  prescribed.  If  the 
future  course  of  moral  development  is  thus  determined, 
the  power  of  human  volition  is  limited,  the  will  is  not  truly 
free.  Conversely,  if  we  are  to  have  true  freedom  in  human 
conduct  and  real  evolution  in  human  life,  the  possibilities 
of  change  and  difference  must  be  unlimited.  Indeed,  the, 
logic  of  the  situation  may  appear  to  require  from__us  the 
admission  that  not  even  the  goal  of  moral  development  is 
fixed,  but  that  it  is  subject  to  indefinite  change  and  varia- 
tion in  response  to  new  and  different  conditions  which  may 
arise  in  the  future.  This  view — that  the  logic  of  develop- 
ment forbids  us  to  attribute  to  development  any  definite 
goal  or  ultimate  end — is  repugnant  alike  to  reason  and  to 

s  common-sense;  it  warns  us  against  the  over-emphasis  of 
one  aspect  of  the  truth,  itself  of  great  importance,  to  the 
exclusion  of  the  other  aspects  which  in  real  experience 
offset  and  balance  it.  Now  the  indubitable  truth  which 
finds  expression  in  the  view  we  are  considering  is  that 
no  genuine  development  realizes  an  end  set  for  it  by  some 

.'  external  agency;  it,  so  to  speak,  unfolds  its  result  out  of 
its  own  nature.  The  moral  ideal  of  self-realization  is  rooted 
in  the  nature  of  volition  itself.  For  development,  To  be 
development,  must  be  the  development  of  something,  not 
of  nothing.  The  thing  in  this  case  is  will,  and  we  learn 
from  experiencing  its  activity  that  it  is  essentially  an 
agency  of  adjustment  and  organization.  It  is  incpjaceiv- 
able,  therefore,  that  the  goal  of  its  development  should  be 


THE  CONDITIONS  OF  SELF-REALIZATION       173 

other  than  the  completed  organization,  perfected  adjust- 
ment. Further  than  this,  reflection  upon  the  achievements 
of  volition  in  human  life  shows  that  it  works  under  certain 
fundamental  conditions,  conditions  fixed  by  the  character- 
istics of  human  nature,  or  by  the  character  of  the  real 
world.  The  existence  of  these  conditions,  revealed  by  the 
results  of  past  action,  makes  it  reasonable  to  conclude — as 
we  shall  presently  see — that  self-realization  in  the  case  of 
all  men  must  involve  an^  integration  of  impulses  in  the 
individual  and  an  adjustment  of  interests  in  society.  But 
in  addition  to  these  necessary  implications,  which  are  of 
a  very  general  nature,  the  process  of  self-realization  holds 
forth  enough  uncertainty  to  test  the  courage  of  the  most 
adventuresome  soul.  The  methods  whereby  self -organiza- 
tion can  be  achieved  in  the  individual  and  social  spheres 
can  be  ascertained  only  by  trial  and  experiment.  Guided 
of  course  by  the  results  of  previous  experience,  man  must 
ever  advance  to  meet  new  situations ;  in  meeting  these  situ- 
ations he  must  have  the  strength  of  will,  the  courage  of 
conviction,  sufficient  to  risk  happiness  already  attained  in 
putting  to  the  test  new  and  more  promising  solutions.  All 
that  ethical  reflection  can  do  is  to  make  such  generalizations 
from  the  moral  experience  of  humanity  as  will  afford  us 
most  effective  guidance  in  solving  the  problems  of  future 
conduct. 

What,  then,  are  the  essential  characteristics  of  human 
nature  which  constitute  the  universal  and  necessary  con- 
ditions of  human  self-realization? 

3.  Man  as  a  Natural  Being. — Man  is  primarily  a  £a> 
ural^bfiing,  a  member  .of  the  highest  of  the  animal  species. 
He  is  the  outcome  of  the  same  natural  evolution  that  has 
produced  the  other  living  forms,  and  is,  therefore,  related 
to  them  by  descent.  His  genealogy  may  be  traced  down 
through  a  succession  of  species  to  the  earliest  and  simplest 
forms  of  life.  As  a  result  of  this,  his  natural  origin  and 


174  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

development,  man  possesses  certain  qualities  which  must 
be  reckoned  as  fundamental  to  his  character.  Most  im- 
portant in  their  influence  upon  conduct  are  the  instincts 
which  all  men  thus  possess.  These  instincts  are  a  part  of 
man 's  natural  inheritance,  and  hence  are  shared  in  common 
with  the  lower  animals.  They  are  modifications  of  the 
nervous  system  originally  developed  in  our  animal  ances- 
tors by  natural  selection  because  giving  an  advantage  in 
the  struggle  for  existence.  Originating  in  this  way  they 
have  been  transmitted  by  physical  heredity  and  made  a 
permanent  part  of  man's  physical  structure. 

4.  His  Native  Instincts. — Hence  the  first  of  the  char- 
acteristics fundamental  to  human  nature  is  the  possession 
by  all  men  of  a  set  of  natural  instincts.  These  instincts 
have  an  important  bearing  upon  man's  conduct,  since  they 
cause  him  at  first  to  react  involuntarily  to  certain  kinds 
of  objects  and  then  consciously  to  desire  and  voluntarily 
to  seek  them.  It  is  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  enumerate 
and  classify  the  various  instincts  of  man.  This  is  not 
because  their  existence  is  in  the  least  doubtful;  but  in 
many  cases  the  objects  and  movements  involved  in  a  group 
of  instinctive  reactions  are  so  related  that  it  seems  an 
arbitrary  matter  whether  we  attribute  the  whole  group 
to  one  instinct  or  divide  it  among  several.  Are  the  in- 
stincts, so-called,  of  defense,  combat,  and  rivalry  three  sep- 
arate instincts,  or  just  varied  manifestations  of  one  instinct  ? 
Who  shall  decide?  Still  it  is  possible  to  make  a  rough 
catalogue  of  the  more  important  human  instincts,  which 
will  be  sufficient  to  our  needs;  since,  for  ethical  pur- 
poses, we  do  not  require  a  complete  classification  of  every 
variety  of  instinctive  reaction  in  man.  For  purposes  of 
the  present  discussion,  then,  man's  instinctive  reactions 
may  be  divided  into  three  classes,  in  accordance  with  the 
nature  of  the  object  upon  which  they  are  directed,  whether 
it  be  the  individual  himself,  an  inanimate  object,  or  another 


THE  CONDITIONS  OF  SELF-REALIZATION       175 

living  individual.  Under  the  first  head  comes  the  instinct 
of  self-preservation,  which  causes  man  to  seek  his  own 
health  and  pleasure,  and  equally  to  avoid  conditions  of 
harm  and  pain.  Under  the  second  head  we  may  note  the 
instincts  of  food,  drink,  shelter,  and  acquisition.  Thirdly, 
come  the  social  instincts,  among  which  are  those  of  sex 
and  parenthood,  of  speech  and  sympathy,  of  resentment 
and  emulation.  We  may  add  as  another  to  these  three 
classes,  certain  instincts  whose  object  may  be  either  an 
inanimate  thing  or  another  living  individual — that  is,  the 
instincts  of  imitation,  curiosity,  beauty,  and  play. 

Originating  as  conditions  of  survival  with  the  lower  forms 
of  life,  these  instincts  serve — through  the  actions  they 
prompt — to  maintain  the  existence  of  the  human  organism 
in  the  natural  world.  Thus  they  relate  man  as  individual 
to  the  objects  of  nature,  giving  value  to  material  things 
according  as  these  minister  to  human  needs.  The  world 
of  the  human  individual  is  consequently  not  a  world  of 
objects  that  merely  exist  as  facts,  but  a  world  of  objects 
which  appeal  as  possible  ends  of  action  because  supplying 
food,  shelter,  clothing,  amusement,  etc.  In  the  same  way 
man's  native  instincts  relate  him  to  other  members  of  his 
own  species.  Other  individuals  acquire  interest  for  him 
because  furnishing  companionship,  arousing  resentment,  or 
appealing  to  sexual  or  parental  emotions.  Through  his 
various  natural  instincts,  therefore,  man  is  set  in  certain 
definite  relationships  to  objects  of  the  material  world  and 
to  other  men  as  natural  individuals. 

5.  Man  as  a  Conscious  Self. — But  man  is  more  than  a 
natural  individual:  he  is  a  conscious  self.  As  a  self  or 
person,  he  is  not  a  material  thing  with  boundaries  to 
separate  it  from  other  things  in  space,  he  is  a  spiritual 
being  to  whom  no  such  limitations  can  be  assigned.  Man's 
selfhood  or  personality  resides  in  the  conscious  unity  of 
his  experience.  "  To  have  a  conception  of  one's  own  self," 


176  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

says  Hobhouse,  "  one  must  be  aware  of  a  certain  identity 
running  through  the  mass  of  past  experiences^  ~and  in- 
f erentially  prolonged  into  the  future. ' ' *  Now  man 's  con- 
sciousness of  the  unity  of  his  experience,  in  which  his  self- 
hood consists,  depends  upon  his  ability  to  weave  together 
the  facts  of  his  experience  into  a  connected  system.  He 
must  do  more  than  associate  experiences  in  the  order  of 
their  occurrence;  for  this  the  animals  do  and  yet  have  no 
selfhood  or  personality.  He  must  be  able  to  establish  per- 
manent relations  among  the  objects  of  his  consciousness 
"  upon  the  basis  of  their  affinities  and  the  more  remote 
connections  that  follow  therefrom."2  Now  this  work  of 
the  organization  of  experience,  which  is  the  condition  of 
conscious  selfhood,  proceeds  ultimately  from  volition,  the 
spiritual  force  in  man  which  builds  out  of  the  materials  of 
animal  life  a  self-conscious  personality.  We  already  know 
how  volition  in  its  first  and  simplest  form  begins  this  work. 
In  discovering  the  means  which  must  be  used  to  attain  the 
end  of  desire  the  individual  is  made  aware  of  relationships 
among  objects  that  are  permanent  and  necessary.  Imita- 
tion and  language  are,  as  we  have  noted,  also  important 
factors  in  the  development  of  the  self.  The  social  charac- 
ter of  selfhood  is  therefore  marked  from  the  first;  since 
self-development  in  its  earliest  stages  is  dependent  upon 
the  influence  of  other  selves  and  the  possibility  of  com- 
municating with  them. 

With  the  appearance  of  volition,  then,  in  the  third  or 
fourth  year  of  human  life,  the  growth  of  the  self  begins  and 
it  continues  through  childhood.  But  full  self -consciousness 
does  not  arise  until  the  power  of  free  thought  and  imagina- 
tion is  developed  in  the  later  period  of  adolescence.  This 
power  enables  the  individual  to  deal  with  his  experience 
in  its  larger  masses  and  more  comprehensive  relationships. 

1  HOBHOUSE:    Mind  in  Evolution,  p.   301. 
1  HOBHOUSE:  Op.  cit.,  p.  300. 


THE  CONDITIONS  OF  SELF-REALIZATION        177 

He  may  behold  himself  as  a  physical  being,  a  denizen  of 
a  planet  in  a  great  solar  system  and  an  insignificant  atom 
in  a  vast  universe  of  suns  and  stars,  or  in  his  social  nature 
as  one  among  the  many  millions  of  souls  now  existing  in 
the  world.  He  may  view  his  present  in  its  connection 
with  the  past  which  is  fading  in  memory,  and  with  the  long 
future  which  stretches  out  before,  filled  with  unknown  pos- 
sibilities. In  such  consciousness  of  self  the  existence  of 
other  selves  is  necessarily  implied.  The  very  relationships 
by  which  the  experience  of  the  self  is  organized  are  as- 
sumed to  hold  for  other  selves  as  well.  The  real  universe  in 
which  the  self  finds  its  home  is  assumed  to  exist  for  other 
selves  also.  In  fact,  consciousness  of  self-existence  involves 
constant  appeal  to  the  existence  of  others.  From  his  nature 
as  such,  the  self-conscious  person  must  identify  himself 
with,  and  yet  at  the  same  time  distinguish  himself  from, 
other  persons.  He  must  recognize  that  all  have  the  same 
world,  yet  each  occupies  therein  his  own  point  of  view. 

6.  His  Spiritual  Capacities. — As  a  conscious  self  man 
has  certain  spiritual  capacities  the  possession  of  which  may 
rank  as  the  second  ofJJie  fundamejaiaL  characteristics  of 
human  nature.  And  as  his  natural  instincts  serve  to  sus- 
tain and  strengthen  his  physical  existence,  so  his  spiritual 
capacities  maintain,  and  enrich  his  conscious  personality. 
These  capacities  are  all  expressions  of  the  basal  activity  of 
volition  which,  through  its  work  of  organization,  builds  up 
the  unity  of  selfhood.  But  in  the  discharge  of  its  office 
volition  manifests  itself  in  three  highly  specialized  forms 
which  it  is  permissible  to  distinguish  as  different  capacities. 
These  spiritual  capacities  in  man  are:  first,  the  Intellectual,  ~J^ 
the  power  of  thought,  the  ability  to  acquire  knowledge; 
second,  the  Technical,  the  ability  to  contrive,  to  construct,  „._ 
to  invent  what  is  serviceable ;  third,  the  ^Esthetic,  the  ability 
to  perceive  and  enjoy  what  is  beautiful.  Now  the  effect  of 
the  operation  of  all  three  of  these  capacities  is  to  extend  and 


178  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

to  enrich  the  unity  of  the  self.  The  intellectual  capacity 
does  this  by  introducing  within  the  unity  of  self-conscious- 
ness the  objects  and  fixed  connections  of  the  real  universe. 
The  scientist,  with  his  telescope  or  microscope,  is  continu- 
ally enriching  human  experience  by  bringing  into  it  new 
facts.  In  a  like  manner  also  does  every  individual  enlarge 
the  content  of  his  own  personality,  who  by  serious  thought 
discovers  a  new  factor  or  hidden  cause  within  the  ken  of  his 
own  experience.  The  technical  capacity  of  man  extends  the 
unity  of  his  own  selfhood  by  subjecting  the  agencies  of  the 
environment,  natural  and  social,  to  the  ends  of  intelligence. 
This  the  inventor  does  when  he  devises  a  machine  by  which 
the  forces  of  nature  are  compelled  to  fulfil  the  purposes 
of  man;  the  educator,  too,  when  he  devises  a  new  method 
for  communicating  knowledge — for  teaching  spelling  or 
arithmetic  or  grammar.  The  same  ability  is  exercised  by 
all  individuals  who,  through  skill  and  contrivance,  adapt 
external  surroundings  to  the  uses  of  their  own  personal 
intelligence.  The  cesthetic  capacity  in  its  way  also  enriches 
the  content  of  the  unitary  self;  through  exercise  of  the 
imagination  and  perceptive  faculties  such  form  and  arrange- 
ment are  given  to  experiences  of  color  and  sound  as  to 
create  in  them  new  suggestions  of  meaning,  and  thus  to 
provide  the  agent  with  new  sources  of  satisfaction.  This 
ability  is  of  course  displayed  primarily  in  the  work  of  the 
artist;  but  in  a  less  degree  by  all  those  who  enjoy  beauty 
in  any  of  its  forms. 

Since  these  activities  spring  from  the  nature  of  the  self 
and  all  contribute  to  its  extension  and  development,  we 
should  expect  that  the  objects  which  they  seek  to  realize 
would  be  ideal  or  spiritual.  Such  is  indeed  the  case ;  the 
objects  of  the  three  spiritual  capacities  mentioned  are 
ideal  in  character  and  possess  none  of  the  limitations  of 
material  things.  Of  course  any  object  which  becomes  an 
x  end  of  action  is  of  necessity  ideal.  This  is  just  as  true 


THE  CONDITIONS  OF  SELF-REALIZATION       179 

of  the  material  object  which  instinct  causes  us  to  desire 
as  it  is  of  the  best  considered  purpose  or  most  comprehensive 
ideal.  But  the  material  ^object  which  becomes  an  end  of 
natural  desire  is  particular  in  character  and  limited  in  time 
and  place ;  hence  it  cannot  be  pursued  by  all  men,  but  only 
by  a  few  individuals.  Through  the  power  of  intelligence, 
generalizing  upon  experiences  of  achievement  by  race  and 
individual,  however,  objects  of  much  greater  range  are 
furnished  as  ends  for  volition  in  its  three-fold  capacity — 
objects  extending  in  their  scope  to  all  places  and  all  times 
and  being  possible  of  pursuit  by  all  individuals.  In  this 
way  simple  curiosity  about  a  particular  object  becomes  a 
wish  to  know  about  a  whole  class  of  objects,  then  a  number 
of  classes  of  objects,  and  at  last  develops  into  the  craving 
for  knowledge  of  all  possible  objects — i.e.  for  Truth.  In- 
terest in  the  steps  which  must  be  taken  to  secure  a  par- 
ticular object  grows  into  a  desire  to  discover  the  best 
means  or  methods  for  attaining  all  objects  of  the  same 
sort:  agencies  and  methods  are  standardized,  technique  is 
developed,  and  finally  Power  or  Efficiency  is  adopted  as 
an  end  to  be  sought  by  all  individuals.  Liking  for  a  special 
object  which,  when  seen  or  heard,  gives  a  peculiar  kind 
of  delight  develops  into  an  interest  in  all  objects  which 
produce  aesthetic  pleasure,  in  their  relation  to  one  another, 
and  the  conditions  of  their  existence;  out  of  this  interest 
grows  the  yearning  to  produce  in  every  sphere  the  con- 
ditions necessary  to  this  species  of  enjoyment  and  thus 
realize  Beauty  universally,  fc-j  *Jtt-}  »  'v^V^. 

Truth,  Power,  and  Beauty,  the  three  ideals  sought  by 
man~as  a  spiritual  being,  are  therefore  ideal  in  the  sense 
of  being  universal,  and  thus  having  a  scope  and  compre- 
hensiveness that  natural  objects  do  not  possess.  In  proof 
of  this,  compare  the  ideal  of  Truth,  the  object  sought  in 
all  intellectual  activity,  with  the  object  of  a  natural  in- 
stinct— say,  food.  Food  is  material,  hence  is  perishable 


180  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

in  character  and  strictly  limited  in  amount,  so  that  what 
one  individual  gains  the  rest  must  necessarily  lose.  Truth, 
on  the  contrary,  being  ideal,  survives  even  the  limits  of 
man's  natural  lifetime,  enduring  and  increasing  as  the 
successive  generations  of  men  are  born  and  die.  It  is  not 
restricted  in  quantity ;  it  cannot  be  ' '  cornered  ' '  by  any 
individual.  Rather  does  the  individual,  in  the  measure  of 
his  success  in  obtaining  it,  increase  the  possessions  of  all 
the  rest;  for  truth  requires  for  its  pursuit  and  discovery 
the  cooperation  of  many  individuals  in  a  community  of 
intelligence.  Nor  is  it  otherwise  with  Power  or  Efficiency, 
the  end  sought  in  technical  activity.  The  engineer  who 
designs  a  new  type  of  bridge,  and  the  agricultural  expert 
who  devises  an  improved  method  of  farming  are  not  seek- 
ing material  things  with  their  narrow  limits — combinations 
of  stone  and  steel,  bushels  of  grain,  or  tons  of  hay.  Instead 
their  object  is  ideal — the  control  of  the  forces  of  nature 
by  the  power  of  intelligence.  The  same  may  be  said  of 
efforts  made  in  the  social  and  political  spheres  to  devise 
methods  and  instruments  whereby  the  aims  of  intelligence 
may  be  attained  in  commerce  and  government.  The  pur- 
poses which  direct  these  undertakings,  because  intelligent 
are  universal,  and  hence  the  object  of  the  inventor  or 
engineer,  the  master  of  industry  or  the  statesman,  when 
attained,  is  of  benefit  to  all  humanity.  Thus  the  originator 
of  the  suspension  bridge  and  steam  engine  pursued  and 
attained  ideal  objects  which,  as  such,  had  permanence 
and  universality;  for  the  inventions  survived  the  natural 
life  of  the  inventor  and  became  the  common  possession  of 
humanity.  Likewise  Beauty,  which  we  in  our  aesthetic 
capacity  seek  to  create  and  enjoy,  is  identical  with  no  block 
of  chiseled  marble  or  piece  of  painted  canvas  which  can 
be  bought  and  sold.  It  is  ideal,  consisting  of  the  pleasant 
harmony  of  imaginative  faculties  induced  by  certain  aspects 
of  nature  and  works  of  art.  In  seeking  it,  then,  we  seek, 


THE  CONDITIONS  OF  SELF-REALIZATION       181 

not  a  particular  object  which  can  be  possessed  by  but 
one  individual,  we  seek  an  ideal  quality  which  resides  in 
this  object  for  all  persons  of  cultivated  imagination,  and 
thus  may  be  seized  on  and  enjoyed  by  them  all. 

Each  of  the  three  "  spiritual  "  activities  of  man  has 
its  distinctive  end.  These  three  ends  constitute  the  three 
ruling^  ideals  of  self-conscious  personality,  Truth,  Po.wer, 
and  Beauty.  In  a  sense  they  are  coordinate  and  inde- 
pendent ideals,  each  having  its  own  distinctive  sphere  and 
rightfully  demanding  supremacy  within  it.  Sometimes, 
however,  the  ideal  of  Goodness  is  given  equal  standing  with 
these  three  or  with  the  first  and  last,  Truth  and  Beauty. 
Herein  a  serious  mistake  is  made ;  for  the  ideal  of  Goodness 
represents  the  demands  of  the  agency  of  volition,  of  which 
intellectual,  aesthetic,  and  technical  activities  are  but  sub- 
ordinate expressions.  Ultimately,  then,  the  three  ideals  we 
have  been  discussing  must  all  be  measured  in  terms  of  good- 
ness, and  all  are  subject  to  the  requirements  which  the 
complete  satisfaction  of  the  power  of  will  imposes  on  human 
conduct.  By  true  ideas  we  mean,  in  last  analysis,  ideas 
that  can  be  realized  as  ends  of  action,  by  efficient  agencies 
or  methods  the  ones  that  will  produce  the  desired  results, 
and  by  beautiful  presentations  those  in  which  the  ends 
of  intelligence  are  immediately  apprehended.  Thus  do  in- 
tellectual, technical,  and  aesthetic  activities  contribute  to 
the  satisfaction  of  volition  in  its  work  of  organizing  and 
enriching  personal  life. 

7.  Necessary  Stages  in  Self-Realization. — Two  chaiv 
acteristics,  we  find,  must  be  regarded  as  fundamental  to 
the  human  self.  They  are  consequences  of  the  fact  that 
man  is  at  once  a  natural  being  and  a  conscious  self.  The 
first  is  the  possession  by  him  of  a  number  of  natural 
instincts  which  relate  him  to  the  material  objects  of  his 
environment  and  to  other  individuals  of  the  human  species. 
The  second  is  the  development  in  the  human  self  of  certain 


182  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

spiritualjjapacities  which  serve  to  relate  it  both  to  other 
selves  and  to  universal  reality.  These  conditions,  funda- 
mental to  human  nature,  determine  the  course  of  self- 
realization  for  all  men.  They  prescribe  what  activities  must 
have  place  in  the  conduct  of  every  human  individual  who 
would  realize  himself.  Hence  we  are  now  prepared  to  learn 
of  the  content  of  self-realization,  as  well  as  the  form,  to 
ask  what  course  self-realization  must  take  in  human  beings 
thus  characterized. 

It  will  be  convenient  to  recognize  in  advance  three  lead- 
ing aspects  of  self-realization  in  man,  which  are  consequent 
upon  the  above-noted  relations  in  which  he  stands,  as  natu- 
ral being,  and  conscious  self. 

Full  Self-realization,  or  the  complete  organization  of 
human  conduct,  requires  the  realization  of : 

(1)  The  Individual  Self. — Through  such  adjustment  of 

the  activities  in  man  that  all  are  made  means  to  the  j>ro- 

.^_  ti  i         r*/     • 

motion  of  individual  interest.  w  -Sl^Tc.   \  ^'^u?[ 

(2)  The  Social  Self. — Through  such  adjustment  of  the 
interest  of  the  human  individual  to  the  interests  of  others 
that  his  activity  is  made  a  means  to  the  furtherance  of 
social  welfare. 

(3)  The  Universal  Self.— Through  the  adjustment  of 
human  welfare  to  the  Universal  Purpose. 

Thus  an  outline  is  furnished  which  may  be  regarded  as 
provisional  until  it  is  filled  in  and  verified  in  subsequent 
discussion.  Let  us  now  ascertain  in  further  detail  what 
activities  are  essential  to  self-realization  under  the  condi- 
tions set  by  the  nature  of  man.  Or,  since  self-realization 
is  achieved  by  voluntary  action,  through  the  pursuit  of 
what  succession  of  ends  the  self  is  fully  realized. 

8.  (a)  The  Individual  Self. — Self-realization  within  the 
individual  sphere  means  that  the  total  interest  of  the 
individual  shall  be  realized  by  all  of  his  acts.  Now,  as 

we  know,  the  human  individual  possesses  both  natural  in- 
C\  ,.  ~*  +  Jfufr^t^+Jr*  *-*J^ATr^  J  »v-  .-  >^  ^*t*-±'  V^-VK^W 

JS^^^SST^^  u!5CH^^^?^^u 


THE  CONDITIONS  OF  SELF-REALIZATION       183 

stincts  and  spiritual  capacities.  In  virtue  of  these  charac- 
teristics of  his  nature,  certain  objects  appeal  to  him  and 
prompt  him  to  act.  In  order  that  his  conduct  shall 
express  himself,  it  is  first  necessary  that  the  objects  of 
instinct  become  the  ends  of  conscious  desire.  "When  this 
is  accomplished,  he  seeks  in  each  succeeding  act  for  the 
thing  which  he  at  the  moment  desires — be  it  food,  play,- 
companionship,  or  what-not.  But  the  total  interest  of  the 
individual  is  not  attained  in  this  way;  for  these  desires 
often  conflict,  and  to  satisfy  one  to-day  may  prevent  the 
satisfaction  of  another  to-morrow,  or  even  for  days  to  come. 
Self-organization,  then,  requires  such  adjustment  and  cor- 
relation of  these  varied  and  opposing  desires  that  each 
may  receive  a  measure  of  fulfilment  consistent  with  the  I 
due  and  proportionate  satisfaction  of  those  remaining.  This 
adjustment  is  not  merely  a  compromise,  however,  in  which 
all  the  desires  are  treated  as  independent  units  and  thus 
admitted  to  have  equal  rights.  Certain  desires  are  given 
a  preference,  but — consistent  with  the  principle  of  Self- 
realization — upon  one  ground  only,  that  is,  their  greater 
comprehensiveness.  The  measure  of  fulfilment  which  self- 
realization  permits  to  one  of  the  particular  desires  or  pur- 
poses of  the  self  is  determined  entirely  by  the  comprehen- 
siveness of  the  object  concerned,  the  degree  to  which  it  in- 
cludes other  objects  sought-for,  and  hence  is  expressive  of 
the  whole  self.  As  illustrative  of  difference  in  this  regard, 
compare  the  objects  of  two  natural  instincts;  for  example 
those  of  food  and  of  resentment  or  anger.  The  first  is 
much  more  comprehensive  than  the  second.  Upon  the  ob- 
tainment  of  a  sufficient  quantity  of  the  proper  food  de- 
pends the  effective  exercise  of  the  most  of  the  other  activ- 
ities of  the  human  individual.  The  other  desire  has  a  very 
narrow  range — since  the  attainment  of  its  object,  retalia- 
tion, in  any  but  the  most  restricted  form  and  unusual  cir- 
cumstances, acts  as  a  hindrance  to  the  attainment  of  other 


184  THE  NATTJRE  OF  THE  GOOD 

objects  desired.  Of  all  the  objects  which  man  seeks  through 
natural  instinct,  the  most  comprehensive  is  self -preservation. 
This  instinct  leads  the  individual  to  desire  those  pleasant 
conscious  states  which  are  indicative  of  physical  well-being, 
and  equally  to  shun  that  consciousness  of  pain  which  sig- 
nifies bodily  disorder.  Generalizing  upon  particular  ex- 
periences of  pleasure  and  pain,  he  is  further  led  to  form 
the  purpose  to  secure  in  life  the  greatest  enjoyment,  or, 
in  other  words,  gain  the  maximum  of  pleasure.  Now 
pleasure,  in  the  sense  of  agreeable  consciousness,  is  the  most 
comprehensive  of  the  objects  which  man  is  led  by  instinct 
to  pursue,  and  therefore  the  purpose  to  pursue  it  deserves 
to  be  made  supreme  over  all  other  desires  and  purposes 
having  a  like  source.  For  the  greatest  amount  of  pleasure 
in  the  case  of  the  human  individual  is  generally  an  accom- 
paniment of  the  highest  degree  of  health,  security,  and 
comfort  in  natural  existence.  And,  since  all  other  instincts 
which  man  possesses  have  been  developed  to  maintain  and 
promote  his  natural  existence,  the  different  objects  which 
they  cause  him  to  desire — wealth,  amusement,  reputation, 
etc. — fall  into  subjection  as  means  to  the  inclusive  end  of 
Pleasure,  or  natural  well-being.  Thus  Pleasure  emerges 
as  the  first  of  the  ends  which,  in  the  process  of  self-realiza- 
tion, represent  the  whole  self  in  contrast  to  any  of  its 
parts ;  and  we  make  due  recognition  of  the  truth  contained 
in  the  Hedonistic  conception  of  the  Good. 

We  have  already  seen,  however,  that  the  ideal  objects 
of  man's  spiritual  capacities — Truth,  Power,  and  Beauty — •• 
are  larger  and  more  comprehensive,  not  merely  than  any 
particular  thing  which  he  naturally  desires,  but  even  than 
his  natural  existence  and  well-being  itself.  Self-organiza- 
tion in  the  individual  life  requires,  therefore,  that  the  end 
lately  made  supreme  over  all  natural  desires  and  purposes 
now  be  subordinated  as  a  means  to  the  realization  of  these 
spiritual  capacities.  The  individual,  that  is,  must  make 


THE  CONDITIONS  OF  SELF-REALIZATION       185 

his  natural  well-being  and  pleasure  a  means  to  the  exercise 
of  his  intellectual,  technical,  and  aesthetic  activities.  The 
ends  of  these  higher  activities  of  the  human  self  taken 
together  may  be  expressed  by  the  word  Culture.  Culture 
thus  appears  as  the  ideal  which  transcends  all  other  ends  in 
the  conduct  of  the  individual,  because  representing  his  larg- 
est interest  and  embracing  all  lesser  goods.  To  its  attain- 
ment, the  natural  existence  and  well-being  of  the  individual 
must  be  made  subordinate,  including  of  course  such  lesser 
purposes  as  those  to  gain  wealth,  amusement,  fame,  etc. 
These  have  now  to  be  realigned  and  made  instrumental,  not 
to  the  gaining  of  Pleasure,  but  to  the  attainment  of  Culture. 
In  thus  making  Culture  supreme  among  the  ends  pursued 
by  the  individual  we  provide  for  the  truth  in  Rationalism, 
which  finds  man's  Good  in  spiritual  activity  rather  than 
natural  pleasure.  The  ideal  of  Culture  on  which  we  dwell, 
as  representing  the  highest  interest  of  the  self  as  individual, 
is  practically  identical  with  the  Highest  Good  as  conceived 
by  Plato  *  and  Aristotle.*  According  to  Plato  Justice,  the 
supreme  and  all-inclusive  virtue,  consists  in  a  strict~clivision 
of  labor  and  harmonious  cooperation  between  the  three 
principles  in  the  nature  of  man — it  being  understood  that 
it  is  the  function  of  reason  to  control.  Aristotle,  in  his 
doctrine  of  the  Mean,  would  allow  to  each  desire  that 
measure  of  gratification  consistent  with  the  realization  of 
the  Supreme  End  which  is  the  fulfilment  of  all  man's 
capacities  under  the  direction  of  reason. 

9.  (b)  The  Social  Self. — Man  is  related  as  a  natural 
being  to  other  members  of  the  human  species,  and,  as  a 
conscious  self,  to  other  selves  in  a  community  of  intelli- 
gence. Self-realization  requires  that  his  interest  as  indi- 
vidual be  adjusted  to  the  interests  of  others  in  society. 

The  human  individual  becomes  aware  of  the  existence 

•PLATO:  Republic,  443.  C. 

*  AKISTOTLE  :  Nicomachean  Ethics,  1106,  B. 


186  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

of  others  as  soon  as  he  becomes  conscious  of  existing  himself. 
One  of  his  leading  instincts,  moreover, — that  of  sympathy, 
— makes  him  desirous  of  increasing  others'  pleasure  and 
lessening  their  pain.  The  formation  of  a  general  purpose 
to  promote  the  happiness  or  well-being  of  others  usually 
waits  upon  the  development  of  a  definite  self-interest  in 
the  individual  himself.  At  first  the  sympathetic  impulse 
is  correlated  with  other  natural  tendencies  of  the  Individual 
and  made  a  means  to  the  promotion  of  his  own  interest, 
and  it  is  only  after  a  comparatively  clear  consciousness 
of  self  and  self-interest  arises  that  there  comes  also  a 
recognition  of  the  interest  of  others.  This  conception  of 
another's  interest  becomes  fuller  and  more  adequate  as  the 
development  of  self-interest  proceeds,  growing  from  the 
idea  of  another's  comfort  and  happiness  merely,  to  the 
cultivation  of  his  higher  personal  capacities.  The  impulse 
of  sympathy,  attaching  to  such  an  idea  of  another's  good, 
makes  it  attractive  as  an  end  of  action.  Thus  a  well-defined 
aim  to  seek  the  interests  of  other  individuals  appears  and 
exists  along  with  the  ideal  of  self-interest.  These  varied 
interests  often  conflict,  so  that  it  seems  possible  to  gain  one 's 
own  ends  as  an  individual  only  by  thwarting  the  ambitions 
of  others,  and,  conversely,  others '  good  can  often  be  realized 
only  at  the  expense  of  one 's  private  ambition.  Self -organi- 
zation makes  necessary  the  adjustment  of  these  warring 
interests.  As  always,  it  insists  that  the  less  inclusive  shall 
be  subordinated  to  the  more  inclusive  end.  Consequently 
the  realization  of  the  self  requires  the  adoption  of  the 
ideal  of  Altruism  on  the  part  of  the  individual — the  de- 
termination to  seek  the  interests  of  others  with  whom  he 
comes  into  contact  as  well  as  his  own.  This  means  that 
he  shall  surrender  his  own  desire — or  partial  interest — 
when  it  is  opposed  to  the  total  well-being  of  another.  In 
cases  where  ego  and  alter  seem  to  have  equal  interests  at 
stake,  Self-realization  enforces  the  doctrine  of  self-sacrifice, 


THE  CONDITIONS  OF  SELF-REALIZATION       187 

since  allowance  must  be  made  for  the  influence  of  a  strong 
and  persistent  tendency  to  over-estimate  the  interest  of 
self  and  under-estimate  that  of  others,  due  to  the  fact 
that  one's  own  interest  is  keenly  felt,  while  that  of  others 
is  only  thought  or  imagined.  There  are  limits,  to  be  sure, 
to  the  extent  of  self-sacrifice  which  self-realization  requires. 
It  would  not,  for  instance,  require  the  individual  to  sac- 
rifice his  own  well-being  to  the  passing  whim  of  another. 
For  here  the  interest  of  the  self  is  the  more  comprehensive 
end. 

Self-realization  in  the  social  sphere  is  not  completed  when 
the  individual  adjusts  his  own  interest  to  the  interests  of 
others  of  his  acquaintance.  For  the  selfhood  of  which  man 
is  conscious  is  a  universal  principle  present  in  all  human 
beings  and  uniting  them  in  a  community  of  intelligence 
and  personality.  For  full  self-realization,  therefore,  it  is 
not  sufficient  that  man  pursue  his  own  highest  interest  as 
an  individual,  or  that  of  other  individuals  with  whom  he 
comes  into  contact ;  he  must  go  further  and  seek  the  good  of 
human  personality,  of  conscious  selfhood,  whenever  and  ! 
wherever  found.  Thus  a  new  end  appears,  more  compre- 
hensive than  Altruism,  which  may  be  called  Humanitarian- 
ism.  It  means  the  development  of  humanity — the  full,  free, 
harmonious  exercise  of  all  the  capacities  of  human  person- 
ality. To  this  ideal,  Self-organization  requires  that  the  in- 
dividual subordinate  his  own  interest  and  the  interests  of  all 
other  particular  individuals.  The  conflict  at  this  point  be- 
tween culture  and  humanitarianism — between  the  interest 
of  the  individual  or  a  privileged  group  or  class  of  indi- 
viduals and  the  welfare  of  humanity — while  less  obvious — 
may  be  as  acute  and  persistent  as  that  betwjeen  egoism  and 
altruism.  It  cannot  be  doubted,  however,  that  the  fullest 
expression  of  the  self  is  found  in  pursuit  of  the  more  com- 
prehensive end,  and  the  highest  culture  can  mean  nothing  , 
less  than  the  fullest  self-development.  The  artist  or  the 

-•"' 


188  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

scientist  may  regard  it  as  a  hindrance  to  be  obliged  to  rec- 
ognize a  social  responsibility  in  their  specialized  activities. 
Yet  the  very  capacities,  intellectual  and  aesthetic,  which  they 
are  exercising  are  implicitly  universal,  involving  the  union 
of  many  persons  in  a  common  knowledge  and  appreciation. 
Can  one  of  these  spiritual  capacities  of  man  be  exercised 
most  effectively,  then,  unless  it  contribute  to  the  highest 
personal  development  of  humanity? 

10.  (c)  The  Universal  Self. — Finally,  man  is  related 
through  his  spiritual  capacities  to  Universal  Reality.  His 
thought  discovers  the  necessary  connections  of  things  and 
shows  how  all  natural  objects  are  part  of  an  inter-related 
system.  Through  constructive  activity  he  learns  how  the 
objects  and  forces  of  nature  are  adapted  as  means  to  the 
purposes  of  intelligence.  Through  his  sesthetic  faculty  he 
feels  the  order  and  harmony  of  nature.  Self-realization 
in  its  third  and  culminating  phase  requires  the  adjustment 
of  human  interests  to  this  all-comprehensive  Reality.  Now 
it  is  plain  that  the  character  of  this  adjustment  will  vary 
in  accordance  with  the  degree  of  development  which  self- 
interest  has  undergone — whether  it  is  still  mainly  individual 
or  has  been  broadened  to  include  the  welfare  of  humanity. 
But  since  in  all  cases  of  incomplete  development  the  ad- 
justment is  only  provisional  we  may  safely  neglect  them 
and  consider  only  the  interest  of  the  self  when  thoroughly 
socialized.  The  question  is,  therefore,  that  of  the  adjust- 
ment of  human  welfare  to  the  Real  Universe.  It  must  not 
be  thought,  however,  that  here  we  go  outside  the  boundaries 
of  the  self  and  inquire  concerning  its  relation  to  an  ex- 
ternal reality.  On  the  contrary,  just  because  the  real  uni- 
verse is  a  necessary  factor  in  self-consciousness,  it  must 
be  reckoned  with  in  the  process  of  self-realization.  The 
problem  of  the  relation  of  man  to  the  universe  is  of  course 
the  problem  of  religion,  and,  as  such,  is  an  essential  aspect 
of  self-realization. 


THE  CONDITIONS  OF  SELF-REALIZATION       189 

The  difficulty  of  the  adjustment  in  question  is  that  the 
ultimate  character  of  the  All-encompassing  Reality  is  un- 
known. It  cannot  be  directly  observed  or  logically  demon- 
strated. Hence  man  can  only  speculate,  and  such  adjust- 
ment as  he  is  able  to  effect  will  rest  upon  an  assumption. 
But  speculation  upon  this  subject  need  not  be  without 
rational  grounds.  In  fact,  it  is  man's  own  moral  develop- 
ment that  is  most  illuminating  at  this  point.  For,  in  the 
process  of  self-realization,  natural  objects  are  sacrificed 
to  spiritual  activities  because  the  latter  prove  to  be  more 
comprehensive.  Is  it  not  reasonable  to  assume,  therefore, 
that  Universal  Reality,  which  is  by  nature  all-comprehen- 
sive, is  spiritual — that  it  is  the  expression  of  a  Universal 
Self  within  which  all  our  human  interests  may  be  included 
and  harmonized?  Of  course  the  existence  of  such  a  Uni- 
versal or  Divine  self  is  in  last  analysis  a  matter  of  faith 
rather  than  knowledge;  but  we  have  seen  that  faith  is 
called  for  along  the  whole  course  of  moral  development. 
The  very  existence  of  the  self  is  rooted  in  an  act  of  will, 
and  each  step  forward  in  its  realization  is  a  venture,  the 
abandonment  of  one  good  which,  although  restricted,  is 
assured,  for  the  sake  of  another  which,  although  it  promises 
a  larger  satisfaction,  is  uncertain  and  largely  unknown. 
Religious  belief  is  simply  the  last  of  these  acts  of  faith, 
the  final  venture,  in  which  man  commits  his  welfare  into 
the  hands  of  the  Universe,  believing  that  since  Spirit  is 
Universal  no  natural  agency,  in  life  or  in  death,  can 
lessen  or  destroy  the  reality  which  has  been  attained  by  a 
conscious  self. 

Man  thus  subordinates  his  interest  to  the  Universal  or 
Divine  Purpose,  adopting  the  latter,  so  far  as  it  can  be 
known,  as  his  own  good.  To  describe  in  detail  the  character 
and  conditions  of  this  adjustment  is  the  task  of  religion 
rather  than  of  Ethics.  It  involves,  for  the  ordinary  man, 
not  a  number  of  specific  activities  in  addition  to  those  pre- 


190  THE  NATURE  OF  THE  GOOD 

scribed  by  individual  and  social  duty,  but  rather,  a  personal 
attitude — of  resignation  to  the  divine  will,  and  trust  in  the 
divine  wisdom.  The  end  now  pursued  is  of  all  the  most 
comprehensive — the  realization  of  the  Universal  Purpose, 
the  Cause  of  Universal  Progress. 


Thus  we  see  that  with  human  nature  characterized  as 
it  is,  the  process  of  self-realization  for  man  is  definite  in 
its  direction  and  specific  in  its  requirements.  In  its  three 
aspects  it  involves  the  attainment  of  a  progression  of  ends, 
each  of  which  includes  and  supersedes  the  one  before, 
until  the  supreme  and  all-comprehensive  ideal  is  reached. 

In  tabulation  these  ends  appear  in  the  following  order: 

Self-Realization 

Agency  —  Organizing  Activity  of  Volition. 

Material  —  Natural  Instincts  and  Spiritual  Capacities  of  Man. 

Aspects  Ends 

Individual    ........  \ 

( 


Culture 


Social  .     Altruism 

(  Humanitarianism 

Universal      .       .       .       .  .       .       .    Universal  Progress 


REFERENCES 

BALDWIN,  Social  and  Ethical  Interpretations  in  Mental  Development, 

Chaps.  VI,  IX,  XII. 
JAMES,  Psychology,  Chap.  XXIV. 
PILLSBUBY,  Essentials  of  Psychology,  Chap.  X. 
GREEN,  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  Book  III,  Chap.  VI. 
ALEXANDER,  Moral  Order  and  Progress,  Book  II,  Chap.  II. 
DEWEY  AND  TUFTS,  Ethics,  Chap.  XX. 
MACKENZIE,  Manual  of  Ethics,  Book  III,  Chap.  I. 
LESLIE  STEPHEN,  Science  of  Ethics,  Chap.  III. 


PART  THREE 
THE   GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 


CHAPTER  I 
THE  CONCEPTION  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

1.  The  Relation  of  the  Good  to  the  Existing  Human  Individual. — 
2.  The  Good  as  External  to  the  Individual. — 3.  The  Good  as 
Identical  with  the  Interest  of  the  Individual .—4.  These  Two 
Aspects  of  Goodness  Explained  by  the  Principle  of  Self-Realiza- 
tion.— 5.  Arnold's  Contrast  of  Hebraism  with  Hellenism. — 6. 
Hebraism. — 7.  Hellenism. — 8.  Relation  of  Christianity  to  Hebra- 
ism and  Hellenism. 

1.  The  Relation  of  the  Good  to  the  Existing  Human 
Individual. — In  the  preceding  part  the  nature  of  the  Good 
was  considered  and  the  conclusion  reached  that  the  summum 
bonum  is  Self-realization.  Concerning  the  Good  another 
question  may  be  asked  which,  although  closely  related  to 
that  of  its  nature,  is  nevertheless  distinct  from  it.  This 
question  refers  to  the  relation  of  the  Good  to  the  human 
individual  in  actual  life.  How  does  the  Good  stand  re- 
lated to  the  normal  man — is  it  connected  intimately  and 
essentially  with  himself,  expressing  his  own  deepest  desires 
and  highest  hopes,  or  is  it  only_  partially  an  expression  of 
his  nature,  representing  his  social  impulses  only  and  at 
variance  with  other  tendencies,  or  does  it  present  itself 
altogether  as  an  authority  from  "without,  a  command  of 
God  or  a  law  of  the  universe  to  which  he  must  conform  or 
perish?  Upon  this  question  two  conflicting  views  have 
arisen  in  the  course  of  ethical  reflection.  The  jme  holds 
that  the  Good  is  identical  with  the  interest  of  the  individual 
and  stands  for  the  complete  fulfilment  of  all  his  desires. 
The  other  regards  the  Good  as  external  to  the  individual 

198 


194  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

and  usually  opposed  to  his  actual  inclinations.1  The  line  of 
division  between  these  two  views  does  not  correspond  to, 
or  even  parallel,  that  between  Hedonism  and  Rationalism. 
Rather  it  cuts  across  this,  although  obliquely.  Thus  one 
may  hold  the  view  first-named,  that  the  Good  is  identical 
with  man's  actual  interest,  and  be  either  a  Hedonist  or 
Rationalist,  according  as  he  finds  this  interest  in  the  enjoy- 
ment of  pleasure  or  the  exercise  of  reason.  Doubtless,  this 
first  view  has  closer  relationship  logically  with  Hedonism; 
feeling  is  the  subjective  factor,  expressing  in  its  warmth  and 
immediacy  the  present  state  of  the  self.  Yet  as  a  matter 
of  historic  fact  it  has  frequently  appeared  in  union  with 
Rationalism,  as  in  the  case  of  Greek  Ethics,  which  at  once 
identifies  the  Good  with  the  nature  of  the  individual  and 
believes  it  to  consist  in  the  supremacy  of  reason  in  his  life. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  second  view,  that  the^  Good  is 
external  to  the  individual,  may  be  maintained  by  one  who 
is  either  a  Rationalist  or  a  Hedonist.  But  here  the  leaning 
is  still  more  marked  toward  one  of  these  rival  theories,  in 
this  case  that  of  Rationalism;  since  reason  is  the  objective 
factor  in  human  nature  and  its  requirements,  possessing 
universal  validity,  seem  frequently  to  have  the  force_of 
external  authority.  If  the  Good  is  pleasure  and  still  ex- 
ternal to  the  individual  it  must  be  the  pleasure  of  other 
men  or  of  God.  But  we  already  know  that  Hedonism  as 
a  historic  doctrine  has  relied  chiefly  on  the  psychological 
argument  that  every  man  must,  from  a  compulsion  of  his 


1  Such  a  view  of  the  Good  may  appear  to  be  a  contradiction  in 
terms,  since  the  Good  has  been  defined  as  that  form  of  conduct 
which  satisfies  the  human  will  completely.  The  fact  of  the  depend- 
ence of  the  Good  upon  the  demands  of  human  volition  has  frequently 
been  obscured,  however,  by  the  features  of  moral  experience  described 
in  the  following  section,  and  the  whole  subject  has  been  complicated 
by  the  belief,  more  or  less  prevalent,  that  man's  will,  although 
originally  directed  upon  the  Good,  has  been  perverted  by  the  sins 
of  our  first  parents  and  thus  turned  altogether  to  the  pursuit  of 
selfish  pleasure. 


THE  CONCEPTION  OF  SELF-REALIZATION       195 

nature,  seek  his  own  pleasure.  Hence  a  view  which  finds 
the  good  of  the  individual  in  the  pleasure  of  some  other 
person  or  persons  does  not  appear  as  a  true  or  consistent 
Hedonism. 

2.  The  Good  as  External  to  the  Individual. — Both  of 
these_jnews  of  the  relation  of  the  Good  to  the  human  in- 
dividual are  supported  by  facts  whose  importance  cannot 
be  gainsaid.  The  view,  second-named,  of  the  externality 
of  the  Good,  is  in  accord  with  the  apparent  facts  of  moral 
experience.  In  the  experience  of  the  majority  of  persons 
the  requirements  of  goodness  are  oppjosed,  more  frequently 
than  not,  to  natural  inclination  and  present  desire.  Con- 
formity to  these  requirements  is  possible,  therefore,  only 
when  inclination  is  thwarted  and  desire  is  repressed.  The 
moral  life  is  correctly  described  as  a  struggle — a  struggle 
with  rebellious  tendencies  and  a  recalcitrant  nature.  We 
must  be  ever  watchful,  always  on  our  guard,  not  against 
the  principalities  and  powers  of  the  outer  world,  but  against 
our  own  wayward  impulses,  the  frowardness  of  our  own 
hearts.  Moral  development  is  not  the  unconscious  matur- 
ing, the  spontaneous  blossoming  forth,  of  our  nature. 
Rather  is  moral  progress  a  slow  and  painful  ascent  in 
which  each  step  upward  is  hard-won  and  costs  pain  and 
privation.  We  develop  morally  by  subjecting  ourselves  to 
a  law  which  our  natures  resist  because  of  its  apparent 
rigor  and  severity.  Hence  even  when  we  have  come  to 
recognize  fully  the  authority  of  the  Good  over  us  and  to 
acquiesce  in  its  dictates,  we  never  regard  it  with  the  affec- 
tion and  familiarity  that  we  do  our  private  plans  and 
ambitions.  Fear  and  dislike  of  the  Good  may  turn  to 
admiration  and  reverence,  but  our  attitude  towards  it  never 
loses  something  of  that  awe  which  we  feel  in  the  presence 
of  a  power  greatly  superior  to  ourselves.  In  spite,  then, 
of  moral  development  and  an  increasing  conformity  to  the 
demands  of  the  Ideal,  duty  always  retains  a  suggestion  of 


196  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

that  stern  and  inflexible  authority  expressed  in  the  lines 
of  Wordsworth: 

"  Stern  Daughter  of  the  Voice  of  God, 
0  Duty,  if  that  name  thou  love 
Who  art  a  light  to  guide,  a  rod 
To  check  the  erring  and  reprove; 
Thou,  who  art  victory  and  law 
When  empty  terrors  overawe; 
From  vain  temptations  dost  set  free; 
And  calm'st  the  weary  strife  of  frail  humanity !  " 

3.  The  Good  as  Identical  with  the  Interest  of  the  In- 
dividual.— When  the  facts  of  the  moral  life  are  made  the 
subject  of  conscious  reflection  the  identity  of  Goodness 
with  the  nature  and  interest  of  the  individual  assumes 
greater  prominence  than  any  semblance  of  opposition  be- 
tween them.  It  is  true  that  the  voice  of  duty  never  loses 
the  note  of  authority  when  it  demands  the  subjection  of 
present  desire  or  natural  impulse.  Yet  it  is  not  an  author- 
ity external  to  the  human  individual  constraining  him 
against  his  will.  So  far  from  this,  the  distinguishing  char- 
acteristic of  duty  or  moral  obligation  is  its  utter  difference 
from  such  external  compulsion.  When  the  individual 
recognizes  a  moral  obligation,  he  feels  that  he  owes  the 
act  in  question,  not  to  any  person  or  power  outside  him, 
but  to  himself.  To  his  conscience,  he  may  say  it  is,  but  his 
conscience  is  an  integral  part  of  his  own  nature.  The 
authority  of  conscience  is  therefore  an  authority  self-con- 
stituted, and  the  law  of  duty  is  a  law  which  we  impose 
on  ourselves.  Neither  can  be  understood  except  as  an 
expression  of  the  will  of  the  agent — a  different  will  from 
that  which  flames  out  in  momentary  desire,  but  as  the  very 
contrast  suggests,  a  steadier  and  larger  will.  There  is  no 
disputing  that  the  demands  of  goodness  express  the  nature 
of  the  individual  and  are  identical  with  his  true  interest. 
This  identity  of  the  Good  with  the  highest  interests  of 


THE  CONCEPTION  OF  SELF-REALIZATION       197 

man  cannot  be  doubted  even  in  the  most  extreme  cases 
of  opposition  between  the  requirements  of  duty  and  the 
apparent  interest  of  the  individual.  Duty  may  demand 
that  he  give  up  comfort  and  possessions,  health,  and  even 
life,  in  the  discharge  of  some  service  to  the  state  whose 
importance  is  not  recognized  or  appreciated.  Is  not  the 
Good  opposed  to  the  interest  of  the  individual  in  this  case  ? 
No,  the  fact  that  he  felt  this  political  or  social  obligation 
shows  that  there  was  a  side  of  his  nature  which  could  not 
be  satisfied  with  wealth,  comfort,  or  pleasure,  but  which 
required  for  its  expression  some  positive  contribution  to 
social  welfare.  Even  though  the  action  is  one  which  a 
fuller  understanding  of  the  matter  will  show  to  be  actually 
at  variance  with  the  true  interest  of  the  individual  or  his 
fellow-men,  the  simple  fact  that  the  agent  feels  an  obliga- 
tion to  perform  it  proves  that  for  him  in  ignorance,  for 
him  with  his  limitations  and  prejudices, — it  is  a  genuine 
expression  of  himself  and  hence  represents  at  the  time  his 
highest  interest.  It  has  been  truly  said  in  the  case  often 
cited  of  the  zealous  Puritan,  who  was  willing  to  be  damned 
if  it  would  increase  God's  glory,  that  for  this  particular 
man  as  he  was,  possessed  of  the  peculiar  theological  con- 
ceptions and  intense  religious  convictions  of  his  sect,  such 
a  fate  for  himself,  with  the  resulting  augmentation  of 
the  divine  glory,  might  represent  the  fullest  satisfaction 
of  his  nature.  Such  discrepancies  between  the  form  and 
the  content  of  goodness  are  fortunately  rare  and  destined 
to  become  rarer  as  moral  enlightenment  proceeds.  One 
of  the  greatest  services  of  ethical  reflection  has  been  to 
make  perfectly  clear  this  dependence  of  the  Good,  or 
the  Moral  Ideal,  upon  the  nature~of  man.  A  better  under- 
standing of  this  fact  by  people  at  large  will  make  it 
less  easy  in  the  future  than  it  has  been  in  the  past  for 
politicians  and  ecclesiastics  to  work  upon  the  consciences 
of  men  through  the  agencies  of  school  and  church,  arousing 


198  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

in  them  a  reverence  for  laws  and  institutions  actually 
opposed  to  the  highest  human  welfare,  on  the  plea  that 
they  express  the  commands  of  Deity  for  mankind. 

4.  These  Two  Aspects  of  Goodness  Explained  by  the 
Principle  of  Self- Realization. — These  two  aspects  of  the 
relation  of  the  Good  to  the  human  individual,  neither  of 
which  can  be  denied,  yet  which  seem  to  contradict  one 
another  absolutely,  are  explained  and  adjusted  when  we 
view  the  Good  as  Self-realization.  From  this  standpoint 
the  Good  is  interpreted  as  the  realization  of  the  whole  self. 
But  the  whole  self,  it  must  be  remembered,  is  actual  only 
at  the  end  of  the  process.  This,  the  goal  of  moral  evolution, 
is  seldom  if  ever  reached  in  the  present  world,  and  exists — 
it  must  be  confessed — rather  as  an  ideal  limit  than  as 
an  actual  state.  In  all  stages  of  incomplete  moral  develop- 
ment, which  is  the  condition  of  all  human  individuals, 
only  a  part  and  not  the  whole  of  the  self  is  actual. 
Hence  the  Good,  whichjs  always  identical  with  the  demands 
of  ,the  larger  total  self,  is  partially  external  to,  and  may  be 
sharply  at  variance  with,  the  desires  of  the  actual  self. 
The  existence  of  the  larger  self,  as  yet  latent  and  unrealized, 
is  demonstrated,  however,  by  the  obligation  felt  to  tran- 
scend the  narrow  boundaries  of  the  actual  nature  and 
enter  a  larger  life.  Thus  a  solution  is  reached  of  the 
chief  antinomy  of  the  moral  life — that  the  Good  is  identical 
with  the  interest  of  human  nature  and  at  the  same  time 
opposed  to  it.  The  Good  is  identical  with  the  interest 
of  the  whole  self,  which  exists  during  the  course  of  moral 
evolution  only  in  potentia,  and  opposed  to  the  interest 
of  the  part  self,  which  is  alone  actual. 

Of  course,  the  character  of  the  self  is  continually  chang- 
ing as  moral  development  proceeds,  and  consequently  the 
battle-ground  between  its  actual  nature  and  latent  possi- 
bilities is  constantly  shifting.  There  are,  however,  certain 
points  in  the  pathway  of  moral  progress  where  the  conflict 


THE  CONCEPTION  OF  SELF-REALIZATION       199 

between  the  actual  and  the  ideal  seems  especially  severe. 
These  assume  the  proportions  of  crises  in  moral  experience ; 
for  upon  the  issue  of  the  battle  here  waged  depends  the 
further  progress  of  the  individual.  Perhaps  the  most  im- 
portant of  these  conflicts  are  those  between  the  sentient 
or  "  natural  "  self  aryl  the  personal  or  "  spiritual ."  self, 
ajad  between  the  individual  or  egoistic  and  the  social  or 
altruistic  self.  In  the  first  case  we  find  that  the  regulation 
and  adjustment  of  animal  impulse,  which  is  the  first  step  in 
self-realization,  has  apparently  increased  rather  than  dimin- 
ished the  desire  for  sentient  satisfaction.  For  such  regula- 
tion is  productive  of  fuller  health  and  a  higher  degree  of 
physical  energy.  Hence  the  craving  for  pleasure  to  be 
obtained  from  the  due  gratification  of  all  sensuous  desires 
becomes  stronger  and  it  is  accompanied  by  an  increasing 
consciousness  of  power  to  gain  such  gratification.  To  the 
demands  for  a  larger  spiritual  attainment  the  nature  of  in- 
dividuals, thus  dominated  by  a  desire  for  sentient  satisfac- 
tion, interpose  the  most  stubborn  resistance.  A  striking 
instance  of  such  conflict  is  afforded  in  the  case  of  young 
men  who,  in  the  full  tide  of  youthful  vitality,  are  confronted 
by  the  necessity  of  submitting  to  a  long  period  of  prepara- 
tory^discipline  as  the  condition  of  successful  achievement  in 
some  professional  sphere.  To  oppose  the  insistent  clamor 
of  fully  awakened  senses  for  their  appropriate  satisfaction 
is  indeed  to  battle  against  nature.  Yet  such  a  conquest 
of  nature  is  the  sine  qua  non  of  all  further  attainment 
and  many  a  promising  career  has  been  ruined  through 
failure  to  achieve  it. 

In  an  analogous  way,  the  second  conflict  arises  when 
as  the  result  of  the  organization  olT~all  the  desires  and 
capacities  of  the  individual  into  a  unitary  system,  a  well- 
defined  self-interest  appears.  This  self-interest,  when  it 
first  emerges  from  the  confusion  of  opposing  tendencies, 
stands  for  the  individual  in  his  individuality  as  a  single 


200  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

unit  among  many,  and  thus  is  of  a  markedly  exclusive 
character.  The  individual  is  sharply  conscious  of  himself 
as  possessing  plans  and  purposes — in  short,  an  interest — 
which  is  entirely  his  own  and  quite  different  from  the 
interest  of  every  other  human  being.  Hence  one  prominent 
part  of  his  true  good  is  external  to  the  nature  of  the  in- 
dividual at  this  stage.  The  welfare  of  others,  which  con- 
stitutes an  important  element  in  the  Good  when  completely 
realized,  is  largely  absent  from  the  interest  of  the  self  when 
this  is  first  defined  in  moral  evolution.  The  ...cost  jof  in- 
creasing coherence  is  at  first  increasing  narrowness  of 
character;  the  immediate  result  of  concentration  may  be 
accentuated  selfishness.  When  a  man,  by  the  ordering 
of  his  various  impulses,  first  awakens  to  the  existence  of 
his  own  individuality  his  attention  is  naturally  centered 
upon  himself  and  upon  his  hopes  and  plans  as  a  separate 
individual.  He  finds  that  his  ambition  often  conflicts  with 
the  purposes  of  others.  The  whole  tendency  of  his  awak- 
ened self-consciousness  is  to  fulfil  this  ambition  of  his, 
to  satisfy  his  own  desire  at  any  cost,  regardless  of  the 
welfare  of  others  and  the  suffering  he  may  cause  among 
his  fellow-men.  If,  notwithstanding  his  natural  inclina- 
tions, he  feels  obliged  to  promote  another's  interest  at  the 
expense  of  his  own,  he  regards  the  Good  which  he  realizes 
as  entirely  external  to  himself.  Duty  appears  to  him 
as  a  foreign  authority  coercing  him  against  his  will 
and  compelling  him  to  give  up  his  own  Good.  Yet 
here  also  it  is  necessary  for  the  individual  to  surrender 
his  private  plans  and  his  actual  ambitions  if  he  is  to  par- 
ticipate in  the  fuller  life  of  social  interchange  and  com- 
munity. 

It  must  not  be  forgotten,  when  we  dwell  thus  upon  the 
conflict  of  the  ideal  with  the  actual  nature  of  the  individual, 
that  the  feeling  of  obligation,  the  recognition  of  a  duty,  to 
overcome  the  limitations  of  this  narrow,  actual  self,  proves 


THE  CONCEPTION  OF  SELF-REALIZATION       201 

clearly  that  a  larger  nature  exists  latent  and  undeveloped. 
No  matter  how  reluctant  the  admission,  no  matter  how 
grudging  the  assent,  still  the  fact  that  the  duty  is  admitted, 
the  obligation  assented  to,  shows  that  the  larger  self  is  there 
waiting  to  be  developed.  And  the  development  follows,  by 
the  necessity  of  psychological  law,  when  the  obligation  is 
met  and  the  duty  performed.  Led  by  a  sense  of  duty,  and 
with  great  unwillingness,  a  man  may  engage  in  the  politics 
of  his  own  city.  He  may  not  at  first  feel  the  slightest  inter- 
est in  the  matter — in  fact,  may  have  a  strong  repugnance 
for  the  associations  and  activities  which  it  involves.  But 
after  repeatedly  acting  as  civic  duty  demands  in  caucus  and 
election,  he  begins  to  form  new  habits  which  make  these 
activities  easier  and  more  natural.  Direct  participation 
in  political  affairs  gives  him  first-hand  knowledge  and 
more  intimate  acquaintance  with  them.  This  in  turn 
arouses  interest,  and  before  many  years  the  newly-formed 
habits  pass  into  a  permanent  disposition  or  trait  of  char- 
acter which  seeks  expression  and  finds  pleasure  in  the 
discharge  of  those  offices  which  formerly  were  performed 
with  dread  and  disgust.  Thus  the  actual  nature  of  an 
individual  is  extended  and  enlarged,  with  its  boundaries 
approaching  ever  more  nearly  those  of  his  total  self, — the 
universal  self,  that  is, — present  implicitly  in  all  human 
individuals.  This  larger  self  which  is  developed  through 
effort  and  struggle  is  often  called  the  ' '  second  nature  ' '  to 
contrast  it  with  the  first  nature  which  is  partially  the 
result  of  heredity  and  early  training.  Speaking  in  the 
same  fashion,  Hegel  says:  "  The  harmoniousness  of  child- 
hood is  a  gift  from  the  hand  of  nature :  the  second  harmony 
must  spring  from  the  labor  and  culture  of  the  Spirit."2 
When  the  Good  thus  becomes  a  second  nature  it  is  no 
longer  in  any  sense  external  to  the  self,  but  becomes  the 
spontaneous  expression  of  a  character  which  has  been  so 
1  HEGEL:  Logic  (Wallace  trans.,  p.  55). 


202  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

broadened  as  to  include  the  interests  of  others  and  so 
organized  as  to  realize  all  of  the  capacities  of  intelligent 
personality. 

5.   Arnold's  Contrast  of  Hebraism  with  Hellenism 

These  two  aspects  of  the  Good  which  we  have  been  con- 
sidering are  connected  by  Matthew  Arnold,  in  his  famous 
essay,  Hebraism  and  Hellenism,  with  two  great  historic 
forces  at  work  in  human  society.  The  final  aim  of  these 
two  spiritual  forces,  he  asserts,  is  the  same, — man's  perfec- 
tion or  salvation ;  but  they  pursue  their  aim  by  very  differ- 
ent courses.  The  one_eniphasizes^ction.  Its  leading  idea  is 
conduct  and  obedience — obedience  to  the  divine  law,  in 
strict  conformity  to  the  demands  of  conscience.  Only  thus 
can  man  conquer  the  sinful  tendency  in  his  own  nature  and 
realize  in  himself  the  perfection  of  the  divine.  The  em- 
phasis of  tfre.jjt.her  is  upon  intelligence.  It  seeks  to  know 
human  life  and  the  world  of  human  experience  as  they  are. 
And  to  such  insight  the  Good  appears  as  a  reasonable 
and  beautiful  thing — the  condition  of  human  happiness, 
to  be  pursued  spontaneously  and  joyously.  "  And  these 
two  forces  we  regard  as  in  some  sense  rivals — rivals  not 
by  a  necessity  of  their  own  nature,  but  as  exhibited  in  man 
and  his  history.  And  to  give  these  forces  names  from  the 
two  races  of  men  who  have  supplied  the  most  signal  and 
splendid  manifestations  of  them,  we  may  call  them,  re- 
spectively, the  forces  of  Hebraism  and  Hellenism.  Hebra- 
ism and  Hellenism — between  these  two  points  of  influence 
moves  our  world.  At  one  time  it  feels  more  powerfully 
the  attraction  of  one  of  them,  at  another  time  of  the  other ; 
and  it  ought  to  be,  though  it  never  is,  evenly  and  happily 
balanced  between  them."  Christianity,  according  to 
Arnold,  is  but  a  modification  of  Hebraism.  "  Christianity 
changed  nothing  in  the  essential  bent  of  Hebraism  to  set 
doing  above  knowing.  Self-conquest,  self-devotion,  the  fol- 
lowing, not  our  own  individual  will,  but  the  will  of  God, 


THE  CONCEPTION  OF  SELF-REALIZATION       203 

obedience,  is  the  fundamental  idea  of  this  form,  also,  of 
the  discipline  to  which  we  have  attached  the  general  name 
of  Hebraism."  Hellenism  was  re-born  at  the  beginning 
of  the  modern  era,  in  the  Renaissance  with  its  desire  for 
knowledge  of  the  material  world  and  its  appreciation  of 
the  beauty  in  nature  and  human  art.  It  persists  in  the 
ideal  of  culture  which  aims  at  a  perfection  of  man 's  natural 
qualities.  It  was  met,  however,  by  a  new_form_of Hebra- 
isno,  the  product  of  the  Reformation.  Protestantism  called 
upon  men  to  find  their  chief  good  in  obedience  to  the 
divine  will  as  revealed  in  the  Scriptures.  This,  the  Puritan 
ideal,  which  makes  duty  or  conscience  supreme  in  human 
life,  is  still  the  strongest  moral  force  in  the  world. — Neither 
of  these  two  great  spiritual  disciplines  which  have  for  so 
long  opposed  one  another  and  still  offer  to  humanity  sharply 
conflicting  ideals  is  to  be  looked  upon  as  furnishing  the 
law  of  human  development.  "  They  are,  each  of  them, 
contributions  to  human  development,  august  contributions, 
invaluable  contributions;  and  each  showing  itself  to  us 
more  august,  more  invaluable,  more  preponderant  over  the 
other,  according  to  the  moment  in  which  we  take  them 
and  the  relation  in  which  we  stand  to  them." 

6.  Hebraism. — It  will  be  illuminating  to  dwell  a  little 
longer  upon  these  two  tendencies  in  the  spiritual  develop- 
ment of  humanity  which  Arnold  contrasts  so  effectively; 
for  here,  as  in  many  other  cases,  history  gives  vitality  and 
concreteness  to  a  distinction  which  of  itself  might  seem 
abstract  and  theoretical.  Let  us  therefore  compare  the 
two  conflicting  doctrines  upon  important  points,  and  then 
inquire  if  there  has  not  arisen  in  history  a  third  view 
which  may  be  taken  as  a  synthesis  of  the  other  two.  We 
derive  our  knowledge  of  Hebraism  chiefly  from  the  litera- 
ture of  the  Old  Testament.  There  man's  good  is  repre- 
sented as  existing,  entirely  outside  his  own  nature,  in  the 


204  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

will  of  God.3  Man  is,  in  fact,  believed  to  be  entirely  sin- 
ful and  incapable  of  knowing  his  own  good.  The  primary 
and  essential  condition  of  goodness  for  him  is  obedience 
to  the  divine  will.  The  commands  of  God  are  not  dis- 
covered by  the  exercise  of  human  reason :  they  are  revealed, 
in  the  form  of  a  divine  law,  by  inspired  law-givers  and 
prophets.  The  revelation  of  this  divine  law  to  a  particular 
people  is  based  upon  a  covenant  in  which  God  as  Law-giver 
agrees,  in  reward  of  their  obedience  to  this  law,  to  make 
of  them  a  favored  race  and  to  continue  them  under  His 
protection  and  guidance.  The  result  of  obedience,  if  given, 
will  not  be  goodness  or  perfection  in  man  like  to  that  of 
God.  But  man  will  attain,  through  obedience  unto  right- 
eousness, a  state  of  conformity  to  the  divine  will.  The 
sphere  in  which  this  righteousness  is  exercised  is  to  be  not  a 
political  state,  but  a  theocratic  kingdom,  a  divinely  estab- 
lished order  to  be  set  up  in  Israel.  The  people  of  God's 
choice  may  live  righteously,  ruled  by  God  Himself.  This 
ethico-religious  system  under  which  the  Hebrew  people  lived 
had  the  great  merit  of  holding  before  men  a  lofty  ideal 
raised  above  the  level  of  individual  interest  because  believed 
to  proceed  from  the  Creator  and  Sovereign  Power  of  all  the 
world.  Thus  the  requirements  of  morality  were  given 
the  dignity  and  majesty  of  a  law  with  a  superhuman  source 
and  supernatural  sanctions.  But  this  very  separation  of 
the  Good  from  the  nature  and  interest  of  man  had  evil 
consequences  which  in  time  seemed  to  outweigh  the  merits 
of  the  system.  Since  the  Good  found  expression  in  a  law 
imposed  upon  men  from  without,  it  was  inevitable  that 
they  should  pay  more  and  more  attention  to  outward  con- 
formity and  less  and  less  to  inward  motive  and  disposition. 
Great  care  was  expended  in  learning  with  literal  exactness 
the  requirements  of  the  law  and  in  practising  with  formal 

*Cf.  BRUCE:  Ethics  of  the  Old  Testament,  Chap.  I,   (2)  "Funda- 
mental Principles  of  Old  Testament  Ethics." 


THE  CONCEPTION  OF  SELF-REALIZATION       205 

precision  the  observances  which  it  required.  Thus  Hebra- 
ism degenerated  into  that  arid  legalism  and  barren  formal- 
ism which  permitted  an  exact  outward  compliance  with 
the  law — a  mere  husk  of  righteousness — to  exist  along  with 
injustice  and  cruelty  and  avarice, — a  condition  denounced 
by  the  later  prophets  and  still  more  strongly  reprobated 
by  Jesus  himself. 

7.  Hellenism. — In  all  essential  points  the  Ethics  of 
Hellenism  is  the  antithesis  of  the  Hebrew  doctrine.  For 
the  Greek  thinker  it  was  a  truth  self-evident  that  the  Good 
was  based  upon  the  nature  of  man  and  identical  with  his 
true  happiness.4  Not  that  all  the  Greek  moralists  were 
Hedonists,  but  it  was  an  assumption  common  to  all  their 
theories  that,  whatever^  the  Qood  was,  it  would  be  such  as 
tojiring.  man  that  happiness  which  results  from  the  fulfil- 
ment of  his  nature.  Even  the  Cynics,  who  recommended 
the  renunciation  of  all  natural  pleasure,  did  so  because  they 
believed  that  only  through  such  asceticism  could  the  human 
soul  gain  peace  and  the  opportunity  to  exercise  freely  and 
uninterruptedly  its  own  capacities.  With  regard  to  the 
primary  and  essential  factor  in  goodness,  practically  all 
the  Greek  moralists  agree  that  this  is  the  exercise,.^ 
reason.  Wisdom,  the  distinctively  human  capacity,  is  the 
one  sterling  coin  for  which  all  the  virtues  may  be  ex- 
changed,5 and  constitutes  the  foundation  of  every  good 
life.  Reason  when  exercised  gives  man  an  insight  into  his 
own  nature  and  into  his  relations  with  his  fellow-men:  it 
enables  him  to  foresee  the  consequences  of  his  conduct  and 
to  act  with  a  view  to  his  future  happiness.  The  effect  of 
thus  applying  reason  to  the  conduct  of  human  life  is  to 
produce  order  and  harmony.  The  several  activities  of 
man's  nature  are  so  regulated  and  adjusted  that  their 
expression  is  harmonious  and  proportionate.  Such  balance 

4  ARISTOTLE:  Nicomachean  Ethics,  Bk.  I,  Chap.  V. 
•PLATO:  Phaedo,  69. 


206  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

and  proportion  in  the  play  of  its  different  activities  are 
equivalent  to  the  health  of  the  soul,  which  is  identical  with 
virtue  or  goodness.6  The  sphere  in  which  this  rationally 
ordered  life  is  attained  is  the  body-politic,  the  city-state; 
since  man  is  a  social  animal,  and  complete  satisfaction  is 
possible  to  his  nature  only  when,  through  the  discharge 
of  his  duties  as  citizen,  he  is  brought  into  varied  and  in- 
timate associations  with  his  fellows.  For  its  effort  thus 
to  connect  the  Good  with  man's  nature  Greek  Ethics  is 
deserving  of  highest  praise.  Represented  as  the  perfection 
of  human  nature,  the  Ideal  is  made  to  appear  in  its  de- 
mands both  reasonable  and  beautiful.  Morality,  instead  of 
being  an  unwilling  obedience  to  a  law  exacting  and  in- 
flexible, is  the  spontaneous  expression  of  a  soul  enlightened 
by  reason.  But  this  identification  of  the  Good  with  the  cul- 
ture and  perfection  of  man's  faculties  had  unfortunate  re- 
sults in  Greek  thought.  For  an  imperfect  understanding  of 
human  nature  led  to  an  inadequate  conception  of  the  Good. 
Reason  was  made  supreme,  and  thus  the  Good  limited  to 
what  could  be  reasonably  expected  to  increase  the  satisfac- 
tion of  the  human  individual.  Hence  no  sufficient  basis  was 
provided,  after  all,  for  social  obligation.  It  was  possible  to 
show  that  the  citizens  of  a  Greek  city  had  mutual  interests, 
and,  for  that  reason,  were  bound  in  duty  to  assist  and 
serve  one  another.  But  that  such  a  community  of  interest 
extended  to  barbarians  and  slaves  could  not  be  demon- 
strated, and  consequently  no  social  obligation  was  admitted 
which  extended  beyond  the  limits  of  the  Greek  nation  to 
humanity  in  general.  And  when  the  Greek  states  lost 
their  independence  and  their  citizens  were  brought  into 
more  direct  contact  with  other  nationalities  and  classes, 
this  individualism  in  their  ethical  thought  was  further 
accentuated  until,  in  the  later  theories,  the  chief  function 
of  reason  in  human  conduct  was  to  give  the  individual  a 
•PLATO:  Republic,  443. 


THE  CONCEPTION  OF  SELF-REALIZATION       207 

means  of  satisfaction  within  himself  which  should  free 
him  from  the  need  of  all  social  activities  and  relation- 
ships. 

8.  Relation  of  Christianity  to  Hebraism  and  Hellen- 
ism.— In  the  opinion  of  Arnold,  as  we  have  seen,  Chris- 
tianity is  only  a  modification  of  Hebraism,  sharing  its  one- 
sidedness  and  inadequacy.  Such  criticism  may  be  justly 
applied  to  the  interpretation  of  Christianity  which  regards 
it  as  a  continuation  of  the  Hebrew  cult,  in  which  an  in- 
tellectual assent  to  the  divinity  of  the  Founder  is  offered 
as  a  substitute  for  that  perfect  conformity  to  the  divine 
law  which  God  demands  and  man  is  unable  to  achieve. 
But  we  find  in  the  teachings  of  Jesus  another  and  a  higher 
view — in  all  important  respects  identical  with  that  of  "  self- 
realization  " — which  raises  Christianity  far  above  the  lim- 
itations of  both  Hebraism  and  Hellenism  and  makes  of 
it  a  comprehensive  synthesis  of  the  profound  and  enduring 
truths  contained  in  these  two  historic  doctrines.  Jesus 
based  the  Good  neither  upon  a  divine  will  external  to  man, 
nor  upon  the  actual  nature  of  the  human  individual.  He 
always  taught  that  goodness  consisted  in  inward  disposi- 
tion and  not  in  outward  conformity :  it  must  be  rooted  deep 
in  the  soul  of  man  and  develop  as  a  true  expression  of 
his  nature.  "  Have  salt  in  yourselves  "  (Mark  9:  50),  he 
admonishes  his  disciples,  and  always  sought  to  arouse  and 
strengthen  the  better  part  of  their  natures.  Of  all  the 
laws  of  the  old  Hebrew  dispensation,  none  was  more  dis- 
tinctive or  held  in  greater  reverence  than  that  concerning 
Sabbath  observance.  Yet  Jesus  did  not  hesitate  to  break 
this  law  when  human  welfare  could  be  benefited  thereby, 
and  to  his  critics  he  replied,  "  The  Sabbath  was  made  for 
man,  and  not  man  for  the  Sabbath."  (Mark  2 :  27.)  Nor, 
on  the  other  hand,  did  he  identify  the  Good  with  the  actual 
interest  of  man.  Rather  did  he  insist  that  its  attainment 
was  an  arduous  task,  involving  struggle  and  submission. 


208  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

The  individual  must  prepare  to  see  his  own  nature 
thwarted  and  his  own  desires  suppressed  if  he  proposes 
to  pursue  the  Ideal.  The  sacrifice  of  private  aim  and 
ambition  was  said  to  be  the  condition  of  achieving  the 
higher  good.  He  who  would  find  his  life  must  be  willing 
first  to  lose  it.  As  the  death  of  the  seed  is  the  condition 
of  the  growth  of  the  plant,  so  the  death  of  the  old  self  is 
the  condition  of  the  development  of  the  new  life  of  virtue 
and  goodness.  Not,  then,  in  a  law  imposed  upon  man  from 
without,  nor  in  desires  existing  within  him,  does  Jesus  find 
the  ground  and  source  of  goodness,  but  in  a  larger  self 
latent  in  human  nature.  This  larger  self  pertains  neither 
to  God  nor  man  exclusively,  but  is  common  to  both  and 
testifies  to  the  union  of  the  human  and  the  divine.  It  is, 
in  fact,  the  divine  principle  in  man,  and  in  its  realization 
man  shares  the  divine  life,  while  God  is  expressed  in  human 
nature.  Through  the  submission  of  his  actual  nature  the 
individual  realizes  his  larger  self,  and  this  perfecting  of 
his  own  nature  brings  him  into  harmony  with  his  fellow- 
men  and  with  God. 

In  further  evidence  of  its  synthetic  character  Christianity 
finds  the  prime  condition  of  goodness  neither  in  wisdom  nor 
obedience,  but  in  a  union  of  thought  and  action — i.e.  faith. 
It  does  not  exalt  as  the  essence  of  righteousness  in  man 
an  unquestioning  obedience  to  a  will  external  to  him  and 
a  law  arbitrarily  imposed  upon  his  conduct.  Instead  Jesus 
based  his  injunctions  upon  a  well-defined  and  consistent 
view  of  man  and  the  universe.  According  to  this,  the 
Christian  view  of  the  world,  man  is  not  what  he  seems, 
a  merely  natural  being  whose  Good  lies  in  the  satisfaction 
of  his  material  wants.  He  is  in  his  deepest  nature  spiritual 
and  the  child  of  the  Divine  Spirit,  who  is  the  source  of 
all  reality.  Hence  the  larger  life  for  man,  the  more  real 
existence,  is  a  spiritual  life  in  which  those  ends  are  sought 
which  have  universal  value.  But  in  the  teachings  of  Jesus 


THE  CONCEPTION  OF  SELF-REALIZATION       209 

no  attempt  is  made  to  prove  or  demonstrate  the  truth  of 
these  views.  Since  they  concern  the  possibilities  of  human 
development  they  lie  beyond  the  region  of  direct  proof 
or  demonstration.  The  only  proof  which  the  individual 
can  have  of  their  truth  comes  from  acting  upon  them. 
He  must  be  willing  to  make  the  venture  before  he  can 
experience  the  satisfaction  of  the  larger  life.  This  venture 
involves  the  surrender  of  objects  known  to  have  value  for 
the  sake  of  others  which  are  untried,  in  actual  experience 
unknown.  Faith  in  the  Christian  conception  is  therefore 
an  act  of  will — enlightened  by  reason,  but  not  prescribed 
or  pre-determined  by  reason.  The  will  in  this  action  only 
expresses  the  larger  self,  voicing  the  latent  possibilities  in 
the  human  individual  of  a  more  comprehensive  and  com- 
pletely organized  life. 

The  larger  self,  which  is  the  basis  of  Christian  Ethics, 
furnishes  also  a  new  social  bond  among  human  beings. 
Since  all  men  possess  this  divine  principle  latent  in  their 
natures  they  are  all  united  by  ties  of  spiritual  kinship. 
A  recognition  of  this  kinship  awakens  in  the  individual 
a  love  for  his  fellow-men.  This  love  is  different  from  a 
natural  sympathy  for  a  limited  number  of  friends  and  ac- 
quaintances; it  is  an  enthusiastic  devotion  to  the  ideal 
possibilities  which  are  present  in  every  human  individual 
and  give  to  each  an  infinite  value.  This  love,  when  it  is 
awakened,  constitutes  the  only  motive  sufficient  to  impel 
men  to  unlimited  social  service.  To  such  motive  Chris- 
tianity appeals,  and  arouses  the  individual  to  effort  in 
behalf  of  all  mankind.  Its  sphere  is  therefore  not  that 
of  the  political  state,  or  an  ecclesiastical  organization,  but 
of  the  whole  human  race,  and  its  social  ideal,  that  of  the 
Kingdom  of  God,  is  a  universal  society  in  which  the  divine 
spirit  of  justice  and  benevolence  prevails  and  each  indi- 
vidual is  given  an  opportunity  for  the  fullest  personal 
development. 


210  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 


REFERENCES 

SETH,  Ethical  Principles,  Part  I,  Chap.  Ill,  §§  1-6. 
JAMES,  Psychology,  Chap.  X. 
DEWEY  AND  TUFTS,  Ethics,  Chap.  XVIII,  §  4. 
MACKENZIE,  Manual  of  Ethics,  Book  II,  Chap.  V. 
ALEXANDEB,  Moral  Order  and  Progress,  Book  II,  Chap.  I. 
GBEEN,  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  Book  III,  Chaps.  I,  II. 
ABNOLD,  Culture  and  Anarchy,  Chaps.  IV,  V. 
CAIBD,  Evolution  of  Religion,  Vol.  II,  Lecture  VI. 


CHAPTER  II 

SELF-REALIZATION  AND  THE  STANDARD  OF 
GOODNESS 

1.  The  Idea  of  the  Good  as  Furnishing  a  Standard  of  Moral  Judg- 
ment.— 2.  Self-Realization  Criticised  as  Failing  to  Supply  Such 
a  Standard. — 3.  The  Ideal  of  Self-Realization  as  the  Standard  of 
Moral  Judgment. — 4.  This  Standard  When  Applied  to  Human 
Life  Yields  Further  Principles  of  Moral  Distinction. — 5.  The 
Principle  of  Individual  Interest. — 6.  The  Principle  of  Social 
Welfare. — 7.  Maxims  of  Individual  Interest:  (a)  Maxim  of 
Prudence, — 8.  (6)  Maxim  of  Idealism. — 9.  Maxims  of  Social 
Welfare:  (a)  Maxim  of  Altruism, — 10.  (6)  Maxim  of  Humani- 
tarianism. 

1.  The  Idea  of  the  Good  as  Furnishing  a  Standard  of 
Moral  Judgment. — One  of  the  reasons  why  it  is  worth  our 
while  to  inquire  at  length  into  the  nature  of  the  summum 
bonum  is  that  the_j2onception  of  the  Good  when  attained 
should  provide  us  with  a  satisfactory  standard  of  moral 
judgment.  Indeed  it  seems  that  this  is  the  chief  reason 
for  such  a  study  as  we  have  undertaken ;  since  the^leading 
aim  of  ^Ethics  is  tp_j*ationalize  human  conduct,  and  this  is 
accomplished  only  by_substituting  a  rational  basis_|or_the 
authority  of  custom  and  tradition,  in  all  judgments  of 
moral  value.  Now,  as  previous  discussion  has  shown,  the 
idea  of  the  Good  ought  to  furnish  just  this  rational  basis 
for  the  deciding  of  all  questions  of  good  and  evil,  and 
hence  for  the  practical  guidance  of  life.  We  have  a  right 
to  expect,  therefore,  that  Self-realization,  if  a  true  view 
of  the  Good,  will  fully  meet  this  requirement.  To  the 
question  of  whether  the  theory  of  Self-realization  actually 
furnishes  such  a  standard  of  moral  judgment  we  now  ad- 
dress ourselves. 

211 


212  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

2.  Self-Realization  Criticised  as  Failing  to  Furnish 
Such  a  Standard. — Unfortunately,  difficulties  are  en- 
countered at  the  very  beginning  in  the  form  of  charges 
recently  made  that  Self-realization  fails  in  just  this  matter 
of  supplying  an  adequate  criterion  of  right  and  wrong. 
It  is  asserted,  in  the  flrsJL. place,  that  Self-realization  gives 
no_ground_for  discriminating  between  different  acts  of 
the  individual,  since  afl  are  equally  expressions  of  the 
self  and  hence  good.  Professor  W.  R.  Sorley  has  thus 
criticised  "  self-realization  "  because  it  affords  no  standard 
for  estimating  the  moral  value  of  the  different  actions  of 
the  individual.  "  In  every  action  whatever  of  a  conscious 
being,"  he  says,  "  self-realization  may  be  said  to  be  the 
end:  some  capacity  is  being  developed,  satisfaction  is  being 
sought  for  some  desire.  A  man  may  develop  his  capacities, 
seek,  and  to  some  extent  attain  self-satisfaction, — in  a  man- 
ner realize  himself — not  only  in  devotion  to  a  scientific 
or  artistic  ideal  or  in  labors  for  a  common  good,  but  jilso 
in  the  selfish  pursuit  of  power,  or  even  in  sensual  enjoy- 
ment. So  far  as  the  word  '  self-realization  '  can  be  made 
to  cover  such  different  activities,  it  is  vo|d^  of  moral  content 
and  cannot  express  the  nature  of  the  moral  ideal. ' ' 1 

In  the  segojid  place,  it  is  charged  that  Self-realization 
doesjnot  permit  us  tojnake  distinctions  of  moral  worth, 
as,  between  t^e^c^djiet_of_different  individuals.  For  are 
not  all  individuals  equally  selves,  and  in  so  far  as  the 
activities  of  each  express  his  own  nature,  are  not  all  upon 
the  same  plane  of  goodness  ?  In  this  connection,  Professor 
Boodin,  for  instance,  criticises  Self-realization  and  charges 
it  with  failure  to  furnish  a  standard  for  the  evaluation  of 
conduct.  "  There  are  many  types  of  selves,  and  each  type 
desires  its  own  fulfilment.  If  self-realization  is  to  be  the 
criterion  of  life,  what  self  is  to  be  realized,  the  baboon 
self,  the  pig  self,  or  what  sort  of  self?  If  all  but  human 
1  W.  R.  SOBLET:  Recent  Tendencies  in  Ethioe,  p.  90. 

. 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  STANDARD  OF  GOODNESS   213 

selves  are  to  be  excluded,  what  sort  of  human  self?  Not 
the  criminal  or  the  insane  self,  surely?  Only  a  normal 
self  could  be  the  standard.  As  Plato  says,  it  must  be  a 
very  wise  man  who  is  to  be  the  measure.  But  what  is 
normal?  "2 

These  critics  strike  at  a  vital  point  in  the  Self-realization 
theory.  The  defect  dwelt  upon  is  not  an  unimportant  or 
external  feature  which  can  be  easily  removed.  Instead  it 
appears  to  be  inseparably  connected  with  the  fundamental 
principle  of  Self-realization.  For  it  is  the  peculiar  merit 
as  well  as  the  distinguishing  characteristic  of  this  view  that 
it  finds  the  Good  not  in  the  exercise  of  any  one  part  or 
faculty  of  human  nature,  but  in  the  harmonious  develop- 
mejit__oJLthe  wholejself.  But  does  not  this  fact,  which  is 
the  boast  of  the  Self-realizationist — that  his  theory  recog- 
nizes as  equally  ...legitimate  and  worthy  all  the  tendencies 
and  powers  of  conscious  personality — prove  a  stumbling- 
block  when  the  attempt  is  made  to  use  the  theory  as  a 
basis  of  moral  judgment?  For  ho wjdjscriminate__ between 
acts,  approving  some  as  good  and  condemning  others  as 
bad^  when  all  are  equally  necessary  expressions  of  the  self? 
And  how  impose  the  same  standard  upon  different  selves, 
when  they  vary  in  character  and  ability,  and  the  ideal 
demands  that  each  should  realize  his  own  capacities? 

Because  they  exalt  one  side  of  human  nature  at  the 
expense  of  the  rest,  the  time-honored  doctrines  of  IJedon- 
ism_and  Rationalism  have  been  discarded.  BUJL  by,  virtue 
of  this  very  quality — one-sidedness,  we  consider  it — they 
succeed,  where  Self-realization  seems  to  fail,  in  furnishing 
a  definite  standard  of  moral  judgment.  Take  Hedonism, 
for  instance ;  pleasant  feeling  is  declared  to  be  the  ^ood. 
Hence  all  acts  that  bring  pleasure  now  or  in  the  future 
are  morally  good;  all  acts  that  bring  pain  are  morally 

* "  The  Ought  and  Eeality,"  International  Journal  of  EtMcs,  July, 
1907,  p.  457. 


214  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

bad;  all  other  acts  are  morally  indifferent.  The  case  is 
the_sa.me  with  Rationalism,  if  the  exercise  of  reason  be 
substituted  for  the  feeling  of  pleasure.  If  we  take  either 
of  these  two  doctrines  as  the  rule  of  life,  we  can  contrast 
acts  which  satisfy  the  chosen  part  of  the  self  with  acts  that 
satisfy  other  parts,  draw  a  sharp  line  of  distinction  be- 
tween them,  and  judge  the  former  actions  to  be  good  and 
the  latter  to  be  bad.  Thus  we  gajn_  aT  serviceable,  principle 
for  the  ordering  of  our  lives,  which  is  certainly  better  tkan 
nojprinciple  _at_all,  and  perhaps^  better  than  a  principle 
which  presents  an  attractive  ideal  but  supplies  no  guidance 
for  the  conduct  of  daily  life. 

3.  The  Ideal  of  Self-Realization  as  the  Standard  of 
Moral  Judgment. — Self-realization  need  rest  under  no 
such  condemnation,  however ;  since  such  criticisms  as  those 
just  mentioned  result  from  a  misunderstanding  of  the 
theory.  It  is  a  mistake  to  think  that  because  Self-realiza- 
tion identifies  the  Good  with  the  expression  of  no  one  part 
of  the  self  to  the  exclusion  of  the  remainder,  it  therefore 
approves  of  all  activities  of  the  self  as  good.  True  it  is, 
that  our  view  finds  the  Good  in  the  exercise  of  no  one 
faculty  of  human  nature,  but  this  does  not  mean  that  it 
is  consequently  deprived  of  any  criterion  by  which  right 
action  can  be  distinguished  from  wrong.  On  the  contrary, 
it  furnishes  a  very  definite__criterion.  For,  according  to 
Self-realization,  the  Good  lies  in  the  realization  of  ihejyhole 
self  in  distinction  from  any  part  or  division  of  the  self. 
From  this  ideal  we  secure  a  clear  and  decisive  standard 
of  moral  judgment.  The  line_pf  distinction  is  drawn  be- 
tween ^actions  which^cpntribute_J;o  the  satisfaction  of^all 
thejcapjacities  of  the  human  self  anjl  thpse_jyhich  serve 
to  gratify  only  single^ones.  The  former  are  judged  good: 
the  latter  are  pronounced  bad.  So  far  from  making  only 
vague  and  ambiguous  recommendation,  Self-realization 
issues  the  mostdefinite  ajid  peremptory  commands.  All 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  STANDARD  OF  GOODNESS    215 

acts  which  hinder  or  frustrate  the  fulfilment  of  man 's  entire 
self  it  condemns  as  utterly  wrong,  and  it  demands  their 
absolute  suppression.  Thus  we  gain  a  secure  and  adequate 
basis  for  all  judgments  of  moral  value. 

The  Ideal  of  Self-realization  furnishes  no  infallible  touch- 
stone of  good  and  evil,  to  be  sure,  deciding  ojf-hand  the 
moral  value  of  every  particular  act.  It  is  an  ideal  of  a 
very  general-character.  Its  application  to  specific  questions 
of  right  and  wrong  is  often  not  apparent,  and  can  be 
made  out  only_by  protracted  and  careful  thought.  This 
does  not  lessen  the  value  of  Self-realization  as  the  Ideal, 
however;  for,  in  order  to  fulfil  this  office,  a  conception  .must 
be  sufficiently  general  to  comprehend  within  its  scope  all 
practical  considerations  whatsoever,  and  to  be_junversally 
applicable  throughout  the  entire  field  of  conduct.  Hence 
whjjje  in  the  regulation  o_f_daily  life  we  may_find_that  prin- 
ciples, more  definite  in  meaning  and  limited  in  range,  are 
usually  of  greater jissistance,  still  on  critical  occasions  when 
these  principles  themselves  are  called  into  question  such 
an  ideal  is  indispensable  as  a  jina!  jjourt  of  appeal.  The 
Ideal  may  be  likened  to  the  polar  star  which,  far  removed 
from  the  affairs  of  our  planet,  gives  to  the  surveyor  of 
the  earth's  surface  his  ultimate  direction  of  reference. 
He  does  not  take  it  into  consideration  every  time  he  meas- 
ures a  distance  or  computes  an  area.  Yet  since  it  furnishes 
the  direction  upon  which  all  other  directions  are  based, 
there  is  a  tacit  reference  to  it  in  every  calculation  of  the 
surveyor,  and,  in  all  cases  of  serious  doubt,  it  is  the  final 
court  ofjmpeal. 

Whenever  we  are  driven^hack  to  firsJLpremises  we  have 
need  of  such  a  standard  as  the  Ideal  of  Self-realization 
supplies.  This  mayjiccur  in  the  case  of__acts  that  are 
comparatively^  unimportant.  An  action  which  in  itself  is 
trivial,  like  playing  a  game  of  cards  or  calling  upon  an 
acquaintance,  may  take  on  the  significance  of  a  test  case 


216  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 


and  involve  all  the  issues  of  morality.  Or^yiarily,  how- 
ever, we  have  recourse  to  an  ultimatj^  standard  only  when 
considering  such  broa^jyid_£iiiLdjam£nta.l  problems  of  human 
life  and  relationships  as  call  in  question  otherwise  accepted 
principles  of  conduct.  This  is  the  case  when  we  are  re- 
quired to  pass  judgment  upon  existing,  pfllitical  aadjsocial 
institutions.  Then  the  value  of  such  a  standard  as  Self- 
realization  is  most  clearly  manifest.  Suppose  that  it  is  a 
form  of  government  which  we  are  critically  considering; 
for  instance,  democracy  or_  aristocracy.  Then  it  is  illumi- 
nating and  even  necessary  to  know  that  the  final  aim  of 
government  is  neither  to  promote  the  interest  of  a  special 
class  nor  to  register  the  will  of  a  majority,  but  to  further 
the  development  of  hugiaB_DjersQn_ality  in  all_individuals, 
to^expressjhe^  *  '  genemLwill.  *  *  Or  if  it  is  a  social  insti- 
tution, like  monogamous_jnarriage,  of  which  we  are  seeking 
to  ascertain  the  value  —  then  we  must  recognize  that  the 
worth  of  such  an  institution  depends,  not  upon  the  extent 
to  which  it  fulfils  a  supposed  divine  command  or  continues 
a  historic  development,  but  rather  upon  the  degree  to  which 
it  contributesjp  the  self-realization  of  the  persons  involved. 
Or,  better  stated  perhaps,  the  pretensions  of  any  social 
or  political  arrangement  to  be  of  divine  origin  or  in  the 
line  of  moral  development  may  be  rejected  as  false  when 
this  arrangement  does  not  minister  to  the  personaj,_welfare 
of  humanity. 

iT'This  Standard  When  Applied  to  Human  Life 
Yields  Further  Principles  of  Moral  Distinction.  —  Still  it 
must  be  Admitted  that  if  Self-realization  were  limited  to 
enjoining  every  individual  to  realize  his  entire  self,  there 
would  be  sufficient  justification  for  the  second  Criticism 
noted  above,  that  the  theory  provides  no  definite  principles 
of  conduct  which  are  binding  upon  all  individuals.  For 
since  indiviflnajs  jljffpj  in  character  and  in  capacities  the 
expression  of  the  entire  nature  will  involve  quite  different 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  STANDARD  OF  GOODNESS    217 

forms  of  conduct  for  each  one.  Self-realization,  as  thus 
far  considered,  an  ideal  which  recommends  the  realization 
of  the  whole  as  distinct  from  the  part  self,  leaves  undecided 
t.hp.  guest  ion  of  what  kind  of  a  self  is  to  be  fully  realized, 
normal  or  abnormal,  primitive  or  civilized,  masculine  or 
feminine,  intellectual,  emotional,  or  practical.  But  this 
objection  also  disappears  after  further  reflection.  When 
the  Ideal  of  Self-realization,  which  we  have  accepted  as 
the  standard  of  moral  judgment,  is  applied_io_acJtuaL  human 
nature,  it  yields^  certain  definite_jp_rinciples  of  action  which 
hold,  jfor  all  men  equally  and  constitute  in  themselves  an 
adequate  answer  to  the  objection.  For  while  human 
nature  varies  almost  without  limit  there  are,  as  has  been 
shown,  fundamentaLchaxaeteristics  which  all  men  possess 
in  common.  In  the  first  place,  all  men  have  the  same  natu- 
raMnstincts,  which  relate  them  to  a  world  of  objects  and 
to  other  members  of  the  human  species.  Secondly,  men 
are  all  alike  in  the  possession  of  certain  spiritual  .capacities,  j 
which  relate  them  to  fellow-men  in  a  community  of  in- 
telligence and  to  the  real  universe  as  an  orderly  system. 
In  consequence  of  this  essential  identity  of  human  nature, 
the  realization  of  the  whole  self  requires  from  all  of  us 
the  same  modes  of  action.  It  is  possible,  therefore,  to 
derive  from  the  Ideal  of  Self-realization,  when  applied  to 
the  actual  nature  of  man,  a  set  of  principles  and  maxims 
which  enable  us  to  distinguish  between  good  and  evil  in 
our  daily  experience.  Of  course,  the  whole  self  is  not . 
realized  in  a  single  act  or  all  at  once.  Rather  is  it  gradu- 
ally unfolded  or  developed  in  a  number  of  spheres  and 
through  a  succession  of  stages.  What^  we  wish  to  know  v 
is  what^form  of  conduct  expresses  the  whole  self,  and Jience 
deserves^  to  be  called  good  in  each  important  spjhere  and 
at  e very ^  nee essary_  stage. 

The  twQ_jaost  important  jspheres  or__aspeci;s  of  the  life 
of  the  self  are  the  individual  and  the  social.    In  the  sphere 


218  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

first-joamed,  the  self  is  mani|e§ljis  an  individual,  gaining 
expression  through  a  system  of  objects.  In  the  second,  the 
self^  appears  as_  united  with  other  individuals  in  a__socjal 
community.  In  the  firsj__s,phere  the  whole  self  is  repre* 
sented  by  the  total_interest  of  the  individual  or  the  satisfac- 
tion of  all  his  desires  and  cap_acities  in  their  organized  unity, 
injgontrast  to  hjs_partial  interest  or  the  satisfaction  of  one 
or  more  desires  at  the  expense  of  the  rest.  In  the  second 
sphere  the  whole_self  is  represented,  by  the  welfare  ofjociety 
or  jhe_  social  jself ,  in  contrast  to  the  interest  of  any  in- 
dividual or  limited  number  of  individuals.  When  applied 
to  both  of  these  spheres  the  Ideal  of  Self-realization  thus 
yields  two  principles  of  moral  judgment,  each  of  which 
may  be  briefly  considered. 

5.    The  Principle  of  Individual  Interest. — The  principle 
which  Self-realization  furnishes  to  guide  moral  judgment 
in  the  individual  sphere  is  that  the  total  interest  of  the 
individual  is  to  be  preferred  to  any  partial  interest  what- 
soever.   And  since  this  total  interest  is  the  result  of  the 
adjustment  of  various  activities  and  tendencies  of  the  in- 
»-,dividual  into  an  organized  system,  its  attainment  will  in- 
^   volve  the  proportionate  expression  of  all  these  activities — 
and  that  in  contrast  to  the  gratification  of  any  single  desire 
or  group  of  desires.     Some  moralists  do  not  admit  the 
existence  of  such  an  adjustment  within  the  life  of  the  in- 
dividual in  distinction  from  the  adjustment  of  the  indi- 
vidual to  society.     For  example,   Mr.   Alexander,   in  his 
Moral  Order  and  Progress,3  tells  us  that  Goodness  may  be 
understood  either  as  (1)  an  adjustment  of  activities  in  the 
individual   or   as    (2)    an   adjustment   of   individuals   in 
••    society.     These  adjustments  are  idejitical  in  process  and 
.     result.     Hence  the  individual  who  gives  harmonious  ex- 
pression to  all  his  impulses  at  the  same  time  discharges 
"  in  full  his  obligation  to  society.     The  same  writer  endeavors 
•ALEXANDER:   Moral  Order  and  Progress,  Book  II,  Chap.  II. 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  STANDARD  OF  GOODNESS    219 

to  show  how  all  the  virtues  usually  regarded  as  solely 
individual  have  also  a  social  reference.  Now  it  is  assuredly 
true  that  the  individual  and  the  social  spheres  cannot  be 
separated,  and  that  they  imply  one  another  at  every  point. 
Such  a  virtue  as  temperance,  ordinarily  thought  of  as 
individual,  has  a  decided  social  bearing.  But  nevertheless 
to  deny  the  existence  of  a  sphere  at  least  relatively  distinct 
from  the  social,  in  which  the  individual  is  concerned  only 
with  his  own  interest,  is  to  overlook  certain  of  the  most 
salient  features  of  morality.  It  is  to  neglect  the  import- 
ance of  the  development  of  individuality  in  the  moral  life, 
both  in  itself  and  as  a  condition  of  the  further  adjustment 
of  the  individual  to  society. 

The  need  for  recognizing  a  distinctly  individual  sphere 
of  action  is  apparent  when  we  think  of  the  principles  which 
should  determine  the  individual's  choice  of  a  profession 
or  occupation.  While  it  is  important  for  the  individual 
to  take  account  of  social  conditions  and  demands,  it  is 
still  more  important  for  him  to  consider  his  own  abilities 
and  limitations,  and  select  that  line  of  work  in  which  the 
one  shall  receive  the  fullest  expression  and  the  other  offer 
the  least  hindrance.  For  genuine  ability  in  a  man  when 
honestly  exercised  may  always  be  socially  useful,  while 
a  work  undertaken  for  social  benefit  will  fail  of  its  purpose 
if  the  individual  is  unfitted  to  perform  it.  "When  social 
influences  or  economic  pressure  interfere,  therefore,  to  pre- 
vent the  individual  from  consulting  his  own  aptitudes  and 
preferences  in  thife  matter  of  a  life-work,  the  result  is  ' 
morally  injurious.  In  European  countries  young  men  have 
been  drawn  in  large  numbers  into  the  clergy  a|jd  the  army, 
not  because  of  any  particular  fitness  for  these  professions, 
but  because  social  convention  has  set  an  artificial  premium 
upon  activity  in  these  lines  and  thus  put  at  a  comparative 
disadvantage  other  professions.  In  America  accepted  so- 
cial standards  tend,  in  like  manner,  to  infringe  upon  the 


220  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

liberty  of  the  individual  by  setting  a  premium  upon  busi- 
ness and  political  success,  and  reflecting  corresponding  dis- 
credit upon  scholarly  and  artistic  achievement.  As  Pro- 
fessor Miinsterberg  says :  ' '  If  we  are  sincere  we  ought  not 
to  overlook  the  fact  that  the  scholar,  as  such,  has  no  position 
in  public  opinion  which  corresponds  to  the  true  value  of 
his  achievement.  The  foreigner  feels  at  once  this  difference 
between  the  Americans  and  the  Europeans.  .  .  .  The  finest 
men  go  into  business  and  industry,  into  law  and  medicine ; 
and  those  who  turn  to  the  graduate  schools  of  the  country 
are,  in  the  majority,  men  without  initiative  and  ambition, 
and  without  promise  for  the  highest  kind  of  work. ' '  *  And 
what  is  here  said  applies,  not  merely  to  professions  and 
"  callings,"  but  to  every  trade  and  occupation  which  men 
pursue.  The  establishment  of  vocation  bureaus  in  some 
of  our  large  cities,  through  which  individuals  are  relieved 
of  economic  pressure  for  a  short  time,  during  which  they 
are  assisted  in  finding  the  occupation  for  which  their  na- 
tures have  fitted  them,  shows  how  far  the  rights  of  in- 
dividuality in  this  respect  have  been  violated  under  present 
social  conditions.  The  man,  who  as  carpenter  or  brick-layer 
leads  a  dissatisfied  and  unregulated  life,  may  as  sign- 
painter  become  a  happy  and  useful  citizen,  because,  in  the 
latter  case,  his  native  ability  is  finding  free  expression 
and  not  being  thwarted  and  stifled. 

After  the  life-work  is  once  chosen  the  individual  may 
rightfully  claim  a  large  liberty  in  methods  of  preparation 
and  accomplishment.  He  should  follow  the  principle  which 
governs  action  in  the  individual  sphere — selecting  those 
means  which  promise,  in  his  case  and  with  his  nature,  the 
most  effectually  to  further  his  supreme  aim.  Of  course 
human  experience  has  discovered,  in  the  case  of  the  leading 
occupations,  what  is  in  general  the  best  preparatory  train- 

4  HUGO  MTTNSTERBEBG :  "The  Standing  of  Scholarship  in 
Atlantic  Monthly,  October,  1900,  p.  455. 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  STANDARD  OF  GOODNESS    221 

ing,  and  the  individual  greatly  economizes  his  own  time 
and  strength  who  submits  willingly  to  such  preparation 
and  appropriates  as  much  as  possible  of  its  benefit.  But 
when  accepted  methods  of  preparation  and  practice  in 
any  trade  or  profession  become  so  rigid  and  exacting  as 
to  cramp  his  originality  and  destroy  his  initiative,  they 
lessen  the  individual's  power  of  achievement,  and  he  is 
justified  in  rebelling  against  them  and  asserting  the  right 
of  his  individuality  to  seek  its  own  methods  of  accomplish- 
ment. 

In  other  details  of  his  conduct  not  related  to  his  specific 
life-work,  but  intimately  connected  with  himself,  such  as 
dress,  amusements,  and  daily  routine,  the  individual  should 
have  in  a  large  measure  the  freedom  to  determine  his 
action  in  accordance  with  what  he  believes  to  be  his  highest 
interest.  These  are  not  matters  of  great  moment,  but  they 
are  ways  in  which  individuality  naturally  seeks  expression. 
Hence  they  may  assume  a  critical  importance  when  an 
unwarranted  interference  in  them  is  attempted  by  society, 
and  such  interference,  if  successful,  reacts  most  unfavorably 
upon  the  character  of  the  individual.  In  this  way  sumptu- 
ary and  "  blue  "  laws,  such  as  those  enacted  by  our 
Puritan  ancestors,  do  great  harm.  Unfortunately,  some 
traces  of  this  aspect  of  Puritanism  are  still  seen  among 
us,  especially  in  our  smaller  communities,  where  a  person's 
attitude  towards  "  worldly  amusements  "  is  deemed  more 
significant  of  his  character  than  his  acts  of  justice  or  of 
mercy.  The  right  which  many  Protestant  communities 
arrogate  to  themselves  of  censoring  their  minister's  con- 
duct, even  in  the  minutiae  of  clothing  and  amusements  and 
domestic  economy,  has  undoubtedly  lessened  the  efficiency 
of  many  members  of  the  Protestant  ministry,  thwarting 
their  individuality  and  destroying  their  independence,  thus 
causing  them  to  appear  negative  and  colorless  in  their 
virtue. 


222  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

6.  The  Principle  of  Social  Welfare. — In  the  social 
sphere  Self-realization  requires  that  the  welfare  of  society 
be  preferred  to  the  interest  of  any  individual.  The  human 
individual  is  thus  forbidden  in  all  his  relations  with  his 
fellows  to  utilize  other  individuals  as  means  or  instruments 
to  the  attainment  of  his  own  interest,  but  is  rather  enjoined 
to  seek  the  interests  of  others  as  his  own.  This  sub9rdina- 
tion  of  individual  interest  to  social  welfare  is  not  in  any 

sense  a  violation  of  the  true  welfare  of  the  self.     Instead 

-••-  -- 

it  signifies  the  realization  of  the  social  self,  and  this  social 
self  is  larger  and  more  complete  than  the  individual  for 
the  very  reason  that  it  does  not  center  around  a  single 
individual  interest,  but  comprehends  in  an  organized  sys- 
tem a  vast  number  of  interests  each  one  of  which  is  an 
end  in  itself.  The  social  self  is  a  kingdom  of  ends  the 
content  and  value  of  each  of  which  is  increased  by  its 
relation  to  all  the  rest ;  humanjsociety  is  an  organic^system 
in  which  all  the  members  stand  in  functional  relation  to 
the  whole. 

The  principle  of  social  welfare  applies  to  all  human 
action  that  concerns  more  than  one  individual.  Of  course 
every  action  of  a  normal  human  being  has  its  reference 
to  other  individuals,  but,  as  we  have  just  recognized,  this 
reference  is  often  only  indirect  and  implied.  On  the  other 
hand,  there  are  actions  of  the  individual  that  are  primarily 
social  in  their  character.  Such  are,  for  instance,  the  activi- 
ties of  citizenship.  In  a  democracy  the  most  important  of 
these  activities  is  the  exercise  of  the  franchise.  In  his  vot- 
ing the  individual  citizen  should  be  governed  altogether 
by  the  principle  just  enunciated.  Not  the  promotion  of 
individual  interest  in  any  of  its  forms,  but  the  furtherance 
of  public  welfare  should  be  the  aim  of  every  ballot  cast. 
This  moral  issue  which  is  involved  in  every  election  is 
frequently  confused  where  popular  government  is  secured 
through  the  party  system.  In  that  case  the  individual 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  STANDARD  OF  GOODNESS    223 

cannot  vote  directly  upon  measures  and  policies,  but  only 
for  party  candidates  who  are  pledged  to  enact  certain 
laws  and  follow  certain  policies.  Now  it  is  unlikely  that 
a  man  who  thinks  seriously  about  public  welfare  will  agree 
entirely  with  the  platform  of  any  party.  Yet,  if  his  vote 
and  influence  are  not  to  be  entirely  ineifective,  he  must 
join  one  of  the  leading  parties  and  support  it  loyally. 
Hence  election  time  finds  the  good  citizen  aiming  directly 
at  party  success  rather  than  public  welfare.  This  necessity 
for  choosing  some  party  as  best  on  the  whole,  and  then  of 
loyally  supporting  it,  despite  objectionable  features  in  pol- 
icies or  personnel,  does  not  mean,  however,  that  the  citizen 
shall  cease  to  think  for  himself  on  all  matters  of  public 
concern  or  shall  hesitate  to  abandon  his  party  on  the  in- 
stant that  he  is  convinced  that  the  policies  of  another  party 
are  more  in  accord  with  the  general  welfare.  Unfortu- 
nately, this  is  just  what  it  does  mean  with  many  citizens 
who  substitute  a  blind  loyalty  to  party  for  an  intelligent 
devotion  to  social  welfare,  thus  seeking  the  good  of  a  group 
within  the  state  rather  than  that  of  the  state  itself. 

The  same  situation  is  reproduced  on  a  larger  scale  when 
we  think  of  the  relation  of  the  human  individual  to  other 
individuals  of  different  nationality — to  human  beings  over 
all  the  world.  The  citizen  of  a  modern  state  can  exert 
very  little  direct  influence  for  good  or  for  ill  upon  the 
citizens  of  other  states.  The  rise  of  the  nationalistic  idea 
in  modern  times  seems  in  many  ways  to  have  increased  the 
barriers  between  civilized  states.  But  the  rise  of  the 
nationalistic  idea  has  been  accompanied  by  the  inception 
and  growth  of  internationalism — the  belief  that  the  single 
state  has  an  office  to  discharge  in  the  family  of  nations. 
Hence  while  the  individual  citizen  can  do  little  directly 
to  affect  the  destinies  of  the  millions  of  human  beings  living 
outside  his  own  state,  he  can  have  a  share  in  determining 
the  policies  of  his  own  nation,  which,  acting  in  its  national 


224  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

capacity,  may  affect  profoundly  the  welfare  of  humanity 
over  all  the  world.  The  principle  of  social  welfare,  applied 
here,  shows  it  to  be  the  duty  of  the  citizen  to  favor  those 
measures  which  promise  to  further,  not  the  well-being  of 
his  own  nation  merely,  but  of  all  the  nations,  of  mankind 
universally.  There  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  such  inter- 
nationalism will  be  as  effective  in  benefiting  humanity 
as  would  a  humanitarianism  which  leveled  all  national 
barriers.  For,  in  acting  at  a  distance  and  in  a  large  way, 
the  organized  agencies  of  government  are  more  adequate 
and  efficient  than  the  effort  of  single  individuals  or  asso- 
ciations of  individuals.  At  the  time  of  the  earthquake  of 
1908,  in  Italy,  much  valuable  assistance  was  rendered 
through  individual  initiative  and  cooperative  enterprise; 
but  none  so  prompt  and  effective  as  that  of  the  govern- 
ment, which  diverted  a  loaded  naval  supply-ship  to  the 
relief  of  the  starving  sufferers. 

7.  Maxims  of  Individual  Interest :  (a)  Maxim  of  Pru- 
dence.— But  the  idea  of  Self-realization  when  interpreted 
in  the  light  of  human  experience  is  capable  of  supplying 
more  explicit  and  detailed  criteria  of  right  and  wrong, 
whose  bearing  upon  the  questions  of  daily  conduct  is  direct 
and  obvious.  Let  the  two  principles  just  explained,  those 
of  individual  interest  and  social  welfare,  be  applied  within 
their  respective  spheres,  and  the  result  is  in  each  case 
two  corollaries  or  maxims.  These  maxims  express  the  re- 
quirements of  Self-realization  in  successive  stages,  and  each 
constitutes  within  its  own  province  the  determining  prin- 
ciple of  moral  judgment. 

In  the  individual  life  Self-realization  calls  first  for  the 
regulation  and  adjustment  of  those  sentient  impulses  which 
are  the  common  heritage  of  mankind.  Now  of  all  the 
natural  instincts  of  man  that  which,  when  raised  to  the  level 
of  conscious  aim,  is  most  comprehensive  in  its  scope,  is  the 
instinct  of  self-preservation.  At  first  merely  a  desire  for 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  STANDARD  OF  GOODNESS    225 

present  security  and  well-being,  it  develops,  with  the  growth 
of  intelligence,  into  the  purpose  to  have  comfort  and 
pleasure  throughout  the  natural  lifetime.  Its  object,  the 
individual  in  his  physical  existence,  endures  throughout 
a  period  of  years,  and  is  permanent  compared  with  multi- 
tudinous objects  of  natural  desire  which  are  varying  and 
transitory.  Within  this  inclusive  purpose,  then,  fall  the 
objects  of  the  other  natural  instincts  which  have  been  de- 
veloped as  means  to  individual  survival,  like  those  of  food, 
acquisition,  resentment,  etc.  Being  thus  inclusive  of  all 
such  objects  in  the  degree  to  which  they  contribute  to 
man's  comfort  and  well-being,  this  purpose  represents  the 
system  of  natural  goods,  and,  within  its  own  province,  the 
Ideal  of  Self-realization.  Hence  the  first  maxim  in  the  in- 
dividual sphere  is  that  survival  and  future  pleasure  should  , 
be  preferred  to  the  gratification  of  any  desire  or  desires. 
There  is  slight  reason,  it  may  appear,  to  enjoin  human 
beings  to  seek  their  own  comfort  and  pleasure.  Prudence 
is  easily  learned,  and  the  burden  of  ethical  teaching  must 
be  to  recommend  the  subordination  of  prudential  con- 
siderations to  the  larger  personal  and  social  ends.  Yet  as 
limited  and  circumscribed  as  is  its  cause  prudence  con- 
stitutes an  end  much  larger  and  more  significant  than  » 
many  of  the  ends  to  which  it  is  often  subordinated.  Such 
objects  are,  for  example,  wealth  and  reputation,  when  these 
are  sought  for  themselves,  and  not  as  part  of  some  far- 
reaching  plan.  To  be  sure,  a  certain  amount  of  property 
and  a  good  reputation  are  important  aids  in  the  attain- 
ment of  comfort  and  security,  and,  in  so  far  as  they  are 
thus  sought,  their  pursuit  is  justified.  But  from  being 
at  first  sought  as  means  they  become,  in  many  cases,  ends 
in  themselves  sought  for  their  own  sake  and  to  which  the 
comfort  and  pleasure  of  living  are  ruthlessly  sacrificed. 
This  is  particularly  true  in  a  country  like  our  own,  where 
the  individual's  sphere  of  activity  and  social  standing  are 


226  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

not  pre-determined  by  his  birth  and  early  surroundings. 
The  appearance  of  unlimited  opportunity  begets  a  spirit 
of  restlessness  and  dissatisfaction  with  present  conditions 
which  leads  the  individual  to  seek  wealth  and  reputation, 
not  from  any  appreciation  of  the  larger  possibilities  of 
life  which  they  may  open,  but  simply  from  a  desire  to 
"  get  on."  To  this  desire,  eager  and  consuming,  all  the 
simpler  joys  of  living  are  sacrificed — the  comfort  of  the 
fireside  on  winters'  evenings  in  company  with  interesting 
books  or  truly  congenial  friends,  the  enjoyment  of  the 
summer's  holiday  out-of-doors,  the  pleasures  of  unimpaired 
digestion,  and  the  solace  of  refreshing  sleep.  Spencer  re- 
marks upon  the  folly  of  the  husband  and  father  who,  in 
order  to  increase  the  income  of  his  family,  applies  himself 
so  unremittingly  to  his  business  that  his  health  is  broken 
down  or  his  life  shortened.5  How  much  more  foolish  is  the 
individual  who  brings  these  results  upon  himself  not  be- 
cause of  devotion  to  his  family  but  merely  from  a  desire 
to  surpass  his  acquaintances  in  wealth  or  rise  above  his 
parents  in  social  position! 

8.  (b)  Maxim  of  Idealism. — In  addition  to  his  natural 
instincts  the  human  individual  possesses,  as  we  well  know, 
certain  spiritual  capacities  which  require  for  their  satis- 
faction the  attainment  of  ideal  objects,  such  as  Truth  and 
Power  and  Beauty.  To  realize  himself  fully  it  follows, 
then,  that  the  individual  must  seek  and  attain  not  only 
material  well-being  but  also  personal_culture.  Now  these 
ideal  ends  which  man  in  his  spiritual  capacity  pursues 
are,  as  has  been  previously  shown,  more  comprehensive  and 
far-reaching  than  any  of  the  objects  of  natural  instinct, 
even  that  of  the  instinct  of  self-preservation  itself ;  because 
such  ideals  as  Truth  and  Beauty  are  not  limited  in  their 
scope  to  the  period  of  the  individual's  natural  lifetime  but 
include  the  existence  and  activity  of  many  generations 

•SPEJfCEB:   Data  of  Ethics,  §  72. 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  STANDARD  OF  GOODNESS    227 

of  men.  Hence  the  individual  who  devotes  himself  to  a 
realization  of  these  ideals  identifies  himself  with  the  cause 
of  spiritual  progress  which  unites  men  of  all  ages  as  loyal 
adherents  ahdTellow- workers.  We  may  therefore  set  down 
as  the  second  maxim  of  Self-realization  in  the  individual 
sphere  that  the  attainment  of  the  ideal  ^objects  of  intelli- 
gence and  personality  should  be  preferred  to  the  promotion 
of  material  well-being  and  the  gratification  of  natural 
desires. 

The  grounds  for  this  maxim  should  be  made  perfectly 
clear.  The  one  and  only  reason  why  from  the  standpoint 
of  Self-realization  the  exercise  of  man 's  spiritual  capacities 
is  better  than  the  gratification  of  his  natural  desires  is  that 
such  spiritual  activity  results  in  a  larger  and  more  com- 
prehensive life.  Thus  the  attainment  of  ideal  ends,  in- 
tellectual, practical,  and  aesthetic,  represents  the  realization 
of  the  whole  self,  in  contrast  to  which  the  material  comfort 
and  pleasure  stand  for  the  interest  of  the  partial  self. 
The  life  of  spiritual  attainment  and  personal  culture  is  to  be 
preferred  morally  because  it  is  a  larger  and  a  fuller  life 
than  that  of  physical  gratification  and  well-being.  This  is 
easy  to  see  when  we  contrast  the  life  of  the  cultivated 
man  of  affairs  with  his  broad  outlook  and  lasting  achieve- 
ments to  that  of  the  unlettered  peasant  with  his  narrow 
horizon  and  rude  pleasures.  But  it  is  not  so  easy  to  see 
when  the  life  of  the  successful  man  of  the  world  and  that 
of  the  struggling  artist  or  obscure  scholar  are  compared. 
Particularly  is  this  true  at  present  when  improved  facilities 
of  transportation  and  communication,  and  the  development 
of  the  arts  of  printing  and  photographic  reproduction,  have 
made  it  possible  for  a  man  possessed  of  good  health  and 
riches  to  travel  over  the  entire  world  and  to  possess  what 
books  and  works  of  art  he  pleases.  It  is  difficult  indeed 
to  believe  that  the  career  of  such  a  man,  widely  traveled 
and  surrounded  by  all  the  fruits  of  culture,  is  not  larger 


228  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

and  fuller  than  that  of  the  artist  or  investigator  who  has 
never  been  able  to  travel  outside  his  own  country  and  can 
scarcely  supply  himself  with  the  books  and  appliances  which 
his  work  necessitates.  Now  the  advantages  of  travel  and 
the  possession  of  books  and  pictures  in  stimulating  even 
a  belated  growth  of  intelligence  and  taste  are  not  to  be 
overlooked  on  the  one  hand,  nor  is  the  limitation  which 
the  lack  of  these  things  imposes  upon  the  most  fruitful 
and  promising  spiritual  activity  to  be  neglected  on  the 
other.  Yet  the  law  inexorably  holds  that  the  breadth  and 
1  fullness  of  human  life  is  directly  proportionate  to  the 
amount  of  spiritual  activity  exercised  in  it.  The  uncul- 
tivated man  may  travel  to  every  quarter  of  the  globe  and 
all  that  his  travel  will  yield  him  is  a  succession  of  un- 
related impressions  which  soon  become  vague  memories  or 
are  forgotten  altogether.  He  cannot  make  the  objects  he 
see  his  own  because  his  mind  furnishes  him  with  no  back- 
ground of  historic  associations  or  value  judgments  with 
which  to  connect  them.  His  varied  and  interesting  ex- 
periences do  not  become  a  permanent  addition  to  his  life, 
for  he  has  built  up  by  his  own  thought  and  study  no  system 
of  ideas  within  which  the  new  experiences  can  be  given  a 
fixed  and  definite  place.  Such  a  person  may  buy  books 
by  the  ton  and  pictures  by  the  gross,  but  these  will  remain 
simply  material  objects  without  a  trace  of  profound  mean- 
ing or  subtle  suggestion.  The  scholar,  artist,  or  investiga- 
tor, on  the  contrary,  although  he  possess  few  or  compara- 
tively none  of  these  advantages,  has  through  the  exercise 
of  his  intellectual  powers,  creative  ability,  or  artistic  skill, 
so  correlated  his  ideas  and  organized  his  experience  that  his 
life  is  extended  in  space  and  time  far  beyond  the  limits 
of  his  geographical  location  or  natural  existence,  under- 
standing the  past  in  its  relation  to  the  present,  viewing 
other  worlds  than  his  own,  and  penetrating  to  the  deeper 
and  essential  meanings  of  things  which  do  not  appear  on 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  STANDARD  OF  GOODNESS    229 

the  surface  but  reveal  themselves  to  rational  insight  and 
aesthetic  intuition.  The  career  of  the  philosopher  Im- 
manuel  Kant  is  instructive  in  proving  that  the  breadth 
and  fullness  of  a  human  life  is  determined  rather  by  cul- 
tivation of  spirit  than  by  any  external  advantages  or  pos- 
sessions whatsoever.  During  the  whole  period  of  his 
maturity  Kant  was  occupied  with  the  methodical  discharge 
of  the  routine  duties  of  a  university  professor.  He  seldom 
left  the  university  town  of  Koenigsberg  and  never  went 
outside  his  native  province  in  Germany.  Yet  he  possessed 
such  an  inquiring  mind  and  so  comprehensive  an  intelli- 
gence that  his  reading  and  thought  extended  far  beyond 
the  subject  of  his  special  interest,  philosophy,  to  all  ques- 
tions pertaining  to  the  earth  and  its  inhabitants.  Hence 
in  addition  to  his  epoch-making  work  in  philosophy  he  wrote 
treatises  on  the  history  of  the  earth,  upon  the  origin  of 
the  different  living  forms,  and  upon  the  relations  of  the 
various  races  of  men.  These  latter  rank  among  the  most 
important  contributions  of  the  eighteenth  century  to  our 
knowledge  of  the  natural  world  and  anticipate  in  a  re- 
markable way  the  evolutionary  conception  of  the  succeed- 
ing century.  Thus  Kant,  secluded  throughout  life  in  an 
insignificant  German  town,  and  hampered  by  the  exactions 
of  an  academic  routine,  attained  a  fuller  knowledge  of 
the  natural  world,  its  facts  and  its  forces,  than  many  a 
contemporary  who,  blessed  with  rank  and  fortune,  was 
able  to  travel  over  Europe  at  will,  viewing  its  most  in- 
teresting localities  and  interviewing  its  most  illustrious 
personages. 

9.  Maxims  of  Social  Welfare:  (a)  Maxim  of  Altru- 
ism.— In  the  social  sphere  the  primary  adjustment  is  be- 
tween single  individuals  or  persons.  The  individual  comes 
into  contact  with  other  persons  like  himself  before  he  en- 
ters into  conscious  relations  with  the  larger  social  groups 
such  as  the  community,  the  "  public,"  the  nation,  or 


230  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

humanity.  In  all  the  stages  of  individual  development  the 
self  is  of  course  associated  with  others.  Material  comfort 
and  pleasure  are  obtained  by  the  individual  only  by  asso- 
ciation with  other  individuals  in  procuring  the  means  of 
subsistence  and  maintaining  the  conditions  necessary  for 
human  existence.  In  this  case,  however,  the  social  rela- 
tionship enters  as  a  means  to  the  survival  and  material 
well-being  of  the  individual.  To  a  still  greater  degree 
does  the  achievement  of  the  aims  of  intelligence  and  per- 
sonality involve  the  cooperation  of  many  individuals  in 
the  fields  of  art  and  science  and  invention.  But  here  the 
individual  is  brought  into  contact  not  with  the  lives  of 
others  in  their  entirety,  but  only  with  such  parts  as  are 
connected  by  the  bond  of  a  common  interest  with  his  own. 
Thus  a  man  can  achieve  professional  success  only  through 
cooperation  with  his  professional  colleagues:  but  he  is  in- 
terested in  them  not  as  men,  but  as  physicians  or  lawyers 
or  engineers.  It  is  this  fact  to  which  Mr.  Chesterton 
refers  in  his  picturesque  and  forcible  way  when  he  asserts 
that  the  social  life  of  the  large  community  like  our  modern 
city  is  much  narrower  and  more  limited  than  that  of  a 
small  community.  For  in  the  large  city  we  come  into 
association  only  with  those  who  have  aims  and  interests 
identical  with  our  own,  while  in  the  small  community  we 
are  forced  to  come  to  terms  with  individuals  in  the  totali- 
ties of  their  natures,  which  are  always  different  from  and, 
at  some  points,  antagonistic  to  our  own. 

"  We  make  our  friends,  we  make  our  enemies ;  but  God  makes  our 
next-door  neighbor.  Hence  he  comes  to  us  clad  in  all  the  careless 
terrors  of  nature ;  he  is  as  strange  as  the  stars,  as  reckless  and  in- 
different as  the  rain.  He  is  Man,  the  most  terrible  of  beasts.  That 
is  why  the  old  religions  and  the  old  scriptural  language  showed  so 
sharp  a  wisdom  when  they  spoke,  not  of  one's  duty  towards 
humanity  but  of  one's  duty  towards  one's  neighbor.  The  duty 
towards  humanity  may  often  take  the  form  of  a  choice  which  is 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  STANDARD  OF  GOODNESS    231 

personal  and  even  pleasurable.  That  duty  may  be  a  hobby;  it  may 
even  be  a  dissipation.  .  .  .  The  most  monstrous  martyrdom, 
the  most  repulsive  experience  may  be  the  result  of  a  choice  or 
a  kind  of  taste.  .  .  .  But  we  have  to  love  our  neighbor 
because  he  is  there — a  much  more  alarming  reason  for  a  much 
more  serious  operation.  He  is  the  sample  of  humanity  which  is 
actually  given  us.  Precisely  because  he  may  be  anybody  he  is 
everybody.  He  is  a  symbol  because  he  is  an  accident."  6 

The  maxim  which  the  principle  of  social  welfare  (and 
ultimately  the  Ideal  of  Self-realization)  supplies  for  the 
directing  of  conduct  in  this  adjustment  of  differing  in- 
dividualities is  that  the  individual  should  prefer  the  interest 
of  another  to  his  own  interest.  Now  it  has  been  previously 
made  clear  that  for  a  man  possessed  of  the  instinct  of  sym- 
pathy and  of  an  intelligence  to  which  his  own  personality 
is  revealed  as  a  universal  principle  present  equally  in  the 
lives  of  all  other  self-conscious  persons,  the  interest  of 
every  other  human  individual  is  an  end  of  equal  value 
with  his  own.  Hence  the  individual  does  wrong  when  he 
treats  another  individual  as  a  means  to  his  own  ends,  sub- 
ordinating the  interest  of  another  to  his  own.  The  reason 
for  this  is  apparent  when  in  case  of  conflict  the  interest 
of  the  alter  is  greater  than  that  of  the  ego;  for  when,  in 
such  emergency,  we  prefer  another's  interest  to  our  own 
we  are  attaining  a  greater  good,  realizing  our  own  larger 
selves.  Perplexity  may  arise,  however,  when  the  conflict- 
ing interests  of  ego  and  alter  are,  as  far  as  honest  thought 
can  decide,  equal  in  amount  and  importance.  Why,  it 
may  be  asked,  when  ego  and  alter  have  equal  interests  at 
stake,  is  it  attaining  a  larger  good  to  sacrifice  my  interest 
to  that  of  another  than  to  sacrifice  his  interest  to  mine? 
Only  one  interest  can  be  attained :  the  other  must  be 
thwarted.  It  is  asserted  that  both  have  equal  value,  and 

•  CHESTEBTON  :  Heretics,  "  On  the  Institution  of  the  Family," 
p.  185. 


232  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

the  same  right  to  attainment.  Let  this  be  granted,  and 
readily — why  then  should  not  mine  be  the  one  that  is 
attained  and  the  other's  the  one  that  is  thwarted?  There 
is  genuine  difficulty  in  such  cases,  but  it  is  not  insuperable. 
From  the  standpoint  of  Self-realization  a  form  of  conduct 
is  preferred  as  better  only  as  through  it  the  self  attains  a 
larger  and  more  inclusive  end.  When  in  the  circumstances 
above  described  the  individual  subordinates  his  interest  to 
that  of  another,  his  own  interest  is  not  entirely  thwarted. 
It  may  be  in  so  far  as  the  attainment  originally  sought  for 
is  concerned.  But  when  voluntarily  sacrificed  to  another's 
good  the  interest  of  the  ego  is  converted  into  a  means  to 
the  promotion  of  the  alter's  interest  and  lives  again  in 
its  complete  and  successful  attainment.  The  same  is  not 
true  in  the  contrary  case  where  another's  interest  is  made 
subordinate  to  one's  own.  The  interest  of  the  alter  may 
be  forcibly  subordinated  to  the  interest  of  the  ego,  but  it 
not  voluntarily  sacrificed  to  it.  No  individual  has  the  power 
to  cause  the  aims  and  interests  of  others  to  sacrifice  them- 
selves voluntarily  to  his  own  interests  and  ambitions.  Hence 
in  the  first  case  the  conflicting  interests  merge,  the  one 
entering  into  and  completing  the  other;  in  the  second  the 
one  is  attained  at  the  expense,  and  to  the  exclusion,  of  the 
other.  Manifestly  it  is  in  the  former  alternative  that  the 
self  attains  the  larger  and  more  inclusive  end,  and  it  is 
this  course  only  which  it  is  right  for  the  individual  to  take. 
Instances  in  which  the  opposing  interests  are  exactly 
equal  are  extremely  rare,  however;  and  the  difficulty  just 
considered  is  more  one  of  theory,  perhaps,  than  of  practice. 
Usually  it  is  amply  sufficient  if  the  individual  recognize 
that  the  interests  of  others  have  equal  value  with  his  own 
and  then,  in  particular  cases  where  the  interests  of  ego 
and  alter  come  into  conflict,  try  earnestly  to  discover  which 
is  the  larger  good.  If  study  of  the  situation  shows  that 
he  has  himself  much  more  at  stake  than  his  fellow,  the 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  STANDARD  OF  GOODNESS   233 

individual  is  justified  in  preferring  his  own  interest.  In 
all  other  circumstances  he  is  morally  bound  to  seek  the 
other's  good.  But  this  obligation  of  the  individual  to  in- 
terest himself  in  desires  and  ambitions  which  are  frequently 
unattractive  or  even  distasteful  does  not,  as  would  at  first 
appear,  act  as  a  check  to  his  own  development,  thwarting 
his  aims  and  impoverishing  his  life.  It  has  just  the  oppo- 
site effect,  by  opening  to  the  individual  new  sources  of 
interest  and  capacities  for  action.  When  we  seek  the  in- 
terests of  others  they,  by  virtue  of  being  different  from 
and  antagonistic  to  our  own,  communicate  to  our  lives  a 
fuller  and  more  varied  content.  The  fullness  or  variety 
of  any  individual's  life  is  measured  largely  by  the  degree 
to  which  he  has,  in  domestic  and  social  life,  interested 
himself  in  the  hopes  and  plans  of  others,  participating  in 
their  efforts  and  sharing  their  successes.  To  seek  the  in- 
terests of  others,  therefore,  so  far  from  hampering  or  im- 
poverishing the  life  of  the  self,  is  the  most  effective  means 
to  broaden  and  deepen  it.7 

10.  (b)  Maxim  of  Humanitarianism. — The  social  re- 
lationship is  not  limited  to  the  association  of  individuals 
who  come  into  direct  contact  with  one  another.  For  to 
the  human  individual  as  an  intelligent  person  all  conscious 
personality  has  the  same  absolute  worth.  Hence  the  wel- 
fare of  humanity  in  the  larger  social  groups  of  the  com- 
munity and  the  state  and  the  world  becomes  an  object  to 
be  sought  for,  although  here  a  personal  contact  of  all  the 
individuals  involved  is  manifestly  impossible.  And  since 

T  Theodore  Roosevelt  brings  out  most  forcibly  the  interest  and 
value  which  attaches  to  each  individual  among  the  mass  of  our 
fellow-citizens  if  we  take  the  trouble  to  investigate  it.  In  his  article, 
"  The  Coal  Miner  at  Home,"  he  says :  "  I  think  that  those  who 
preach  to  the  educated  man — to  the  graduate  of  a  particular  school 
or  college — about  his  duty  to  the  country  often  tend  to  lay  the  em- 
phasis on  the  wrong  side.  If  he  remains  aloof  from  his  fellow- 
citizens,  the  damage  done  is  really  not  as  much  to  them  as  to  him, 
and  he  is  the  man  who  suffers  most." — Cf.  Outlook,  December  24, 
1910,  pp.  900-904. 


234  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

all  persons  are  alike  ends  whose  interest  is  to  be  pursued, 
the  most  inclusive  object  is  that  which  embraces  in  its 
realization  the  welfare  of  the  largest  number  of  persons. 
Most  comprehensive  of  all  objects  in  the  social  sphere  is, 
therefore,  humanity,  the  welfare  of  human  personality  uni- 
versally. It  follows  then  that  the  second  maxim  in  the 
social  sphere  is  that  the  welfare  of  humanity  shouldjbe 
preferred  to  the  interest  of  any  lesser  number  of  indi- 
viduals. 

The  first  duty  of  the  individual  in  the  social  sphere 

is  to  seek  the  good  of  other  individuals  with  whom  he  is 

L  -i '  _  ... 

acquainted.     This  means  that  he  shall  strive  incessantly 

to  extend  that  personal  development  and  cultivation  which 
he  seeks  for  himself  to  the  members  of  his  family,  his  circle 

^  tof  friends,  and  those  with  whom  he  is  professionally  asso* 
ciated.  Such  effort  has  frequently  been  successful  ii* 

[..inhuman  history,  and  small  groups  or  classes  have  arisen 
which,  through  cooperative  activity  and  mutual  encourage- 
ment, have  attained  a  high  level  of  personal  culture  in  the 
various  fields  of  spiritual  achievement  such  as  art,  science, 
literature,  etc.  But  the  culture  of  these  small  groups  has 
usually  been  at  the  expense,  rather  than  for  the  benefit, 
of  existing  humanity.  A  much  larger  number  of  their 
fellow-men  have  been  condemned  to  lives  of  ceaseless  and 
spirit-killing  toil  in  order  that  a  selected  few  should  have 
the  needed  leisure  and  appropriate  surroundings  for  the 
exercise  of  the  higher  psychic  powers  of  human  nature. 
It  was  thus  in  ancientjGrreece  where  the  labor  of  thousands 
of  slaves  provided  a  small  number  of  citizens  with  the 
means  of  subsistence  and  thus  made  possible  their  in- 
comparable intellectual  and  artistic  achievement.  The 
same  condition  has  existed,  though  to  a  less  extent,  in 
many  modern  states  in  which  the  presence  of  a  hereditary 
aristocracy  has  led  to  a  restriction  of  culture,  as  a  privilege 
of  the  select  few  born  into  this  class.  Up  to  the  time  of 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  STANDARD  OF  GOODNESS    235 

the  French  Revolution  the  great  mass  of  toilers  with  few 
exceptions  bore  this  arrangement  uncomplainingly,  being 
led  by  social  tradition  and  religious  superstition  to  believe 
that  the  lot  to  which  God  had  ordained  them  was  to  labor 
unremittingly  that  a  few  of  their  fellows  might  enjoy  the 
better  things  of  life.  But  during  the  past  century  the 
proletariat  has  been  awakening,  its  attitude  has  entirely 
changed,  and  it  will  no  longer  submit  willingly  to  a 
regime  that  restricts  the  benefits  of  culture  to  a  chosen 
few.  As  Eucken  says:  "  Hitherto  spiritual  conflict  has 
usually  been  confined  to  the  limited  arena  of  cultivated 
society,  and  the  general  mass  of  mankind  has  not  been  much 
affected.  Now,  however,  the  people  are  pressing  forward; 
they  not  only  demand  a  voice  in  the  settlement  of  ultimate 
questions,  but  require  that  the  whole  structure  of  society 
shall  be  regulated  with  reference  to  their  opinions  and 
interests.  They  are  very  liable  moreover  to  that  harsh 
intolerance  which  always  characterizes  big  mass  move- 
ments. " 8  It  is  plain  then  that  the  work  of  extending  to 
all^  humanity  the  opportunity  for  real  cultivation  of  spirit 
— to  each  man  according  to  his  capacity — must  be  under- 
taken more  vigorously  and  on  a  larger  scale  than  ever  here- 
tofore. For  the  days  of  privilege  are  numbered,  and  the 
sort  of  spiritual  expansion  which  is  possible  in  a  few  only 
at  the  cost  of  a  corresponding  limitation  in  the  many,  will 
not  be  permitted  to  exist  much  longer  on  the  earth.  Cul- 
ture must  now,  if  ever,  be  justified  of  her  children,  and 
those  of  her  exponents  do  her  indeed  a  poor  service  who 
assert  that  she  is  essentially  selective  and  opposed  to  the 
spirit  of  democracy.  For  if  culture  is  identified  with  priv- 
ilege she  is  destined  to  be  swept  away  by  that  movement 
for  human  brotherhood  and  social  equality  which  is  slowly 
beginning  and  gathering  momentum,  but  which  when  it 
gains  its  full  force  shall  sweep  all  else  before  it.  Far 
•  EUCKEN  :  The  Problem  of  Human  Life,  Eng.  trans.,  p.  566. 


236  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

truer  and  more  consistent  with  ethical  principles  is  it  to 
identify  culture  with  that  united  effort  on  the  part  of  all 
mankind  to  develop  the  highest  powers  of  human  person- 
ality, which  is  itself  identical  with  human  brotherhood. 

REFERENCES 

ALEXANDEB,  Moral  Order  and  Progress,  Book  II,  Chap.  II. 
GREEN,  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  Book  III,  Chaps.  Ill,  IV. 
MACKENZIE,  Manual  of  Ethics,  Book  III,  Chaps.  I,  II,  III. 
SETH,  Ethical  Principles,  Part  I,  Chap.  Ill,  §§  6-9. 
DEWET  AND  TUFTS,  Ethics,  Chap.  XX. 

KANT,  Metaphysic  of  Morals,  Second  Section  (Abbott's  trans.). 
THILLY,  Introduction  to  Ethics,  Chap.  IX. 


CHAPTER  III 
SELF-REALIZATION  AND  SELF-SACRIFICE 

1.  The  Problem  of  Self-Sacrifice. — 2.  Self-Sacrifice,  if  a  Duty,  Must 
Be  of  Ultimate  Benefit  to  the  Individual. — 3.  Self-Sacrifice,  if 
Genuine,  Must  Involve  Real  Loss  to  the  Individual. — 4.  The 
Conception  of  Organization  Furnishes  Solution  of  the  Problem. — 

5.  All  Organization  Involves  the  Sacrifice  of  Part  to  the  Whole. — 

6.  Self-Mastery. — 7.  Self-Sacrifice. — 8.  Is    Self-Sacrifice    Due    to 
Merely  Temporary  Maladjustment? — 9.  On  the  Contrary,  It  Is 
a    Necessary    Factor    in    Self-Organization. — 10.  Optimism    and 
Pessimism. — 11.  Conclusion. 

1.  The  Problem  of  Self-Sacrifice.— The  subject  of  self- 
sacrifice  has  always  been  one  of  special  difficulty  for  the 
student  of  morality.  Indeed,  there  is  reason  for  regarding 
it  as  the  gravest  problem  in  the  field  of  Ethics,  since  ethical 
reflection  itself  originated  in  the  urgent  necessity  of  solving 
it.  As  long  as  the  conduct  of  men  was  determined  by 
customs  which  conserved  the  well-being  of  group  and  com- 
munity, no  question  arose  of  a  possible  discrepancy  between 
the  obligations  of  morality  and  the  good  of  the  individual. 
But  when  individuality  was  so  far  developed  as  to  produce 
in  man  a  consciousness  of  aims  and  interests  belonging  to 
him  as  an  individual  which  clashed  with  the  desires  and 
ambitions  of  other  individuals  and  the  interest  of  the 
community,  it  was  inevitable  that  he  should  ask  the  ques- 
tion: "  Why  should  I  abandon  my  own  plans,  surrender 
my  own  ambitions,  in  order  that  the  plans  and  ambitions 
of  others  may  be  f ulfilled  ?  ' '  This  crisis  in  moral  develop- 
ment occurred  with  the  Greeks  in  the  fifth  century  B.C. 
The  Sophists  cut  the  Gordian  knot  by  asserting  that  no 
obligation  existed  for  the  individual  to  sacrifice  his  in- 

887 


238  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

terest  to  the  welfare  of  his  fellows — that  every  man's  in- 
terest was  his  good  and  the  law  of  the  state  represented 
the  interest  of  the  strongest  individuals.  The  illustrious 
contributions  of  Socrates,  Plato,  and  Aristotle,  to  ethical 
theory  were  prompted  by  a  desire  to  find  rational  grounds 
for  a  social  obligation  supreme  over  all  considerations  of 
individual  interest.  But  while  the  insight  of  these  great 
thinkers  was  more  illuminating  and  profound  than  the 
shallow  and  dogmatic  pronouncements  of  the  Sophists,  still 
they  were  only  partially  successful  in  solving  the  problem. 
They  agree  in  basing  social  obligation  on  the  faculty  of 
reason  common  to  all  men — holding  that  if  men  would 
take  the  trouble  to  think  clearly  concerning  human  life 
and  conduct  they  would  be  convinced  that  the  interests  of 
all  individuals  in  the  state  are  identical  and  hence  that  any 
individual  who  serves  community  or  nation  is  thereby  at- 
taining his  own  private  interest.  They  were  able  to  demon- 
strate that  such  a  community  of  interest  existed,  however, 
among  a  comparatively  small  number  of  fellow-citizens, 
only;  much  larger  classes  such  as  women,  slaves,  and  bar- 
barians, being  left  partly  or  wholly  out  of  account.  Hence 
the  problem  of  the  larger  social  obligation  extending_ta 
all  fellow-humans  was  left  unsolved.  It  remained  for 
Christianity  to  enforce  this  obligation  in  its  fullest  ex- 
tension, making  self-sacrifice  the  .keynote  of  its  teaching 
and  communicating  to  mediaeval  and  modern  morality  a 
negative  and  ascetic  tone  which  contrasts  sharply  with  the 
freedom  and  spontaneity  of  Greek  life.  In  justification 
of  thus  enjoining  the  individual  to  sacrifice  his  interest  to 
the  good  of  humanity  there  is  clearly  suggested  in  the 
Christian  gospel  ~a  view  of  human  nature  and  human  life 
much  more  adequate  and  profound  than  that  of  Greek 
philosophy.  But  this  has  been  so  often  confused  by  ex- 
ponents of  Christianity  with  merely  a  supernatural  sanc- 
tion of  morality  which  recompenses  the  individual  in  a 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  SELF-SACRIFICE       239 

future  life  for  the  pain  and  privation  undergone  in  the 
discharge  of  duty  here,  that  the  whole  problem  must  be 
considered  afresh  by  present-day  Ethics  and,  if  possible,  a 
solution  found  which  will  agree  with  modern  conceptions 
of  man,  his  social  relations,  and  his  place  in  the  world. 

2.  Self-Sacrifice,  if  a  Duty,  Must  Be  of  Ultimate 
Benefit  to  the  Individual. — The  problem  of  self-sacrifice 
arises  from  the  presence  in  man's  moral  experience  of 
two_  sets  of  facts  neither  of  which  can  be  disputed,  but 
which  seem  to  "contradict  and  even  to  exclude  one  another. 
The  first  of  these  facts  is,  that  whatever  it  be  that  conscience 
requires  of  man,  it^is  for  his  real  benefit  to  recognize  and 
fulfil  this  obligation.  This  identity  of  the  Good  with  the 
highest  interest  of  man  has  been  sufficiently  emphasized 
in  previous  pages.  In  the  case  of  self-sacrifice  it  seems 
an  indubitable  fact,  therefore,  that — no  matter  how  extreme 
the  sacrifice — if  it  is  a  duty,  then  it  is  the  fulfilment  of 
the. individual's  own  good.  Even  the  extreme^  of  self-sac- 
rific^recommended  by  Christianity  must  thus  be  regarded 
as  a  method  of  self-realization — just_as  much  as  the  ob- 
servance of  the  jnean,  or  the  attainment  of  a  harmony,  in 
conduct,  was  to  the  Greek  moralist.  In  this  connection 
Green  says  with  his  usual  discernment: 

"  It  is  not  because  it  involves  the  renunciation  of  so  much 
pleasure  that  we  deem  the  life  of  larger  seIF-"3enial  which  the 
Christian  conscience  calls  for,  a  higher  life  than  was  conceived 
by  the  Greek  philosophers;  but  because  it  implies  a  fuller  reali- 
zation of  the  human  soul.  It  is  not  the— xenunciati^n  as  such 
but  the  spiritual  staje  which  it  represents  that  constitutes  the 
value  of  a  life  spent  in  self-devoted  service  to  mankind;  and  it 
represents,  we  must  remember,  not  merely  a  certain  system  of 
desires  and  interests,  on  the  part  of  the  persons  who  make  the 
renunciation,  but  certain  social  development  in  consequence  of 
which  those  desires  and  interests  are  called  into  play."  x 

:  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  §273,  p.  332. 


240  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

3.  Self-Sacrifice,  if  Genuine,  Must  Involve  Real  Loss 
to  the  Individual. — A  second  group  of  facts  which  are 
equally  important  seem  to  show  that  moral  value  attaches 
only  to  such  "  self-sacrifice  "  as  entails  real  loss.  When 
this  aspect  of  the  subject  comes  home  to  us  in  full  force, 
it  becomes  impossible  to  treat  self-sacrifice  as  an  incident, 
merely,  in  self-realization.  Moral  experience  teaches  us 
that  self-sacrifice  is  a  real  surrender  of  personal  interest 
involving  the  pain  of  irretrievable  loss  and  calling  for 
genuine  heroism.  Shall  we  understand  it  then  as  a  tem- 
porary discomfort  due  to  the  denial  of  present  desire  for 
the  sake  of  future  well-being?  This  is  to  make  self- 
sacrifice  a  part  of  enlightened  prudence.  Such  an  in- 
terpretation appears  to  contravene  the  plain  teaching  of 
moral  experience  and  to  rob  this  vitally  important  feature 
of  morality  of  its  true  meaning.  It  was  this  aspect  of  the 
subject  which  impressed  Leslie  Stephen,  who  believed  that 
morality  has  been  developed  as  a  means  for  securing  social 
as  distinct  from  individual  survival,  and  that  the  obligation 
to  altruism  can  never  be  reconciled  with  individual  interest. 
Certainly  his  remarks  upon  this  subject  contain  much 
shrewd  sense: 


"When  we  listen  to  the  careful  demonstrations  of  the  reality 
of  benevolence,  when  we  are  told  again  and  again  that  a  man 
may,  and  in  fact  does,  sacrifice  his  own  happiness  to  the  good 
of  his  fellows,  we  are  edified  and  convinced.  But  we  receive 
something  of  a  shock  when  the  edifying  moralist  suddenly  turns 
round  and  tells  us  that  the  sacrifice  is  only  temporary,  that  is  to 
say,  that  it  is  after  all  unreal.  It  is  still  more  surprising  when 
this  is  presented,  and  precisely  by  the  moralists  who  profess 
to  take  the  loftiest  theory,  not  merely  as  expressing  the  fact, 
but  as  an  a  priori  truth  deducible  from  the  very  nature  of  things. 
For  what  can  this  be  but  to  fall  back  upon  the  purely  egoistic 
doctrine."  * 

*  STEPHEN:  Science  of  Ethics,  ed.  of  1882,  p.  430. 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  SELF-SACRIFICE       241 

4.  The    Conception    of    Organization    Furnishes    the 
Solution  of  the  Problem. — How  shall  we  interpret  self- 
sacrifice  so  as  to  harmonize  these  discordant  facts  ?    The  con- 
ception of  moral  development  as  a  progressive  self-organiza- 
tion through  the  instrumentality  of  volition  gives  us  thejsey 
to  the  puzzle.     For  all  organization,  not  only  in  the  de- 
velopment of  conscious  intelligence,  but  also  in  the  evolu- 
tion of  all  living  matter,  involves  two  opposite  and  com- 
plementary aspects.     On  the  one  hand  there  is  differentia- 
tion or  the  division  of  the  whole  which  is  being  organized 
into  disparate  parts.     Thus  the  evolution  of  the  organism 
is  accompanied  by  a  multiplication  of  cells  and  structures, 
the  development  of  consciousness  by  a  diversification  of 
ideas  and  experiences.     On  the  other  hand  and  equally 
prominent  is  integration,  in  which  the  independence  of 
these  parts  is  canceled  and  they  are  adjusted  within  a 
comprehensive  whole.     Thus  organic  evolution  is  accompa- 
nied by   an   increasing   inter-dependence   of   tissues   and 
organs,  aijd  personal  development  by  a  more  and  more 
perfect  correlation  of  the  contents  of  consciousness.     These 
two  aspects  of  differentiation  and  integration  characterize 
evolution  universally  and  may  be   accepted  as   essential 
features  of  all  growth,  conscious  and  unconscious.     And 
in  this  fact  that  all  growth,  as  an  organizing  process,  en- 
courages the  development  of  parts  in  independence  of  one 
another  and  of  the  whole  to  which  they  belong,  while  it 
also  destroys  this  independence  and  subordinates  the  parts 
to  the  good  of  the  whole,  we  have  a  possible  explanation 
of  the  presence  and  importance  of  self-sacrifice  in  moral 
development. 

5.  All  Organization  Involves  the  Sacrifice  of  the  Part 
to  the  Whole. — Such  sacrifice  of  parts  to  the  whole  pre- 
vails throughout  the  field  of  organic  evolution.     The  single 
organism  is  a  colony  of  cells  and  tissues  crowding  one 
another  for  place  and  competing  with   one   another  for 


242  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

food.  Yet  the  health  of  the  organism  and  the  proper  bal- 
ance of  its  functions  necessitate  that  the  activities  of  these 
constituent  parts  be  strictly  limited  and  that  they  be  pre- 
vented from  attaining  their  maximum  of  size  and  strength. 
Frequently  in  the  life-history  of  organisms  structures  are 
developed  to  completeness  and  maturity  simply  as  a  means 
to  the  inception  and  growth  of  other  structures  more  im- 
portant to  the  existence  of  individual  or  species.3  Then, 
when  these  latter  are  produced,  the  former — like  a  tem- 
porary scaffolding — are  destroyed.  Striking  instances  of 
such  sacrifice  of  one  part  or  member  of  a  living  organism 
to  the  welfare  of  another  or  of  the  whole  have  been  observed. 
Evidently  the  familiar  statement  has  more  than  a  figurative 
meaning  which  compares  the  act  of  self-sacrifice  to  the 
dying  of  the  seed  that  the  young  plant  may  live  and  grow. 
Turning  from  ontogeny  to  phylogeny  we  find  that  the 
evolution  of  the  species  is  accomplished  by  a  process  of 
struggle  and  selection  in  which  the  individual  is  sacrificed 
to  the  welfare  of  his  race  or  species.  Individuals  are  born 
in  much  greater  numbers  than  the  environment  can  support 
and  then  a  large  majority  of  these  are  exterminated,  often 
suffering  painful  deaths,  in  order  that  only  the  individuals 
possessing  the  best  natural  equipment  shall  survive  and 
reproduce  their  kind.  An  analogous  process  of  competition 
and  resulting  selection  goes  on  among  the  species  in  their 
turn,  many  living  forms  suffering  extinction  in  order  that 
a  more  perfect  adaptation  of  the  existing  forms  of  life 
to  the  resources  of  the  environment  shall  be  secured.  Many 
species  seem  to  be  developed  simply  as  bridges  from  the 
parent  form  to  the  one  still  more  divergent  and  then  to 

'  A  beautiful  case  is  that  of  the  "  nurse-cells "  which  in  some 
insect  and  other  forms  surround  the  young  egg-cell  and  nourish  it. 
The  egg-cell  grows  rapidly  at  the  expense  of  the  nurse-cells,  which, 
being  steadily  depleted,  become  mere  rudiments  attached  to  the  egg- 
cell  and  then  finally  disappear.  ( WILSON:  The  Cell  in  Development 
and  Heredity,  p.  151.) 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  SELF-SACRIFICE       243 

be  eliminated  in  competition  with  these  two.  Thus  we  see 
that  throughout  the  entire  field  of  Jljfe  evolution  as  a 
progressiveorganization  involves  the  complementary^jjroc- 
esses  ofjffi^entiation  and  integration,  in^_vvhich_^paj^  are 
developed^  in  distinction  f rpm  the  whole  and,  at^the^same 
time,  thisjndependpnp.fi  jp  gannplprl  jn_a  subordination  of 
alT  parts  to  the  good  of  the  whole.  In  all  these  cases~"bf 
the  sacrifice  of  parts  or  members  to  the  welfare  of  the 
whole  undergoing  development,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the 
benefit  of  the  whole  to  which  the  sacrifice  of  the  4>arts  is  ; 
instruin^n^ar^accrues  only  a/fer__the__part  has  been  sup- 
pressed .orjdestroyed^. 

6.  Self- Mastery. — The  evolution  of  intelligent  con- 
sciousness is  achieved  by  volition  which  is  itself  an  organ- 
izing agency.  The "  work  of  volition  displays  those  two 
features  of  organization  just  mentioned — more  strongly 
emphasized,  however,  and  set  in  sharper  and  clearer  relief. 
Self -organization  begins  with  a  differentiation  or  diversi- 
fication of  conscious  life.  Volition  first  expresses  itself  in 
differentiating  out  of  a  mass  of  instinctive  tendencies  a 
number  of  separate  desires,  each  having  a  distinct  object 
and  employing  special  methods  in  its  pursuit.  The  differ- 
entiation of  these  desires  is  the  first  step  in  self-organiza- 
tion and  the  pre-requisite  of  all  further  moral  development. 
For  the  individual  to  be  conscious  of  certain  definite  needs, 
for  him  to  desire  certain  special  objects  as  ends,  and  also 
to  have  knowledge  of  the  ways  of  gratifying  these  desires, 
of  availing  himself  of  the  resources  of  the  objective  world 
— this  ability,  while  it  occupies  the  very  lowest  place  in 
the  scale  of  moral  excellence,  is  still  the  absolutely  indis- 
pensable foundation  upon  which  the  higher  development 
rests.  The  individual  who  is  too  dull  to  have  any  definite 
desires,  too  listless  to  make  any  special  demands  upon  the 
world,  and  too  incapable  to  secure  the  few  objects  he 
does  desire  is,  morally  speaking,  the  one  absolutely  hopeless 


244  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

case.  It  is  necessary  to  Self -realization,  then,  that  a  num- 
ber of  different  desires  and  purposes  be  developed  within 
the  consciousness  of  the  individual,  and  that  each  of  these 
desires  should  acquire  a  certain  strength  and  independence. 
But  organization  requires  that  this  process  be  supple- 
mented by  a  complementary  activity  of  correlation  and 
adjustment  in  which  tKese  different  desires  are  subordi- 
nated as  means  to  larger  ends.  It  is  a  natural,  an  in- 
evitable, consequence  of  raising  a  desire  to  clearest  con- 
sciousness and  adding  to  this  consciousness  a  knowledge 
of  the  most  expeditious  method  of  gratification,  that  the 
desire  in  question  should  insist  upon  its  own  gratification 
regardless  of  any  other  considerations  whatever.  The  re- 
sult of  the  primary  differentiating  of  desires  within  the 
individual  is  thus  to  put  him  at  the  mercy  of  a  number 
of  eager  and  aggressive  impulses,  each  of  which  is  clamor- 
ing for  its  own  satisfaction  to  the  exclusion  of  the  others. 
Hence  volition  is  compelled  to  undertake  the  work  of  sup- 
pressing these  desires  in  their  independence  and  isolation 
— only  permitting  them  to  exist  as  they  are  made  con- 
formable to  the  total  interest  of  the  individual.  This  re- 
pression which,  from  the  standpoint  of  the  single  desire, 
may  be  injurious  and  destructive,  is  strongly  resisted.  Vo- 
lition is  compelled  to  overcome  this  resistance  and  forcibly 
to  restrain  the  rebellious  desire  or  purpose.  Such  forcible 
restraint  causes  distress  and  pain  to  the  individual;  since 
the  desire  which  is  subjugated  after  struggle  is  a  part 
of  himself  and  he  suffers  both  the  distress  of  a  nature 
divided  against  itself  and  the  pain  of  a  consciousness  de- 
prived of  its  usual  gratification.  This  form  of  self-sacrifice 
which  arises  from  the  necessity  of  integrating  all  single 
desires  and  purposes  within  the  unity  of  the  individual 
life  may  be  called  self-mastery,  to  distinguish  it  from  self- 
sacrifice  proper,  which  will  be  later  discussed.  Pla,io  treats 
of  this  subject  of  self-mastery  in  a  well-known  passage  of 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  SELF-SACRIFICE       245 

the  Republic.  Socrates  is  made  to  remark  upon  the  para- 
dox involved  in  the  expression  "  master  of  himself." 
"  For  the  man  who  is  master  of  himself  will,  also,  I  pre- 
sume, be  the  slave  of  himself,  and  the  slave  will  be  the 
master.  For  the  subject  of  all  these  phrases  is  the  same 
person. ' '  *  The  use  of  such  an  expression  is  due  in  the 
opinion  of  Socrates  to  the  presence  in  human  nature  of 
two  principles,  a  good  and  a  bad,  and  a  man  is  said  to  be 
master  of  himself  when  the  good  principle  is  master  of  the 
bad.  He  further  maintains  that,  of  these  two  principles 
which  are  in  constant  conflict,  the  good  is  the  rational 
and  the  bad  the  sentient  or  irrational  part  of  our  nature; 
and  this  is  generally  true  because  the  ends  of  reason,  being 
concepts,  are  larger  and  more  inclusive  than  the  particular 
objects  of  sensuous  desire. 

Self-mastery  does  not  usually  consist,  as  we  might  sup- 
pose, in  a  certain  amount  of  compulsory  restraint  placed 
upon  all  desires  equally,  in  the  interest  of  individual  well- 
being.  The  fact  is  that  in  most  cases  the  great  majority 
of  desires  submit  without  much  resistance  to  subordination 
and  control,  and  the  rebellion  is  concentrated  in  a  few  de- 
sires (or  perhaps  just  a  single  one)  especially  strong  and 
insistent  in  the  particular  individual — his  "  besetting  "  sin 
or  sins,  as  the  expression  is.  With  such  desires  man  must 
fight,  and  over  them  he  must  triumph,  if  he  is  to  realize 
himself  as  an  individual.  Of  course,  any  desire  may  prove 
thus  difficult  to  control,  but  there  are  certain  impulses  and 
appetites  which  seem  particularly  liable  to  make  trouble 
with  all  human  beings.  Such  is  the  appetite  for  stimulants 
and  narcotics  which  because  uncontrolled  has  ruined  the 
life  of  many  an  individual.  Our  literature  contains  many 
descriptions  of  the  agonizing  experiences  of  individuals  who 
have  fought  desperately  with  the  craving  for  alcoholic  drink 
9,nd  finally  have  conquered  it — and  mastered  themselves. 
*  Republic,  431  A. 


246  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

The  passion  for  gaming  and  the  desire  for  sexual  grati- 
fication belong  to  the  same  class  of  appetites  which  often 
possess  exceptional  strength  and  which,  unless  closely  re- 
strained, will  escape  from  control.  Nor  is  the  total  interest 
of  the  individual  to  which  all  the  single  desires  are  made 
subservient,  always  represented  by  the  demands  of  all  his 
desires  and  purposes  in  their  organized  unity.  Just  as 
the  resistance  of  the  different  parts,  to  such  an  adjustment, 
may  be  concentrated  in  a  single  desire,  so  the  good  of  the 
individual  as  a  whole  may  be  represented  by  a  single  pur- 
pose or  desire.  Thus  the  part  and  the  whole  confront  one 
another  in  the  guise  of  two  conflicting  desires,  and  self- 
mastery  consists  in  the  victory  of  the  one  over  the  other. 
To  take  a  concrete  instance  chosen  almost  at  random  from 
a  large  and  important  class,  the  total  interest  of  an  in- 
dividual may  be  represented  by  a  comprehensive  purpose 
to  achieve  success  as  an  artist,  thus  realizing  marked  crea- 
tive ability  and  gratifying  a  strong  love  of  beauty.  The 
chief  obstacle  to  the  realization  of  this  purpose  in  a  youth 
or  young  man  may  reside  in  the  presence  of  strong  sexual 
and  social  impulses  which  conflict  with  the  larger  purpose 
because  they  resist  that  postponement  of  marriage  and 
domestic  life  which  a  long  period  of  preparatory  study 
and  travel,  would  entail.  Here  self-mastery,  the  attainment 
of  the  more  comprehensive  good,  demands  that  the  desire 
for  immediate  marriage  and  a  home,  be  subordinated  and 
its  gratification  postponed,  in  order  that  the  larger  end 
be  pursued  which,  if  realized,  will  provide  for  a  more 
permanent  and  adequate  satisfaction  of  these  desires  as 
well. 

Self-mastery — self-denial — prove  then  to  be  instrumen- 
tal to  self-development.  In  these  experiences,  painful  as 
they  are,  the  individual  gains  and  not  loses.  Yet  it  must 
not  be  forgotten  that  he  does  not  experience  the  gain  when 
he  suffers  the  loss.  The  attainment  of  the  larger  interest 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  SELF-SACRIFICE       247 

does  not  occur  simultaneously  with  the  loss  of  the  desired 
object.  If  it  did,  the  pain  of  deprivation  might  be  can- 
celed and  overcome  by  the  satisfaction  of  a  larger  attain- 
ment. But  the  condition  of  achieving  the  greater  goods 
is  that  the  lesser  goods  shall  first  be  surrendered.  The  pain 
of  denial  and  deprivation  must  be  endured  before  the  satis- 
faction of  a  full  and  harmonious  expression  of  individuality 
can  be  experienced.  Moreover,  the  satisfaction  of  fulfilling 
the  larger  aims  of  his  entire  nature  cannot  even  be  imagined 
adequately  by  the  individual,  because  this  is  a  satisfaction, 
not  of  his  nature  as  it  is  at  present  but  of  his  present 
nature  after  it  has  been  changed  by  just  such  painful 
adjustments  as  he  now  is  making.  Moral  development  re- 
quires the  sacrifice  of  objects  proved  in  experience  to  be 
good,  on  behalf  of  others  which  might  not  at  present  be 
satisfactory  even  though  successfully  achieved.  The  anv 
bitious  boy  abandons  amusements  which  give  him  keenest 
delight  in  order  to  acquire  information  and  training  in  a 
field  of  activity  whose  significance  he  does  not  clearly  un- 
derstand and  whose  value  he  does  not  fully  appreciate. 
But  thus  it  is  with  all  growth,  spiritual  as  well  as  natural, 
the  interest  of  an  assured  present  is  sacrificed  to  a  larger 
future  which  is  yet  to  be. 

7.  Self-Sacrifice. — The  very  process  of  integration  which 
we  have  been  describing — of  activities  within  the  life  of 
the  individual — is  itself  a  differentiation.  For  it  is  through 
such  an  adjustment  of  different  desires  and  impulses  that 
the  nature  of  the  individual  is  organized  and  his  abilities 
all  directed  towards  the  attainment  of  some  supreme  aim 
or  life-purpose.  Knowledge  of  such  overmastering  interests 
in  himself  makes  the  individual  conscious  of  the  dominance 
of  similiar  aims  and  ambitions  over  the  lives  of  other  in- 
dividuals. The  respective  interests  of  self  and  others  soon 
show  themselves  to  be  discordant.  Self-organization,  or 
Goodness,  then  necessitates  another  process  of  integration, 


248  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

this  time  upon  a  larger  scale,  the  adjustments  of  these 
warring  interests  within  the  unity  of  an  organized  social 
system.  "When,  in  the  course  of  moral  development,  the 
necessity  thus  arises  for  the  individual  to  subordinate  that 
interest  which  he  has  come  to  identify  with  himself,  to 
the  welfare  of  others, — then  self-sacrifice  proper  first  enters 
the  moral  life.  Previous  to  the  emergence  of  individuality 
through  the  coordination  of  the  various  desires,  true  self- 
sacrifice  is  impossible,  for  the  self-in-its-unity  has  not  yet 
attained  to  conscious  expression.  Hence  neither  the  child 
nor  the  savage  is  capable  of  self-sacrifice  in  the  full  meaning 
of  the  word,  since  the  individuality  of  neither  has  come 
to  conscious  existence  through  the  adoption  of  plans  and 
purposes  which  he  recognizes  as  his  own  and  distinct  from 
all  others.  This  awakening  of  individuality  to  conscious- 
ness of  itself  comes  in  the  history  of  the  race  when,  owing 
to  a  developing  intelligence  and  easier  conditions  of  life, 
men  refuse  to  be  bound  longer  in  their  conduct  by  tradition 
and  custom,  but  assert  their  rights  as  individuals  to  choose, 
each  of  them,  the  manner  of  life  which  appeals  to  his  in- 
telligence and  suits  his  taste.  It  occurs  in  the  development 
of  the  individual  when,  at  the  period  of  adolescence,  the 
youth  is  unwilling  to  be  dominated  longer  by  the  practices 
and  potnt-of-view  of  his  family,  and  considers  plans  and 
adopts  purposes  which  he  proposes  to  pursue  as  an  inde- 
pendent individual. 

Just  as  much  as  the  total  interest  of  the  individual  is, 
through  its  greater  complexity  and  superior  organization, 
stronger  and  more  compelling  than  any  one  of  his  single 
desires,  so  much  the  greater  is  the  power  of  resistance  it 
shows  when  attacked.  Hence  the  subordination  or  suppres- 
sion of  self-interest  is  a  greater  task,  calling  for  more  effort 
and  persistence  than  that  of  self-mastery,  and  it  is  accom- 
panied by  struggle  and  suffering  correspondingly  more  in- 
tense. The  individual  who  feels  the  obligation  to  sacrifice 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  SELF-SACRIFICE       249 

his  interest — his  most  cherished  hopes  and  plans — for  the 
good  of  another  faces  the  gravest  crisis  of  the  moral  life. 
His  soul  is  the  scene  of  a  mighty  conflict  upon  the  issue  of 
which  may  hang  his  moral  salvation.  Our  recognition  of 
the  high  moral  worth  of  self-sacrifice,  as  well  as  our  appre- 
ciation of  its  almost  insurmountable  difficulty,  is  witnessed 
by  the  spontaneous,  burst  of  approval  and  admiration  that 
greets  every  notable  instance  of  it  which  is  brought  to 
public  attention.  Indeed  the  public  praise  and  eulogy — 
in  newspaper,  pulpit,  and  periodical — of  those  who  have 
under  unusual  circumstances  sacrificed  property  or  health 
or  life  for  the  sake  of  others '  welfare,  may  lead  us  to  think 
of  self-sacrifice  as  something  which  occurs  only  under 
extraordinary  conditions  and  in  a  dramatic  setting — as 
when  the  engineer  dies  at  the  throttle  in  saving  the  train, 
or  a  miner  risks  his  life  in  returning  to  a  burning  mine 
in  order  to  rescue  his  injured  comrade,  or  the  sailor  insists 
that  his  shipmates  go  first  in  life-boat  or  breeches-buoy 
and  is  left  to  freeze  or  drown.  But  self-sacrifice,  in  order 
to  be  genuine,  requires  no  dramatic  setting,  no  wide  public- 
ity— it  need  in  fact  be  known  to  no  one  except  the  in- 
dividual who  is  undergoing  it.  Such  self-sacrifice  is  con- 
stantly occurring  with  no  blare  of  trumpets  or  bursts  of 
applause,  but  just  as  a  part  of  recognized  duty — hard, 
but  cheerfully  or  stoically  endured.  Thus  there  are  par- 
ents working  to  the  breaking-point  and  foregoing  nearly 
every  rightful  pleasure,  in  order  that  children  may  be 
educated;  there  are  sons  and  daughters  giving  up  plans 
and  ambitions  which  seem  to  mean  more  than  life  itself 
to  them,  in  order  to  care  for  an  aged  or  infirm  parent; 
there  are  physicians  wearing  themselves  out  in  the  relief 
of  pain  and  the  curing  of  disease  among  their  fellows; 
there  are  ministers  and  teachers  expending  their  intelli- 
gence and  energy  without  stint  in  ministering  to  the  souls 
which  have  been  committed  to  their  charge.  What  Pro- 


250  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

fessor  Royce  says  about  loyalty  in  this  connection  is  also 
true  of  self-sacrifice  which  is  an  essential  part  of  all  true 
loyalty. 

"My  own  mind  also  chooses  some  of  the  plainest  and  ob- 
scurest people  whom  I  chance  to  know,  the  most  straightforward 
(and  simple-minded  of  folk,  whose  loyalty  is  even  all  the  more  sure 
to  me  because  I  can  certainly  affirm  that  they  at  least  cannot  be 
making  any  mere  display  of  loyalty  in  order  that  they  should 
be  seen  of  men.  Nobody  knows  of  their  loyalty  except  those 
that  are  in  more  or  less  direct  touch  with  them ;  and  these  usually 
appreciate  this  loyalty  too  little.  You  all  of  you  similarly  know 
plain  and  wholly  obscure  men  and  women  of  whom  the  world  has 
not  heard  and  is  not  worthy,  but  who  have  possessed  and  who  have 
proved  in  the  presence  of  you  who  have  chanced  to  observe  them  a 
loyalty  to  their  chosen  causes  which  was  not  indeed  expressed 
in  martial  deeds  but  which  was  quite  as  genuine  a  loyalty  as 
that  of  a  Samurai  or  as  that  of  Arnold  von  Winkelried  when 
he  rushed  on  the  Austrian  spears.  As  for  ordinary  expressions 
of  loyalty,  not  at  critical  moments  and  in  the  heroic  instants  that 
come  to  the  plainest  lives,  but  in  daily  business,  we  are  all  aware 
how  the  letter-carrier  and  the  house-maid  may  live,  and  often 
do  live  when  they  choose,  as  complete  a  daily  life  of  steadfast 
loyalty  as  could  any  knight  or  king."  5 

With  these  facts  before  our  minds  we  condemn  as  the 
veriest  .sophistry  any  view  which  does  not  admit  that  the 
sacrifices  exacted  by  duty  are  real,  or  attempts  to  explain 
them  as  part  of  a  larger  prudence  or  as  the  gratification 
of  sympathetic  or  social  impulses.  Such  interpretations  of 
self-sacrifice  do  not  explain  it:  they  explain  it  away.  Self- 
sacrifice  is  a  means  to  Self-realization  ?  Yes,  assuredly ! 
But  it  is  not  the  sacrificed  self  wThich  is  finally  realized. 
It  is  not  the  surrendered  interest — the  unfulfilled  ambi- 
tions, the  thwarted  aims,  the  lost  hopes — which  are  tri- 
umphantly attained.  No,  it  is  the  self  whose  character 
has  been  transformed  through  the  ordeal  of  suffering  and 
5  ROYCE:  Philosophy  of  Loyalty,  pp.  112-13. 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  SELF-SACRIFICE      251 

sacrifice  that  is  finally  realized:  it  is  an  interest  which 
has  been  altered  and  enlarged  by  denial  and  deprivation 
that  is  triumphantly  attained.  Self-sacrifice  is  then  a  real 
"  dying  to  self  "  in  which  the  pangs  of  dissolution  under- 
gone by  the  old  nature  are  the  birth-pains  of  the  new. 
' '  The  higher  or  personal  self  can  be  realized  only  through 
the  death  of  the  lower  or  individual  self,  as  lower  and 
merely  individual."6  "The  individual  must  die  to  an 
isolated  life — i.e.  a  life  for  and  in  himself,  a  life  in  which 
the  immediate  satisfaction  of  desire,  as  his  desire,  is  an 
end  in  itself — in  order  that  he  may  live  the  spiritual  life, 
the  universal  life  which  really  belongs  to  him  as  a  spiritual 
or  self-conscious  being."7  It  is  necessary  that  the  limita- 
tions of  a  narrow  and  exclusive  individuality  shall  be  over- 
come  if  man  is  to  realize  the  larger  possibilities  of  his 
nature.  But  such  individuality  maintains  its  independence 
and  isolation  with  utmost  stubbornness.  It  must  be  crushed 
and  broken,  therefore;  for  thus  only  can  it  be  rendered 
pliant  and  adaptable — capable  of  adjustment  along  with  the 
differing  interests  of  other  individuals  within  a  comprehen- 
sive system  of  social  ends  and  activities.  As  long  as  Self- 
realization  compels  man  to  make  this  adjustment,  it  will  re- 
main a  severe  ordeal  fraught  with  spiritual  struggle  and 
soul  agony.  Self-sacrifice  cannot  be  expelled  from  human 
life,  then;  but  seems  destined  to  remain  one  of  the  most 
profound  and  searching — as  well  as  the  most  characteristic 
— experiences  in  man's  moral  life. 

8.  Is  Self-Sacrifice  Due  to  Merely  Temporary  Mal- 
adjustment?— While  the  social  adjustment  of  individuals 
whose  desires  and  ambitions  are  at  variance  with  the  good 
of  society  is  difficult  and  exceedingly  painful,  is  it  not 
sure  to  become  much  easier  and  less  painful  as  moral 
development  proceeds?  In  the  course  of  social  evolution 
are  not  man's  social  instincts  and  impulses  certain  to 

•  SETH:  Ethical  Principles,  p.  207.  T  CAIBD:  Hegel,  p.  213. 


252  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

be  so  far  strengthened,  and  his  understanding  of  the  ad- 
vantages of  cooperation  so  much  increased,  that  he  will 
seek  others'  interests  as  naturally  and  spontaneously  as 
his  own  ?  HerberJ  jSpencer  looked  forward  to  such  a  state 
of  human  society  in  the  far  distant  future,  in  which  there 
would  be  no  more  need  of  self-sacrifice,  and  the  conflicting 
claims  of  egoism  and  altruism  would  be  completely  recon- 
ciled. In  his  own  words: 

"From  the  laws  of  life  it  must  be  concluded  that  unceasing 
social  discipline  will  so  mold  human  nature  that  eventually  sym- 
pathetic pleasures  will  be  spontaneously  pursued  to  the  fullest 
extent  advantageous  to  each  and  all.  The  scope  for  altruistic 
activities  will  not  exceed  the  desire  for  altruistic  satisfactions."  8 

Confining  ourselves  just  now  to  the  trend  of  social  de- 
velopment and  the  direction  of  civilization  as  we  can  ob- 
serve them — and  not  asking  whether  the  laws  which  govern 
moral  development  as  a  progressive  self-organization  permit 
of  the  elimination  of  self-sacrifice — we  find  slight  reason 
for  expecting  that  such  a  condition  of  ready-prepared 
social  adjustment  and  harmony  will  come  in  the  near  or 
distant  future.  It  is  true  that  man  becomes  more  social- 
ized as  civilization  advances.  We  are  less  confident  than 
Spencer  was  that  his  experience  of  the  benefits  of  social 
life  and  his  acquisition  of  habits  socially  useful  are  modi- 
fying his  native  instincts  and  impulses  in  any  decided  or 
revolutionary  fashion.  There  is  no  doubt,  however,  that 
as  he  becomes  further  civilized  man  gains  a  more  adequate 
knowledge  of  his  community  of  interest  with  his  fellows 
and  a  more  intelligent  appreciation  of  the  importance  and 
value  of  social  organization  and  social  service.  Such  knowl- 
edge of  social  relations,  being  transmitted  through  train- 
ing and  education  from  one  generation  to  the  next,  steadily 

•  SPENCEB:  Data  of  Ethics,  §  95,  p.  294. 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  SELF-SACRIFICE       253 

accumulates  and  must,  it  might  appear,  make  altruistic 
action  easier  and  the  social  adjustment  more  natural  and 
spontaneous.  Hence  we  should  expect  to  find  the  citizen 
of  a  highly  civilized  state  more  willing  to  serve  his  nation 
at  the  expense  of  private  interest  than  the  member  of  a 
society  not  so  highly  civilized.  Unfortunately  the  facts 
are  otherwise — or  partially  so — owing  to  the  operation  of 
other  factors  which  have  a  contrary  influence.  For  the 
mental  development  which  accompanies  advance  in  civiliza- 
tion not  only  leads  to  an  increased  sense  of  social  obliga- 
tion but  it  also  makes  clearer  and  more  acute  the  conscious- 
ness of  individual  interest.  The  stimulation  of  intellectual 
and  imaginative  faculties  in  an  advanced  civilization  gives 
to  the  individual  a  much  more  vivid  and  realizing  sense 
of  his  own  interest — present  and  future.  His  imagination 
enables  him  to  enjoy  in  anticipation  the  pleasures  of  ful- 
filling his  ambitions — and  equally  to  suffer  in  apprehen- 
sion of  the  failure  of  his  plans  and  the  frustration  of  his 
purposes.  An  increased  sensitivity  to  pain  seems  to  be  an 
accompaniment  of  civilization,  due  both  to  added  power 
of  imagining  it  beforehand  and  to  a  more  delicate  sensi- 
bility which  has  resulted  from  easier  conditions  of  life. 
Hence  the  citizen  of  a  half-civilized  state  might,  and  prob- 
ably would,  respond  more  readily  to  the  call  to  take  up 
arms  and  suffer  danger,  pain,  and  possible  death,  for 
his  country,  than  would  the  educated  man  of  modern 
society.  And  this  would  not  be  because  he  had  a  clearer 
or  more  intelligent  conception  of  his  duty  as  a  citizen 
but  because  he  had  less  ability  to  imagine  the  hardships 
and  sufferings  he  would  have  to  undergo  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  satisfactions  and  successes  he  might  be  compelled 
to  forego,  on  the  other.9  Yet  the  outcome  is  that  he  can 

'Compare  this  statement  of  Aristotle  (Nicomachean  Ethics,  Bk. 
Ill,  Chap.  XII)  :  "If  then  the  case  in  regard  to  courage  is  similar 
to  this,  death  and  wounds  will  be  painful  to  the  courageous  man  and 
involuntary ;  but  he  will  endure  them  because  endurance  is  honorable 


254  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

be  depended  upon  to  sacrifice  himself  as  an  individual, 
more  willingly,  suffering  peril  and  death  in  his  country's 
cause  with  less  hesitation,  than  his  civilized  descendant. 
These  facts  have  caused  it  to  be  alleged  as  a  penalty  of 
civilization  that  nations  lose  their  "  fighting  edge."  The 
intensifying  of  self-consciousness,  the  training  of  imagina- 
tion, and  the  refinement  of  sensibility  in  the  individual  all 
tend  to  make  him  less  ready  to  place  himself  at  the  disposal 
of  his  country  as  a  weapon  or  instrument  to  be  used  in  its 
defense.  Hence,  it  is  predicted,  nations  in  which  civiliza- 
tion has  progressed  thus  far  will  be  at  a  decided  disad- 
vantage in  time  of  war  and  will  perhaps  be  defeated  and 
finally  superseded  by  other  peoples,  in  whom  mental  devel- 
opment has  not  proceeded  so  far  as  to  interfere  with  the 
action  of  instinctive  loyalty  and  unthinking  courage.  How- 
ever this  may  be — and  many  other  facts  would  have  to  be 
considered  before  assent  were  given  to  such  a  conclusion — 
the  significance  of  the  whole  matter  as  it  bears  upon  the 
present  argument  is  that  an  increasing  knowledge  of  the 
character  and  importance  of  the  social  relation  among  the 
individuals  that  compose  a  society  does  not  of  necessity 
make  the  sacrifice  of  private  interests  to  the  public  good 
any  easier  for  these  individuals.  For  the  same  growth 
of  intelligence  that  enlightens  the  individual  concerning 
his  social  relationships  gives  him  also  a  clearer  conception 

and  avoidance  disgraceful.  Nay,  in  proportion  as  he  possesses  virtue 
in  its  fullness  and  is  happy,  will  be  his  pain  at  the  prospect  of 
death;  for  to  such  an  one  life  is  preeminently  valuable,  and  he  will 
be  consciously  deprived  at  death  of  the  greatest  blessings.  But, 
painful  as  such  deprivation  is,  he  is  none  the  less  courageous,  nay 
,  perhaps  he  is  even  more  courageous,  as  he  willingly  sacrifices 
these  blessings  for  noble  conduct  on  the  field  of  battle.  It  is 
not  the  case,  then,  that  all  virtues  imply  a  pleasurable  activity, 
except  in  so  far  as  one  attains  to  the  end.  Still,  it  is  true  perhaps, 
after  all,  that  people  who  enjoy  a  happy  life  are  not  such  good 
soldiers  as  people  who  are  less  courageous  but  have  nothing  to  lose, 
as  these  last  are  ready  to  face  any  danger,  and  will  sell  their  lives 
for  a  small  sum  of  money"  (Welldon's  trans.,  p.  89). 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  SELF-SACRIFICE      255 

of  his  interests  as  an  individual  and  an  added  power  of 
imagining  his  own  successes  and  failures.  Thus  self- 
sacrifice  becomes  no  easier,  and  may  even  be  rendered  more 
difficult  and  painful. 

9.  On  the  Contrary  It  Is  a  Necessary  Factor  in  Self- 
Organization. — Self-sacrifice  has  been  interpreted  as  the 
surrender  of  the  narrower  purposes  and  ambitions  with 
which  individuality  has  identified  itself  in  order  that  the 
larger  ends  of  the  social  self  may  be  realized.  Such  an 
interpretation  should  satisfy  all  persons  who  believe  in  the 
reality  of  self-sacrifice — except,  to  be  sure,  those  who,  like 
Leslie  Stephen,  believe  that  self-sacrifice,  in  order  to  be 
real,  must  involve  final  and  irretrievable  loss  to  the  self. 
From  this  extreme  standpoint,  if  self-sacrifice  is  regarded 
as  instrumental  in  self-realization,  its  meaning  is  entirely 
destroyed  and  it  is  degraded  into  a  form  of  self-interest. 
Thus  if  one  who  sacrifices  his  plans  and  purposes  for  an- 
other's benefit  is  aiming  at  his  own  self-realization  his 
sacrifice  is  not  genuine  and  his  conduct  is  merely  prudent. 
And  moral  enlightenment  is  all  that  is  necessary  to  remove 
as  groundless  from  the  experience  of  man  any  feeling  of 
pain  or  sorrow  in  the  subordination  of  private  interest  to 
social  welfare  and  to  create  instead  the  pleasant  conscious- 
ness of  securing  his  own  good.  This  position  would  be 
justified  if  our  actions  were  in  every  case  inevitably  de- 
termined— as  Socrates,  for  example,  believed — by  what  we, 
upon  solely  intellectual  grounds,  thought  was  for  our  high- 
est interest.  Then  certainly  virtue  would  be  knowledge 
and  our  pursuit  of  the  largest  good  would  be  simply  an 
affair  of  intellectual  enlightenment.  But  the  fajcts  are 
nearly  the  reverse.  Man's  action  is  not  necessarily  de- 
termined by  what  he  believes  to  be  true  from  the  exercise 
of  his  reason,  and  in  independence  of  action.  Rather  is 
his  knowledge  determined  by  his  action,  his  conception  of 
truth  dependent  upon  his  conduct  with  its  experiences  of 


256  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

success  and  failure.  The  true  idea  is  the  idea  that  can 
be  realized,  i.e.  that  satisfies  volition  in  increasing  the 
fullness  and  variety  of  self-conscious  life.  Hence  the 
largesj;  knowledge  at  the  command  of  any  human  individual 
— the  body  of  accepted  truths  in  any  generation — but  sums 
up  the  results  of  human  achievement  in  the  past.  The 
science  of  Ethics  is  thus  a  systematic  reflection  upon  the 
experience  of  man  in  organizing  his  life  and  thus  fulfilling 
the  power  of  self-development  resident  in  his  own  will. 
Now  the  individual  must  act  with  the  fullest  knowledge 
available  if  his  action  is  to  build  upon  his  own  experience 
and  the  experience  of  his  fellow-men.  But  to  new  situa- 
tions in  which  the  individual  finds  himself  this  knowledge 
is  never  adequate;  since  it  can  receive  conclusive  verifica- 
tion only  in  his  own  experience  and  the  prospect  of  further 
development  open  before  every  human  being  involves  the 
possibility  of  entirely  new  and  unexpected  experiences. 
Hence  at  each  successive  step  in  his  moral  development 
man  is  compelled  to  abandon  objects  which  his  experience 
has  shown  to  be  satisfactory  for  the  sake  of  others  whose 
reality  and  value  await  their  final  verification  in  the  results 
of  the  action  which  he  is  then  undertaking.  Such  acts 
are  primarily  ventures  of  will  and  not  expressions  of 
knowledge ;  and  they  are  of  necessity  painful,  because  they 
call  for  the  negation  of  objects  through  which  the  self 
itself  has  found  expression — thus  putting  its  very  existence 
in  jeopardy  in  order  that  other  and  larger  objects  may 
be  sought  and,  if  possible,  attained.  Self-sacrifice  is  the 
greatest  as  well  as  the  most  painful  of  these  ventures, 
requiring  the  surrender  of  objects  on  which  the  existence 
and  integrity  of  individuality  itself  seem  to  depend,  as 
the  condition  of  pursuing  social  ends  which  are  untried 
and  hence  in  character  and  value  uncertain.  Thus  self- 
sacrifice  is  revealed  as  a  necessary  consequence  of  the 
fundamental  fact  of  morality,  that  moral  development  is 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  SELF-SACRIFICE       257 

an  organization  of  conduct  achieved  by  volition  and  not 
an  organization  of  ideas  accomplished  by  thought  and 
reproduced  in  action. 

10.  Optimism  and  Pessimism. — Self-sacrifice  appears 
as  one  and  perhaps  the  most  important  of  the  adjustments 
of  parts  to  the  whole  which  are  effected  by  volition  in 
the  course  of  its  organizing  activity.  Viewed  from  this 
standpoint,  but  with  a  slight  change  of  angle,  it  may  be 
regarded  as  a  consequence  of  the  maladjustment  which 
actually  exists  within  the  nature  of  man  and  throughout 
the  world  of  human  experience.  The  existence  of  such 
maladjustment,  deep-seated  and  thorough-going,  cannot  be 
disputed.  The  presence  of  moral  evil,  springing  from  the 
opposing  interests  of  individuals  in  society  and  the  con- 
flicting tendencies  within  these  individuals  themselves,  tes- 
tifies to  its  presence  in  the  nature  of  the  human  indi- 
vidual and  in  human  society.  The  existence  of  physical 
evil  likewise,  the  indescribable  suffering  and  painful  deaths 
inflicted  upon  countless  thousands  of  innocent  human  be- 
ings by  the  forces  of  nature  in  fire  and  famine,  flood  and 
storm,  earthquake  and  volcanic  eruption,  proves  that  the 
natural  universe  is  not  adjusted  to  the  needs  and  pur- 
poses of  man.  It  is  this  maladjustment  with  which  in- 
telligently directed  will  is  contending  in  the  evolution  of 
human  life  and  conduct,  and  which  it  has  been  able  in 
a  measure  to  overcome.  This  process  is  necessarily  painful. 
But  suffering  cannot  be  escaped  in  any  event;  it  must 
follow  from  the  lack  of  adjustment  and  harmony  in  the 
actual  nature  of  things.  In  the  organization  of  life  through 
the  instrumentality  of  volition,  we  see  this  pain  and  suffer- 
ing made  a  means  to  a  larger  satisfaction,  however,  the 
extent  and  fullness  of  intelligent  life  being  increased  by 
the  number  and  variety  of  originally  conflicting  elements 
that  have  been  adjusted  within  it.  Such  an  understanding 
of  moral  development  leads  us  to  a  view  of  the  world  of 


258  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

human  experience  that  is  between  the  extremes  of  optimism 
and  pessimism.  Extreme  optimism  would  deny  that  there 
is  any  disorder  or  maladjustment  inherent  in  the  nature 
of  the  world.  What  seems  to  be  such  must  be,  from  this 
point  of  view,  purely  temporary  and  presently  to  be  done 
away  with,  or  only  apparent,  i.e.  due  to  our  failure  to 
understand  the  world  completely,  and  sure  to  disappear 
when  we  gain  a  fuller  knowledge.  Extreme  pessimism 
sees  only  disorder  and  conflict  in  the  world  of  human 
experience  and  believes  it  to  be  impossible  for  man  to 
introduce  into  it  any  real  consistency  or  derive  from  it  any 
genuine  satisfaction.  Now  the  true  view  lies  between  these 
two  extremes,  in  a  qualified  optimism.  It  is  difficult  to 
see  how  any  one  not  superficial  in  his  thought  or  else 
wilfully  blind,  can  deny  that  evil,  due  to  radical  maladjust- 
ment, is  inherent  in  the  actual  world.  The  insight  recently 
gained  by  science  into  the  causes  operative  in  organic  evo- 
lution adds  to  the  evidence  already  more  than  sufficient 
which  human  experience  has  furnished  on  this  point.  In 
the  process  of  natural  selection  the  evolution  of  species  is 
secured  at  the  expense  of  the  individuals  which  compose 
it,  the  majority  of  those  born  in  each  generation  suffering 
death  and  often  cruel  death  before  reaching  maturity  in 
order  that  only  the  minority  who  are  best  adapted  to  the 
conditions  of  life  shall  be  allowed  to  breed  and  thus  de- 
termine the  character  of  the  species.  Yet  there  is  another 
side  which  is  equally  prominent  and  equally  worthy  oTem- 
phasis.  Our  increased  knowledge  of  organic  evolution  and 
of  the  history  of  human  morality — of  universal  evolution, 
n  fact — sets  in  stronger  relief  than  ever  the  fact  that  this 
maladjustment  is  being  overcome,  that  harmony  and  order 
are  being  won  through  pain  and  struggle.  The  discovery  of 
natural  selection  was  not  needed  to  teach  us  that  warfare 
is  incessant  and  cruelty  prevalent  in  the  organic  world, 
that  the  law  of  the  jungle  is  the  law  of  tooth  and  claw, 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  SELF-SACRIFICE       259 

that  nature  on  its  face  so  peaceful  and  "  bright  with 
gladness  "  is  the  scene  of  constant  turmoil  and  destruc- 
tion.10 But  we  are  indebted  to  science  for  the  knowledge 
that  this  suffering  is  not  useless  and  not  meaningless,  but 
through  its  instrumentality  adaptation  is  being  secured  and 
evolution  is  proceeding.  In  the  sphere  of  intelligence  and 
personality  likewise  a  survey  of  moral  development  shows 
us  how  in  the  process  of  self-organization  man,  by  suppress- 
ing his  single  desires  in  their  independence,  gains  control 
over  his  entire  nature,  all  of  whose  different  resources  are 
thus  put  at  his  command;  by  sacrificing  his  interest  as 
an  individual  he  gains  entrance  into  a  larger  life  which 
provides  a  wider  and  more  varied  field  for  the  exercise 
of  his  own  powers;  and  by  seeking  to  understand,  and 
adapt  himself  to,  the  laws  and  forces  of  the  universe,  he 
allies  himself  with  the  process  of  universal  evolution  and 
the  cause  of  world  progress. 

11.  Conclusion. — In  the  only  world  we  human  beings 
know  the  cost  of  progress  is  pain,  and  suffering  is  an  accom- 
paniment of  evolution.  Moreover,  mental  development  in 
man  has  for  its  penalty  an  increase  of  this  suffering — 
present  pain  being  more  acute  and  highly  focalized  in  his 
consciousness,  while  that  of  the  past  is  preserved  in  memory, 
and  that  of  the  future  anticipated  in  imagination.  Yet 
for  this,  his  superior  intelligence  more  than  recompenses 
him  by  revealing  with  increasing  fullness  the  stupendous 
results  which  are  being  achieved  through  the  toil  and  travail 
of  the  world — reproducing  in  his  conscious  life  the  main 
stages  of  universal  evolution,  and  awakening  within  his 
soul  some  appreciation  of  the  significance  and  value  of  the 
ends  that  are  being  realized  therein. 

19  Of.  DABWIN:  Origin  of  Species,  Chap.  HI. 


260  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 


REFERENCES 

LESLIE  STEPHEN,  Science  of  Ethics,  Chap.  X,  §  4. 
ALEXANDER,  Moral  Order  and  Progress,  Book  II,  Chap.  IV. 
SETH,  Ethical  Principles,  Part  I,  Chap.  Ill,  §  10. 
CAIBD,  Evolution  of  Religion,  Vol.  II,  Lecture  VII. 
THILLY,  Introduction  to  Ethics,  Chap.  X. 
RASHDALI,,  Theories  of  Good  and  Evil.  Book  II,  Chap.  III. 


CHAPTER  IV 

SELF-REALIZATION  AND  THE  MOTIVE  OF  GOODNESS 

1.  The  Motive  of  Good  Conduct. — 2.  The  Egoistic  Motive:  Self- 
interest. — 3.  Inadequacy  of  the  Egoistic  Motive. — 4.  The  Altru- 
istic Motive:  Sympathy. — 5.  Inadequacy  of  the  Altruistic  Mo- 
tive.— 6.  The  Religious  Motive. — 7.  Self-Realization  as  the  Mo- 
tive of  Good  Conduct.— 8.  Self -Respect.— 9.  Philanthropy.— 10. 
Reverence. — 11.  Mixed  Motives. 

1.  The  Motive  of  Good  Conduct. — The  motive  of  con- 
duct has  been  defined  as  that  idea  which  as  an  end  attracts 
the  self  to  action  in  its  pursuit.  The  motive  of  good  con- 
duct is,  of  course,  the  idea  of  the  Good.  The  Good  is  now 
understood  to  be  Self-realization.  We  have  in  the  present 
chapter  then  to  consider  the  adequacy  and  efficacy  of  Self- 
realization  as  the  motive  of  good  conduct.  There  are  many 
motives  which  actually  impel  men  to  action,  varying  in 
comprehensiveness  and  power  from  the  particular  object 
of  the  individual's  momentary  desire  to  the  great  cause 
which  commands  the  devotion  of  tens  of  thousands  in  suc- 
cessive generations.  Among  these  different  motives  three 
stand  out  as  predominant  in  the  influence  they  exert  upon 
human  conduct.  They  are — love  of  self,  sympathy  for 
others,  and  fear  of  God.  It  will  be  found  helpful  to  dis- 
cuss these  leading  motives  singly — first,  the  egoistic  or  self- 
interest;  second,  the  altruistic  or  sympathy;  third,  the  re- 
ligious, or  reverence:  and  then  to  consider  Self-realization 
in  the  capacity  of  motive,  as  related  to  each  of  these  three. 
Thus  we  may  hope  to  gain  a  true  idea  of  the  potency  of 
Self-realization  as  an  impelling  principle  in  the  conduct  of 
men. 

261 


262  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

2.  The  Egoistic  Motive:  Self-interest. — Certainly  the 
love  of  self,  or  "  self-interest, "  is  a  controlling  force  in 
human  life  and  affairs.  So  important  a  part  does  it  play 
that  many  moralists  have  regarded  it  as  the  sole  motive 
actuating  man's  conduct.  "  Of  all  the  voluntary  acts  of 
man  the  object  is  some  good  to  himself,"1  says  Hobbes, 
and  by  this  he  means  that  man  seeks  his  own  pleasure  and 
that  only,  in  all  that  he  does.  Accordingly,  Hobbes  and  the 
school  of  Egoistic  Utilitarians  which  he  founded  sought  to 
explain  all  the  actions  of  men — even  those  which  appear 
most  unselfish,  or,  it  may  be,  self-sacrificing — as  expressions 
of  self-interest.  ' '  Pity, ' '  says  the  philosopher  in  question, 
"  is  imagination  or  fiction  of  future  calamity  to  ourselves, 
proceeding  from  the  sense  of  another  man 's  calamity. ' ' 2 
Charity  or  good-will,  he  thus  explains:  "  There  can  be  no 
greater  argument  to  a  man  of  his  own  power,  than  to 
find  himself  able  not  only  to  accomplish  his  own  desires 
but  also  to  assist  other  men  in  theirs:  and  this  is  that 
conception  wherein  consisteth  charity."  3  Reverence  is  also 
interpreted  in  terms  of  self-interest  as  "  The  conception 
we  have  concerning  another,  that  he  hath  the  power  to  do 
unto  us  both  good  and  hurt. ' ' 4  Thus  to  resolve  all  the 
springs  of  human  action  into  forms  of  self-interest  seems 
to  present  thought  a  gross  exaggeration  of  the  importance 
of  this  motive  and  a  perversion  of  the  plain  facts  of  moral 
experience.  Indeed  some  students  of  morality  to-day  not 
merely  deny  that  self-interest  is  the  sole  motive  but  question 
whether  it  is  even  an  important  motive  in  the  conduct 
of  man.  These  thinkers  maintain  that  a  true  psychology 
of  action  shows  that  the  human  will  is  directed  primarily 
upon  external  objects  and  not  upon  subjective  states,  such 

1  HOBBES  :  Leviathan,  Part  I,  Chap.  XIV. 

*  HOBBES  :  Human  Nature,  Chap.  IX,  §  10. 

•  Ibid.,  §  17. 

4  Op.  tit.,  Chap.  VIII,  §  7. 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  MOTIVE  OF  GOODNESS      263 

as  the  pleasure  or  comfort  of  the  self.5  Thus  the  man 
whose  conduct  appears  most  selfish  is  probably  moved  by 
the  idea  of  food  or  of  drink,  of  the  most  comfortable  seat 
or  the  finest  view,  rather  than  by  any  idea  of  his  own 
pleasure.  Now  it  is  undoubtedly  true  that  the  human  will 
is  first  attracted  by  such  external  objects  as  promise  to 
satisfy  its  natural  desires.  But  it  is  also  a  fact  that  the 
instinct_of  self-preservation  leads-man  to  seek  to  prolong 
and  to  renew  pleasant  experiences,  and  to  curtail  and  to 
avoid  those  that  are  painful.  Hence  objects  which  experi- 
ence shows  will  yield  pleasure  are  sought  as  pleasurable, 
while  those  that  have  been  found  to  bring  pain  are  avoided 
as  painful.  Thus  far  the  facts  can  scarcely  be  disputed. 
When  we  consider  next  that  self-consciousness  develops  in 
due  time,  bringing  with  it  a  recognition  _of  individuality  in 
its  exclusive  character,  we  see  how  the  motive  of  self-interest 
takes  form  and  acquires  great  power  as  a  spring  of  action. 
In  this  motive,  the  idea  which  impels  the  individual  to 
act  is  not  that  of  his  own  pleasure  in  the  abstract,  but 
rather  the  idea  of  some  object  or  objects,  attractive  because 
known  to  be  a  source  of  individual  enjoyment.  The  man 
whose  conduct  is  actuated  entirely  by  self-interest  is  not 
wholly  absorbed  in  increasing  his  own  pleasure,  thought 
of  as  a  subjective  or  psychological  state.  Such  a  character 
scarcely  exists  outside  the  books  of  ethical  theorists.  But 
love  of  self  is  a  leading  motive  in  human  conduct,  never- 
theless; and  some  men's  lives  seem  completely  dominated 
by  it.  "What  such  individuals  seek  is  money,  or  land,  or 
power,  or  some  other  object,  which  they  imagine  themselves 
as  enjoying.  Thus  the  moving-spring  of  their  action  may 
with  truth  be  said  to  be  their  own  enjoyment  or  comfort. 
We  may  therefore  accept  Sidgwick's  statement,  as  correct 
in  substance  at  least,  when  he  says  that  the  object  of  self- 
love  is  "  the  kind  of  feeling  we  call  pleasure  taken  in  its 
•  DEWET  AND  TDTTS  :  Ethics,  p.  379. 


264  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

widest  sense  and  including  every  species  of  delight,  en- 
joyment, and  satisfaction,  except  in  so  far  as  any  particular 
species  may  be  excluded  by  its  incompatibility  with  some 
other  greater  pleasures."  6  The  object  with  which  the  an- 
ticipated enjoyment  is  identified  may  be  a  material  one, 
or  it  may  be  the  ideal  object  of  some  spiritual  capacity, 
such  as  the  discovery  of  truth  in  the  intellectual,  or  the 
attainment  of  beauty  in  the  aesthetic,  sphere.  In  such  case, 
however,  the  ideal  object  is  sought  by  the  individual  merely 
as  a  means  to  his  own  enjoyment;  and,  since  the  ability  of 
such  larger  ends  to  yield  pleasure  in  their  attainment  is 
less  obvious  and  certain,  self-interest  usually  prompts  to 
the  pursuit  of  the  narrower  objects  of  natural  desire. 
Aristotle  recognizes  that  two  meanings  are  given  to  the 
term  self-love — the  word  in  its  more  restricted  and  also 
more  common  signification  being  properly  applied  to 
"  people  who  assign  themselves  a  larger  share  of  money, 
honors,  and  bodily  pleasures,  than  belongs  to  them. ' ' 7 

"When  the  motive  of  self-interest  is  defined  as  the  appeal 
which  the  idea  of  his  own  comfort  and  pleasure  makes  to 
the  human  individual,  few  indeed  will  deny  its  power  and 
efficacy  as  a  dynamic  in  the  field  of  conduct.  While  the 
statements  of  those  moralists  who  explain  all  the  deeds  of 
men  as  due  to  the  working  of  self-interest  are  justly  con- 
demned as  cynical  and  exaggerated,  still  their  general  plaus- 
ibility and  partial  truth  bear  witness  to  the  extensive  influ- 
ence of  this  motive.  When  joined  with  an  intelligence  that 
foresees  consequences  and  understands  the  larger  relation- 
ships of  human  life,  it  is  capable  of  imposing  a  thorough  and 
far-reaching  regulation  upon  the  conduct  of  man.  Self- 
interest  enjoins  strict  tempjerance  upon  the  man  who  fore- 
sees the  injurious  consequences  of  excess.  Comparatively 

•SiDQWiCK:  Method  of  Ethics,  p.  88. 

TABISTOTLE:  Nicomachean  Ethics,  Bk.  IX,  Chap.  VIII  (Welldon's 
trans.,  p.  300). 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  MOTIVE  OF  GOODNESS      265 

little  knowledge  is  required  to  show  the  individual  that 
since  his  own  security  and  comfort  are  dependent  upon 
the  maintenance  of  the  social  and  political  orders,  it  is 
for  his  interest  to  support  their  authority.  The  lesson  that 
honesty  (at  least  in  the  sense  of  an  outward  observance  of 
others'  property-rights)  is  the  best  policy,  is  easily  learned. 
Thus  love  of  self  becomes  a  great  conserving  agency  in 
human  society  which  no  ethical  theory  can  afford  to  neg- 
lect, making  for  steadiness  of  purpose  in  the  individual 
and  stability  in  society. 

Not  confining  ourselves  to  the  positive  contributions  to 
social  welfare  which  an  enlightened  self-interest  will 
prompt,  we  may  notice  further  the  benefits  which  accrue 
to  society  incidentally  from  the  operation  of  this  motive, 
even  when  the  thought  of  the  individual  is  altogether  con- 
cerned with  his  own  enjoyment.  The  man  who  is  impelled 
by  love  of  self  to  preserve  his  bodily  vigor  and  mental 
capacity  while  accumulating  sufficient  property  to  provide 
for  himself  during  his  old  age,  at  least  relieves  society  of 
the  burden  of  caring  for  him  in  his  declining  years.  More- 
over, that  normal  degree  of  self-interest  which  leads  the 
individual  to  seek  healthful  amusement  and  to  keep  his 
bodily  functions  vigorous  is  productive  of  a  cheerful  dis- 
position and  a  flow  of  animal  spirits  which  are  contagious 
and  themselves  a  contribution  to  social  welfare.  As  Spencer 
says,  in  defending  the  rights  of  egoism  to  a  place  in  a  well- 
ordered  and  socially  efficient  life: 

"  The  conclusion  forced  on  us  is  that  the  pursuit  of  individual 
happiness  within  those  limits  prescribed  by  social  conditions,  is 
the  first  requisite  to  the  attainment  of  the  greatest  general  hap- 
piness. To  see  this  it  needs  but  to  contrast  one  whose  self- 
regard  has  maintained  bodily  well-being,  with  one  whose  regard- 
lessness  of  self  has  brought  its  natural  results;  and  then  to  ask 
what  must  be  the  contrast  between  two  societies  formed  of  two 
such  kinds  of  individuals. 


\ 
266  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

"Bounding  out  of  bed  after  an  unbroken  sleep,  singing  or 
whistling  as  he  dresses,  coming  down  with  beaming  face  ready 
to  laugh  on  the  smallest  provocation,  the  healthy  man  of  high 
powers,  conscious  of  past  successes,  and  by  his'energy,  quickness, 
resource,  made  confident  of  the  future,  enters  on  the  day's 
business  not  with  repugnance  but  with  gladness;  and  from  hour 
to  hour  experiencing  satisfactions  from  work  effectually  done, 
comes  home  with  an  abundant  surplus  of  energy  remaining  for 
hours  of  relaxation.  Far  otherwise  is  it  with  one  who  is  en- 
feebled by  great  neglect  of  self.  Already  deficient,  his  energies 
are  made  more  deficient  by  constant  endeavors  to  execute  tasks 
that  prove  beyond  his  strength,  and  by  the  resulting  discourage- 
ment. Besides  the  depressing  consciousness  of  the  immediate  future, 
there  is  the  depressing  consciousness  of  the  remoter  future,  with 
its  probability  of  accumulated  difficulties  and  diminished  ability 
to  meet  them.  Hours  of  leisure  which,  rightly  passed,  bring 
pleasures  that  raise  the  tide  of  life  and  renew  the  powers  of 
work,  cannot  be  utilized :  there  is  not  vigor  enough  for  enjoy- 
ments involving  action,  and  lack  of  spirits  prevents  passive  en- 
joyments being  entered  upon  with  zest.  In  brief,  life  becomes 
a  burden.  Now,  if,  as  must  be  admitted,  in  a  community  com- 
posed of  individuals  like  the  first  the  happiness  will  be  relatively 
great,  while  in  one  composed  of  individuals  like  the  last,  there 
will  be  relatively  little  happiness,  or  rather  much  misery;  it 
must  be  admitted  that  conduct  causing  the  one  result  is  good, 
and  conduct  causing  the  other  is  bad."  Data  of  Ethics,  §  70. 

3.  Inadequacy  of  the  Egoistic  Motive. — After  doing 
full  justice  to  the  actual  importance  and  ethical  value  of 
the  motive  of  self-interest,  we  must  admit  that  when  this 
motive  is  allowed  to  rule  alone  in  human  conduct  or  to 
dominate  all  other  motives,  it  not  only  proves  itself  inade- 
quate but  also  positively  ruinous  in  its  effects,  stunting  and 
deforming  the  nature  of  the  individual,  checking  and  sub- 
verting social  progress,  and  endangering  human  welfare. 
The  defect  of  self-love  may  at  first  appear  to  be  of  a  purely 
negative  character — that  it  is  not  sufficiently  inclusive,  but 
confines  itself  to  the  happiness  of  the  individual.  Beginning 
thus  with  a  passive  neglect  of  others'  interest,  to  be  sure, 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  MOTIVE  OF  GOODNESS      267 

— when  it  is  given  the  opportunity  to  grow  and  expand 
through  continuous  exercise, — this  motive  leads  directly 
to  an  active  violation,  and  finally  to  a  complete  annihila- 
tion, of  the  rights  of  others.  The  worst  feature  of  the 
life  entirely  controlled  by  self-interest  is  not,  therefore, 
that  itjseeks  wealth  and  honor  and  pleasure  which  it  does 
not  propose  to  share  with  others,  but  that  in  an  increasing 
degree  it  seeks  to  use  other  human  beings  as  instruments 
in  the  amassing  of  wealth,  as  stepping-stones  in  the  acquir- 
ing of  reputation,  as  tools  in  the  gaining  of  pleasure.  The 
ethical  problem  would  be  simpler  if  such  uncurbed  and 
ruthless  selfishness  always  defeated  its  own  ends — bring- 
ing satiety  and  disgust,  a  sense  of  estrangement  from  fellow- 
men  increasingly  painful,  and  a  growing  feeling  of  regret 
over  the  suffering  caused  to  others.  Unfortunately  this  is 
not_always  true.  History  affords  conspicuous  examples  of 
monsters  of  selfishness  who  throughout  a  long  life  have  used 
intelligence  and  skill  in  preserving  their  bodily  vigor,  hus- 
banding their  financial  resources,  and  maintaining  their 
reputation  and  influence  over  their  fellows,  all  in  order 
that  they  might  the  more  fully  gratify  their  private  lusts. 
No,  the  fundamental  fact  is  that  self-interest  in  the  sense 
of  individual  enjoyment,  and  the  largest  human  welfare 
do  not  always  coincide.  The  attainment  of  the  latter  often 
— usually,  it  seems — requires  the  sacrifice  of  the  former. 
The  motive  of.  self-interest  cannot  be  relied  on,  consequently, 
to  furnish  the  dynamic  for  good  conduct,  conduct  that  shall 
have  for  its  aim  the  realization  of  all  capacities  of  human 
personality.  The  short-sightedness  and  folly  of  appealing 
to  thia  motive  when  the  desire  is  to  promote  social  effi- 
ciency and  personal  development,  have  recently  been  demon- 
strated in  this  country.  For  decades  the  gospel  of  "  suc- 
cess "  has  been  preached  to  American  youths  in  school 
and  in  home,  from  lecture  platform  and  magazine  page. 
The  success  which  was  thus  glorified  in  the  mind  of  the 


268  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

growing  boy  was  generally  a  purely  individualistic  one: 
his  imagination  was  stimulated  by  tales  of  the  making  of 
enormous  fortunes,  the  building  up  of  extensive  industries, 
and  the  attainment  of  supreme  political  power.  The  anti- 
social character  of  such  teaching  remained  for  long  un- 
noticed; for  the  settlement  of  a  new  country  placed  an 
especially  high  premium  upon  individual  initiative  and 
aggressiveness,  and  the  exploitation  of  undiscovered  re- 
sources or  the  organization  of  new  industries  which  were 
incidental  to  the  acquisition  of  private  fortunes,  seemed  to 
constitute  a  sufficient  social  justification.  But  now  that 
the  country  is  nearly  all  settled  and  some  of  its  resources 
show  signs  of  exhaustion,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  ability 
of  favored  individuals  to  exploit  the  land  and  its  resources 
has  been  tremendously  increased  by  combinations  of  cap- 
ital, superior  organization  of  industry,  and  better  facilities 
of  production  and  distribution,  on  the  other,  things  assume 
a  different  complexion.  The  further  depletion  of  national 
resources  which  belong  to  the  whole  people  by  a  few  in- 
dividuals for  their  own  enrichment  appears  no  longer  as 
a  case  of  commendable  initiative  and  enterprise  but  of  de- 
plorable rapacity  and  greed.  In  fact  the  "  enterprising  " 
business  man  is  now  seen  as  the  commercial  pirate,  and 
the  "  shrewd  "  politician  who  works  with  him  (and  upon 
him)  as  the  political  free-booter.  Of  the  two  characteriza- 
tions perhaps  the  latter  is  the  truer,  but  both  are  extreme. 
One  lesson  should  be  learned,  however;  that  if  we  would 
lay  the  foundations  of  democracy  and  social  justice  deep 
in  the  character  of  our  people,  we  should  not  attempt  in 
our  teaching  of  youth  primarily  to  arouse  individual  am- 
bition through  appeal  to  the  motive  of  self-interest,  but 
rather  to  develop  an  interest  in  civic  problems  and  a 
capacity  for  public  service,  by  an  appeal  to  that  sentiment 
of  comradeship  and  capacity  for  loyal  devotion  to  ideal 
causes  which  is  latent  in  all  normal  human  beings. 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  MOTIVE  OF  GOODNESS      269 

4.  The  Altruistic  Motive:  Sympathy. — The  failure  of 
egoistic  interpretations  of  morality  such  as  that  of  Hobbes 
to  win  general  acceptance  is  due  principally  to  the  recog- 
nized presence  in  human  nature  of  an  altruislic-lejidency 
which  makes  others'  welfare  in  itself  attractive  as  an  end 
of  action.  Against  this  fact  of  the  existence  of  an  altruistic 
or  social  motive  in  the  nature  of  man,  as  against  an  im- 
pregnable rock,  all  egoistic  theories  are  shattered  in  pieces. 
While  the  existence  of  an  altruistic  motive  had  been  recog- 
nized by  earlier  thought,  it  remained  for  the  biological 
studies  carried  on  in  the  last  century  under  the  inspiration 
of  the  idea  of  evolution,  to  establish  the  true  importance 
of  this  motive  for  human  conduct  and  to  give  it  unques- 
tionable scientific  standing.  Darwjn,  as  is  generally  known, 
found  in  the  social  instinct  which  man  inherits  from  the 
lower  animals,  the  foundation  of  human  morality.  This 
instinct,  he  believed,  was  an  extension  of  the  parental  and 
filial  affections  which  are  rooted  as  deep  in  the  nature  of 
the  organism  as  the  instinct  of  self-preservation  itself.8 
He  thought  it  highly  probable  that ' '  any  animal  whatever, 
endowed  with  well-marked  social  instincts,  the  parental  and 
filial  affections  being  here  included,  would  inevitably  ac- 
quire a  moral  sense  or  conscience  as  soon  as  its  intellectual 
powers  had  become  as  well,  or  nearly  as  well,  developed 
as  in  man."9  Those  practices  and  beliefs  which  originate 
in  this  instinct  and  consequently  tend  to  promote  social 
welfare  would,  he  believed,  be  favored  by  natural  selection 
because  they  make  a  group  stronger  and  more  efficient  in 
its  struggle  with  other  groups.10  Other  writers,  following 
Darwin  and  approaching  Ethics  from  the  biological  stand- 
point, sought  to  show  with  increasing  fullness  and  detail 
lio\v  human  morality  had  grown  out  of  this  social  or  sym- 
pathetic instinct.  Leslie  Stephen  explained  morality  as 

•DABWIN:   Descent  of  Man,  Chap.  IV.  •  Ibid. 

10  Op.  tit.,  Chap.  V. 


270  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

the  condition  of  social  health  and  survival.  Mr.  Suther- 
land in  his  compendious  work  The  Origin  and  Growth  of 
the  Moral  Instinct  reviews  the  whole  course  of  moral  de- 
velopment, endeavoring  to  prove  that  it  consists  essentially 
in  an  extension  of  the  instinct  of  sympathy,  which  is  itself 
derived  from  the  parental  instinct.  In  the  words  of  this 
writer,  who  gives  the  most  complete  exposition  of  the  view 
we  are  considering,  "  Moral  conduct  is  that  conduct  which 
is  actuated  by  wise  sympathy.  Sympathy,  of  course,  is  the 
natural  capacity  of  being  pleased  at  the  pleasures  and 
pained  at  the  sufferings  of  others.  Sympathy  is  wise  when 
it  sacrifices  no  ultimately  greater  happiness  of  others  for  the 
sake  of  a  smaller  but  more  immediate  happiness."11 
Hence  Mr.  Sutherland  is  led  to  maintain  that  "  An  efficient 
degree  of  sympathy  will,  and  among  the  mass  of  mankind 
actually  does,  provide  an  adequate  morality  without  a  great 
admixture  of  other  qualities."12  With  reference  to  moral 
development,  it  consists,  he  asserts,  in  a  growth  of  sym- 
pathy which  involves  both  a  widening  and  a  deepening. 
Arising  in  family  life  out  of  the  parental  and  sexual  in- 
stincts, sympathy  first  spreads  to  all  members  of  the  tribe 
where  it  is  deepened  and  strengthened  through  the  increas- 
ing friendliness  and  devotion  of  fellow-tribesmen.  Then 
its  area  is  extended  beyond  the  tribal  bounds,  first  in 
toleration,  then  in  friendliness,  and  finally  in  universal 
human  brotherhood.13 

Moralists  of  the  school  just  referred  to  have  done  a 
service  of  inestimable  value  to  ethical  reflection.  They 
have  established  beyond  possibility  of  further  doubt  or 
question  the  existence  and  importance  of  an  altruistic 
motive  in  human  conduct.  By  their  historical  and  ethno- 
logical researches  they  have  demonstrated  the  preeminently 

11  SUTHEBLAND:  Origin  and  Gh-owth  of  the  Moral  Instinct,  Vol.  II, 
p.  19. 

lf  Op.  tit.,  Vol.  II.  p.  9. 
"  Ibid.,  Vol.  I,  p.  369. 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  MOTIVE  OF  GOODNESS     271 

social  character  of  morality  from  its  earliest  beginnings; 
thus  a  death-blow  has  been  dealt  to  all  egoistic  theories 
whether  of  a  naturalistic  or  theological  character.  More- 
over they  have  summoned  the  incontrovertible  facts  of 
Biology  to  show  that  altruism  is  as  authentic  and  necessary 
a  product  of  the  organic  evolution  as  is  egoism.  While  the 
range  or  meaning  of  benevolence  is  not  limited  by  the 
scope  of  the  instinct  in  which  it  originated,  still  it  is  reas- 
suring to  know  that  the  instinct  of  sympathy  is  as  deeply 
rooted  in  human  nature  as  the  instinct  of  self-preservation. 
The  fact  that  sympathy  is  not  a  derivative  or  secondary 
product  gives  an  additional  warrant  for  those  developments 
of  intelligent  altruism  wrhich  pass  altogether  beyond  the 
limits  of  organic  adaptation.  With  reference  to  the  im- 
portance and  value  of  the  motive  of  sympathy  in  the  field 
of  human  life  and  conduct,  it  is  scarcely  possible  to  ex- 
aggerate. In  many  periods  of  human  history,  it  alone  has 
thrown  a  cheerful  kindly  light  in  scenes  of  darkness  and 
disorder  where  insatiate  greed  and  brutal  passion  have 
vaunted  themselves.  Although  it  does  not  possess  the 
breadth  and  elevation  characteristic  of  the  self-sacrificing 
devotion  of  patriot  or  martyr  to  his  ideal  cause,  yet  sym- 
pathy has  a  spontaneity  and  readiness  about  it  that  renders 
it  a  peculiarly  gracious  and  inspiring  element  in  human 
life.  It  creates  an  atmosphere  in  which  good  deeds  and 
noble  aspirations  flourish.  Upon  the  subject  the  words 
of  Mr.  Sutherland  may  again  be  quoted  with  heartiest 
approval : 

"  So  too  with  our  social  relations,  duty  makes  a  substitute, 
but  only  an  indifferent  substitute,  for  kindly  sympathies.  The 
man  who  does  what  he  ought  to  do,  though  actuated  by  no 
feeling  of  gladness  in  giving  happiness,  no  sense  of  compassion 
for  the  sorrows  of  others,  may  indeed  make  a  good  enough 
citizen.  But  if  he  reluctantly  help  another  out  of  a  ditch  because 
it  is  his  duty  to  do  so,  instead  of  cheerfully  giving  a  hand  because 


272  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

eager  to  help,  the  quality  of  the  resulting  morality  is  very 
inferior.  The  man  who  is  incapable  of  a  warm  friendship  or 
a  noble  enthusiasm  of  patriotism  or  the  glow  of  benevolence  is 
in  so  far  a  poorer  type.  Though  upright  he  is  frigid;  though 
courteous  he  is  stiff.  We  all  think  him  a  good  man,  but  our 
hearts  never  gladden  at  his  approach.  Whereas  the  man  whose 
life  finds  the  spring  of  its  goodness  in  active  sympathy  brings 
happiness  wherever  he  goes,  and  his  morality  is  contagious."  14 

5.  Inadequacy  of  the  Altruistic  Motive. — Although  it 
seems  frequently  to  constitute  the  redeeming  virtue  of 
man's  nature,  this  altruistic  motive,  if  allowed  to  rule 
without  check  or  control,  produces  a  life  as  incomplete  and 
one-sided,  if  not  as  perverted  and  monstrous,  as  that  dom- 
inated entirely  by  egoism.  For  altruism,  when  it  is  not 
balanced  by  the  opposite  tendency  or  included  within  a 
principle  of  action  comprehensive  enough  to  embrace  them 
both,  defeats  itself.  In  the  first^  place,  a  person  who  is 
so  far  preoccupied  with  the  welfare  of  others  as  to  neglect 
altogether  his  individual  interest  will  soon  find  himself 
lacking  the  ability  to  give  further  help,  and  will  finally 
become  a  care  and  a  burden  upon  those  whom  he  wishes 
to  benefit.  Thus  the  head  of  a  family  whose  incessant 
exertions  on  behalf  of  wife  and  children  leave  no  time 
for  rest  or  recreation  is  in  danger  of  being  incapacitated 
in  middle  life  and  becoming  an  invalid  to  be  supported 
by  the  labor  of  those  whom  he  would  serve.  Or,  think  of 
a  man  in  a  position  of  great  social  or  political  responsibility 
upon  whose  wisdom  and  skill  the  continued  prosperity  and 
moral  betterment  of  hundreds  of  thousands  of  his  fellow- 
beings  depend.  Let  such  a  man  become  so  absorbed  in 
his  plans  for  others'  good  that  he  forgets  the  limits  of 
his  own  strength  and  breaks  his  health  down,  or  heedlessly 
exposes  himself,  contracts  pneumonia,  and  dies ;  the  objects 
of  his  devotion,  the  men  and  women  who  are  dependent 

14  SUTHERLAND  :  Op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  p.  8. 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  MOTIVE  OF  GOODNESS     273 

upon  him,  will  pay  the  penalty  of  his  exaggerated  altruism. 
Hence  the  cause  of  altruism  itself  justifies  a  moderate  and 
healthy  egoism — an  indulgence  of  desires  for  rest  and 
recreation,  for  appetizing  food  and  comfortable  clothing, 
and  all  other  objects  which  contribute  to  individual  strength 
and  efficiency.  Then,  secondly,  unbalanced  altruism  de- 
feats, .itself  by  encouraging  an  extreme  of  egoism  in  those 
to  whom  it  ministers.  How  often  do  the  unwearied  efforts 
of  a  devoted  wife  and  mother  to  increase  the  comfort  and 
happiness  of  husband  and  children  encourage  a  deplorable 
selfishness  in  these  members  of  her  family !  A  similar  re- 
sult is  frequently  observable  where  an  unrestricted  gener- 
osity leads  to  the  distribution  of  bounties  without  the  ex- 
pectation or  desire  of  any  service  in  return.  The  effect 
seems  usually  to  be  the  fostering  of  selfishness  in  the  re- 
cipients— their  appetite  for  further  benefits  is  whetted,  and 
their  willingness  to  render  adequate  service  in  return  is 
correspondingly  diminished.  Self-respect  is  lost  and  pau- 
perization begins. 

Even  within  the  field  of  altruism  proper  the  instinct  of 
sympathy,  when  it  is  not  reinforced  by  other  factors  and 
abilities,  proves  to  be  an  insufficient  motive.  Like  all  other 
organic  instincts  it  responds  only  to  its  properjftimulus, 
and  this  stimulus  must  be  a  particular  object  or  event. 
Thus  sympathy  is  elicited  by  the  pleasure  or  pain  of 
fellow-beings  when  this  is  seen,  or  otherwise  perceived. 
Hence  it  is  naturally^  Circumscribed  in  the  scope  of  its 
object  to  individual  cases  and  particular  occasions.  True, 
it  may,  through  the  help  of  memory  and  the  imagina- 
tion, be  extended  to  cover  the  future  happiness  or  misery 
of  particular  persons.  Yet  it  remains  too  limited  in  its 
influence  to  move  men  to  the  service  of  ideal  causes  rep- 
resenting some  general  aspect  of  human  welfare — like  the 
moral  awakening  of  a  nation,  or  the  establishment  of  peace 
throughout  the  world.  Furthermore,  sympathy,  because  an 


274  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

organic  reaction,  will  be  determined  as  to  intensity  and 
duration  by  the  physiological  condition  of  the  subject  as 
well  as  by  the  character  of  the  stimulating  object.  Thus 
the  amount  of  sympathy  which  the  same  situation  arouses 
in  any  individual  will  vary  from  time  to  time,  depending 
upon  the  condition  of  his  health,  his  mood,  the  time  in 
his  day,  etc.  Hence  sympathy  has  not  motive-power  suffi- 
cient to  inspire  devotion  to  a  social  end  which  can  be 
realized  only  by  small  degrees  but  must  be  steadily  pur- 
sued, such  as  the  good  of  a  city  or  the  welfare  of  an 
institution.  Mr.  Sutherland  himself  recognizes  its  defects 
as  a  motive.15  It  is  capricious  in  its  play,  he  admits,  vary- 
ing from  person  to  person,  and  in  the  same  person  from 
time  to  time.  It  is  dependent  for  its  strength  upon  ex- 
ternal and  accidental  conditions  such  as  the  good  humor 
of  the  agent,  and  the  beauty  or  attractiveness  of  the  ob- 
ject. Hence — his  conclusion  is — while  sympathy  supplies 
the  motive-power,  the  sense  of  duty  is  required  as  a  kind 
of  fly-wheel  to  steady  its  spasmodic  energies.  This  sense 
of  duty  he  explains  as  methodized  sympathy,  it  is  true; 
but  the  important  point  for  our  notice  is  that  even  this 
champion  of  sympathy  is  forced  to  confess  that  in  its 
natural  manifestation  and  without  being  supplemented 
by  other  faculties,  it  is  inadequate  as  a  motive  of  good 
conduct.  The  limitations  of  sympathy  as  a  motive  of  al- 
truistic conduct  are  well  illustrated  by  a  too-familiar  type 
of  political  leader  in  our  cities.  The  ward  "  boss  "  often 
owes  his  influence  in  his  district  largely  to  his  ready  kind- 
ness. To  no  cry  of  suffering  or  distress  can  he  turn  a 
deaf  ear  and  his  constituents  when  in  trouble  can  appeal 
to  him  with  the  assurance  of  meeting  quick  sympathy  and 
substantial  aid.  He  is  loyal  to  active  supporters,  keeping 
every  promise  made  to  them ;  for  his  friends  he  has  a  gen- 
uine affection  and  safeguards  their  interest  as  his  own. 

11  SUTHEBIAND:   Op.  dt.,  Vol.  II,  p.  30. 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  MOTIVE  OF  GOODNESS     275 

But  at  the  same  time  he  is  absolutely  without  a  sense  of 
the  larger  social  obligation.  He  will  "  sell  out  "  his  city 
without  a  qualm  and  betray  the  interests  of  its  people 
for  the  profit  of  a  privileged  few. 

6.  The  Religious  Motive. — Religion  must  now  be  con- 
sidered as  furnishing  man  with  a  third  great  dynamic  to 
action.  For  the  "  fear  of  the  Lord  "  is  not  only  the 
"  beginning  of  wisdom  ";  it  has  always  been  a  powerful 
incentive  to  good  conduct.  We  shall  not  have  to  discuss  the 
question  whether  the  religious  motive,  like  the  other  two 
just  described,  originates  from  a  primary  instinct  or  in- 
herent faculty  of  human  nature.  Sufficient  for  purposes 
of  our  discussion  is  the  fact  now  well-established  that  a 
religious  tendency  or  "  sense  "  is  practically  universal 
among  mankind.  Recent  studies  of  the  history  and  de- 
velopment of  religion  agree  in  their  emphasis  upon  two 
points:  first,  that  religion  is  an  outgrowth  of  man's  con- 
sciousness of  value;  and,  second,  that  religion,  especially 
in  its  beginning,  is  primarily  social  both  in  origin  and  ref- 
erence. A  recognition  of  these  two  facts  paves  the  way 
for  a  clearer  understanding  of  the  function  which  religion 
discharges  in  moral  development.  The  object  which  under- 
lies all  forms  of  religious  thought  and  belief  is  the  universe 
— the  all-encompassing  reality.  Thus  religion  has  been 
lately  defined  as  a  "  feeling  of  harmony  between  ourselves 
and  the  universe."16  Of  course  a  clear  conception  of  the 
universe  as  such  does  not  enter  into  all  religious  belief; 
rather  is  the  object  of  belief  and  worship  often  a  very 
insignificant  part  of  it — a  carved  stick,  a  solitary  tree,  a 
species  of  animal.  But  these  objects  are  all  thought  of  as 
endowed  with  what  a  recent  writer  on  the  subject  has  well 
called  a  "  mysterious  potency  "  which  they  derive  from 
the  great  hidden  forces  of  the  universe,  the  total  scheme 

'•McTAQGABi:  Some  Dogmas  of  Religion,  p.  3. 


276  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

of  things.17  In  this  way  they  become  divine.  Now  man's 
attitude  toward  these  his  divinities  is  that  of  valuation. 
He  regards  them  not  merely  as  facts  which  exist,  but  in 
a  certain  sense  as  ends  which  he  desires  to  achieve;  that 
is,  he  believes  that  their  favor  and  assistance  may  be  won, 
and  that  if  he  complies  with  certain  conditions  the  super- 
human power  of  these  divinities  —  and  they  represent  always 
the  great  hidden  forces  of  the  universe  —  may  be  enlisted 
in  his  service  to  secure  the  greatest  goods  of  life.  These, 
the  greatest  goods  of  life,  are  always  conceived,  during 
the  earlier  stages  of  human  development,  in  social  terms, 
and  represent,  under  the  varying  forms  of  the  imagination, 
the  best  welfare,  largest  power,  and  longest  life,  of  the 
tribe  itself.  Thus  religion  appears  to  be  in  its  essence  a 
belief  that  the  powers  of  the  universe  are,  or  may  be,  allied 
on  the  side  of  the  Good  —  of  the  highest  human  welfare. 
It  is,  in  short,  a  belief  that  Universal  Reality  is  good.  The 
same  conclusion  is  reached  by  a  somewhat  different  path 
when  we  agree  with  Hoffding  in  defining  religion  as  '  '  faith 
in  the  ultimate  conservation  of  values.  '  '  18  From  this 
standpoint,  religion  is  exhibited  as  the  belief  not  that 
Reality  is  good  but  that  Goodness  is  Real.  Yet  if,  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  second  form  of  statement,  our  religion 
consists  in  the  belief  that  those  ends  and  ideals  which  we 
value  most  highly  are  conserved  and  provided  for  in  the 
nature  of  things,  what  is  this  but  belief  that  the  universe 
or  reality  is  good?  Thus  the  second  proposition  may  be 
accepted  as  the  simple  converse  of  the  first,  a  belief  in  the 
goodness  of  reality  implying  a  faith  in  the  reality  of 
goodness. 

If  religion  is  such  an  adjustment  between  the  good  of 
man  and  the  nature  of  the  universe  it  is  plain  that  re- 
ligious belief  may  furnish  a  strong  support,  a  powerful 


KING:  Development  of  Religion,  Chap.  VL 
"HblTDnvG:  Philosophy  of  Religion. 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  MOTIVE  OF  GOODNESS      277 

incentive,  to  good  conduct.  For  if  the  Supreme  Power 
of  the  universe  is  allied  with  the  cause  of  goodness,  the 
man  who  performs  a  good  act  has  the  universe  behind  him. 
Even  though  the  act  appear  to  be  one  of  absolute  self- 
sacrifice  yet  the  individual  cannot  really  lose,  since  God  is 
on  his  side.  Hence  religion  has  exerted  tremendous  in- 
fluence throughout  the  whole  course  of  human  history  in 
impelling  individuals  to  surrender  their  private  interests 
to  the  welfare,  or  supposed  welfare,  of  the  group  or  nation. 
This  influence  has  not  always  been  exerted  for  the  true 
good  of  man,  or  his  genuine  development,  however.  Often, 
too  often,  it  has  supplied  an  external  and  artificial  sanc- 
tion for  a  conventional  morality  long  outgrown,  but  which, 
partly  through  the  aid  of  religion,  is  able  to  preserve 
its  authority  and  block  all  progress.  Such  is  the  case  in 
Russia  to-day,  where  the  influence  of  religion  and  the 
Orthodox  Church  is  exercised  effectively  to  maintain  in  ex- 
istence and  power  an  antiquated  and  barbarous  regime. 
These  facts  prove  the  inadequacy  of  religion  as  a  motive 
of  good  conduct,  when  acting  alone  and  not  including  an 
intelligent  self-interest  and  a  due  regard  for  the  welfare 
of  others.  When  unaccompanied  by  an  insight  into  the 
dependence  of  the  Good  upon  the  true  interest  of  the 
individual  and  the  real  welfare  of  society,  religion  presents 
the  requirements  of  goodness  to  man  as  if  they  were  the 
commands  of  an  external  power  which  must  be  obeyed  if 
the  individual  is  to  escape  the  punishment  which  this  power 
can  inflict,  and  enjoy  the  reward  which  it  proffers.  These 
rewards  and  punishments  were  at  first  supposed  to  come  in 
the  present  life  ;~but  the  observed  facts  of  human  existence 
made  this  view  no  longer  possible  and  hence  the  divine  judg- 
ment was  postponed  until  after  death.  It  is  apparent  that 
the  religious  motive,  when  its  appeal  is  based  upon  such 
considerations,  is  but  a  disguised  form  of  self-interest,  and 
shares  all  the  defects  of  this  latter  motive.  The  individual 


278  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

is  moved  by  a  desire  to  increase  his  enjoyment  and  to 
diminish  his  suffering,  not,  in  this  case,  within  the  limits 
of  his  earthly  existence  merely,  but  during  the  future  life 
as  well.  That  religion  may  be  transformed  into  a  mere 
'  appeal  to  the  lower  kind  of  self-interest  is  proved  by  the 
frequency  with  which  the  noble  Christian  doctrine  of  self- 
realization  through  self-sacrifice  has  been  degraded  by  its 
exponents  into  an  arbitrary  device  whereby  the  human 
individual  can  gain  Heaven  and  escape  Hell.  Further  evi- 
dence to  the  same  effect  is  supplied  by  the  fact  that  the 
egoistic  utilitarianism  of  the  school  of  Hobbes  often  had 
recourse  to  theology  to  provide  hedonic  sanctions  for  con- 
duct which,  though  necessary  for  social  welfare,  could  not 
be  shown  to  increase  the  sum-total  of  the  individual's  en- 
joyment during  the  present  life.  In  pursuance  of  this 
method  Pajjey  defined  virtue  as  "  the  doing  good  to  man- 
kind, in  obedience  to  the  will  of  God,  for  the  sake  of  ever- 
lasting happiness." 

7.  Self-Realization  as  the  Motive  of  Good  Conduct — 
Self-realization  has  now  to  be  exhibited  as  the  only  adequate 
motive  of  good  conduct,  including  the  three  just  mentioned 
and  raising  each  to  a  higher  plane  of  meaning  and  effi- 
ciency. Self-realization  does  not  simply  combine  in  an 
external  fashion  the  egoistic,  altruistic,  and  religious  mo- 
tives; it  unites  them  organically,  making  each  a  function 
oT  the  central  activity  of  volition  and  causing  each  to 
express  within  a  certain  department  of  human  life  the 
characteristic  and  insistent  demand  of  volition  for  a  com- 
pletely organized  life.  Of  these  different  motives  at  least 
two  originate  in  native  instincts  which,  when  raised  to  the 
level  of  intelligent  desire  or  purpose,  express  the  craving 
of  the  human  will  for  a  larger  satisfaction — the  first  in 
such  a  system  of  objects  as  will  yield  fullest  enjoyment 
throughout  the  indiviclualjs-Jife,  and  the  second  in  such 
activities  as  will  increase  the  happiness  of  other  individuals 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  MOTIVE  OF  GOODNESS      279 

with  whom  he  comes  into  contact.  To  the  attainment  of 
such  ends  are  the  promptings  of  self-interest  and  sympathy 
limited,  in  their  natural  and  undeveloped  form.  But  when 
the  individual  is  illuminated  by  a  better  understanding  of 
his  capacities  as  a  conscious  person  and  these  capacities 
are  themselves  developed  through  constant  exercise,  the 
two  motives,  egoistic  and  altruistic,  and  the  religious  as 
well,  are  expanded  in  meaning,  and  strengthened  in  power, 
until  each  expresses  in  its  own  way  the  supreme  and , 
unifying  motive  in  the  conduct  of  man  as  a  moral  agent 
— a  yearning  for  the  largest  and  most  comprehensive  life. 
The  impelling  force  of  self-love  is  extended  beyond  the 
boundaries  of  "  self-interest  "  and  is  bestowed  upon  such 
ideal  and  inclusive  objects  as  Truth  and  Beauty,  which  are  ' 
required  to  satisfy  the  higher  psychic  capacities  of  human 
nature.  The  propulsive  power  of  sympathy  is  extended 
beyond  the  happiness  of  a  limited  number  of  individuals 
and  communicated  to  humanity — the  welfare  of  the  whole 
human  race  being  rendered  supremely  attractive  as  an  end 
of  action.  The  compelling  influence  of  religion  is  no 
longer  limited  to  the  enforcement  of  a  divine  command 
which  promises  punishment  if  disobeyed,  but  is  extended 
to  a  divine  purpose  which  is  made  inspiring  by  the  fact 
that  it  guarantees  the  attainment  of  those  ideals  which 
man  values  most  highly,  and  provides  for  the  welfare  of 
both  the  individual  and  the  race.  Thus  these  three  mo- 
tives prove  to  be  only  manifestations  of  the  impelling  power 
of  a  single  inclusive  object — that  of  complete  Self-realiza- 
tion. They  do  not  inaugurate  three  different  lines  of  ac- 
tion ;  they  all  prompt  to  one.  They  representjhree  aspects 
of  the  one  process  of  self-organization,  and  while  there  is  a 
difference  of  emphasis  in  every  case,  each  one  includes 
and  makes  place  for  the  other  two.  The  attainment  by 
the  individual  of  the  larger  ideal  objects  of  his  higher 
powers,  intellectual,  practical,  and  emotional,  requires  from 


280  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

him  the  fullest  cooperation  with  his  fellows  in  a  mutual 
sympathy  and  service.  The  promotion  of  the  true  welfare 
of  humanity  must  include  the  attainment  of  the  real  in- 
terest of  the  individual  himself.  Finally  the  realization 
of  the  Divine  Purpose  will  secure  the  highest  well-being 
of  self  and  others  as  integral  parts  of  the  universal  order. 

.Let  us  now  reconsider  these  three  motives  as  interpreted 

}  anew  in  the  light  of  Self-realization. 

8.  Self-Respect. — Self-love,  as  expressing  the  demand 
of  the  human  will  for  complete  Self-realization,  does  not 
remain  a  desire  of  the  individual  for  his  own  enjoyment 
through  the  objects  which  he  may  possess  to  the  exclusion 
of  all  other  individuals.  It  is  rather  the  individual's  re- 
gard for  himself  in  the  universal  aspect  of  his  nature 
— for  the  satisfaction  of  those  capacities  for  intellectual 
attainment,  for  social  companionship  and  conversation,  and 
of  those  abilities  for  constructive  and  creative  achievement, 
which  are  characteristic  of  human  personality  universally. 
These  capacities  require  for  their  satisfaction  objects  that 
also  are  not  exclusive  but  universal,  and  shared  by  all  in- 
dividuals composing  the  community  of  intelligence  and 
personality.  Self^ove  in  this  larger  sense  has  not  the 
subjective  and  intimate  character  of  self-interest.  Rather 
it  has  an  objective  and  almost  external  reference,  since  it 
directs  the  attention  of  the  individual  to  those  powers  and 
abilities  in  his  nature  which  distinguish  human  personality 
as  such.  He  esteems  himself  not  as  an  individual  but  as 
a  person.  Self-love  in  this  higher  development  is  fre- 
quently called  self-respect,  and  is  recognized  as  an  im- 
portant factor  in  moral  development.  Self-respect  is  a 
regard  for  one 's  own  worth  and  dignity  as  a  human  person, 
and  a  concern  for  the  due  satisfaction  of  the  powers  and 
capacities  of  intelligent  personality  consequently  possessed. 
As  a  motive  it  has  a  powerful  influence  in  restraining  the 
individual  from  actions  that  are  mean,  tricky,  and  selfish, 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  MOTIVE  OF  GOODNESS      281 

and  impels  him  to  the  pursuit  of  larger  and  more  appro- 
priate ends  of  intellectual  and  artistic  activity  and  public 
service.  The  force  of  self-respect  alone  has  influenced  men 
to  lead  clean  and  well-regulated  lives  when  removed  by 
circumstances  from  critical  scrutiny  of  their  fellows  in  the 
lonely  outposts  of  civilization  and  has  enabled  them  to 
resist  the  insidiously  debasing  effect  of  close  contact  with 
uncivilized  or  partly  civilized  peoples  with  their  lower 
standards  of  conduct.  Indeed,  as  was  explained  in  the 
preceding  section,  when  the  motive  of  self-love  is  taken 
in  this  wider  meaning  and  understood  to  voice  the  demand 
of  the  whole  self,  natural  and  spiritual,  for  satisfaction, 
it  is  an  expression  of  the  moral  ideal  and  is  identical  with 
conscience  itself.  It  is  thus  that  Butler  understands  the 
principle  of  self-love  which  he  makes  coordinate  with  con- 
science, asserting  that  both  "  always  lead  us  in  the  same 
way."  Aristotle,  as  noted  above,  distinguishes  between 
two  meanings  given  to  the  term  "  self  -love. "  According 
to  one,  the  narrower  meaning,  the  designation  "  lover-of- 
self  "  is  justly  used  as  a  term  of  reproach,  signifying 
selfishness  and  greed.  But  in  the  second  and  larger  sense 
it  is  applicable  to  the  good  man,  for  he  "  loves  and  grati- 
fies the  supreme  part  of  his  being. "  "It  follows  that  the 
virtuous  man  is  a  lover  of  self,  although  not  in  the  sense 
in  which  a  man  who  is  censured  for  self-love  is  a  lover 
of  self,  but  in  a  sense  differing  from  it  as  widely  as  a 
life  directed  by  reason  differs  from  a  life  directed  by 
emotion,  and  as  the  desire  for  what  is  noble  differs  from  a 
desire  for  what  seems  to  be  one 's  own  interest. ' ' 18  Hence 
Aristotle  believes  that  the  good  man  may  in  the  true 
sense  be  a  friend  of  himself ;  since  friendship  is  based  upon 
a  recognition  of  personal  worth  and  the  good  man  esteems 
most  highly  the  universal,  rational  principle  in  his  nature. 

11  ABiSTortE:  Nioomachean  Ethics,  Bk.  IX,  Chap.  VIII  (Welldon'c 
trans.,  p.  301). 


282  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

9.  Philanthropy. — The  altruistic  motive,  when  it  is  en- 
lightened by  a  true  understanding  of  the  nature  and 
capacities  of  man,  undergoes  a  like  development.  Its  limits 
are  no  longer  those  of  natural  sympathy  which,  at  its 
best,  is  restricted  in  application  to  the  happiness  of  a 
certain  number  of  individuals.  Instead,  altruism  becomes 
the  love  of  humanity,  an  affection  for  all  men,  a  genuine 
philanthropy,  which  is  based  upon  a  realizing  sense  of  the 
value  of  every  human  being  as  possessed  of  the  capacity 
for  personal  development  and  self-realization.  Such  is  the 
Christian  spirit  of  love  for  fellow-men,  the  feeling  of  human 
brotherhood  springing  from  a  recognition  of  the  spiritual 
kinship  of  the  whole  human  race.  Philanthropy  is  thus 
universal  in  a  way  that  sympathy  could  never  be — not 
having  to  depend  upon  the  accidents  of  personal  contact, 
individual  attractiveness,  and  temperamental  affinity,  but 
reaching  as  far  as  the  essential  characteristics  of  human 
nature  themselves  go.  It  is  more  catholic  and  all-embrac- 
ing than  the  sympathy  of  a  Walt  Whitman  whose  liking 
for  his  human  kind  led  him  to  mingle  with  the  jostling 
throng  on  crowded  street  or  ferry,  for  mere  delight  of 
human  presence  and  contact.  Even  such  wide  sympathy 
has  necessarily  its  boundaries  of  time  and  space ;  it  is,  more- 
over, in  a  large  degree  a  native  endowment  and  hence  cannot 
be  acquired  by  that  large  majority  of  persons  who  do  not 
by  nature  possess  it.  Furthermore,  philanthropy,  in  the 
sense  just  explained,  is  much  more  effective  as  a  factor  in 
moral  development  than  even  the  wide  sympathy  of  a 
Whitman  could  be.  For  such  sympathy  finds  human  be- 
ings supremely  attractive  as  they  are,  with  the  qualities 
and  dispositions  they  actually  possess.  It  tends  to  rest 
in  enjoyment  of  the  characteristics  which  at  present  exist 
and  is  seized  by  no  passion  to  change  and  improve  the 
character  of  men  and  women.  The  deeper  love  of  human- 
ity, on  the  contrary,  is  not  awakened  by  the  existent  traits 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  MOTIVE  OF  GOODNESS      283 

and  qualities  of  human  beings — these  may  be  neutral  or 
even  repellent — but  rather  by  the  unrealized  possibilities 
for  personal  growth  and  achievement  which  it  detects  and 
responds  to,  in  every  human  individual,  qua  human.  That 
these  capabilities  of  higher  attainment  and  larger  life 
should  thus  prove  attractive,  means  that  they  will  become 
ends  to  be  pursued  and  realized.  Thus  the  man  interested 
by  the  motive  of  philanthropy  in  his  fellow-men  is  im- 
pelled to  constant  effort  to  bring  out  and  make  actual  the 
potency  for  better  things  which  he  discovers  is  latent  within 
each  of  them.  The  love  which  Jesus  sought  to  arouse 
among  men  was  of  this  sort — not  a  love  for  our  fellows 
as  they  are,  for  their  defects,  their  frailties,  their  sins — 
but  for  them  as  they  might  be,  for  the  splendid  and  noble 
possibilities  of  every  human  self.  This  is  the  love  which 
has  inspired  all  great  moral  reformers  with  their  visions 
of  a  regenerate  humanity,  of  an  uplifted  and  purified 
human  nature — has  animated  all  great  liberators  with  their 
dreams  of  nations  relieved  from  oppression  and  their  in- 
habitants permitted  in  consequence  to  live  larger  and  hap- 
pier lives.  The  transforming  effect  of  a  love  of  this  sort  is 
happily  illustrated  in  Jerome  K.  Jerome's  pretty  story 
or  allegory,  The  Passing  of  the  Third  Floor  Back.  Here 
a  "  stranger  "  is  represented  as  entering  into  association 
with  a  group  of  people  from  whom  every  fine  and  gentle 
trait  seems  to  be  absent  and,  through  a  love  based  upon 
an  insight  into  their  better  nature  and  higher  possibilities, 
awakening  each  to  a  new  and  higher  life. 

10.  Reverence.  A  few  words  will  suffice  to  indicate  a 
little  more  fully  how  the  religious  motive  is  illuminated 
and  transformed  through  a  true  conception  of  man's  high- 
est good.  It  is  a  psychological  truism  that  if  the  commands 
of  God  are  to  move  men  to  action  they  must,  like  any 
other  object  of  pursuit,  appeal  to  some  part  of  his  nature, 
to  some  tendency  in  himself.  Now  unless  the  requirements 


284  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

of  deity  are  believed  to  be  based  upon  the  highest  human 
welfare,  unless  their  appeal  is  made  to  that  yearning  of 
man's  will  for  fullest  Self-realization,  they  must  make  their 
appeal  to  some  lower  and  more  restricted  desire.  This 
is  precisely  what  happens  when  moral  laws  are  obeyed 
without  any  real  insight  into  their  character  or  questioning 
of  their  authority,  as  the  dictates  of  the  external  power 
supreme  in  the  universe  and  hence  able  to  enforce  its 
commands.  Under  such  conditions  these  divine  behests 
acquire  their  influence  over  man's  will  through  their  ap- 
peal to  a  desire  that  is  comparatively  low — that  of  gaining 
pleasure,  the  pleasure  of  reward,  and  of  escaping  pain,  the 
pain  of  punishment.  Thus  the  performance  of  duty  in 
obedience  to  the  will  of  God  becomes  part  of  a  very  simple 
and  elementary  egoism.  The  attempt  may  be  made  to 
avoid  this  conclusion  by  assuming  that  the  commands  of 
deity,  unlike  all  other  objects  of  thought,  appeal  in  some 
mystical  or  supernatural  fashion  to  a  special  faculty  in 
human  nature,  thus  deriving  a  unique  authority.  But  there 
is  not  the  slightest  evidence  in  favor  of  such  a  belief.  Like 
all  other  ends  which  we  pursue  and  seek  to  attain,  obedi- 
ence to  God  must  appeal  to  some  one  of  our  actual  in- 
terests— if  not  to  a  higher,  why  then  to  a  lower.  Nor  does 
a  recognition  of  this  fact  deprive  the  divine  will  of  its 
rightful  authority  over  us.  Rather  do  we  secure  for  it 
the  highest  possible  authority  when  we  identify  it  with 
the  Moral  Ideal  understood  as  the  most  complete  realiza- 
tion of  the  powers  of  intelligent  personality.  The  absolute 
worth  of  this  object  is  witnessed  by  the  feeling  of  reverence 
which  it  arouses  within  us,  a  feeling  which  is  akin  to 
religious  awe,  and  which  in  its  turn  proves  that  these 
possibilities  of  higher  personal  development  which  we 
human  beings  possess  are  a  divine  birth-right  and  a  con- 
sequence of  our  spiritual  origin. 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  MOTIVE  OF  GOODNESS      285 

11.  Mixed  Motives. — It  is  a  fact  of  moral  experience, 
frequently  commented  upon,  that  men  seldom  act  from 
a  single  motive,  but  are  usually  impelled  to  their  action 
by  the  combined  efficacy  of  several  motives.  Thus  we  are 
often — most  often,  it  might  appear — led  to  serve  others 
when  our  sympathy  for  them  is  reinforced  by  a  recognition 
that  in  helping  them  we  shall  ultimately  be  benefiting  our- 
selves. In  the  same  way  the  egoistic  motive  combines  with 
the  religious  until  they  seem  indeed  to  merge  completely. 
On  first  thought  this  fact  that  an  action  is  due  to  a 
mixture  of  motives  may  appear  to  discredit  it — as  when 
a  person  gives  generously  to  the  cause  of  charity,  recog- 
nizing that  it  will  improve  his  standing  in  the  community, 
or  when  a  man  realizes  high  ideals  of  professional  achieve- 
ment in  order  to  please  wife  or  mother.  Now,  to  be  sure,  it 
is  discreditable  to  perform  an  act  ostensibly  from  one  motive 
which  is  generally  admired  but  actually  from  another  not 
given  such  approval,  thus  practising  a  kind  of  deception 
upon  the  community  and  winning  praise  which  is  unde- 
served— as  when  a  business  or  professional  man  undertakes 
charitable  work  solely  for  purposes  of  self-advertisement. 
Action  from  mixed  motives  is  not  always  blameworthy, 
however;  it  is  to  be  regarded  rather  as  the  normal  thing 
in  conduct,  indicating  in  the  majority  of  cases  increasing 
intelligence  and  moral  development.  For,  as  we  have  seen, 
the  leading  motives  of  human  action  are  not  necessarily 
exclusive  and  antagonistic :  they  turn  out,  when  developed 
in  all  their  implications,  to  be  different  expressions  of  the 
one  underlying  tendency  of  volition  to  seek  complete  Self- 
realization.  Hence  it  is  perfectly  natural  and  extremely 
advantageous  that  they  should  supplement  one  another 
and  lend  their  combined  strength  of  impulsion,  especially 
where  the  attainment  of  the  good  end  requires  severe  ex- 
ertion and  the  surmounting  of  great  obstacles.  At  first 
the  presence  and  influence  of  the  two  different  and  appar- 


286  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

ently  antagonistic  motives  may  be  accompanied  by  no  con- 
sciousness of  their  unity  in  the  higher  synthesis  of  the 
Moral  Ideal ;  but  the  experience  of  acting  under  their  com- 
bined promptings,  with  the  results  achieved,  will  itself 
produce  a  growing  sense  of  the  harmonious  cooperation  of 
intelligent  egoism,  altruism,  and  religious  devotion,  in  the 
attainment  of  Self-realization.  As  a  matter  of  actual  fact 
we  do  not  by  any  means  always  disapprove  of  action  from 
mixed  motives.  Instead,  our  judgments  of  others'  conduct 
when  we  come  to  reflect  upon  them  are  striking  proof  that 
we  do  appreciate  the  other  side  of  the  subject  just  dwelt 
upon,  viz.  that  the  operation  of  several  motives  in  place 
of  one  often  indicates  a  better  balanced  and  more  developed 
character.  As  the  genial  essayist  Dr.  Crothers  says  in 
discussing  this  subject  in  a  witty  paper: 

"  So  far  as  I  have  been  able  to  observe,  such  mixed  motives 
are  the  ones  that  take  men  furthest.  Altruism  is  no  exception 
to  the  general  rule  that  a  man  does  good  work  only  when  he 
likes  his  job.  .  .  .  We  cannot  abide  an  altruist  who  does  not 
enjoy  himself  and  who  has  not  a  sportsmanlike  spirit.  We 
resent  his  attempt  to  monopolize  brotherly  kindness.  If  he  be 
without  imagination  he  will  insist  on  working  for  us  instead 
of  with  us.  He  will  not  admit  us  to  a  partnership  in  good 
works.  He  insists  upon  doing  all  the  self-sacrifice  and  having 
us  take  the  ignominious  part  of  passive  recipients  of  his  goodness. 
He  confers  a  benefit  on  us  with  an  air  that  says,  '  I  have  come 
to  do  you  good.  I  have  no  selfish  gratification  in  what  I  am 
doing  for  you.  But  a  sense  of  duty  has  triumphed  over  my 
personal  inclination.'  .  .  .  The  universal  preference  which  all 
self-respecting  people  have  for  being  helped  by  cheerful  friends 
rather  than  by  conscientious  benefactors  is  a  great  limitation 
to  all  philanthropic  effort.  Unless  we  heartily  enjoy  ourselves 
other  people  will  not  allow  us  to  improve  their  minds  or  their 
morals." 20 

"CBOTHEBS:  "My  Missionary  Life  in  Persia,"  Atlantic  Monthly, 
October,  1910,  pp.  336-37. 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  MOTIVE  OF  GOODNESS      287 


REFERENCES 

SPENCEB,  Data  of  Ethics,  Chaps.  XT,  XII. 

SUTHERLAND,  Origin  and  Growth  of  the  Moral  Instinct,  Chaps.  XI- 

XIV. 

DARWIN,  Descent  of  Man,  Chap.  IV. 
HOBBES,  Human  Nature,  Chaps.  VII-IX. 
PAULSEN,  System  of  Ethics,  Book  II,  Chap.  VI. 

MABTINEAU,  Types  of  Ethical  Theory,  Part  II,  Book  I,  Chaps.  V,  VI. 
DEWEY  AND  TUFTS,  Ethics,  Chap.  XVIII,  §§  2.  3. 
SETH,  Ethical  Principles,  Part  I,  Chap.  Ill,  §  12. 
ALEXANDER,  Moral  Order  and  Progress,  Book  II,  Chap.  IV,  §  3. 


CHAPTER  V 
SELF-REALIZATION  AND  HAPPINESS 

1.  Pleasure  as  an  Element  in  Self-Realization. — 2.  Self -Realization 
Not  Identical  with  the  Greatest  Sum  of  Pleasures, — 3.  But 
Rather  with  a  Harmony  of  Pleasures,  or  Happiness. — 4.  Happi- 
ness Thus  the  Feeling  That  Accompanies  the  Organization  of 
Conduct. — 5.  Happiness  Not  to  Be  Accepted  as  the  Good,  Be- 
cause It  Is  Unduly  Subjective  in  Its  Reference. — 6.  And  It  Im- 
plies a  State  of  Passive  Enjoyment. — 7.  Is  the  Pursuit  of  Good- 
ness Certain  to  Result  in  the  Greatest  Happiness? — 8.  It  Is,  on 
the  Assumption  That  Moral  Purpose  Is  Supreme  in  the  Uni- 
verse,— 9.  And  That  Man  May  Complete  His  Moral  Development 
in  a  Future  Life. 

1.  Pleasure  as  an  Element  in  Self-Realization. — Refer- 
ence has  previously  been  made  to  the  fact  that  just  as 
on  the  level  of  sentient  life  pleasure  is  an  accompaniment 
of  all  action  which  is  beneficial  to  the  organism,  so  on 
the  higher  plane  of  intelligence  and  personality  pleasant 
feeling  is  attendant  upon  all  unimpeded  and  successful 
activity.  Such  activity,  having  its  source  in  self-conscious 
volition,  is  directed  not  merely  upon  those  objects  which 
natural  instinct  makes  attractive  because  required  for  the 
continued  preservation  and  well-being  of  the  human  or- 
ganism; it  is  directed  also  upon  the  ideal  objects  which 
are  likewise  necessary  for  the  satisfaction  of  man's  psychic 
capacities  of  thought,  emotion,  and  practice.  Pleasure  is 
thus  the  normal  accompaniment  of  all  voluntary  action 
when  successful  in  attaining  its  object,  and  equally  whether 
this  object  be  material  or  spiritual.  Now  Self-realization 
as  the  Highest  Good  is  just  the  fullest  possible  satisfaction 
of  all  the  capacities  of  intelligent  personality,  natural  and 
spiritual.  It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  pleasure  is  an  es- 

288 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  HAPPINESS  289 

sential  element  in  Self-realization,  an  integral, part ,o£_the 
(jood.  We  have  then  to  take  account  of  the  place  occupied 
by  Pleasure  in  the  good  life. 

2.  Self-Realization  Not  Identical  with  the  Greatest 
Sum  of  Pleasures. — If  it  be  true  that  pleasure  accompanies 
the  gratification  of  every  desire,  the  fulfilment  of  every 
purpose,  and  Self-realization  consists  in  the  fullest  possible 
satisfaction  of  all  purposes  and  desires,  the  question  arises — 
May  not  the  Good  then  be  conceived  as  the  maximum  of 
pleasure,  i.e.  the  greatest  amount  of  pleasure  obtainable 
by  the  individual  during  his  life?  If  we  grant  this,  we 
find  ourselves  in  practical  agreement  with  the  Hedonist 
whose  contention  we  lately  rejected  as  erroneous.  But 
further  thought  shows  us  that  the  logic  of  Self-realization 
compels  no  such  surrender  to  the  claims^ofJEIedonism :  the 
two  positions  remain  distinct  throughout  and,  in  certain 
points,  fundamentally  antagonistic.  For  the  recognition 
that  pleasure  is  a  necessary  constituent  of  Self-realization, 
the  highest  human  good,  is  by  no  means  identical  with 
the  assertion  that  man's  good  is  the  greatest  amount  of 
pleasure.  Pleasures  can  thus  be  added  only  when  reduced 
to  a  common  denominator.  And  this  could  be  accomplished 
solely  through  a  separation  of  pleasures  from  the  objects  in 
connection  with  which  they  arise.  Then,  indeed,  all  qualita- 
tive distinctions  would  disappear  and  we  would  have  left 
only  specific  instances  of  the  same  type  of  consciousness,  the 
pleasant  as  distinguished  from  the  unpleasant.  These  in- 
stances of  pleasant  feeling  would  differ  only  in  quantity,  i.  e. 
in  duration  and  intensity.  The  consistent  Hedonist  sep- 
arates pleasures  in  this  way  from  their  objective  con- 
ditions, admitting  no  qualitative  differences  and  propos- 
ing such  a  calculation  as  will  bring  the  individual  the 
greatest  amount  of  pleasure.  But  thus  to  separate  pleas- 
ures from  the  objects  and  activities  that  produce  them 
is  to  falsify  the  facts  of  experience.  A  pleasure  thus  cut 


290  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

away  from  its  objective  source  is  a  psychological  abstrac- 
tion, not  a  part  of  our  concrete  experience.  Pleasure  al- 
ways conies  to  us  as  one  element  in  a  unitary  experience, 
it  being  the  inner,  the  subjective  aspect,  to  which  the 
object,  as  the  outer  or  external  factor,  is  essential  and  com- 
plementary, the  two  being  strictly  inseparable  in  their 
intimate  and  organic  union.  When  pleasure  is  thus  con- 
ceived— not  as  an  abstract  psychological  entity,  mere  pleas- 
ure— but  concretely,  as  the  pleasure  of  this  object  or  that 
action,  they  do  differ  qualitatively.  The  pleasure  of  poetry 
has  a  different  quality  from  that  of  eating,  and  the  pleasure 
of  benevolence  from  either  of  the  other  two.  Now  Self- 
realization  implies  the  recognjjtion  of  a  difference  in  quality 
among  pleasures,  and  along  with  this  qualitative  difference 
a  difference  in  moral  value.  According  to  this  principle, 
the  moral  value  of  any  form  or  feature  of  conduct  is,  as 
we  know,  determined  by  the  degree  to  which  it  contributes 
to  the  realization  of  all  the  capacities  of  the  self.  But, 
in  this  very  respect,  pleasures  differ  widely.  Certain 
pleasures,  although  in  themselves  comparatively  intense, 
tend  to  destroy  the  capacities  out  of  which  they  arise  and 
to  lessen  the  amount  of  satisfaction  possible  to  other  capac- 
ities. On  the  contrary,  other  pleasures,  not  in  themselves 
strong,  are  self-augmenting  and  create  conditions  favorable 
to  a  fuller  exercise  of  the  other  capacities.  Compare,  for 
instance,  the  pleasures  arising  from  action  to  satisfy  two 
instincts,  both  natural  and  hence  having  a  legitimate  claim 
to  expression,  that  of  resentment  and  that  of  curiosity. 
The  pleasure  of  anger  and  retaliation,  if  sought  after  or 
frequently  enjoyed,  so  affects  the  disposition  of  the  agent, 
deadening  his  powers  and  warping  his  faculties,  that  his 
possibilities  for  satisfaction  in  other  lines  of  endeavor  are 
greatly  lessened.  The  other  pleasure,  though  less  vivid 
and  absorbing,  increases  with  repetition,  develops  into  the 
joy  of  intellectual  attainment  and.  through  the  added 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  HAPPINESS  291 

knowledge  which  accompanies  it,  assists  in  the  fulfilment 
of  all  other  aims  and  purposes.  Measured,  then,  by  the 
standard  which  Self-realization  applies,  some  pleasures  de- 
serve to  be  approved,  within  this  class  distinctions  being 
made  of  good,  better,  and  best ;  while  other  pleasures 
equally  deserve  to  be  condemned  as  bad.  From  the  good 
life  the  latter  class  of  pleasures  is,  of  course,  entirely  ex- 
cluded; while  pleasures  of  the  former  class  enter  in  a 
degree  proportionate  to  their  moral  value.  Since  Self- 
realization  thus  recognizes  qualitative  distinctions  among 
pleasures  and  provides  a  criterion  whereby  the  place  of 
each  pleasure  in  the  good  life  may  be  determined,  it  is 
obviously  in  radical  opposition  to  Hedonism,  wrhich  ignores 
all  differences  in  quality  and  proposes,  by  adding  quantities 
of  pleasure,  to  secure  the  greatest  amount. 

3.  But  Rather  with  a  Harmony  of  Pleasures,  or  Hap- 
piness.— The  Good  as  interpreted  by  Self-realization  is  not 
to  be  identified  with  a  sum  of  pleasures  but  rather  with 
a  harmony  or  system  of  pleasures.  To  such  a  harmony 
of  pleasures  the  word  Happiness  may  appropriately  be 
applied.  When  thus  used,  the  term  has  a  meaning  quite 
distinct  from  pleasure  or  a  sum  of  pleasures;  since  pleas- 
ures may  be  so  joined  as  to  constitute  a  true  synthesis 
entirely  different  from  the  mechanical  aggregate  which 
results  from  combining  them  externally.  Such  a  synthesis, 
as  has  been  pointed  out,  is  based  upon  an  insight  into  the 
qualitative  differences  between  pleasures,  differences  in  the 
content  and  meaning  through  which  one  pleasure  has  im- 
plicit reference  to  another.  For  it  is  a  fact  that  pleasures 
have  these  inner  relationships  and  in  consequence  of  them 
some  pleasures  reinforce  and  supplement  one  another  while 
other  pleasures  are  conflicting  and  discordant.  To  read 
an  interesting  novel  and  to  stroll  in  the  park  on  a  summer's 
evening  are  both  pleasant  diversions  and,  when  they  are 
taken  out  of  their  setting  in  the  life  of  a  particular  person, 


292  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

there  is  little  to  choose  between  them.  Yet  the  character 
of  each  is  such  as  to  make  it  harmonious  with  certain 
activities  and  enjoyments  and  discordant  with  others.  For 
the  bookkeeper  whose  eyes  are  strained  and  muscles 
cramped  by  the  day's  labor  the  pleasure  of  strolling  in 
the  park  is  much  to  be  preferred  of  the  two,  because  it 
both  affords  greater  present  satisfaction  through  its  con- 
trast with  the  mode  and  scene  of  his  daily  employment 
and  also  will  prepare  him  to  discharge  more  efficiently  and 
enjoyably  the  duties  of  his  occupation  on  the  morrow. 
The  other  pleasure,  on  the  contrary,  would  have  afforded 
less  present  enjoyment  through  its  unfavorable  relation  to 
the  day 's  labor  just  past  and  would  have  diminished  future 
satisfaction  because  affecting  prejudicially  the  activity  of 
the  coming  day.  The  case  is  typical  and  shows  that  the 
question  as  between  pleasures  cannot  be  settled  simply  by 
comparing  the  amount  of  enjoyment  each  will  furnish,  but 
involves  instead  a  consideration  of  each  in  the  total  context 
of  the  individual's  life,  and  a  discovery  of  which  one 
harmonizes  most  completely  with  all  his  other  activities 
and  enjoyments.  Happiness  may  be  understood  as  a  har- 
monious arrangement  of  pleasures,  a  system  or  synthesis 
in  which  each  of  the  constituent  pleasures  supplements  and 
strengthens  the  rest. 

"Within  such  a  system,  no  pleasure — no  matter  how  in- 
tense— which  conflicts  with  and  weakens  others,  thus  tend- 
ing to  destroy  the  unity  and  upset  the  equilibrium  of  the 
whole  system,  can  find  a  place.  But,  on  the  contrary, 
pleasures  in  themselves  weak  and  faint  enough  may  be 
given  an  important  place  because  reinforcing  and  reviving 
others.  Paradoxical  as  it  may  seem,  unpleasantness  or  even 
pain  may  have  its  part  in  producing  the  harmony  of  hap- 
piness just  as  a  discord  may  enter  into  and,  in  a  way, 
increase  the  harmony  of  a  musical  composition.  Thus  the 
happiness  of  a  great  love  or  friendship  may  be  increased 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  HAPPINESS  293 

by  the  pain  of  temporary  separation  from  the  beloved,  or 
by  the  suffering  that  may  be  undergone  in  serving  him. 
Of  course  it  is  not  true  that  in  such  cases  sorrow  is  trans- 
formed into  joy,  or  pain  into  pleasure,  in  the  literal  sense ; 
but  it  is  true  that  the  unpleasant  experience  is  intimately 
connected  as  an  essential  part  in,  or  necessary  means  to,  the 
realization  of  an  object  which  is  a  fertile  and  inexhaustible 
source  of  pleasure,  and  for  this  reason  is  continually  direct- 
ing the  attention  to  this  object  which  proves  on  thought  to 
be  so  agreeable  as  to  cause  the  present  pain  to  be  forgotten. 
Thus  the  pain  of  separation  causes  the  lover  to  think  of 
his  friend  and  immediately  his  pain  is  replaced  by  greater 
pleasure  in  the  thought  of  their  love:  the  suffering  of  the 
mother  from  weariness  of  her  long  vigil  over  the  sick  child 
is  constantly  arousing  a  deeper  joy  as  she  thinks  that 
through  these  painful  efforts  his  life  is  being  preserved. 

4.  Happiness  Thus  the  Feeling  That  Accompanies  the 
Organization  of  Conduct. — It  is  clear  that  such  a  harmony 
of  pleasures  as  we  have  been  describing  can  arise  only 
through  the  adjustment  of  the  various  activities  of  life — 
through  the  organization  of  conduct.  Hence  happiness 
may  be  defined  not  only  as  a  harmony  of  pleasures  but  \ 
also  as  the  pleasure  of  a  harmonized  or  unified  life.  With 
this  idea  in  mind,  Mr.  Rashdall  says  that  it  represents 
"  satisfaction  with  one's  existence  as  a  whole — with  the 
past  and  future  as  well  as  with  the  immediate  present."1 
Now,  as  we  are  already  aware,  such  a  unity  can  be  achieved 
in  human  life  only  through  the  continued  activity  of  voli- 
tion in  subordinating  particular  objects  of  desire  to  more 
general  aims  and  purposes  and  including  these  aims  and 
purposes  within  a  single  comprehensive  ideal.  "When  this 
is  done — or  to  the  degree  in  which  it  is  done — all  the  action 
of  the  individual  has  one  object  and  his  life  possesses 
unity.  The  progressive  realization  of  this  ideal  is  of  course 
1  RIBHDALL:  Theories  of  Good  and  Evil,  Vol.  II,  p.  57. 


294  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

accompanied  by  pleasure.  This  pleasure  may  be  continu- 
ous and  permanent;  for,  as  every  act  contributes  to  the 
realization  of  the  Supreme  Ideal,  its  attainment  occupies 
the  whole  of  the  individual's  life.  Unlike  the  narrower 
objects  of  natural  desire  and  individual  ambition,  its  pos- 
sibilities are  not  easily  exhausted  nor  is  its  attainment 
dependent  upon  fortune  and  circumstance  to  the  degree 
of  these  lesser  goods.  It  provides,  therefore,  a  permanent 
source  of  joy  which  gives  tone  and  buoyancy  to  the  whole 
of  life,  tending  to  crowd  out  the  pain  of  temporary  mis- 
fortune and  even  to  relieve  the  sorrows  of  deprivation  and 
bereavement.  The  complete  organization  of  life  through  a 
supreme  and  all-inclusive  ideal  with  the  consistent  pursuit 
of  this  ideal  is  thus  the  source  of  true  happiness  and  of 
that  "  peace  which  the  world  cannot  give."  History 
records  many  instances  of  men  who  have  identified  them- 
selves with  ideal  causes  and  have  found  in  their  devotion 
a  happiness  which  not  the  pain  of  increasing  illness  and 
infirmity  or  even  the  prospect  of  torture  and  death  itself 
could  destroy;  biography  tells  of  individuals  who,  restless 
and  discontented  while  seeking  their  own  comfort  and 
amusement,  discovered  joy  and  peace  in  the  assumption 
of  arduous  responsibility.  Of  course  the  question  may  be 
asked,  "  What  if  the  Ideal  prove  impossible  of  fulfilment, 
what  if  the  Cause  fail?  "  Whence  shall  come  the  happi- 
ness of  the  widowed  mother  who  devotes  herself  to  the 
education  of  her  only  son  and  sees  him  turn  out  a  weakling 
or  a  scoundrel,  or  of  the  patriot  who  strives  all  his  life 
for  the  freedom  of  his  people  and  at  last  when  the  oppor- 
tunity of  achieving  it  arises  sees  the  chance  lost  through  the 
cowardice  or  treachery  of  his  compatriots?  The  only  _an- 
swer  which  can  be  made  in  such  cases  is  that  the  particular 
cause  must  fail  in  order  that  a  still  larger  good  shall 
be  realized  and  that  the  individual  shall  find  in  the 
eventual  attainment  of  this  larger  end  a  source  of  renewed 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  HAPPINESS  295 

happiness.  To  believe  this — and  still  more  to  practise  it — 
requires  moral  faith,  faith  that  ultimately  the  force  which 
makes  for  righteousness  will  prevail.  Fortunately  human 
experience  justifies  this  faith — although  it  does  not  convert 
it  into  a  certainty.  The  yearning  to  identify  his  life  with 
an  object  that  could  not  fail,  to  adopt  as  his  own  a  purpose 
that  was  sure  to  be  realized,  led  the  ancient  Stoic  to  seek 
peace  and  happiness  in  unity  with  Nature;  it  was  the 
same  motive  which  caused  Spinoza  to  recommend  to  men 
the  "  intellectual  love  of  God,"  a  joy  which  arises  when 
the  finite  identifies  itself  with  the  Infinite  and  the  human 
individual  finds  his  own  good  in  the  Universal  Order. 

There  is  a  possible  danger,  however,  in  seeking  to  obtain 
happiness  or  peace  through  "  conformity  to  Nature  "  or 
"  union  with  God."  It  is  that  the  ideal  attained  will  be 
one  of  thought  merely,  the  discovery  that  Reality  is  one 
inter-related  system,  and  that  along  with  this  intellectual 
insight  will  come  a  quietism  in  practice,  and  an  acceptance 
of  whatever  occurs  as  right  because  necessitated  by  the  uni- 
versal system.  The  realization  of  such  an  ideal  satisfies 
man's  intellectual  faculty  alone  and  fails  to  fulfil  his  prac- 
tical needs  which  demand  that  the  world  shall  be  capable 
of  mastery  by  intelligence,  of  being  adapted  to  the  re- 
quirements of  conscious  personality.  When  the  attempt 
is  made  in  practice  to  assist  in  the  adjustment  of  the 
world  to  the  needs  of  intelligent  personality — when,  in 
other  words,  the  individual  endeavors  in  his  small  way 
to  promote  the  cause  of  universal  progress — his  ideal  proves 
far  more  difficult  to  achieve  and  his  prospect  of  securing 
happiness  through  its  successful  attainment  much  less  than 
if  he  were  content  with  a  purely  theoretical  adjustment. 
The  objective  order  seems  to  be  in  some  points  antagonistic 
to  the  purposes  of  intelligence,  and  evil  to  be  inherent  in 
the  nature  of  things.  The  same  objection  does  not  neces- 
sarily apply  to  belief  and  trust  in  an  over-ruling  Providence 


296  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

in  the  Christian  sense,  as  a  source  of  happiness  and  con- 
tentment, however;  for  the  distinguishing  feature  of  the 
Christian  revelation  is  the  conception  of  God  as  the  power 
striving  for  righteousness  in  the  world,  whose  efforts  in- 
volve suffering  and  self-sacrifice  but  whose  leadership  in 
the  battle  against  the  forces  of  evil  gives  man  the  assistance 
which  he  sorely  needs  and  the  practical  assurance  of  ulti- 
mate victory. 

5.  Happiness  Not  to  Be  Accepted  as  the  Good,  Because 
It  Is  Unduly  Subjective  in  Its  Reference. — Happiness,  as 
it  has  been  lately  defined,  is  evidently  an  essential  part 
of  Self-realization,  if  not  actually  identical  with  it.  In 
fact,  the  two  words  when  properly  understood  may  seem  to 
have  the  same  meaning.  Might  it  not  be  better  then  to 
speak  of  the  Good  as  Happiness  rather  than  Self-realiza- 
tion? Certainly  if  the  word  has  no  implications  which 
stand  in  the  way  of  its  use  it  is  preferable  on  grounds 
of  being  better  understood  and  hence  appealing  more 
directly  to  the  majority  of  minds.  But  the  truth  is  that 
happiness  does  possess  implications,  does  have  a  distinctive 
emphasis,  which  constitutes  sufficient  reason  for  rejecting 
it  as  the  summum  bonum.  Its  emphasis  is  always  upon 
the  inner,  the  subjective,  aspect  of  all  activity  and  ex- 
perience ;  it  calls  attention  to  the  effect  upon  the  sub- 
jective consciousness  of  every  action  and  achievement;  it 
directs  the  thought  of  the  self  upon  those  inner  states 
which  may  be  expected  to  accompany  the  pursuit  and 
attainment  of  objects.  Because  of  these  implications  hap- 
piness is  not  well-suited  to  serve  as  the  supreme  end  of 
conduct.  Led  to  think  of  his  own  states  of  feeling  pri- 
marily, the  agent  is  biassed  in  favor  of  those  objects  which 
have  proved  themselves  to  be  reliable  sources  of  enjoy- 
ment. But  the  full  satisfaction  of  his  own  will — as  well 
as  the  attainment  of  happiness  itself — requires  that  the 
agent  forget  himself  and  his  own  conscious  states  entirely 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  HAPPINESS  297 

in  his  devotion  to  the  object.     For  it  is  only  through  such 
free  outgoing  activity,  unimpeded  by  subjective  concern,  T 
that  the  powers  of  intelligence  and  volition  in  man  can    w 
reach  their  complete  fulfilment.     The  ' '  paradox  of  Hedon-  £ 
ism  "  that  to  secure  pleasure  one  must  forget  it  because,  if   .• 
he  aims  at  it,  he  will  miss  it,   retains  force  as  an  ob- 
jection to  making  any  form  or  system  of  feeling  the  supreme 
good.     Indeed  the  most  serious  objection  to  Self-realization  p 
itself  as  the  Good  is  that  it  directs  the  attention  of  the 
agent  upon  himself  rather  than  upon  the  objects  through 
which  his  will  can  gain  satisfaction.     This  disadvantage 
seems  to  be  more  than  counterbalanced,  however,  by  the 
merit  of  Self-realization  in  emphasizing  the  fact  that  the 
Good  is  based  upon  the  powers  and  capacities  of  the  con- 
scious self  and  not  upon  the   demands  of  any  external 
authority. 

6.  And  It  Implies  a  State  of  Passive  Enjoyment. — 
Closely  connected  with  the  first  is  a  second  objection  to 
accepting  happiness  as  the  summum  bonum.  In  laying 
stress  upon  the  subjective  effects  at  the  expense  of  the 
objective  conditions  of  activity,  such  a  conception  of  the 
Highest  Good  encourages  a  tendency  to  conceive  of  the 
Good  in  terms  of  passive  affection  instead  of  active  attain- 
ment; it  invites  the  agent  to  fall  into  a  state  of  receptive 
enjoyment  whenever  possible  and  to  seek  to  prolong  and 
repeat  such  enjoyment.  Certainly  this  is  an  erroneous 
conception  of  happiness  and  the  course  which  it  prompts 
the  individual  to  pursue  is  mistaken;  for,  as  the  ancient 
moralists  clearly  saw,  if  a  man  thinks  of  his  happiness 
as  an  effect  produced  in  him  by  external  causes  he  is 
then  made  dependent  upon  the  objects  without  him,  is 
rendered  the  slave  of  fortune  and  circumstance.  True  hap- 
piness, on  the  contrary,  arises  when  the  consciousness  of 
the  agent,  absorbed  in  the  pursuit  and  attainment  of  a 
chosen  end  which  he  recognizes  as  an  integral  part  of 


208  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

his  life's  purpose,  is  suffused  by  a  glow  of  pleasant  feel- 
ing which  adds  light  and  life  to  his  thought  and  action. 
Happiness  is  thus  inseparable  from  activity.  This  fact 
has  caused  great  moralists  like  Aristotle  to  define  it  as 
a  "  species  of  activity."  Not,  of  course,  that  happiness 
is  not  a  condition  of  feeling,  but  that  this  feeling  is 
one  that  arises  when  objects  are  chosen  and  pursued, 
and  is  present  in  a  degree  proportionate  to  the  adjustment 
and  organization  of  these  various  activities.  Thus  it  is 
relieved  from  entire  subservience  to  external  conditions 
and  made  dependent  upon  the  choice  and  action  of  the 
individual ;  it  also  gains  from  his  life  purpose  a  steadiness 
and.  permanency  which  raises  it  above  the  changing  play 
of  natural  events.  Aristotle  held  this  view  of  happiness, 
as  is  evident  from  the  following  statement: 

"  We  have  formed  a  conception  of  happiness  as  something  that 
is  permanent  and  exempt  from  the  possibility  of  change  and 
because  the  same  persons  are  liable  to  many  revolutions  of 
fortune.  For  it  is  clear  that,  if  we  follow  the  changes  of  fortune, 
we  shall  often  call  the  same  person  happy  at  one  time  and 
miserable  at  another,  representing  the  happy  man  as  '  a  sort 
of  chameleon  without  any  stability  of  position.'  It  cannot  be 
right  to  follow  the  changes  of  fortune.  It  is  not  upon  these  that 
good  or  evil  depends ;  "they  are  necessary  accessories  of  human 
life  as  we  said,  but  it  is  man's  activities  in  accordance  with  virtue 
that  constitute  bis  happiness  and  the  opposite  activities  that 
constitute  his  misery."  2 

7.  Is  the  Pursuit  of  Goodness  Certain  to  Result  in  the 
Greatest  Happiness? — Another  problem  related  to  happi- 
ness may  be  touched  upon  briefly  before  leaving  the  sub- 
ject ;  although  in  this  case  only  suggestions  and  not  a  final 
solution  can  be  presented.  Happiness  has  been  described 
as  a  feeling  of  harmony  which  results  from  the  organization 
of  our  activities.  Such  organization  frequently  requires 

2  ARISTOTLE:  Nicomachean  Ethics,  Bk.  I,  Chap.  IX  (Welldon's 
trans.,  p.  24). 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  HAPPINESS  299 

that  our  desires  be  denied  the  pleasure  of  immediate  ful- 
filment in  order  that  some  larger  end  may  be  realized  in 
the  future.  The  larger  end — ultimately  the  summum 
bonum  itself — may  be  expected  in  attainment  to  furnish 
a  satisfaction  so  great  as  to  outweigh,  or,  better,  so  com- 
prehensive as  to  include,  the  gratification  of  the  desire  in 
question  with  its  attendant  pleasure.  All  very  true,  pro- 
vided that  the  larger  end  is  attained.  But  suppose  that 
death  intervenes  and  prevents  this.  Has  not  the  indi- 
vidual really  lost  in  happiness  through  his  self-control  and 
devotion  to  his  ideal?  Moreover  is  it  not  the  common  lot 
of  those  who  sacrifice  their  immediate  inclinations  to  the 
pursuit  of  extensive  and  far-reaching  purposes,  to  die  be- 
fore seeing  these  purposes  realized?  The  complete  organi- 
zation of  conduct  requires  the  adoption  of  an  ideal  too 
comprehensive  to  be  realized  in  the  natural  lifetime  of 
the  human  individual.  Hence  the  good  man  seems  des- 
tined to  miss  the  pleasure  of  achieving  his  highest  aim. 
How  then  is  it  possible  to  maintain  that  happiness  always 
accompanies  self-organization  ?  Or  that  goodness  and  hap- 
piness coincide?  Immanuel  Kant  was  impressed  with  the 
importance  of  this  problem  and  was  led,  by  the  necessity 
which  he  felt  of  finding  a  solution  for  it,  to  introduce  two  of 
his  famous  "  postulates  of  practical  reason."  The  demand 
of  the  moral  law  that  happiness  shall  be  proportioned  to 
goodness  justifies  us  in  postulating,  he  believed,  the  exist- 
ence of  a  God  able  to  bring  about  such  an  apportionment, 
and  of  an  immortality  for  man  in  which  he  shall  have  time 
enough  to  bring  his  will  into  perfect  accord  with  the 
moral  law. 

8.  It  Is,  on  the  Assumption  that  Moral  Purpose  Is 
Supreme  in  the  Universe. — Kant's  introduction  of  God 
at  just  this  point  in  his  ethical  system  has  been  much 
criticised  and  certainly  this  criticism  is  deserved  if  it 
means  that  God  intervenes  in  a  mechanical  fashion  to 


300  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

square  accounts  and  set  things  right,  giving  the  good 
the  amount  of  pleasure  which  they  have  missed  in  life. 
But  the  question  of  the  relation  of  happiness  to  goodness 
is  not  necessarily  that  of  the  sanctions  of  goodness  in  the 
way  of  reward  conferred  upon  the  good  man  by  an  external 
power.  It  is  a  question  of  the  ultimate  ground  of  moral 
value.  Is  goodness  real  in  the  sense  that  the  man  who 
achieves  it  enters  upon  a  larger  and  more  permanent  life 
whose  satisfactions  are  uninterrupted  by  physical  death 
or  is  it  simply  a  belief  produced  in  the  human  mind  by 
certain  physical  and  biological  forces  which  work  upon  it, 
with  the  consequence  that  while  it  may  bring  about  useful 
adjustments  it  can  furnish  no  satisfaction  which  extends 
beyond  the  period  of  natural  existence  ?  The  whole  matter 
goes  back  finally  to  the  nature  of  the  universe — is.  moral 
purpose  inherent  in  it,  so  that  the  person  who  attains 
moral  development  at  whatever  cost  of  physical  health  or 
existence  acquires  more  reality,  or  is  it  the  product  of 
mechanical  forces  solely,  so  that  reality  must  be  measured 
altogether  by  the  amount  of  physical  energy  and  the  length 
of  natural  existence  ?  The  alternatives  remain  the  same  as 
they  appeared  to  Marcus  Aurelius:  "  Either  a  Providence 
or  Democritus  and  his  Atoms;  and  with  it  whatsoever  we 
brought  to  prove,  that  the  whole  world  is  as  it  were  one 
Citie  ?  ' !  But,  it  may  be  said,  we  have  already  based  moral 
value  upon  the  human  will.  This  is  truej  for  all  empirical 
study  of  conduct  must  proceed  from  a  consideration  of 
the  demands  of  volition  as  these  are  revealed  in  human 
experience.  Our  study  of  the  demands  of  intelligent  voli- 
tion has  brought  to  light  this  significant  fact,  however, — 
that  its  ultimate  satisfaction  requires  objects  whose  attain- 
ment extends  beyond  the  term  of  man's  natural  existence. 
The  possibility  of  full  satisfaction  to  the  human  will — of 
complete  Self-realization  for  man — evidently  depends,  there- 
fore, upon  the  standing  of  intelligent  will,  of  self-conscious 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  HAPPINESS  301 

personality,  in  the  universe.  Is  it  the  ultimate  reality  to 
which  all  physical  forces  are  subordinate!  Is  it  not  the 
source  of  the  natural  universe  itself?  We  can  have  no 
certain  knowledge  on  this  point  and  of  course  the  con- 
clusions of  other  sciences  besides  Ethics  should  influence 
our  belief.  Perhaps  the  best  justification  for  the  belief 
or  assumption  that  the  ground  of  the  universe  is  spiritual, 
is  the  fact  that  in  our  moral  lives  we  do  assume  it.  Or, 
more  precisely,  we  act  upon  it.  For  what  other  belief 
than  that  of  the  superior  reality  of  spirit  or  personality 
can  be  reconciled  with  the  system  of  moral  values  which 
we  uphold,  with  the  deliberate  sacrifice  of  natural  well- 
being,  to  ideal  ends  and  purposes  ?  It  is  a  significant  fact, 
furthermore,  that  those  individuals  who  do,  through  such 
sacrifice  of  natural  well-being,  enter  upon  the  larger  spir- 
itual life,  are  most  firmly  convinced  of  its  reality  and 
permanence.  The  supremacy  of  a  Power  that  makes  for 
righteousness  in  the  world, — in  other  words,  the  existence 
of  GTocl, — seems  requisite,  therefore,  to  explain  fully  the 
facts  of  morality,  and  particularly  to  give  a  final  solution  of 
the  problem  of  happiness  in  its  relation  to  goodness.  Not 
that  God  is  required  to  reward  the  good  and  punish  the 
wicked  after  death,  but  that  the  superior  reality  of  purpose 
anjljgersonality  over  matter  and  mechanism  is  necessary 
to_¥alidate  the  assumption  on  which  the  whole  of  moral 
development  is  based — that  the  human  will  gains  fuller 
satisfaction  through  the  pursuit  of  ideal  ends  and  pur- 
poses which  cannot  be  completely  realized  in  the  present 
life  than  in  the  attainment  of  those  natural  goods  whose 
possession  may  be  enjoyed  during  the  period  of  physical 
existence. 

9.  And  that  Man  May  Complete  His  Moral  Develop- 
ment in  a  Future  Life. — The  question  of  immortality  is 
also  involved  in  the  subject  under  discussion.  And  the  con- 
siderations advanced  as  a  warrant  for  belief  in  God  have 


302  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

equal  weight  in  the  case  of  immortality.  The  strongest 
argument  in  favor  of  belief  in  a  future  existence,  tliat  is, 
is  furnished  by  the  fact  that  in  moral  development  we  do 
surrender  satisfactions  which  we  are  reasonably  sure  of 
enjoying  in  the  present  existence  for  the  sake  of  ideals 
whose  scope  and  extension  are  too  great  to  permit  of  their 
being  realized  during  the  term  of  our  natural  lifetime. 
Now  if  death  cut  off  all  further  attainment  and  made  the 
complete  realization  of  these  ideals  absolutely  impossible, 
they  must  necessarily  lose  much,  a  great  part,  perhaps, 
of  their  value.  Immortality  has  its  deepest  meaning  and 
highest  worth  in  removing  from  man's  will  the  limitations 
imposed  by  the  conditions  of  physical  existence  and  in 
opening  before  it  the  prospect  of  a  far-reaching  development 
in  a  larger  life.  Mr.  Lowes  Dickinson  gives  beautiful  ex- 
pression to  this  idea  in  his  recent  Ingersoll  Lecture:  "  The 
whole  strength  of  the  case  for  immortality  as  a  thing  to 
be  desired,  lies  in  the  fact  that  no  one  in  life  attains  his 
ideal.  The  soul,  even  of  the  best  and  most  fortunate  of 
us,  does  not  attain  the  Good  of  which  she  feels  herself 
to  be  capable,  and  in  which  alone  she  can  rest.  The  poten- 
tiality is  not  wholly  realized.  I  do  not  infer  from  this 
that  life  has  no  value  if  the  Beyond  is  cut  off.  That,  I 
think,  is  contrary  to  most  men's  experience.  The  Goods 
we  have  here  are  real  Goods,  and  we  may  find  the  Evil 
more  than  compensated  by  them.  But  what  I  do  maintain 
is  that  life  here  would  have  indefinitely  more  value  if  we 
knew  that  beyond  death  we  should  pursue,  and  ultimately 
to  a  successful  issue,  the  chosen  ideal  of  which  we  are 
always  in  quest.  The  conception  that  death  ends  all  does 
not  empty  life  of  its  worth,  but  it  destroys  in  my  judgment 
its  most  precious  element,  that  which  transfigures  all  the 
rest;  it  obliterates  the  gleam  on  the  snow,  the  planet  in 
the  east;  it  shuts  off  the  great  adventure,  the  adventure 
beyond  death."  The  objection  may  be  offered  that  thus 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  HAPPINESS  303 

to  regard  immortality  as  implied  by  the  facts  of  moral 
development  is  to  introduce  a  factor  into  morality  for 
which  experience  gives  no  warrant  and  of  which  we  can 
have  no  certain  knowledge.  That  we  can  have  no  certain 
knowledge  concerning  this  matter  of  future  existence  is 
assuredly  true.  But  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that,  as 
we  have  already  seen,  moral  development  is  conditioned 
primarily  not  by  intellect  but  by  volition — it  is  a  venture 
of  will  rather  than  an  expression  of  knowledge.  To  take 
the  first  step  in  this  development  man  must  sacrifice  a 
present  inclination  which  he  actually  experiences  for  the 
sake  of  a  future  which  is  uncertain  and  whose  existence 
and  character  no  knowledge  can  fully  reveal  to  him.  Then 
in  social  adjustment  he  must  surrender  interests  which 
have  proved  satisfying  to  him  as  an  individual  in  order 
to  seek  social  ends  whose  nature  and  ability  to  satisfy 
cannot  be  known  before  the  sacrifice  is  made.  Is  it  un- 
reasonable then  to  suppose  that  moral  development  re- 
quires one  more  act  of  will — this  time  of  the  will  to  be 
a  self  whose  life  extends  beyond  the  limits  of  physical 
existence — in  which  man's  natural  life  itself  with  all  its 
interests  is  made  subordinate  to  the  fuller  and  more  lasting 
satisfactions  of  a  future  life?  Of  the  character  of  this 
future  life  we  know  nothing  and  possibly  should  expect 
to  know  nothing — whether  it  will  be  eternal  and  without  the 
bounds  of  time  or  will  have  its  duration  indefinitely  ex- 
tended, whether  we  shall  possess  individuality  and  enter 
into  social  relations  as  we  now  do.  But  the  same  considera- 
tions which  lead  us  to  believe  in  any  future  existence  at  all 
suggest  that  the  form  and  mode  of  that  existence  will  be 
such  as  to  enable  us  to  participate  in  the  realization  of 
those  ends  for  which  we  have  striven  and  suffered  here. 


304  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 


REFERENCES 

SIDQWICK,  Method  of  Ethics,  Book  III,  Chap.  XIV. 

ALEXANDEB,  Moral  Order  and  Progress,  Book  II,  Chap.  V,  §  2. 

MACKENZIE,  Manual  of  Ethics,  Book  II,  Chap.  IV. 

SETH,  Ethical  Principles,  Part  I,  Chap.  Ill,  §  11. 

DEWEY  AND  TUFTS,  Ethics,  Chap.  XV. 

PAULSEN,  System  of  Ethics,  Book  II,  Chap.  VII. 

KANT,  Practical  Reason,  Part  I,  Book  II,  Chap.  II  (Abbott's  trans.) 

LESLIE  STEPHEN,  Science  of  Ethics,  Chap.  X,  §  2. 


CHAPTER  VI 

SELF-REALIZATION  AND  THE  SYSTEM  OF  VIRTUES 

1.  Intuitional  and  Empirical  Conceptions  of  Virtue. — 2.  Virtue  as 
Interpreted  by  Self-Realization. — 3.  The  Classification  of  the 
Virtues. — 4.  Historic  Methods  of  Classifying  the  Virtues. — 5. 
Other  Methods  of  Classifying  the  Virtues. — 6.  Defects  of  These 
Classifications  Illustrated  by  Pre-evolutionary  Classification  of 
Living  Forms. — 7.  Classification  of  Virtues  as  Stages  in  Self- 
.  Organization  Illustrated  by  Evolutionary  Classification. — 8. 
Classification  of  Virtues  in  Accordance  with  Method  of  Self- 
Realization. — 9.  Advantages  of  Such  Classification. 

1.    Intuitional  and  Empirical  Conceptions  of  Virtue. — 

The  treatment  of  the  different  virtues  or  duties  which  are 
a  recognized  part  of  morality  has  varied  in  accordance 
with  the  theory  of  conscience,  whether  intuitional  or  em- 
pirical. Intuitionists  have  regarded  the  several  virtues  as 
habits  of  character  whose  moral  worth  is  self-evident  to 
the  human  conscience.  In  this  view,  certain  forms  of  con- 
duct such  as  courage  and  temperance  and  justice  are  given 
a  peculiar  authority  and  prestige  in  human  life.  It  is, 
moreover,  a  necessary  consequence  of  its  self-evident  char- 
acter that  this  authority  should  be  admitted  universally 
by  men  of  all  races  and  times.  Thus  Intuitionists  have 
been  led  to  maintain  that  a  generaljagreement  exists  among 
all  human  beings  as  to  the  fundamental  duties  or  virtues. 
If  such  agreement  exists  it  should  not  be  difficult  to  dis- 
cover what  these  virtuous  practices  are,  and  the  Intuition- 
ists have  endeavored  to  enumerate  them.  But,  possessing 
no  standard  of  moral  value  in  the  form  of  an  end  to  the 
attainment  of  which  all  right  practices  are  related  as 
means,  it  is  not  strange  that  these  moralists,  in  the  face 
of  the  bewildering  diversity  of  beliefs  and  practices  that 

305 


306  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

enter  into  the  morality  of  different  peoples  and  times, 
should  have  failed  in  their  attempt  to  discover  and  cata- 
logue the  fundamental  human  virtues.  The  Empjricist, 
on  the  contrary,  believing  that  judgments  of  moral  value 
are  determined  by  the  conditions  of  individual  existence 
and  social  survival,  does  not  expect  to  find  any  such  general 
agreement  among  men,  as  to  the  types  of  conduct  and 
character  which  are  approved  as  good.  He  does  not  be- 
lieve that  any  rule  of  action  possesses  absolute  authority 
over  the  life  of  men,  and  points  to  the  lack  of  agreement 
among  races,  as  to  what  is  virtuous  and  what  is  vicious, 
as  evidence  sustaining  his  position.  He  is  not  tempted  to 
undertake  a  description  or  classification  of  all  the  virtues, 
seeing  in  the  failure  of  the  Intuitionist 's  attempt  sufficient 
proof  of  the  futility  of  such  an  undertaking. 

2.  Virtue  as  Interpreted  by  Self-Realization. — In  this 
matter  Self-realization  as  usual  takes  the  via  media  and 
attains  the  larger  truth.  In  accordance  with  this  point  of 
view,  a  virtue  is  any  habit  or  disposition  required  of  a 
human  individual  as  a  means  to  his  Self-realization.1  It 
is  apparent  at  once  that  this  conception  of  virtue  allows 
for  and  explains  the  many  and  confusing  differences  of 
opinion  among  men  as  to  what  practices  are  virtuous. 
What  is  meat  to  one  man  is  poison  to  another;  yet  each 
must  have  his  proper  means  of  subsistence  if  he  is  to  live 
and  develop  his  powers.  Furthermore,  the  conditions  of 
man's  life,  the  character  of  the  human  environment,  vary 
with  every  individual,  every  race,  and  every  epoch ;  yet  it 
is  these  conditions  and  circumstances  that  the  individual 

1  The  relation  of  duty  and  virtue  was  explained  in  Chap.  I  of 
Part  II.  These  two  words  do  not  signify  different  things,  the  one 
an  outward  act,  which  is  distinct  from  the  other,  an  inward  quality. 
Rather  do  they  both  refer  to  the  same  thing,  to  an  activity  which 
is  judged  an  essential  part  of  goodness.  For  convenience,  the  term 
virtue  will  be  employed  exclusively  in  the  discussion  which  follows 
in  the  present  chapter,  it  being  understood  to  mean  equally  a  habit 
of  action  or  a  disposition  to  act. 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  SYSTEM  OF  VIRTUES      307 

must  reckon  with  and  utilize,  if  he  is  to  maintain  his 
existence  and  realize  his  larger  self.  It  is  not  strange  then 
that  what  one  race  esteems  highly  as  a  virtue  another  race 
at  a  different  period  of  development  and  under  other  con- 
ditions should  regard  with  great  disapproval  and  repug- 
nance. If  an  Eskimo  should  meet  the  game  he  is  hunting 
in  unusually  large  numbers  and  under  circumstances  ex- 
ceptionally favorable  to  himself,  it  might  well  be  a  virtuous 
action  for  him  to  make  as  large  a  kill  as  possible  in  order 
to  provide  food  for  himself  and  his  family  during  the 
winter;  but  such  wholesale  slaughter  of  game  by  a  sports- 
man in  a  civilized  country  would  be  rightly  condemned  and 
viewed  with  abhorrence.  For  the  scholar  who  works  long 
hours  at  his  desk  or  in  his  laboratory  it  is  a  duty  to  take 
exercise  in  the  open-air  for  a  certain  time  each  day ;  for  the 
farmer  who  works  in  the  fields  or  the  mechanic  whose  trade 
is  pursued  out-of-doors  this  duty  does  not  exist,  but  virtue 
for  him  consists  in  keeping  his  intellectual  faculties  alive 
by  daily  reading  and  thought. 

Adopting  the  principle  of  Self-realization  we  are  thus 
able  to  make  ample  allowance  for  the  variety  of  conditions 
under  which  moral  development  proceeds  and  do  full 
justice  to  the  relative  and  changing  character  of  moral 
distinctions ;  but  we  have  also  found  that  there  are  certain 
conditions  which  are  essential  to  all  human  life  and  con- 
duct. Every  human  individual  possesses  a  set  of  natural 
instincts  and  a  number  of  spiritual  capacities,  which  relate 
him  as  a  natural  being  to  material  objects  and  other  in- 
dividuals, as  a  conscious  self  to  other  selves  in  a  com- 
munity of  intelligence  and  personality,  as  a  human  person- 
ality to  the  Universal  Order  and  Purpose.  These  condi- 
tions, holding  for  all  human  beings,  determine  on  broad 
lines  the  course  of  Self-realization  for  every  one.  In  view 
of  the  aforesaid  characteristics  of  human  nature  and  human 
life  which  seem  to  be  fixed  and  essential,  all  men  must 


308  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

achieve  a  series  of  adjustments  if  they  are  to  organize  their 
conduct.  These  activities  of  adjustment  which  are  neces- 
•  sary  for  self -organization  in  the  case  of  every  human  being 
deserve  most  truly  the  designation  of  virtues.  Since  they 
are  indispensable  means  to  the  attainment  of  Self-realiza- 
tion, the  supreme  end,  they  share  its  absolute  moral  worth. 
And  as  they  are  practices  required  equally  of  all  men  who 
would  completely  organize  their  conduct,  they  may  be  dis- 
tinguished from  habits  of  character  requisite  to  Self-reali- 
zation in  different  individuals  and  with  particular  societies, 
and  be  properly  regarded  as  universal  virtues.  But  to 
maintain  that  these  habits  of  adjustment,  necessary  to  com- 
plete self-organization  in  all  men,  are  universal  in  their 
authority,  does  not  mean  that  their  worth  as  virtues  is 
recognized  by  all  peoples  or  observed  by  all  individuals. 
For  the  organization  of  conduct  is  achieved  through  a  slow 
and  arduous  development  both  in  society  and  the  indi- 
vidual; in  consequence  many  peoples  have  never  gone  be- 
yond the  earlier  stages  and  the  first  adjustments;  they 
admit  the  obligation  to  temperance  and  courage  but  have 
hardly  a  notion  of  idealism  or  benevolence.  Just  to  this 
extent,  accordingly,  their  moral  development  is  incomplete 
and  self-organization  unattained. 

3.  The  Classification  of  the  Virtues. — Thus  to  conceive 
of  virtuous  actions  as  necessjiry-jsteps  in  the  organization 
of  conduct,  and  of  the  fundamental  virtues  as  activities 
which  the  essential  conditions  of  human  life  require  of 
all  men  who  would  achieve  Self-realization,  gives  the  most 
satisfactory  solution  to  the  problem  of  the  virtues  and 
their  inter-relation.  Interpreting  the  virtues  as  necessary 
stages  in  self-organization  they  are  made  functions  within  a 
single  process  and  hence  joined  in  an  organic  system. 
Moreover,  a  criterion  or  standard  is  supplied  by  which  the 
claims  of  an  activity  or  disposition  to  be  admitted  to  the 
class  of  virtues  may  be  tested.  To  receive  a  place  in  the 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  SYSTEM  OF  VIRTUES     309 

system  such  an  activity  must  be  shown  to  be  necessary 
to  Self-realization  under  the  universal  conditions  of  human 
life.  Thus  the  foundation  is  laid  for  a  classification  of 
the  virtues  which  shall  be  systematic,  comprehensive,  and 
— most  important  of  all — expressive  of  the  inherent  char- 
acter of  moral  development  itself. 

The  value  of  such  a  classification  would  seem  to  be  self- 
evident.  Yet  thus  it  does  not  appear  to  recent  writers 
on  Ethics;  in  fact  the  whole  undertaking  has  fallen  into 
disfavor.  Professor  Dewey  regards  a  catalogued  list  of 
the  virtues  with  an  exact  definition  of  each  as  undesirable 
and  impossible.2  Professor  Mackenzie  thinks  that  the  at- 
tempt to  make  a  list  of  the  particular  virtues  is  almost 
frivolous.3  The  relative  and  changing  character  of  moral 
distinctions,  and  the  dependence  of  all  judgments  of  vice 
and  virtue  upon  individual  opinion,  are  cited  as  showing 
the  futility  of  any  attempt  to  make  a  classification  of  the 
virtues  which  shall  possess  universal  validity.  The  general 
acceptance  of  any  classification,  moreover,  would  mean  that 
morality  had  become  formalized  and  conventional;  since 
moral  development,  itself  living  and  fluent,  cannot  with- 
out violence  be  restricted  to  the  limits  of  fixed  forms 
of  conduct  and  character.  In  defense  of  the  value  and 
importance  to  Ethics  of  defining  and  classifying  the  virtues, 
the  reply  may  be  made  that  if  Ethics  is  to  succeed  in 
its  chief  purpose  of  describing  in  an  intelligible  and  con- 
vincing fashion  the  essential  features  of  the  good  life, 
it  must  be  able  to  give  this  life  some  coherent  form,  some 
definite  framework.  Such  form  or  framework  is  supplied 
only  when  we  define  the  activities  which  are  necessary 
constituents  of  goodness  in  all  individuals.  Furthermore, 
if  the  conclusions  of  Ethics  are  to  furnish  guidance  in 
life  they  must  contain  recommendations  sufficiently  concrete 

*  DEWEY  AND  TUFTS  :  Ethics,  p.  402. 
•MACKENZIE:  Manual  of  Ethics,  p.  366. 


310  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

and  certain  to  be  carried  out  in  practice.  There  is  danger 
lest  present-day  Ethics  in  its  anxiety  to  avoid  stereotyped 
formulas  and  systematic  principles  should  leave  its  students 
with  ideas  too  indefinite  and  complicated  to  be  remembered 
or  applied  in  actual  life.  There  is  cause  then  for  the 
complaint  of  the  French  moralist  who  wrote  a  few  years 
ago  deploring  the  lack  of  agreement  in  their  practical 
recommendations  among  teachers  of  Ethics  in  French  uni- 
versities, saying  these  differences  of  opinion  furnished  cap- 
ital for  the  enemies  of  philosophy  in  ecclesiastical  circles.* 
He  then  detailed  a  list  of  ten  virtues  and  maintained  that 
these  at  least  might  be  generally  recognized  by  moralists 
as  essential  to  good  conduct. 

4.  Historic  Methods  of  Classifying  the  Virtues.  —  The 
most  important,  and  still  the  most  celebrated,  classification 
of  the  virtues  is  that  of  Pl^to,  who  describes  the  four 
"  cardinal  "  virtues,  "Wisdom,  Courage,  Temperance,  and 
Justice.  This  classification  doubtless  owes  its  fame  and 
continued  influence  to  the  fact  that  it  is  really__organic  — 
being  based  upon  an  analysis  of  the  faculties  of  the  human 
self  and  a  study  of  the  conditions  of  their  activity  in 
human  society.  Recognizing  three  "  faculties  "  in  the 
human  soul,  the  rational,  spirited,  and  appetitive,  Plato 
considers  that  a  virtue  resides  in  the  discharge  of  its 
proper  office  by  each  of  these  faculties,  Wisdom  in  the 
control  by  reason  of  appetite,  Courage  in  the  execution  by 
will  of  the  commands  issued  by  reason  to  sensuous  desire, 
and  Temperance  in  the  subjection  of  appetite  and  desire 
to  the  control  of  reason.  Justice,  the  virtue  remaining, 
consists  in  the  harmonious  activity  of  the  whole  self  which 
results  from  the  proper  functioning  of  each  of  these  fac- 
ulties within  its  own  province.  Justice  is  evidently  iden- 
tical with  Self-realization  and  the  three  other  virtues  may 


E:    "Lea    Principes   Universels   de    I'&Iucation   Morale," 
Revue  de  Metaphysique,  Vol.  IX,  p.  237. 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  SYSTEM  OF  VIRTUES     311 

be  considered  as  adjustments  required  for  this  end  by 
the  essential  characteristics  of  the  human  self.  The  classi- 
fication is  patently  unsatisfactory,  however,  because  it  does 
not  contain  enough  virtues  to  cover  the  whole  field  of  the 
moral  life.  It  has  a  semblance  of  adequacy  only  because 
justice  is  made  to  include  all  the  social  virtues.  Perceiving 
this  defect  in  the  Platonic  classification,  Aristotle  gives  us 
a  much  longer  list  of  virtues.  But  while  his  classification 
is  much  more  inclusive  and  concrete  than  that  of  Plato, 
it  is  less  organic  and  essential.  He  first  divides  virtues 
into  two^jclasses,  intellectual  and  moral,  the  former  being 
activities  of  reason  alone  and  the  latter  involving  both  the 
rational  and  the  non-rational  principles  in  human  nature 
and  consisting  in  the  control  by  reason  of  desire  and  emo- 
tion. Now  the  law  of  reason  in  the  conduct  of  life  is 
that  of  the  organic  mean,  i.e.  such  regulation  of  every 
impulse  and  activity  as  will  make  it  a  means  to  the  realiza- 
tion of  the  end  of  life  itself.  The  moral  virtues  then 
consist  in  the  observance  of  this  "  golden  mean  "  in  the 
gratification  of  every  desire.  Aristotle  enumerates  a  num- 
ber of  virtues  which  thus  represent  moderation  in  the 
different  departments  of  human  nature  and  the  various 
activities  of  human  life.  His  account  of  these  virtues, 
while  always  highly  illuminating  and  instructive,  contains, 
through  its  very  fullness  and  detail,  much  that  applies 
only  to  his  own  time  and  people.  One  misses,  moreover, 
a  unifying  principle  which  will  reveal  the  inner  and  essen- 
tial articulation  of  these  forms  of  conduct.  As  Mackenzie 
says,  Aristotle's  list  of  the  virtues  is  little  more  than  a 
"  collection  of  specimens  of  some  of  the  most  important  ; 
types  to  be  found  in  his  age  and  country. ' ' 5 

5.    Other  Methods  of  Classifying  the  Virtues. — Many 
other  classifications  of  the  virtues  have  been  made  since 
the  time  of  the  Greek  moralists.     A  method  frequently 
•MACKENZIE:  Manual  of  Ethics,  p.  372, 


312  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

used  is  as  follows:  Certain  types  of  action  are  recognized 
as  virtuous.  These  are  examined  and  compared.  Points 
of  similarity  are  noted  by  which  several  virtues  are  asso- 
ciated together  and  at  the  same  time  set  off  from  other 
virtues  which  do  not  possess  these  qualities.  One  of  these 
aspects  in  which  groups  of  virtues  differ  is  selected  as  a 
convenient  principle  of  classification.  Thus  the  object  of 
reference  of  a  virtue  is  often  chosen  as  a  handy  means 
of  classifying  it.  Certain  virtues  are  distinguished  as 
self-regarding,  like  prudence  and  temperance;  others  are 
said  to  be  social  in  their  reference,  like  justice  and  sym- 
pathy. Or,  the  faculties  which  they  bring  into  play  are 
hit  upon  as  a  principle  for  dividing  the  virtues.  We 
then  have  intellectual  virtues,  like  tolerance  and  sincerity; 
virtues  of  the  will,  as  courage  and  self-control;  and  those 
of  the  affections,  as  kindness,  loyalty,  etc. 

An  excellent  illustration  of  this  way  of  treating  the 
virtues  is  furnished  by  the  classification  of  Thomas  Aquinas, 
the  accepted  philosopher  of  the  Roman  Catholic  church. 
Thomas  first  divides  the  virtues,  according  to  their  source, 
into  natural  and  supernatural.  The  supernatural  virtues, 
faith,  hope,  and  charity,  are  produced  in  man  by  God. 
The  natural  virtues  man  acquires  by  the  exercise  of  his 
own  powers.  They,  in  their  turn,  are  divided,  according 
to  their  source  in  human  nature,  into  intellectual  and 
moral  virtues.  The  moral  virtues  are  four,  justice,  pru- 
dence, courage,  and  temperance.  In  classifying  these  four, 
Thomas  uses  another  principle  and  distinguishes  them 
according  to  the  object  of  their  reference.  Thus  justice, 
because  it  refers  to  the  good  of  others,  is  separated  from 
prudence,  courage,  and  temperance,  which  are  concerned 
with  the  welfare  of  self. 

6.  Defects  of  These  Classifications  Illustrated  by 
Pre-evolutionary  Classification  of  Living  Forms. — Such 
a  method  of  classification  has  grave  faults.  It  is  bound  to 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  SYSTEM  OF  VIRTUES      313 

lead  to  results  largely  subjective,  because  the  principle 
used  depends  upon  individual  taste  and  opinion.  The 
same  virtue  may  belong  to  an  indefinite  number  of  groups, 
according  to  the  quality  or  aspect  of  it  chosen  for  em-  / 
phasis.  Thus  tolerance  may  be  classed  with  sincerity  as 
an  intellectual,  or  with  justice  as  a  social  virtue,  according 
as  we  emphasize  its  source  in  the  individual  nature,  or 
the  end  toward  which  it  is  directed.  Then,  too,  a  principle 
of  classification  so  selected  for  convenience's  sake  affords 
no  test  of  the  fitness  of  any  activity  to  be  admitted  to  the 
system  of  virtues.  Suppose  we  classify  the  virtues  accord- 
ing to  the  object  of  their  reference.  Then  any  practice  de- 
signed to  promote  the  welfare  of  the  self,  e.g.  cunning, 
might  be  included  among  the  self-regarding  virtues.  At 
least  the  principle  of  classification  would  furnish  no  ob- 
stacle. But  these  and  many  other  shortcomings  have  their 
roots  in  one  fundamental  defect, — a  principle  is  employed 
in  classification  which  is  not  organic  to  the  field  of  its  • 
application.  Hence  it  follows  inevitably  that  the  results 
obtained  are  subjective,  and  room  is  left  for  endless  doubt 
and  dispute.  No  necessity  attaches  to  the  conclusions 
because  the  essential  inter-relation  of  the  facts  is  not 
observed. 

The  biological  sciences  have  long  since  abandoned  a 
method  of  classification  whose  results  are  so  unsatisfactory. 
Before  the  time  of  Darwin,  however,  plants  and  animals 
were  classified  in  this  fashion.  The  naturalists  of  the 
eighteenth  century  based  their  classifications  for  the  most 
part  upon  broad  and  easily  discovered  resemblances  in  the 
external  characters  of  organisms.  Such  similarities  in 
structure  and  habit  as  seemed  important  to  the  individual 
investigator  were  utilized  by  him  in  the  grouping  of  forms. 
None  of  the  systems  thus  constructed  gained  universal 
acceptance;  for  all  were  subjective,  and  hence  artificial. 
But  the  advent  of  evolution  changed  all  this,  and  put  into 


314  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

the  hands  of  the  biologist  a  new  and  better  instrument 
for  the  organization  of  his  field.  The  relation  of  descent 
was  seen  to  constitute  the  natural  principle  of  classification. 
Living  forms  which  are  grouped  genetically  are  not  arbi- 
trarily associated  by  an  external  tie  and  a  common  label; 
they  are  organically  united  by  community  of  descent  and 
consequent  identity  of  nature.  By  their  phylogenetic 
affinities  the  various  living  forms  are  grouped  into  an 
organic  system,  between  the  members  of  which  there  is 
essential  inter-relation  and  functional  inter-dependence. 

7.  Classification  of  Virtues  as  Stages  in  Self-Organi- 
zation Illustrated  by  Evolutionary  Classification. — We 
now  ask,  can  we  make  such  a  classification  of  the  virtues, 
a  classification  based  not  on  external  resemblances  but  on 
organic  interconnection?  Can  we  apply  the  organic  con- 
ception to  the  moral  life,  and  conceive  of  the  virtues  as 
functions,  whose  nature  and  position  are  determined  by 
the  part  they  play  in  the  realization  of  the  Moral  Ideal? 
This  is  quite  possible  if  we  understand  the  moral  life  as  a 
development  whose  end  is  the  complete  organization  of 
human  conduct,  and  the  different  virtues  as  necessary  steps 
in  this  process  of  organization.  Pursuing  this  method  we 
reach,  it  would  appear,  a  satisfactory  classification  of  the 
virtues.  It  resembles  the  classification  of  living  forms 
made  by  the  biologist.  Like  this,  it  is  a  natural  arrange- 
ment based  upon  genetic  relationship  and  functional  inter- 
dependence. As  the  various  species  of  plants  and  animals 
are  regarded  as  stages  in  the  evolution  of  the  living  organ- 
ism, so  the  different  virtues  are  conceived  as  steps  in  the 
evolution  of  conduct.  As  the  many  living  species  are 
united  by  genetic  affinities  in  one  great  organic  system,  so 
the  different  virtues  are  united  in  the  complete  organiza- 
tion of  conduct.  As  the  species  are  classified  according 
to  the  part  they  play  in  the  process  of  organic  evolution, 
so  the  virtues  are  classified  according  to  the  office  they 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  SYSTEM  OF  VIRTUES     315 

discharge  in  the  organization  of  conduct.  Thus  our  ideal 
of  a  principle  organic  to  the  field  of  its  application  is 
realized.  The  virtues  are  classified  within  the  system  ac- 
cording to  the  function  which  they  discharge  in  its  organi- 
zation. Temperance  and  prudence  are  associated  because 
both  are  required  in  the  organization  of  individuality. 
Justice,  and  benevolence  are  distinguished  from  them  and 
classed  together  because  necessary  for  the  adjustment  of 
thejndiyidual  to  society.  Finally,  it  may  be  noticed  that 
here  the  principle  used  in  classification  is  itself  a  test  of 
the  fitness  of  any  activity  to  be  admitted  to  the  system. 
For  it  is  only  through  the  function  which  it  discharges  in 
the  organization  of  conduct  that  an  activity  can  be  classed 
among  the  virtues. 

8.  Classification  of  the  Virtues  in  Accordance  with  the 
Method  of  Self-Realization. — Adopting  the  method  pro- 
posed and  following  it  out  along  the  lines  indicated  in 
previous  chapters,  we  recognize  first  that  self-organization 
for  man  involves  three  necessary  aspects: 

I.  The  organization  of  impulses  and  activities  within 
the  nature  of  the  individual. 

II.  The    organization    of    individual    interests    within 
society. 

III.  The  adjustment  of  human  welfare  to  Universal 
Reality. 

We  see  further  that  self -organization  in  each  of  the  first 
two  aspects  (with  which  alone  Ethics  is  directly  concerned) 
can  be_achieved  only  through  two  subordinate  activities 
of  adjustment.  These  adjustments,  rendered  habitual,  are 
in  truth  necessary  steps  in  the  organization  of  conduct. 
They  are  as  follows: 

I.  INDIVIDUAL. 

a)  The   adjustment  of  all  natural  desires  to  the 
material  comfort  and  well-being  of  the  individual. 
6)  The  adjustment  of  the  individual's  physical  com- 


316  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

fort  and  well-being  to  those  ideals  required  to  satisfy 
his  spiritual  capacities. 
II.  SOCIAL. 

a)  The  adjustment  of  individual  interest  to  the  in- 
terests of  others  with  whom  he  comes  into  personal 
contact. 

6)  The  adjustment  of  all  individual  interests  to  the 
welfare  of  all  human  personality. 
Let  it  be  noted  finally  that  each  of  these  habits  of  ad- 
justment has  two  sides;  a  negative,  in  the  repression  or 
restriction  of  constituent  activities;  and,  a  positive,  in  the 
attainment  of  a  more  comprehensive  end  thereby.  Such 
positive  and  negative  sides  may  be  clearly  distinguished 
in  any  adjustment  which  is  a  step  in  progressive  organiza- 
tion and  it  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  to  find  that  in  the 
four  or  (including  the  religious)  the  five  adjustments 
above-named,  each  side  furnishes  the  basis  for  a  virtue. 
It  is  of  course  a  well-known  fact  that  the  virtues  go  in 
pairs,  the  members  of  which  supplement  and  complete  one 
another,  as  e.g.  justice  and  benevolence,  temperance  and 
prudence. 

Thus  we  are  enabled  to  designate  and  define  ten  virtues 
which  are  necessary  steps  or  stages  in  Self-realization  under 
the  universal  conditions  of  human  life. 
I.  INDIVIDUAL. 

o-l)  Temperance. — The  habit  of  restraining  single 
impulses  and  desires  in  the  interest  of  individual  well- 
being. 

a-2)  Prudence. — The  habit  of  furthering  individual 
comfort  and  security  through  the  due  subordination 
of  single  impulses  and  desires. 

6-3)  Courage. — The  habit  of  sacrificing  individual 
safety  and  comfort  in  the  attainment  of  a  larger  and 
more  comprehensive  good. 

6-4)  Idealism  (Wisdom,  Efficiency,  Refinement). — 


SELF-REALIZATION  AND  SYSTEM  OF  VIRTUES     317 

The  habit  of  exercising  the  higher  spiritual  capacities 
of  the  individual  at  the  expense  of  his  material  com- 
fort and  pleasure. 

II.  SOCIAL. 

o-5)  Kindness. — The  habit  of  surrendering  individ- 
ual interest  when  this  is  known  to  conflict  with  the 
interest  of  another. 

a-6)  Friendship. — The  habit  of  promoting  another's 
welfare  with  disregard  for  one's  own  interest. 

6-7)  Justice. — The  habit  of  subordinating  individual 
interest,  whether  of  self  or  of  others,  to  the  good  of 
humanity. 

6-8)  Benevolence. — The  habit  of  promoting  the  wel- 
fare of  all  fellow-men,  whether  in  community,  nation, 
or  world,  by  means  of  individual  effort  and  initiative. 

III.  RELIGIOUS. 

a-9)  Reverence. — The  subordination  of  human  in- 
terests to  the  ends  of  Universal  Intelligence. 

o-lO)  Piety. — The  adoption  by  man  of  the  Universal 
Purpose  as  his  good. 

9.  Advantages  of  Such  Classification. — The  agreement 
of  the  classification  here  proposed  with  modern  evolutionary 
conceptions  is  brought  out  clearly  if  we  compare  it  with 
that  made  by  Thomas  Aquinas  and  adopted  by  Roman 
Catholic  moralists.  Indeed,  the  classification  here  given 
is  related  to  that  of  Thomas  much  as  modern  genetic  systems 
in  biology  are  related  to  those  of  the  pre-Darwinian  natu- 
ralists. Thus  Thomas  separates  absolutely  the  supernatural 
from  the  natural  virtues.  The  former  are  gifts  of  God; 
the  latter  have  natural  causes.  In  an  analogous  way  pre- 
Darwinian  science  separated  man  from  other  animal  species, 
believing  that  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  his  creation  had 
given  him  a  unique  place  in  the  organic  realm.  We  have 
recognized  no  such  difference  in  kind  between  the  "  re- 
ligious "  and  other  virtues.  All  are  stages  in  one  process 


318  THE  GOOD  AS  SELF-REALIZATION 

of  organization,  the  religious  virtues  representing  simply 
the  final  step  in  which  the  individual  adjusts  himself  to 
Universal  Eeality.  In  a  like  manner,  of  course,  modern 
science  admits  of  no  absolute  separation  between  the  human 
and  other  species.  In  his  detailed  classification  of  the 
natural  virtues  Thomas  makes  sharp  distinctions  based 
upon  single  features  chosen  as  principles  of  division,  thus 
separating  the  intellectual  from  the  moral  virtues  according 
to  the  faculties  which  they  bring  into  play,  rational  or 
appetitive,  and  among  the  moral  virtues  distinguishing  two 
classes  according  to  the  object  of  their  reference,  social 
or  selfish.  All  this  reminds  us  of  eighteenth-century  classi- 
fications in  biology  by  means  of  parts  and  attributes  singled 
out  by  the  systematist  because  serviceable  to  his  purpose. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  arrangement  suggested  above  agrees 
with  modern  evolutionary  systems  in  allowing  no  arbitrary 
^distinction  of  forms,  but  classifying  them  all  according  to 
ftheir  genetic  affinities  in  one  process  of  development. 


The  following  chapters  are  devoted  to  a  study  of  these 
different  virtues  which  represent,  in  their  orderly  sequence, 
the  necessary  stages  in  the  life  of  Self-realization. 

REFERENCES 

DEWEY  AND  TUFTS,  Ethics,  Chap.  XIX. 

MACKENZIE,  Manual  of  Ethics,  Book  II,  Chap.  Ill,  and  Book  III, 

Chap.  IV. 

PAULSEN,  System  of  Ethics,  Book  III,  Chap.  I. 
ALEXANDER,  Moral  Order  and  Progress,  Book  II,  Chap.  VL 
SIDQWICK,  Methods  of  Ethics,  Book  III,  Chap.  II. 
SETH,  Ethical  Principles,  Part  II,  Chaps.  I,  II. 
GREEN,  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  Book  III,  Chap.  V. 
ABISTOTLE,  Nicomachean  Ethics,  Book  II  (Welldon's  trans.). 
PLATO,  Republic,  Book  IV    (Trans,  of  Davies  and  Vaughn). 


PART  FOUR 
THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-KEALIZATION 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  INDIVIDUAL  VIRTUES 

1.  The  Exercise  of  Volition  as  the  Pre-aupposition  of  All  Moral 
Development.  —  2.  Temperance.  —  3.  Prudence.  —  4.  Courage.  — 
5.  Idealism. 

1.  The  Exercise  of  Volition  as  the  Pre-supposition  of 
All  Moral  Development. — The  human  race  as  a  whole  has 
inherited  from  its  animal  progenitors  certain  natural  in- 
stincts and  impulses,  such  as  those  of  food  and  sex,  of 
curiosity  and  acquisition,  of  sympathy  and  resentment. 
These  instincts  have  been  developed  in  the  organism  as 
means  of  adjusting  it  to  the  environment;  they  enable  the 
living  being  to  avail  itself  of  the  resources  of  the  natural 
world  and  thus  to  preserve  its  existence  and  maintain  its 
strength. 

The  preliminary  condition  of  all  moral  development  is 
that  the  objects  of  these  instincts  and  impulses,  originally 
pursued  from  inherited  nervous  tendency,  shall  become  ends 
of  conscious  desire.  That  the  self  shall  be  capable  of 
intelligent  volition  is  the  pre-requisite  of  its  own  reali-  ' 
zation.  Volition  first  manifests  itself  as  an  organizing 
agency  in  the  control  of  action  by  intelligent  desire.  In 
this,  the  simplest  form  of  voluntary  action,  an  object  is 
pursued  because  it  corresponds  to,  and  contributes  to 
the  realization  of,  an  idea  already  present  in  the  mind 
of  the  self.  Thus  the  will  initiates  that  process  of  expan- 
sion whereby  the  self  grows  by  appropriating  from  the 
external  world  those  objects  that  appeal  to  it.  With  the 
ability  to  act  in  fulfilment  of  desire  there  appears  for  the 

821 


322  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

first  time  in  the  history  of  the  living  organism  the  possi- 
bility of  self-expression  and  self-development.  Its  advent 
means  the  attainment  of  freedom  as  well  as  the  assump- 
tion of  responsibility  on  the  part  of  the  living  individual. 
Hence  the  ability  to  satisfy  desire  through  intelligently 
directed  effort  must  be  present  as  the  foundation  upon 
which  all  further  building  of  personality  rests. 

Since  it  is  the  indispensable  preliminary  of  all  personal 
development, — the  first  condition  of  Self-realization  with 
all  men, — the  ability  of  volition  to  achieve  successfully 
objects  of  desire  seems  to  demand  recognition  as,  in  its 
continuous  exercise,  the  first  of  the  virtues  of  the  moral 
life.  Certainly,  the  inability  to  pursue  and  attain  objects 
of  desire  would  render  all  moral  development  impossible ; 
the  case  of  the  individual  thus  incapacitated  would  be  quite 
hopeless  morally.  Indeed,  the  exercise  of  this  fundamen- 
tal capacity  of  volition  is  so  necessary  that  without  it  the 
individual  could  not  be  regarded  as  a  moral  agent  at  all. 
Since  it  is  the  possession  of  every  normal  human  being, 
however,  the  activity  in  question  is  rather  taken  for  granted 
as  the  pre-supposed  basis  of  all  conduct,  than  esteemed 
as  a  distinct  factor  in  moral  attainment. 

As  its  first  necessary  step  forward,  Self-realization  re- 
quires of  all  men  such  adjustment  of  natural  impulses  and 
desires  as  will  make  them  a  means  to  the  preservation  and 
comfort  of  the  individual.  On  its  negative  side  this  activity 
of  adjustment  is  identical  with  the  virtue  of  temperance. 

2.  Temperance. — Temperance  is  the  habit  of  restrain- 
ing single  impulses  and  desires  in  the  interest  of  individual 
well-being.  Signifying  the  control  of  natural  instinct  by 
active  intelligence  it  is  the  fundamental  virtue  of  the 
moral  lif e.  In  emphasis  of  this  point  Paulsen  says : 

"  Temperance  or  moderation,  the  ability  to  resist  temptation 
to  sensuous  pleasure,  is  the  precondition  of  humanization.  The 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  VIRTUES  323 

animal  is  essentially  blind  impulse,  in  the  satisfaction  of  which 
its  life  consists.  Man,  too,  is  endowed  with  an  animal  nature, 
but  its  purpose  is  to  serve  as  the  soil  for  the  higher  spiritual 
life;  this  soil  is  prepared  by  the  discipline  of  the  natural  im- 
pulses." 1 

Our  natural  desires  are  thus  habitually  restrained,  but 
not  because  they  are  in  themselves  evil  and  ought  to  be 
uprooted  from  our  nature.  From  the  Self-realization 
standpoint,  all  normal  instincts  and  impulses  of  man  are, 
on  the  contrary,  good  in  themselves;  moral  value  attaches 
onTy^jtT  their  expression  and  never  to  their  suppression 
as  an  end  sought  for  its  own  sake.  Goodness  belongs  only 
to  the  affirmation  of  human  nature,  never  to  its  negation, 
except  when  this  is  a  means  to  a  fuller  and  more  complete 
affirmation.'  And  it  is  as  a  means  of  securing  the  fullest 
satisfaction  of  our  nature  rather  than  of  repressing  it  that 
temperance  is  placed  in  the  first  rank  of  the  virtues.  For 
the  single  impulse  or  desire,  if  permitted  all  the  gratifica- 
tion which  it  does  on  its  own  account  demand,  will  hinder 
or  prevent  the  satisfaction  of  other  desires.  Hence  the 
greatest  possible  satisfaction  of  all  desires  and  capacities 
makes  necessary  the  habitual  restraint  of  single  ones  within 
the  limits  set  by  the  rightful  claims  of  others. 

By  temperance  we  understand,  therefore,  not  abstinence, 
not  repression,  but,  in  general,  moderation  in  all  exercise  ) 
and  indulgence.  Thus  we  take  the  word  in  the  Greek 
sense,  meaning  by  temperance  the  measured  life,  the  ordered 
life — the  life  .which  observes  the  "  golden  mean  "  in  all 
its  activities,  not  refraining  from  any  wholesome  pleasure 
or  normal  gratification  but  at  the  same  time  scrupulously 
avoiding  excess  in  every  case.  But  it  should  be  especially 
noted  that  true  moderation — as  Aristotle  himself  observed 
of  the  ' '  golden  mean  ' '  — does  not  permit  of  the  same  fixed 
amount  of  gratification  to  all  desires  in  all  individuals. 
1  PAULSEN  :  System  of  Ethics,  trans,  by  Thilly,  p.  485. 


324  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

Interpreted  in  the  light  of  Self-realization,  moderation  sig- 
nifies not  the  mathematical  but  the  organic  mean  in  the 
conduct  of  life — that  each  impulse  be  made,  in  its  expres- 
sion, a  means  to  the  promotion  of  individual  well-being. 
Now  it  is  manifest  that  the  natural  desires  differ  in  strength 
with  different  individuals,  as  also  the  conditions  under 
which  these  desires  may  be  satisfied  vary  from  person  to 
person.  Hence  what  constitutes  moderation  in  the  gratify- 
ing of  a  desire  will  be  different  for  every  person.  It  is 
then  the  duty  of  each  person  to  determine  what  amount 
of  restraint  the  organization  of  all  his  activities  imposes 
upon  each  single  impulse;  and  in  the  habitual  observance 
of  this  limit  consists  temperance  for  him.  Moreover,  many 
individuals  cannot  indulge  certain  desires  even  slightly 
without  danger  of  going  to  excess,  frustrating  the  satisfac- 
tion of  other  desires  equally  legitimate  and  introducing 
disorder  and  confusion  into  their  lives.  In  such  cases 
temperance,  moderation  as  we  have  understood  it,  requires 
abstinence,  complete  and  entire.  The  observance  of  tem- 
perance, for  instance,  compels  many  individuals  to  abstain 
altogether  from  alcoholic  liquors  and  others  to  avoid  all 
games  associated  with  gambling.  Besides  these  extreme 
instances  there  are  in  all  of  us  desires  especially  strong 
and  eager,  apt  at  all  times  to  slip  the  leash  and  work  havoc 
with  our  lives;  over  these  temperance  enjoins  the  practice 
of  strictest  restraint. 

The  rule  of  temperance  extends  to  all  human  activities — 
prescribing  moderation  in  our  amusements,  our  speech, 
our  expenditures,  as  well  as  our  eating  and  drinking.  It 
is  a  fact  frequently  commented  on,  that  reformers  who, 
in  the  name  of  temperance,  zealously  wage  war  upon  a 
certain  indulgence  or  excess,  are  often  guilty  of  intemper- 
ance themselves  in  the  way  of  exaggeration  and  unwar- 
ranted assumptions.  But  while  the  virtue  of  temperance 
should  thus  be  realized  in  all  fields  of  conduct,  still  it 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  VIRTUES  325 

cannot^ _be  denied  that  its  chief  reference  is  to  a  few  espe- 
cially strong  desires.  Aristotle  limited  the  application  of 
temperance  to  the  fundamental  animal  appetites,  those  of 
food  and  drink  and  sex,2  and  his  judgment  in  this  matter 
has  been  in  a  large  measure  confirmed  by  subsequent  ex- 
perience and  reflection.  For  these  three  desires  or,  join- 
mg  the  two  former,  the  two — the  desire  for  food  and  the  KI 
impulse  of  sex — express  the  elemental  needs  of  life  itself,  Tl 
in  the  individual,  and  the  species;  hence  nature  has  made 
them  strong  in  their  appeal  and  insistent  in  their  demands. 
They  are  often  called  the  "  physical  appetites  "  to  indicate 
their  intimate  connection  with  our  animal  life,  an  appetite 
being  well-defined  as  a  "  desire  with  a  massive  bodily 
basis. ' ' 3  Now  the  power  and  urgency  of  these  appetites 
have  made  them  most  difficult  of  all  natural  tendencies  to 
control  and  regulate  in  the  interest  of  an  intelligently 
ordered  life.  Volition  has  accepted  the  challenge  they 
offered,  however;  and,  aroused  by  the  difficulties  involved, 
and  stung  by  successive  defeats,  has  made  with  these  appe- 
tites the  supreme  struggle  for  self-control.  Hence  the  prac- 
tice of  temperance  in  human  life  still  means  primarily  the 
exercise  of  restraint  in  matters  of  eating  and  drinking  and 
of  the  sexual  relationship.  It  will  be  appropriate  then  to 
take  note  of  some  of  the  implications  of  temperance  when 
manifest  in  these  particular  departments  of  life. 

The  exercise  of  temperance  in  the  pleasures  of  eating 
may  first  be  considered.  The  food  instinct  is,  of  all  in- 
stincts, perhaps  the  most  deeply  ingrained  in  the  organism. 
This  is  what  we  should  expect ;  as  the  activity  of  the  lower 
forms  of  life  is  for  the  most  part  spent  in  a  ceaseless 
search  for  food.  Nor  is  it  otherwise  with  primitive  man 
who  must  wage  a  constant  battle  with  nature  to  escape 
ever-imminent  starvation.  Thus  natural  necessity  has  made 

•ARISTOTLE:  Xicomachean  Ethics,  Bk.  Ill,  Chap.  XIIL 
•MEZES:  Explanatory  Ethics,  p.  222. 


326  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

the  craving  for  food  strong  within  us, — much  stronger  than 
is  required  by  present  conditions  of  life  in  civilized  socie- 
ties, since  for  none  but  a  limited  class  of  unfortunates  does 
the  securing  of  sufficient  food  for  bodily  sustenance  require 
constant  thought  and  attention.  Not  only  have  improved 
methods  of  production  and  distribution  increased  the  avail- 
able supply  of  food,  but  the  protection  against  hardship 
and  exposure  secured  through  better  housing,  warmer  cloth- 
ing, and  easier  transportation,  for  civilized  man,  has  at  the 
same  time  decreased  the  amount  of  food  needed  to  maintain 
his  bodily  energies.  Add  the  further  fact  that  man  by 
the  possession  of  intelligence  is  able  to  plan  and  prepare 
food  in  such  manner  as  particularly  to  please  his  taste,  and 
the  situation  appears  to  be  plainly  one  provocative  of  ex- 
cessive indulgence.  Over-eating  is  too  often  regarded  as 
an  offense  of  a  trifling  character;  certainly  it  is  one  com- 
mitted constantly  by  persons  otherwise  temperate  in  their 
habits  and  disinterested  in  their  serving  of  friends  and 
community.  But  the  offense — in  its  proper  designation, 
the  vice  of  gluttony — brings  many  evils  in  its  train,  lessen- 
ing as  it  does  man's  efficiency  and  increasing  his  hours 
of  discomfort  and  misery.  It  would  be  difficult  indeed  to 
over-estimate  the  amount  of  peevishness,  discouragement, 
and  bad  temper  due  directly  to  excess  in  eating.  Here 
then  is  a  most  important  field  for  the  exercise  of  temper- 
ance. Temperance  calls  for  the  habitual  control  by  voli- 
tion of  the  desire  for  food  with  a  view  not  to  the  obtaining 
of  the  greatest  amount  of  pleasure  out  of  eating  but  of 
maintaining  the  body  in  the  best  possible  health  and  highest 
state  of  efficiency.  The  attention  that  has  recently  been 
given  to  the  subject  of  food,  the  manufacture  and  adver- 
tisement of  health-foods,  the  discussion  of  the  merits  of 
various  systems  of  diet,  is  in  its  way  a  healthy  sign;  for 
it  shows  that  people  in  general  are  awakening  to  the  im- 
portance of  the  careful  regulation  of  diet,  especially 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  VIRTUES  327 

> 

for  those  who  lead  sedentary  lives  under  the  artificial  con- 
ditions of  our  present  civilization.  We  may  expect  to  de- 
rive great  assistance  from  scientific  research  in  this  matter 
of  selecting  and  preparing  our  food,  but  obviously  much 
must  always  be  left  to  the  judgment  and  will  of  the  in- 
dividual. For  no  rule  can  be  laid  down  which  will  cover 
all  cases.  The  quality  and  quantity  of  food  which  should 
be  eaten  depends  both  upon  the  constitution  of  the  indi-  • 
vidual  and  upon  his  environment  and  occupation.  A  diet 
too  meager  for  a  man  of  massive  frame,  performing  ex- 
hausting physical  labor,  will  perhaps  be  too  hearty  for 
the  brain-worker  of  light  build.  Moreover,  a  change  of 
occupation  and  surroundings  on  the  part  of  the  same  in- 
dividual may  often  call  for  a  changed  rule  of  eating,  and 
this  alteration  of  diet  is  made  especially  difficult  by  the 
existence  of  previous  habits  of  a  contrary  nature.  Thus 
the  man  who  as  engineer  or  surveyor  has  spent  years  in 
vigorous  exercise  out-of-doors  and  comes  to  take  a  desk 
in  a  city  office,  finds  that  he  needs  scarcely  half  the  food 
he  consumed  formerly  while  his  old  habits  tempt  him 
continually  to  eat  the  same  amount.  Thus  there  is  con- 
stant need  with  most  human  beings  for  self-control  in  in- 
dulging the  appetite  for  food,  but  the  reward  of  vigilance 
in  this  matter  is  heightened  individual  efficiency  and  greater 
possibilities  of  personal  achievement. 

A  second  appetite  which  requires  habitual  restraint  if 
personal  development  is  to  proceed  unimpeded  is  that  for  - 
drink — not  of  course  for  food  in  liquid  form,  but  for  in- 
toxi^ating  liquors.  So  important  is  self-control  in  the 
matter  of  this  appetite  that  the  word  "  temperance  "  has 
been  restricted  in  popular  speech  to  this  particular  mani- 
festation of  it  and  thus  has  come  to  mean  moderation  or 
abstinence  in  the  use  of  alcoholic  beverages.  The  subject 
of  drinking  as  thus  understood  has  been  so  complicated 
by  discussion  and  controversy  that  hundreds  of  pages  would 


328  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

be  needed  for  its  adequate  treatment.  Hence  it  is  possible 
in  the  present  outline  only  to  indicate  the  general  prin- 
ciples which  must  be  applied  in  reaching  a  rational  solution 
of  the  problem.  The  first  question  which  arises  when  the 
subject  is  approached  from  the  standpoint  of  Self-realiza- 
tion is,  "  Is  the  appetite  for  intoxicating  or  exhilarating 
beverages  a  natural  or  normal  one  ?  ' '  If  it  can  be  proved 
that  this  appetite  is  abnormal  or  perverted,  then,  all  indul- 
gence in  alcoholic  liquors  is  forbidden  at  the  outset.  The 
truth  of  this  view  may  appear  to  be  demonstrated  by  the 
fact  that  all  fermented  drinks  contain  a  poisonous  principle 
— alcohol — and  since  it  seems  impossible  to  regard  the  de- 
sire for  what  is  poisonous  as  a  normal  desire,  the  appetite 
appears  to  be  condemned  as  perverted  and  monstrous.  But 
unfortunately — for  this  argument — it  applies  also  to  tea  and 
coffee,  which  contain  a  poisonous  element  as  well,  and  few 
would  be  willing  to  condemn  tea  and  coffee  drinking  on  the 
same  grounds.  Moreover  the  desire  for  beverages  that  stim- 
ulate and  enliven  is  too  widespread  among  various  races  and 
in  different  times  to  allow  of  its  being  branded  offhand  as 
unnatural  and  perverted.  If,  then,  as  seems  more  reason- 
able, we  regard  this  appetite  as  natural,  it  is  subject  to  the 
same  rule  of  temperance  that  holds  in  the  case  of  all 
desires — strict  control  in  the  interest  of  the  due  satisfaction 
of  other  desires,  involving  moderation  for  the  majority, 
and  abstinence  in  the  case  of  those  who,  by  individual  con- 
stitution and  special  surroundings,  are  in  constant  danger 
of  excess.  Only,  in  the  case  of  the  appetite  for  liquor, 
the  consequences  of  excess  are  so  disastrous,  including  the 
loss  of  intelligence  and  self-control,  the  temporary  destruc- 
tion of  that  personality  itself  which  is  the  sole  aim  of 
morality  to  conserve  and  develop,  that  an  exceptional  de- 
gree of  restraint  is  imperatively  demanded.  In  view  of 
this  danger  which  should  need  no  emphasis  to  one  ac- 
quainted with  the  facts  of  actual  life,  abstinence  is  the 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  VIRTUES  329 

safer  course  for  a  large  proportion  of  mankind.  Certainly 
it  is  required  with  the  young  and  with  all  who  have  reason 
to  suspect  that,  because  of  heredity  or  on  other  grounds, 
they  have  the  slightest  tendency  to  excess.  For  the  rest,  the 
use  of  intoxicants  should  be  limited  to  those  places  and 
occasions  where  social  and  conventional  safeguards  reduce 
the  danger  to  a  practical  zero.  Finally,  it  should  be  borne 
in  mind  that  the  question  of  the  existence  of  public  drink- 
ing-places  where  such  customs  as  that  of  treating  prevail, 
is  one  quite  apart  from  that  of  "  drinking  "  itself.  This 
latter  is  a  social  and  not  an  individual  matter  and  should 
be  settled  on  grounds  of  social  welfare  entirely. 

The  other  impulse  of  such  strength  as  to  be  difficult  of 
control  is  that  of  sex.  Since  its  satisfaction  is  the  condition 
of  the  continued~existenee  of  the  human  species,  the  de- 
mands of  this  impulse  are  bound  to  be  imperative  with 
human  beings,  and  it  must  remain  a  dominating  influence 
in  human  society.  In  Greek  Ethics  the  same  rule  of  tem- 
perance is  applied  to  the  sex  impulse  as  to  the  other  bodily 
appetites — the  rule  of  moderation,  permitting  only  such 
degree  of  indulgence  as  would  be  consistent  with  the  total 
interest  of  the  individual  as  a  citizen  of  the  state.  On 
this  principle,  any  indulgence  injurious  to  the  health  of 
the  individual  or  violating  the  family  rights  of  a  fellow- 
citizen,  would  be  condemned  as  vicious  excess, — the  vice 
of  licentiousness.  But  we  find  in  this  principle  no  ground 
for  the' Christian  ideal  of  chastity  which  permits  this  desire 
to  be  indulged  only  under  the  conditions  of  monogamous 
marriage.  This  ideal  of  sexual  morality  professed  now 
by  all  civilized  societies,  is  based  upon  the  principle  first 
enunciated  by  Christianity,  of  the  infinite  worth  of  all 
human  personality,  Greek  or  barbarian,  male  or  female, 
bond  or  free.  For,  it  should  be  noticed  that  the  sex  impulse 
differs  from  the  other  natural  instincts  of  man  in  having, 
not  an  inanimate  thing,  but  a  living  person  for  its  object. 


330  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

Its  indulgence  is  therefore  subject  to  the  higher  law  which 
governs  the  relations  of  persons  in  an  intelligent  com- 
munity— i.e.  that  human  personality  should  always  be 
treated  as  an  end  and  never  as  a  means.  To  treat  another 
person  as  an  instrument  for  selfish  gratification  is  thus  to 
commit  a  moral  offense  of  gravest  character.  In  the  growth 
of  real  reverence  for  personality  is  to  be  found  the  only 
solution  for  the  vexed  problem  of  sex-relations,  for  the 
"  social  evil  "  and  other  irregularities  and  excesses. 

Reverting  to  the  subject  of  temperance  as  manifest  in 
i  the  habitual  control  of  every  desire,  the  growth  of  this 
virtue  is  most  effectively  encouraged  by  providing  normal 
and  wholesome  expression  for  all  our  natural  impulses. 
For,  whenever  through  mistaken  teaching  or  unfavorable 
conditions,  any  of  the  desires  natural  to  human  personality 
are  denied  their  normal  satisfaction,  the  result  is  likely  to 
be  either  excess  in  some  other  direction  or  a  perverted 
and  unnatural  expression  of  the  impulse  whose  rightful 
satisfaction  is  prevented.  In  former  times  this  result  was 
produced  by  a  false  asceticism  taught  in  the  name  of  re- 
ligion; at  present  it  is  brought  about  by  unfortunate  con- 
ditions of  life — particularly  in  sparsely  settled  and  back- 
ward rural  districts  on  the  one  hand,  and  in  the  congested 
urban  centers  on  the  other.  Because  of  comparative  isola- 
tion and  inadequate  facilities  for  social  intercourse,  the 
country-bred  youth  is  apt  to  have  his  natural  desire  for 
stirring  games,  for  the  relish  of  eating  and  drinking  in 
good  company,  for  love-making  and  courtship,  to  a  large 
extent  denied,  and  consequently  be  led  into  forms  of  vicious 
excess.  At  the  opposite  extreme,  conditions  of  modern  city 
life,  as  Miss  Addams  has  convincingly  shown  in  her  Spirit 
of  Youth  and  the  City  Streets,  prevent  a  large  proportion 
of  the  young  from  obtaining  the  wholesome  recreation 
which  they  normally  crave ;  such  conditions  offer  in  the  life 
of  the  crowded  streets  opportunities  for  unwholesome  ex- 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  VIRTUES  331 

citement,  and,  through  commercialized  enterprises  for  fur- 
nishing pleasures  such  as  saloons,  dance-halls,  and  cheap 
theaters,  tempt  the  growing  boy  or  girl  to  debasing  and 
vicious  indulgence.  Hence  all  efforts  to  establish  play- 
grounds, social  centers,  places  of  amusement,  where  health- 
ful  recreation  may  be  obtained,  particularly  by  the  youth  in 
both  country  and  city,  should  be  welcomed  and  encouraged 
by  all  those  interested  in  moral  development,  as  most  im- 
portant aids  in  fostering  self-control  and  temperance  among 
our  people.  "  Let  us  cherish  these  experiments  as  the 
most  precious  beginnings  of  an  attempt  to  supply  the 
recreational  needs  of  our  industrial  cities.  To  fail  to  pro- 
vide for  the  recreation  of  youth  is  not  only  to  deprive  all 
of  them  of  their  natural  form  of  expression,  but  is  certain 
to  subject  some  of  them  to  the  overwhelming  temptation 
of  illicit  and  soul-destroying  pleasures. "  *  In  conclusion 
it  may  be  added  that  the  best  safeguard  against  over- 
absorption  in  the  pursuit  of  pleasure,  even  though  of  a 
natural  and  wholesome  sort,  is  found  in  such  training  as 
gives  efficiency  in  a  chosen  line  of  work — occupation,  trade, 
or  profession — and  thus  furnishes  the  individual  with  a 
controlling  interest  and  constant  source  of  pride  and  sat- 
isfaction.5 

3.  Prudence. — The  limitation  placed  upon  the  gratifi- 
cation of  various  single  desires  in  the  exercise  of  temper- 
ance is  not  an  end  in  itself.  It  is  a  means  to  the  maximum 
satisfaction  of  all  the  desires  natural  to  the  human  self. 
Now;  as  has  been  previously  pointed  out,  the  amount  of 
satisfaction  permitted  to  any  desire  depends  upon  the  in- 
clusiveness  of  its  object — the  degree  to  which  it  includes 
the  objects  of  other  desires  and  provides  for  their  satis- 
faction. But  among  these  desires  there  is  one  whose  object 
may  with  truth  be  said  to  comprehend  the  objects  of  all 

*  JANE  ADDAMS:  The  Spirit  of  Youth  and  the  City  Streets,  p.  103. 
1  PAULSEN  :  Op.  oit.,  p.  486. 


332  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

other  desires  characteristic  of  man  as  a  natural  being. 
1  This  is  the  desire  for  continued  security  and  comfort  during 
the  period  of  natural  existence.  Itself  the  conscious  ex- 
pression of  the  powerful  instinct  of  self-preservation,  this 
desire,  we  have  already  seen,  constitutes  one  of  the  dom- 
inating motives  of  human  action.8  As  such,  it  is  an  effective 
instrument  in  the  organization  of  conduct;  since  the  end 
which  it  seeks  is  of  highest  importance, — is  one  whose 
attainment  is  necessary  to  Self-realization.  Considered  in 
comparison  to  larger  ideal  aims  and  aspirations,  the  pres- 
ervation of  natural  existence  seems  an  end  narrow  and 
poor,  indeed.  But  the  maintenance  of  natural  life  during 
the  few  years  of  its  allotted  course,  with  the  enjoyment 
which  accompanies  such  physical  preservation  and  well- 
being,  is  for  the  human  individual  the  indispensable  con- 
dition of  his  participating  visibly  in  the  attainment  of 
larger  and  more  comprehensive  ideals.  Hence  physical 
security  with  its  attendant  pleasure  is  an  end  of  high  moral 
value.  The  habit  of  furthering  natural  well-being  and 
comfort  through  the  subordination  of  single  desires  and 
impulses  is  identical  with  the  virtue  of  prudence.  De- 
fined in  this  way,  prudence  is  just  the  other  and  positive 
aspect  of  temperance,  while  temperance  is  the  negative 
side  of  prudence.  The  end  of  prudence  is  most  effectually 
secured  through  the  attainment  of  several  objects  suffi- 
ciently general  to  include,  when  taken  together,  practically 
all  the  things  which  man  naturally  desires.  Prudence  is 
therefore  practised  through  the  pursuit  and  attainment 
of  these  general  objects,  adopted  as  purposes. 

HEALTH 

The  first  of  these  purposes  is  to  maintain  and  increase 
as  far  as  possible,  Health.     The  welfare  of  man  as  a  natural 
•  Cf.  Part  III,  Chap.  IV,  §  2. 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  VIRTUES  333 

being  has  its  foundation'  in  bodily_  _he.alth.  Hence  of  all 
the  "  natural  "  ^bods  of  human  life  this  is  the  greatest 
and  most  essential.  Health  is  secured  through  the  attain- 
ment of  certain  objects  and  conditions  which  are  themselves 
ends  of  desire. 

The  first  essential  of  continued  health  is  food  and  drink 
in  proper  kind  and  amount.  That  the  obtaining  of  food 
in  quantity  barely  sufficient  for  bodily  sustenance  is  some- 
times difficult  or  impossible  for  the  human  individual — even 
in  civilized  countries — is  proved  by  the  recent  investigations 
of  school  authorities  in  some  of  our  large  cities  which  show 
that  many  children  are  unable  to  profit  by  the  instruction 
they  receive  because  they  come  to  school  ill-nourished  on 
account  of  inadequate  breakfasts.  When  the  means  of  the 
individual  are  sufficient  to  provide  himself  and  his  depend- 
ents with  food  necessary  to  life,  then  arises  the  further  ques- 
tion, to  which  allusion  has  been  made,  of  determining  its 
quality  and  regulating  its  quantity  in  a  manner  suited  to 
individual  needs  (under,  of  course,  the  artificial  conditions 
of  human  life). — As  long  as  the  great  majority  of  human 
beings  were  scattered,  in  their  residence,  over  wide  areas  it 
was  comparatively  easy  to  secure  an  abundant  quantity  of 
fresh,  pure  drinking-water.  But  with  the  increase  of  popu- 
lation and  the  crowding  of  individuals  into  cities  the  sources 
of  water-supply  have  become  contaminated  by  sewage  and 
refuse.  Hence  provision  for  this  fundamental  physical 
need,  of  pure  water,  is  indeed  a  difficult  problem  in  our 
centers  of  population.  Yet  the  need  is  as  important  as 
that  of  food  itself  and,  as  a  matter  of  public  hygiene,  its 
satisfaction  is  also  a_matter  of  public  morality. 

A  second  necessity  of  good  health  is  appropriate  cloth-    , 
ing.     Clothing  is  needed  to  protect  the  body  against  the 
"  elements  " — cold,  wind,  sun,  rain,  and  snow — in  prac- 
tically all  regions  of  earth.     Clothing  of  course  serves  an- 
other purpose — that  of  adornment — and  the  clothing  we 


334  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

wear  owes  much  of  its  complication  to  the  effort  to  satisfy 
the  demands  both  of  beauty  and  comfort.  The  desire  to 
wear  garments  that  please  the  eye  in  texture,  color,  and 
shape  is  certainly  legitimate  and  laudable;  still  it  should 
always  be  subordinated  to  the  other,  the  chief  purpose  of 
clothing,  to  protect  the  body  against  hostile  influences  of 
air  and  water  and  sun.  But  if  it  is  wrong  to  sacrifice 
bodily  comfort  to  considerations  of  beauty  and  proportion, 
what  shall  be  said  of  the  tendencies  observable  in  present 
societies  to  risk  health,  and  perhaps  to  shorten  life,  in 
order  to  follow  a  vapid  succession  of  senseless  fashions 
in  dress! 

In  the  third  place  suitable  shelter  is  required  for  the 
preservation  of  health.  In  all  save  tropical  climes  man 
must  have  for  his  physical  security  a  house  closed  against 
rain  and  snow,  and  properly  heated.  Now  that  the  art 
of  house-building  gives  us,  as  a  matter  of  course,  dwellings 
which  are  tight  and  warm,  we  must  be  on  our  guard  lest 
through  their  very  "  tightness  "  our  houses  exclude  the 
sunlight  and  become  receptacles  for  the  storing  of  bad  air. 
Full  ventilation  and  plenty  of  fresh  air  are  required  in 
any  house  which  is  to  fulfil  the  purposes  of  good  health 
for  its  inmates. 

Cleanliness  is  a  fourth  essential  of  good  health.  The 
cleanliness  needed  is  not  one  of  body  and  clothing  merely, 
which  of  course  comes  first,  but  also  of  house,  of  grounds, 
of  street,  and  of  all  public  buildings  and  conveyances. 
Cleanliness  in  this  sense  embraces  all  that  is  implied  in 
modern  sanitation — such  disposal  of  all  human  waste,  all 
refuse  and  rubbish  of  all  sorts,  and  such  isolation  and 
care  of  cases  of  contagious  disease,  that  the  micro-organisms 
which  threaten  human  health  shall  not  multiply  or  be 
further  disseminated  among  human  beings. 

Goo.d  health  cannot  be  maintained,  in  the  fifth  place, 
without  a  moderate  amount  of  physical  exercise  and  whole- 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  VIRTUES  335 

some  amusement.  The  manual  laborer  receives  this  exer- 
cise— although  often  of  an  excessive  and  unbalanced  sort 
and  under  most  unhealthful  conditions — through  his  daily 
toil.  Those  of  sedentary  occupation,  however,  must  make 
special  provision  to  secure  it  in  the  gymnasium,  and  through 
outdoor  games  and  pastimes.  Only  through  such  exercise 
can  the  brain-worker  keep  his  bodily  organs  in  such  health- 
ful tone  and  his  physical  functions  so  vigorous  as  to  permit 
his  brain  and  higher  centers  to  act  with  maximal  efficiency. 

PROPERTY 

A  second  object  whose  possession  is  made  a  definite  pur- 
pose in  the  practice  of  prudence  is  property.  We  have  just 
seen  that  the  maintenance  of  health  requires  the  possession 
and  use  of  certain  material  objects  such  as  articles  of 
clothing  and  means  of  shelter.  Even  food,  the  prime  requi- 
site of  life  itself,  must  be  gathered  and  stored  either  by 
the  individual  or  the  society  of  which  he  is  a  member  if  a 
quantity  sufficient  for  human  needs  is  to  be  always  avail- 
able. Indeed  we  find  the  ability  to  provide  in  the  present 
for  future  well-being  first  manifested  among  living  forms 
in  the  instinct  of  animals  to  hoard  food  for  days  to  come 
or  even  for  a  season  ahead,  as  when  the  squirrel  stores  nuts 
for  the  coming  winter.  Some  students  of  moral  evolution 
look  upon  the  hoarding  or  acquisitive  instinct,  which  is 
strongly  marked  in  many  animal  species,  as  the  basis  of 
the  right  of  private  ownership  and  the  institution  of  prop- 
erty, in  human  society.  No  doubt,  the  idea  of  acquiring 
property  owes  much  of  its  strength  as  a  motive  to  action, 
to  this  instinct  which  man  inherits  from  the  lower  forms. 
But  property  or  wealth  considered  as  an  end  in  moral 
development  has  also  a  rational  basis  in  the  principle  of 
use  or  occupation  which  enunciates  the  right  of  every 
human  individual  to  possess  those  material  objects  which 


336  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

he  does  or  must  use,  to  preserve  his  own  existence  and 
secure  his  own  well-being. 

The  habit  of  acquiring,  through  industry,  property  suffi- 
cient for  individual  needs,  and  of  protecting  and  conserv- 
ing this  property  when  acquired,  has  come  to  be  regarded 
as  a  distinct  virtue.  This  virtue,  designated  as  thrift  or 
frugality,  is  usually  defined  as  moderation  in  the  acquisition 
and  expenditure  of  wealth,  a  mean  which  avoids  the  ex- 
tremes of  miserliness  and  of  prodigality.  It  does  not  sur- 
prise us  that  the  practice  of  obtaining  and  of  safeguarding 
material  possessions  should  have  been  raised  to  the  rank 
of  an  individual  virtue  when  we  reflect  that,  second  to  the 
control  of  the  major  animal  appetites,  there  is  no  more 
effective  means  of  securing  the  ends  of  prudence  than  that 
furnished  by  the  ownership  of  property.  It  is  the  best 
agency  which  intelligence  has  devised  to  offset  the  radical 
changes  in  physical  strength  and  capacity  which  occur 
during  the  course  of  individual  existence,  and  thus  to  pro- 
vide for  a  life's  well-being.  Man  passes  from  an  infancy 
of  helplessness,  through  a  childhood  and  youth  of  limited 
strength,  to  a  maturity  when  power  and  capacity  reach 
their  maximum;  thence  he  passes  down  through  stages  of 
decreasing  efficiency  to  a  helpless  old  age.  He  also  has 
periods  of  illness  and  physical  disability.  During  a  full 
i  third  of  his  life,  therefore,  the  human  individual  is  unable 
fully  to  supply  his  own  natural  needs.  He  must  then  be 
an  unwelcome  burden  upon  the  shoulders  of  others  unless 
during  his  maturity,  when  his  powers  are  full-orbed,  he  is 
able  to  accumulate  sufficient  property  to  support  himself 
during  his  old  age  and  also  to  care  for  his  offspring  during 
their  period  of  helplessness  and  incapacity,  thus  squaring 
himself  with  society  for  similar  care  given  to  him  during 
his  own  infancy,  and  thereby  establishing  his  own  economic 
independence.  In  a  similar  manner,  through  industry  and 
saving,  the  individual  is  able  to  provide  for  his  own  support 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  VIRTUES  337 

in  periods  of  sickness  and  enforced  idleness.  Hence  thrift, 
though  it  appears  inferior  to  some  other  virtues  which 
realize  a  more  comprehensive  end,  is  nevertheless  of  utmost 
importance,  as  one  of  the  foundation  stones  on  which  these 
higher  virtues  must  rest.  A  man's  first  duty  to  society  is 
to  provide  for  himself  and  his  offspring;  the  exercise  of 
thrift  is  the  only  way  to  maintain  industrial  independence 
and  economic  integrity.  Without  this  virtue  it  is  exceed- 
ingly difficult  to  develop  the  higher  personal  and  social 
capacities  of  human  nature;  the  utterly  thriftless,  as  we 
know,  seldom  reach  any  higher  levels  of  moral  development. 
We  must  always  be  on  our  guard,  therefore,  lest  by  in- 
discriminate individual  giving  or  unwise  social  charities, 
we  deprive  any  number  of  individuals  of  the  stimulus 
and  occasion  supplied  by  natural  need,  for  the  development 
of  this  virtue. 

To  describe  the  different  kinds  of  property  which  man 
may  advantageously  possess,  to  discuss  the  different  forma 
which  wealth  may  take,  would  carry  us  far  afield — into  the 
domain  of  Economies,  in  fact.  Of  material  possessions 
those  which  have  greatest  ethical  value  have  already  been 
mentioned.  All  human  individuals  must  possess  comfort- 
able clothing  and  adequate,  sanitary  dwellings  if  they 
are  to  maintain  that  health  and  vigor  which  is  the  basis 
of  all  further  achievement.  The  ethical  value  of  own- 
ing a  home  is  a  thing  that  should  be  emphasized  in  this 
day  of  restless  moving  from  one  habitat  to  another  and 
of  close  crowding  in  tightly  packed  city  apartments.  The 
possession  of  house  and  grounds  with  which  the  interest 
of  individual  or  family  is  identified  and  in  whose  con- 
veniences and  adornments  the  tastes  of  the  owner  find  ex- 
pression produces  not  merely  a  sense  of  physical  security 
but  also  a  feeling  of  personal  power  and  stability  to  be 
gained  in  no  other  way.  Another  class  of  objects  whose 
possession  is  necessary  to  the  natural  welfare  of  the  in- 


338  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

dividual  is  that  of  tools  and  instruments.  One  of  the 
traits  which  distinguish  man  from  the  animals  is  the  ability 
to  fashion  tools  by  whose  use  he  can  avail  himself  more 
easily  and  effectually  of  the  resources  of  the  natural  en- 
vironment. Made  at  first  by  the  individual  for  his  own 
use  and  employed  most  effectively  by  their  maker,  tools 
were,  next  to  the  clothing  actually  worn,  the  first  class  of 
objects  to  be  recognized  as  private  property.  They  still 
constitute  a  class  of  private  possessions  most  important  to 
the  individual  in  providing  for  his  own  natural  well-being. 
The  right  of  the  individual  to  own  those  material  instru- 
ments which  are  necessary  for  efficient  performance  in  the 
special  field  of  his  activity,  be  it  physical  or  mental  (and 
this  applies,  of  course,  not  merely  to  mechanical  instruments 
but  to  books,  pictures,  musical  instruments,  etc.,  etc.),  is 
grounded  deep  in  the  conditions  of  human  life  and  cannot 
be  gainsaid.  The  invention  of  machinery  and  the  organi- 
zation of  industry  have  in  a  large  degree  deprived  the 
laborer  of  this  right  to  his  tools — and  have  also  taken  from 
him  his  rightful  share  in  the  product  of  his  labor.  That 
such  an  industrial  system  is  ethically  indefensible  is  be- 
coming more  and  more  generally  recognized,  however,  and 
the  conviction  is  growing  that  capitalism  must  be  super- 
seded by  a  more  equitable  arrangement.  In  addition  to 
these  special  classes  of  property,  prudence  demands,  lastly, 
that  the  individual  possess  a  surplus  in  some  form  of 
wealth  easily  convertible  into  any  of  the  necessities  of  life, 
in  order  that  in  such  emergencies  as  accident  or  illness  he 
may  have  the  means  of  sustenance  and  be  able  to  secure 
the  necessary  remedies. 

REPUTATION 

The  third  purpose  is  one  whose  object  although  not  itself 
material  is  nevertheless  a  necessary  factor  in  the  material 
well-being  of  the  human  individual.  This  object  is  favor- 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  VIRTUES  339 

able  reputation  in  the  community — the  esteem  of  one's 
fellows.  Man  is  a  gregarious  animal  and  from  the  begin- 
ning men  have  found  it  advantageous  to  live  and  work 
together.  At  first  they  cooperated  for  purposes  of  defense 
against  common  enemies.  Then  the  same  cooperation  was 
found  to  be  profitable  in  the  field  of  industry — there  in- 
rolving  division  of  labor  and  exchange  of  products. 
Finally  the  same  principle  was  extended  to  the  fields  of 
art  and  science,  of  education  and  invention.  But  in  all 
its  forms  this  cooperation  has  its  basis  in  mutual  confi- 
dence. Without  this  confidence  the  material  benefits  which 
accrue  to  individuals  through  the  organization  of  industry 
cannot  be  secured.  The  man  who  has  entirely  lost  the 
confidence  of  his  fellows  cannot  carry  on  with  profit  any 
of  those  economic  activities  which  are  essential  to  his 
continued  existence  and  natural  well-being.  He  cannot 
secure  a  fair  recompense  for  the  product  of  his  labor,  since 
no  one  will  trust  the  honesty  of  his  work;  he  cannot  buy 
the  necessaries  of  life  since  no  one  will  credit  his  ability 
or  intention  to  pay.  In  our  civilized  societies  he  is  fre- 
quently unable  to  secure  the  opportunity  to  work  at  all — 
as  is  shown  in  the  case  of  ex-convicts  who  find  it  impossible 
to  gain  honest  employment.  He  is,  in  fact,  a  social  rene- 
gade, an  outcast,  and  as  such  is  deprived  of  the  means  of 
natural  subsistence.  Conversely,  in  the  degree  to  which 
the  individual  gains  good  reputation  among  his  fellows, 
in  proportion  as  he  rises  in  their  estimation,  is  he  able  to 
procure  for  himself  all  the  means  of  comfort  and  security. 
That  honesty  is  the  best  policy  is  an  axiom  universally 
admitted  in  the  business  world;  hence  the  prudent  man 
cannot  afford  to  neglect  his  reputation.  Rather,  he  must 
guard  his  reputation  most  carefully,  making  it  one  of  his 
chief  aims  to  win  and  to  retain  the  esteem  of  his  fellows 
(if  for  no  other  reason)  because  only  through  such  means 
can  he  secure  his  own  natural  well-being. 


340  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

The  objects  of  the  three  purposes  just  described,  Health, 
Wealth,  and  Fame,  as  they  are  sometimes  denominated, 
are  often  called  the  three  "  natural  "  goods  of  human 
life.  The  value  of  these  three  objects  as  ends  of  action 
is  so  obvious  that  their  pursuit  absorbs  the  minds  of  the 
majority  of  men.  Nor  is  this  to  be  wondered  at,  for  man 
is  first  of  all  a  natural  being  and  he  must  maintain  his 
existence  and  efficiency  in  the  material  world  before  he 
realizes  his  capacities  as  a  self-conscious  person;  it  is  not 
to  be  regretted  that  men  seek  health,  comfort,  and  every 
other  natural  advantage,  but  only  that  when  they  secure 
these  benefits  they  do  not  use  them  as  means  to  a  larger 
and  more  comprehensive  good.  Intelligence  speedily  dis- 
covers that  the  three  objects  under  discussion  are  the  most 
effective  means  to  self-preservation  under  the  conditions 
of  human  life,  and  thus  the  instinct  of  self-preservation 
is  called  in,  and  communicates  to  them  great  impelling 
power.  The  motive-force  of  the  last  two  ends,  property 
and  reputation,  which  are  less  closely  connected  than  the 
first  with  the  preservation  of  physical  existence,  is  rein- 
forced by  the  acquisitive  and  social  instincts  of  which  they 
are,  at  least  in  part,  an  expression.  Thus  the  three  ends 
in  question  possess  exceptional  strength  as  motives.  So- 
ciety avails  itself  of  this  fact  in  discharging  its  functions 
of  government.  Appeal  is  made  to  the  strength  of  these 
motives  to  secure  from  the  individual,  obedience  to  those 
laws  and  regulations  which  are  required  for  the  general 
welfare.  Individuals  who  break  these  laws  are  punished 
by  death  or  imprisonment,  by  fine,  and  by  loss  of  standing 
as  citizens — one,  two,  and  even,  in  extreme  cases,  by  all 
of  these  penalties.  The  same  motives  are  appealed  to, 
with  penalties  of  course  much  less  severe,  by  parents  in 
training  their  children.  Punishment,  involving  physical 
pain  or  close  confinement,  the  loss  of  possessions,  disgrace 
in  the  family  circle,  are  the  penalties  commonly  inflicted 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  VIRTUES  341 

in  household  and  school,  to  secure  that  order  and  discipline 
which  are  necessary  to  individual  development  and  social 
welfare.  When,  through  an  external  and  artificial  system 
of  rewards  and  penalties,  the  strength  of  these  motives  is 
thus  utilized  to  support  the  claims  of  the  larger  goods  of 
the  social  and  personal  life,  they  are  called  the  sanctions 
of  morality. 

4.  Courage. — While  we  acknowledge  the  importance  of 
material  comfort  and  well-being  as  the  condition  of  further 
achievement  on  the  part  of  the  human  self,  still  we  must 
not  forget  that  the  objects  secured  by  prudence  are  im- 
portant only  as  means  to  the  broader  personal  and  social 
ends  of  human  life.  Moral  development  requires  that  the 
natural  goods  which  we  have  been  considering  should  be 
strictly  subordinated  to  the  more  comprehensive  spiritual 
goods.  Whenever  any  conflict  arises  between  the  narrower 
interests  of  man's  physical  nature  on  the  one  hand  and 
the  deeper  concerns  of  his  self-conscious  personality  on  the 
other  the  moral  ideal  demands  that  material  well-being 
shall  be  sacrificed,  that  pain,  privation,  and  even  death, 
shall  be  undergone,  in  the  realization  of  larger  and  more 
inclusive  ends.  In  the  words  of  the  formula  already 
adopted,  Self-realization  requires,  as  its  second  step  in 
the  individual  sphere,  the  adjustment  of  material  comfort 
and  well-being  to  those  more  comprehensive  ends  through 
whose  attainment  the  higher  spiritual  capacities  of  man 
gain  adequate  expression.  On  its  negative  side,  in  the 
subordination  of  natural  well-being  with  its  attendant 
pleasures  to  a  greater  good,  this  adjustment  is  identical 
with  the  virtue  of  courage.  Courage  is  thus  the  habit 
of  sacrificing  individual  safety  and  comfort  in  the  attain- 
ment  of  a  larger  and  more  comprehensive  good.  It  is  not, 
like  temperance,  involved  in  prudence  or  to  be  interpreted 
as  one  of  its  aspects;  it  rather  marks  a  step  beyond  pru- 


342  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

dence  and  as  such  is  essentially  different  from,  and  in 
some  respects  antagonistic  to,  that  virtue. 

Among  the  different  virtues  courage  was  the  first  to  win 
recognition  and  admiration  in  human  history.  Primitive 
societies  depended  for  their  existence  upon  the  ability  of 
their  members  to  cooperate  in  protecting  themselves  against 
common  enemies.  Hence  it  was  natural  that  an  habitual 
readiness  to  endure  pain  and  risk  death  in  defending  the 
clan  or  tribe  against  ever-threatening  foes,  should  come 
to  be  regarded  as  the  whole  duty  of  the  individual,  both 
to  himself  and  his  fellows.  As  man's  life  became  more 
secure  and  the  relations  of  human  societies  more  peaceable, 
the  field  for  the  exercise  of  courage  was  increasingly  re- 
stricted. The  importance  of  this  virtue  was  lessened  and 
its  prestige  diminished  until  in  civilized  societies  of  the 
present  it  is  reckoned  as  but  one  and  by  no  means  the 
most  important  of  the  many  virtues  that  enter  into  the 
moral  life.  Nevertheless,  there  is  a  sense  in  which  courage 
may  still  be  accounted  the  supreme  and  inclusive  virtue — 
identical  in  essence  with  goodness  itself.  Moral  develop- 
ment has  its  source  in  will  and  its  progress  depends  upon 
the  continued  exercise  of  this  power.  But  progressive  self- 
expansion  through  effort  of  will  requires — as  has  been 
shown  in  the  foregoing — the  constant  sacrifice  of  objects 
already  attained  and  proved  satisfactory,  for  the  sake  of 
larger  ends  which  are  new  and  untried.  Moral  develop- 
ment is  therefore  throughout  its  course  a  venture;  it  de- 
mands from  the  agent  that  habitual  willingness  to  take 
risks,  to  endure  suffering  and  privation,  in  pursuit  of 
remote  and  apparently  inaccessible  ideals,  which  is  the 
essence  of  courage.  Nay,  the  very  will  to  be  a  self  the 
horizons  of  whose  life  are  continually  enlarging,  which  is 
the  basis  of  all  the  virtues,  is  courage — courage  of  the  most 
fundamental  sort.  The  moral  life  is  throughout  a  "  great 
adventure  "  calling  for  courage,  even  for  heroism,  at  every 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  VIRTUES  343 

stage  in  its  course ;  and  the  merely  prudent  soul  which 
requires  to  be  assured  of  success  before  undertaking  each 
new  enterprise  will  never  come  within  sight  of  the  goal. 

As  man 's  natural  well-being  is  most  effectually  furthered 
through  the  attainment  of  health,  wealth,  and  reputation, 
so  the  subordination  of  such  welfare  to  larger  ends  involves 
the  sacrifice  of  one  or  of  all  of  these  "  goods."  Now  it  is 
according  as  one  or  the  other  of  these  objects  is  sacrificed 
— whether,  that  is,  health  or  wealth  or  reputation,  is  put 
in  jeopardy — that  different  forms  of  courage  are  distin- 
guished. Courage  in  its  first  form,  requiring  the  sacrifice 
of  health,  is  known  as 

PHYSICAL  COURAGE 

This  is  the  readiness  to  endure  physical  pain  or  risk 
death  in  the  service  of  some  higher  cause.  As  courage  was 
the  first  virtue  to  win  approval  in  the  history  of  mankind, 
so,  among  the  varieties  of  courage,  physical  was  the  first 
to  receive  favorable  recognition  and  general  applause. 
Such  admiration  of  courage,  particularly  of  physical  cour- 
age, along  with  greatest  admiration  for  the  man  displaying 
courage  of  this  type,  was  inevitable,  we  have  perceived, 
in  view  of  the  conditions  of  primitive  human  existence. 
In  the  early  stages  of  social  development,  man  lived  in 
constant  danger ;  the  element  of  hazard  pervaded  the  whole 
of  human  life.  Men  were  without  adequate  shelter,  or 
clothing,  or  tools  or  weapons.  They  were  obliged  to  snatch 
at  every  advantage  which  changing  circumstances  offered 
them  in  the  continuous  battle  against  ever-present  enemies, 
natural,  animal,  and  (not  the  least  menacing)  human. 
Hence  the  quality  most  needed,  and  therefore  most  highly 
prized,  in  the  individual,  was  the  willingness  to  take  his 
life  in  his  hands  in  the  effort  to  avert  some  threatening 
peril  from  the  tribe  or  clan.  Such  bravery  would  con- 


344  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

tribute  to  success,  in  the  hunt,  upon  exploring  expeditions, 
in  warfare ;  upon  the  success  of  its  members  in  these  fields 
does  the  very  existence  of  the  clan  depend.  So  great  and 
so  obvious  is  the  social  value  of  physical  courage  in  the 
earlier  periods  of  human  development  that  as  a  natural 
consequence  men  have  come  to  admire  mere  daring,  the 
willingness  to  endure  pain,  even  to  risk  life,  when  there  is 
no  adequate  cause.  We  in  civilized  societies  share  this 
tendency,  although  perhaps  in  a  weakened  form;  for  we 
feel  a  thrill  of  admiration  almost  instinctive  over  the  climb 
to  dizzy  heights,  or  the  swim  through  dangerous  rapids, 
while  our  reason  at  the  same  time  may  condemn  the  acts 
as  unwarranted  and  foolhardy.  The  readiness  to  suffer 
pain  or  endanger  one 's  life  is  not  itself  a  virtue,  of  course ; 
since,  as  we  have  just  seen,  physical  well-being  is  an  end 
of  high  value  and  we  are  justified  in  sacrificing  it  only 
when  in  this  way  we  attain  some  larger  end.  Yet  human 
experience  shows  that  the  realization  of  these  larger  ideals 
so  frequently  calls  for  the  sacrifice  of  material  comfort  and 
well-being  that  it  is  not  strange  that  an  habitual  willingness 
to  place  health  and  safety  in  jeopardy  should  come  to  be 
regarded  as  itself  virtuous. 

As  human  societies  continue  and  develop,  the  advantages 
of  leadership  and  discipline  in  hunting  and  in  warfare 
become  increasingly  apparent.  More  and  more  authority 
is  given  to  chief  or  sovereign  and  under  his  direction  a 
selected  group  of  the  strongest  and  most  enterprising  men 
are  trained  and  drilled  for  purposes  of  fighting.  Organized 
warfare  now  becomes  possible,  and  is  regarded  as  the  most 
worthy  and  admirable  of  human  pursuits.  A  new  theater 
is  thus  provided  for  the  display  of  courage,  and  of  all 
forms  of  physical  courage,  that  exhibited  on  the  field  of 
battle  is  deemed  the  noblest.  In  this  period  of  semi-civi- 
lized or  barbarous  society  patriotism  is  thought  to  find  true 
expression  only  in  military  courage — in  the  eagerness  of 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  VIRTUES  346 

the  warrior  to  lay  down  his  life  fighting  the  enemies  of 
his  sovereign  upon  the  field  of  battle.  The  battlefield  itself 
with  the  presence  of  thousands  in  disciplined  array,  the 
waving  of  standards,  the  clash  of  arms,  and  the  shouts 
of  victory  seemed  to  provide  the  appropriate  dramatic 
setting  for  the  finest  kind  of  courage.  Emotions  were 
stirred  by  the  pomp  of  military  display;  imagination  was 
kindled  by  tales  of  heroic  exploits  in  battle.  The  highest 
praise,  the  most  enthusiastic  plaudits,  were  given  to  the 
victorious  warriors,  while  of  all  weaknesses  cowardice  in 
warfare  was  deemed  the  most  contemptible.  Owing  to  the 
influences,  partly  political  and  partly  psychological,  which 
act  upon  human  societies  in  the  period  between  savagery 
and  civilization,  military  courage  acquired  a  prestige  and 
importance  among  the  virtues  which  is  quite  undeserved. 
Its  presence  in  an  individual  served  as  an  ample  excuse, 
even  a  complete  justification  for  unbridled  cruelty,  lust, 
and  avarice.  Even  the  clear  vision  of  Aristotle  was  dazzled 
by  the  spectacular  and  often  melodramatic  character  of 
military  exploits  and  to  the  question  as  to  what  is  the  noblest 
form  of  courage,  he  answers  not  that  displayed  by  facing 
death  at  sea  or  from  disease,  but  on  ' '  the  noblest  occasions, 
i.e.  such  occasions  as  present  themselves  in  war;  for  that 
is  the  greatest  and  noblest  of  perils."  7 

The  march  of  social  progress  at  last  replaces  the  militant 
social  organization  with  the  industrial.  The  individual 
citizen  is  now  comparatively  secure;  he  is  protected  in  his 
life  and  labor  by  the  authorized  agencies  of  society ;  society 
requires  of  him  not  daring  in  the  chase  or  upon  the  battle- 
field but,  primarily,  industry,  sobriety,  and  public  spirit. 
Wars  have  become  less  and  less  frequent  until  now  among 
civilized  nations  they  promise  to  cease  entirely.  Does  this 
mean,  then,  that  physical  courage  is  no  longer  necessary 
to  social  warfare  and  that  consequently  we  may  expect  it 
T  ARISTOTLE:  Nicomachean  Ethics,  Bk.  Ill,  Chap.  IX. 


346  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

to  disappear  from  the  ranks  of  the  virtues?  Many  have 
believed  that  this  is  the  result  towards  which  industrialism 
is  tending.  Some,  indeed,  have  found  in  this  supposed  fact 
a  reason  for  perpetuating  war,  and  for  fostering  the  mili- 
tary spirit ;  because,  they  maintain,  the  kind  of  courage  de- 
veloped in  war — the  bravery,  the  hardihood,  the  discipline, 
of  the  soldier — is  one  of  the  noblest  qualities  developed  in 
man,  too  good,  in  fact,  to  lose.  "William  James  disposes  of 
this  argument  in  defense  of  war,  while  at  the  same  time  an- 
swering the  question  concerning  the  future  standing  of 
physical  courage  in  human  societies  organized  upon  an  in- 
dustrial basis  in  his  stirring  and  trenchant  essay  on  The 
Moral  Equivalent  of  War.  He  is  in  the  first  place  a  firm 
believer  in  the  value  of  the  qualities  of  bravery  and  hardi- 
hood bred  by  the  military  life. 


"  Militarism  is  the  great  preserver  of  our  ideals  of  hardihood, 
and  human  life  with  no  use  for  hardihood  would  be  contemptible. 
Without  risks  or  prizes  for  the  darer,  history  would  be  insipid, 
indeed ;  and  there  is  a  type  of  military  character  which  every  one 
feels  that  the  race  should  never  cease  to  breed,  for  every  one  is 
sensitive  to  its  superiority." 


He  believes  that  states  pacifically  organized,  if  they  are 
to  remain  peaceful,  must  preserve  some  of  the  old  elements 
of  army  discipline. 


"  We  must  make  new  energies  and  hardihoods  continue  the  man- 
liness to  which  the  military  mind  so  faithfully  clings.  Martial 
virtues  must  be  the  enduring  cement;  intrepidity,  contempt  of 
softness,  surrender  of  private  interest,  obedience  to  command 
must  still  remain  the  rock  upon  which  states  are  built — unless,  in- 
deed, we  wish  for  dangerous  reactions  against  commonwealths 
fit  only  for  contempt,  and  liable  to  invite  attack  whenever  a 
center  of  crystallization  for  military-minded  enterprise  gets 
formed  anywhere  in  their  neighborhood." 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  VIRTUES  347 

But  he  believes  that  it  is  quite  possible  within  a  per- 
manently peaceful  society  to  keep  alive,  and  even  to  develop, 
the  military  spirit,  through  an  incessant  warfare  waged 
against  nature  and  natural  ills.  He  proposes  instead  of  a 
military  conscription,  a  conscription  of  the  whole  youthful 
population,  to  form  for  a  certain  number  of  years  part  of 
an  army  enlisted  to  fight  against  Nature.  "  The  military 
ideals  of  hardihood  and  discipline  would  be  wrought  into 
the  growing  fibre  of  the  people;  no  one  would  remain 
blind,  as  the  luxurious  classes  are  blind,  to  man's  real 
relations  to  the  globe  he  lives  on,  and  to  the  permanently 
sour  and  hard  foundations  of  his  higher  life.  To  coal  and 
iron  mines,  to  freight  trains,  to  fishing  fleets  in  December, 
to  dish-washing,  clothes-washing,  and  window-washing,  to 
road-building  and  tunnel-making,  to  foundries  and  stoke- 
holes, and  to  the  frames  of  sky-scrapers,  would  our  gilded 
youth  be  drafted  off,  according  to  their  choice,  to  get  the 
childishness  knocked  out  of  them,  and  to  come  back  into 
society  with  healthier  sympathies  and  soberer  ideas.  .  They 
would  have  paid  their  blood-tax,  done  their  own  part  in 
the  immemorial  human  warfare  against  nature,  they  would 
tread  the  earth  more  proudly,  the  women  would  value  them 
more  highly,  they  would  be  better  fathers  and  teachers 
of  the  following  generation." 

ECONOMIC  COURAGE 

Next  to  health,  the  thing  deemed  most  necessary  for  the 
human  individual  to  possess,  if  he  is  to  live  in  comfort  and 
security,  is  wealth.  The  institution  of  property,  as  it  has 
been  developed  in  social  evolution,  offers  to  human  intelli- 
gence its  most  effective  weapon  for  combating  the  uncer- 
tainties of  life — for  equalizing  seasons  of  plenty  with 
seasons  of  scarcity,  periods  of  health  and  productivity  with 
periods  of  illness  and  incapacity.  But  just  because  the 


348  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

possession  of  money  has  proved  such  an  effective  means 
of  furnishing  the  individual  with  all  physical  comforts  and 
pleasures — with  a  luxurious  abode,  tempting  food,  skilled 
and  obsequious  attendance — is  its  pursuit  and,  in  many 
cases,  even  its  possession,  liable  to  be  materializing  and 
debasing.  For  ceaseless  preoccupation  with  money  sought 
always  as  the  price  of  physical  comfort  and  security,  tends 
to  confine  the  attention  of  the  individual  more  and  more 
completely  to  concerns  of  his  own  physical  well-being,  to 
restrict  his  gaze  more  and  more  exclusively  to  narrow  pru- 
dential considerations,  rendering  him  insensible  to  the  ap- 
peal of  universal  principles  and  shutting  him  in  to  the 
earthy,  the  prosaic,  and  the  sordid.  Moreover,  the  con- 
tinued possession  and  enjoyment  of  wealth  make  the  pleas- 
ures and  luxuries  it  will  purchase  increasingly  necessary; 
life  appears  to  be  unsupportable  without  them.  Thus  the 
individual  is  made  blind  to  the  higher  psychic  satisfactions 
which  he  is  missing  through  his  absorption  with  money-get- 
ting, is  rendered  oblivious  to  the  social  injustice  which  may 
be  involved  in  his  possession  of  wealth.  It  is  a  well-known 
fact  that  the  ownership  of  property  makes  a  man  more 
conservative  in  his  attitude  towards  all  proposed  changes 
in  social  and  political  arrangements.  He  inclines  to  fear 
political  reform,  even  changes  in  social  convention,  lest 
they  diminish  the  value  of  his  property  or  interfere  with 
plans  he  has  on  foot  for  augmenting  his  wealth.  Thus 
there  is  bred  in  the  individual  a  spirit  of  caution  essentially 
inimical  to  moral  development  which  depends  upon  the 
ability  of  the  individual  to  risk  what  he  has  already  won 
for  the  sake  of  still  larger  rewards.  In  his  novel  Open 
Country  Maurice  Hewlett  shows,  in  a  picturesque  and 
forcible  fashion,  how  the  pursuit  and  possession  of  prop- 
erty checks  and  finally  destroys  the  personal  development 
of  many  members  of  modern  civilized  society.  His  hero, 
Senhouse,  defines  salvation  as  the  "  use  and  perfecting 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  VIRTUES  349 

of  faculty  "  and  declares  that  "  liberty  to  learn  is  the 
only  way  of  it."  "  Now  money,  I  say,  is  the  one  cause 
of  slavery  and  work  our  one  hope  of  salvation.  Therefore, 
our  civilization  as  they  disastrously  term  it,  is  a  condition 
of  acquiring  slavery  easily  and  of  obliterating  the  hope  of 
salvation."  "  Civilization  is  a  condition  of  freedom  to  use 
your  faculties  to  their  fullest  extent ;  and  your  faculties  are 
every  power  of  mind  and  heart  and  muscle  and  sense.  Very 
well.  Now  I  say  that  every  sovereign  you  put  into  a  man's 
pocket  seduces  him  away  from  the  use  of  his  faculties,  and 
every  machine  you  devise  directly  deprives  him  of  one  of 
them — and  then  where  are  we?  Why  here;  that  what  is 
true  of  a  man  is  true  of  a  million  of  men  and  that,  so  far 
from  being  more  civilized  than  the  Periclean  Athenians,  we 
are  actually  less  so  than  the  neolithic  dweller  on  the  South 
Downs,  who  hacked  up  the  earth  with  a  red  deer 's  horn  and 
drove  his  cattle  to  the  dew-pond  at  sun-down,  and  back 
again  into  an  inclosure  banked  against  the  wolves.  And 
that's  very  odd,  with  art  and  poetry  behind  us  and  before, 
we  might  by  this  time  be  like  the  sons  of  Gods."  Exagger- 
ated, this  is,  and  largely  untrue ;  but  in  its  statement  of  the 
demoralizing  influences  of  the  institution  of  private  prop- 
erty, as  at  present  developed,  containing  more  than  a  grain 
of  truth. 

The  pursuit  of  wealth  may  present  a  serious  obstacle, 
in  some  cases  even  an  absolute  bar,  to  the  exercise  of  man's 
spiritual  capacities.  It  may  prevent  the  individual  from 
seeking  truth  and  power  and  beauty  in  his  own  life,  and 
from  laboring  to  extend  these  higher  satisfactions  to  the 
rest  of  humanity.  When  this  is  the  case,  Self-realization 
requires  that  wealth  be  surrendered.  Since  surrender  in- 
volves pain, — the  mental  discomfort  of  work  and  anxiety, 
and  perhaps  also  physical  suffering  caused  by  actual  priva- 
tion and  want, — its  practice  deserves  to  rank  as  one  of  the 
varieties  of  courage.  It  has  been  distinguished  by  no 


350  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

special  name  in  ethical  reflection;  we  might,  possibly,  call 
it  economic  courage.  But  while  it  has  received  no  dis- 
tinctive label,  this  kind  of  courage  is  by  no  means  unknown 
in  human  society.  It  has  been  shown,  and  is  being  shown, 
by  all  those  aspiring  human  souls  who  sacrifice  all  the 
wealth  they  possess  or  all  the  opportunity  they  have  of 
ever  possessing  any  wealth  of  their  own,  in  their  devotion 
to  the  spiritual  well-being  of  humanity.  It  is  a  courage 
which  the  well-to-do  class  needs  to  exercise,  in  making  those 
social  and  political  reforms  which  must  come  if  social  justice 
is  to  prevail,  and  all  men  be  given  a  chance  of  truly  human 
development.  Keen-visioned  students  of  present  society  see 
in  the  women  of  the  propertied  classes  one  of  the  chief 
obstacles  to  needed  social  reforms,  because,  while  they  pos- 
sess as  a  rule  readier  sympathies  than  men,  they  are  more 
attached  to  the  comforts  and  luxuries  of  wealth,  and  lack 
the  courage  to  give  them  up  even  to  save  their  fellow- 
beings  from  perishing  by  starvation  or  by  exposure,  or  from 
sufferings  worse  than  death.  It  is  just  this  kind  of  courage 
which  we  may  suppose  the  "  rich  young  ruler  "  lacked, 
to  whom  Jesus  said: 

"  One  thing  thou  lackest  yet :  sell  all  that  thou  hast,  and 
distribute  unto  the  poor,  and  thou  shalt  have  treasure  in  Heaven : 
and,  come,  follow  me.  But  when  he  heard  these  things  [con- 
scious apparently  of  his  own  fatal  weakness],  he  became  ex- 
ceedingly sorrowful;  for  he  was  very  rich.  And  Jesus,  seeing 
him,  said:  How  hardly  shall  they  who  have  riches  enter  the 
Kingdom  of  God!"' 

MORAL  COURAGE 

The   willingness   to  sacrifice   reputation   or  endure  re- 
proach for  the  sake  of  a  larger  social  or  personal  good 
constitutes  a  third  form  of  courage.    This  form  of  courage 
•Luke  xviii,   22-24. 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  VIRTUES  351 

has  been  somewhat  ineptly  named  "  moral  "  courage.  Ref- 
erence has  already  been  made  to  the  important  influence 
which  the  individual's  reputation  among  his  fellows  exerts 
upon  his  own  private  fortunes.  If  he  stands  well  in  the 
community,  others  will  look  with  sympathy  upon  his  efforts 
to  provide  for  his  present  and  future  well-being.  Unless 
his  success  interferes  with  their  own  interests  his  fellow- 
men  will  be  glad  to  see  him  succeed.  Certainly  they  will 
not  trouble  themselves  to  put  obstacles  in  his  path.  Let 
a  man  lose  his  reputation,  however,  let  him  forfeit  his 
standing  in  the  community,  and  all  this  is  changed.  Other 
men  regard  him  with  ill-concealed  suspicion,  if  not  with 
open  hostility.  They  question  his  motives;  they  criticise 
his  actions.  His  successes  awaken  jealousy  and  resent- 
ment; his  failures  are  occasions  for  rejoicing.  It  is  con- 
sequently no  light  thing  to  sacrifice  one's  reputation  in 
human  society.  Such  sacrifice  entails  suffering  and  sac- 
rifice too  severe  to  be  undergone  without  loss  of  self-respect 
and  sanity,  except  indeed  as  the  individual  is  inspired  and 
strengthened  by  his  knowledge  of  the  greater  good  which 
he  serves  through  his  suffering.  To  be  sure  the  suffering 
is  not  primarily  physical  (although  physical  hardships  are 
likely  to  follow  eventually  from  social  condemnation ) .  But 
the  pain  is  none  the  less  real  because  "  mental  " — the 
anguish  of  soul  produced  by  severed  friendships,  by  looks 
of  scorn  and  contempt,  by  unjust  suspicions  and  ill-founded 
resentments.  Of  this  sort  is  the  suffering  which  has  been 
endured  by  those  individuals  of  every  generation  who  have 
remained  steadfast  in  their  adherence  to  unpopular  causes. 
Such  men  must  indeed — as  the  familiar  saying  is — have 
the  courage  of  their  convictions.  The  history  of  every 
nation  abounds  in  examples  of  men  who  have  suffered  dis- 
grace on  account  of  their  loyalty  to  righteous  causes.  The 
contempt  and  odium  incurred  by  Abolitionists  in  many  of 
our  communities  before  the  Civil  War,  is  an  illustration 


352  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

from  American  history.  Religion,  science,  art — yes,  every 
great  cause,  every  lofty  ideal, — has  its  heroes  who  have 
endured  ignominy  and  derision  for  its  sake. 

Steadfast  and  consistent  devotion  to  principle  upon  the 
part  of  individual  members  of  human  society  is  practically 
certain  to  result  in  a  greater  or  less  degree  of  unpopularity 
and  misunderstanding;  therefore  those  individuals  who 
would  organize  their  lives,  and  thus  realize  their  larger 
selves,  must  be  prepared  to  exercise  moral  courage.  Indeed, 
this  virtue  must  be  cultivated  by  those  who  have  convic- 
tions and  propose  to  follow  them.  Moreover,  the  need  of 
moral  courage  was  perhaps  never  greater  than  in  our  mod- 
ern civilized  societies.  Not  that  public  opinion  exerts  a 
stronger  pressure  upon  the  individual  than  it  did  in  earlier 
periods  of  social  development.  The  savage  who,  on  indi- 
vidual initiative,  went  counter  to  the  customs  of  his  tribe — 
those  of  religion  or  of  marriage,  for  instance — met  sum- 
mary punishment  at  the  hands  of  his  indignant  fellows; 
if  he  was  not  killed  outright,  he  was  driven  forth  as  an 
outlaw,  to  be  the  victim  of  whatever  hostile  force  he  en- 
countered. But  with  the  organization  and  complication  of 
life  that  have  accompanied  increasing  civilization,  the  range 
of  its  influence  has  been  enormously  extended,  until  it  now 
affects  the  smallest  details  of  daily  life  touching  matters 
that  formerly  were  regarded  as  the  individual's  own  con- 
cern. Fashion  extends  her  tyrannical  rule  to  every  depart- 
ment of  our  lives — to  the  utmost  minutia?  of  our  clothing, 
to  the  decorating  of  our  homes,  to  our  methods  of  educa- 
tion, to  our  art  and  our  literature,  even  to  modes  of  wor- 
ship and  forms  of  religious  belief.  Now  it  is  absolutely 
necessary  for  the  individual  who  would  preserve  the  in- 
tegrity of  his  own  personality,  frequently  to  repudiate  this 
form  of  social  control  and  assert  his  right  to  regulate  his 
conduct  and  manner  of  life  in  accordance  with  his  own 
convictions.  This  is  not  to  recommend  or  even  to  excuse 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  VIRTUES  353 

a  foolish  contrariety  of  views  or  habits,  still  less  a  self- 
conscious  eccentricity  in  word  and  manner.  In  matters 
where  no  principle  is  affected  or  any  particular  taste  or 
preference  involved,  it  is  usually  saving  both  of  time  and 
of  money  to  follow  the  current  fashion.  But  where  the 
individual  finds  his  own  principles  violated,  or  his  own 
personal  taste  seriously  offended  by  a  prevailing  fashion, 
it  is  his  duty  to  refuse  to  follow  it,  although  the  cost  may 
be  the  derision  and  dislike  of  his  fellows.  For  self-develop- 
ment must  proceed  from  within,  and  no  man  can  build  up 
a  self-contained  and  unified  character  who  is  the  slave  of 
public  opinion. 

5.  Idealism. — The  virtue  of  courage  has  been  explained 
as  the  subordination  by  the  human  individual  of  his 
material  interests,  whether  of  health  or  of  property  or  of 
reputation,  to  more  inclusive  and  far-reaching  ends.  The 
most  comprehensive  and  therefore  the  highest  ends  which 
can  be  attained  by  man  in  the  individual  sphere  are  the 
ideal  objects  of  his  spiritual  capacities  of  thought,  action, 
and  feeling.  These  ideal  objects — Truth,  Power,  and 
B^eauty — are  themselves  so  intimately  related  that  they 
form,  when  taken  together,  an  articulated  unity,  which  in 
its  synthesis  represents  the  whole  good  of  the  individual  self. 
Now  the  realization  of  these  ideal  objects  at  the  expense 
of  material  comfort  and  well-being,  constitutes  the  virtue 
of  idealism.  Idealism  is  therefore  the  highest  virtue  of 
the  individual  life;  it  marks  the  culminating  point  in  the 
development  of  the  human  individual  as  a  self-conscious 
person. 

The  virtue  of  Idealism  as  thus  understood  takes  two 
forms :  the  combined  harmonious  development  of  the  three 
capacities  above  named,  with  consequent  realization  of  the 
three  corresponding  ideals,  producing  in  the  individual 
the  three  qualities  of  wisdom,  efficiency,  and  refinement, 
which  in  their  union  constitute  culture;  and  the  special 


354  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

and  persistent  exercise  of  that  one  capacity,  intellectual, 
technical,  or  aesthetic,  which  is  strongest  in  the  particular 
individual,  with  resulting  achievement  in  an  exceptional 
degree  of  the  end  of  Truth,  Power,  or  Beauty.  Let  us 
consider  idealism  in  each  of  these  two  manifestations. 

CULTURE 

By  culture  is  meant  the  unimpeded  and  harmonious  ac- 
'  tivity  of  all  man 's  higher  personal  faculties.  It  represents, 
indeed,  the  complete  spiritual  development  of  the  human 
individual.  The  spiritual  capacities  of  man  have  their 
source  in  the  activity  fundamental  to  intelligent  personal- 
ity itself,  i.e.  volition;  but  this  fundamental  activity  in 
the  higher  stages  of  its  development  has  three  specialized 
expressions,  those  of  thought,  action,  and  feeling.  Hence 
culture  has  three  departments,  the  intellectual,  the  techni- 
cal, the  aesthetic.  It  consists  in  the  attainment  of  Truth, 
Power,  and  Beauty, — not  as  three  separate  ideals,  to  be 
sure,  but  in  their  organic  inter-dependence  and  unity. 

The  first  essential  of  culture  is  the  exercise  of  thought 
(  in  the  acquisition  of  knowledge.  Thought  is  the  ability 
to  form  ideas  which  can  be  verified — that  is  to  say,  which 
are  true.  The  work  of  thought  is  to  interpret  the  outcome 
of  previous  experience  in  realizing  ends,  with  a  view  to 
the  guidance  of  future  conduct.  The  human  individual  is 
not  limited,  however,  to  the  results  of  his  own  experience. 
The  results  of  the  experience  of  past  generations  of  man- 
kind in  the  realization  of  objects,  may  be  communicated 
to  him  through  the  medium  of  language,  and  thus  his 
mental  outlook  may  be  enlarged  to  include  those  objects 
which  the  conduct  of  other  men  has  proved  real.  The 
effect  of  thinking  on  the  part  of  the  individual,  therefore, 
in  connection  with  the  processes  of  intelligent  instruction, 
is  to  furnish  him  with  a  world  of  objects  which  are  possible 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  VIRTUES  355 

ends  of  action.  This  does  not  mean  that  the  outcome  of 
education  and  enlightenment  is  merely  to  reveal  to  the  in- 
dividual the  existence  of  a  certain  number  of  objects,  to 
which  he  is  limited  in  selecting  ends  of  action.  On  the  con- 
trary, through  processes  of  abstraction  and  comparison, 
analysis  and  synthesis,  he  may  work  over  the  results  of  ex- 
perience, combining  its  materials  in  new  ways  and  thus 
constructing  original  ideals,  whose  reality  may  be  tested  in 
subsequent  experiences  of  pursuit  and  attempted  attain- 
ment. More  than  this,  many  of  these  objects  are  themselves 
changing,  so  that  each  successive  moment  presents  to  the 
agent  a  situation  which,  in  its  totality,  is  essentially  new  and 
thus,  for  purposes  of  action,  contains  many  unforeseen 
possibilities.  Never  will  his,  knowledge,  no  matter  how 
great,  enable  him  to  predict  with  absolute  certainty  the 
issue  of  his  own  conduct;  he  must  nevertheless  be  willing 
to  advance  and  prepared  to  meet  many  unexpected  and 
surprising  developments. 

So  many  ideas  have  been  verified  in  human  experience, 
so  great  a  body  of  truth  has  thus  been  accumulated,  that 
no  individual  mind  is  longer  able  to  contain  its  detail  of 
fact.  The  day  of  the  encyclopedic  scholar  like  Leibnitz 
or  Aristotle,  who  was  reputed  to  be  master  of  every  known 
branch  of  learning,  is  now  past.  All  that  intellectual  cul- 
tivation can  now  hope  to  obtain  is  a  knowledge  of  the  most 
important  truths  concerning  each  principal  class  of  objects. 
To  this  knowledge  should  be  added  a  firsthand  acquaint- 
ance with  the  methods  whereby  ideas  are  verified  in  these 
main  departments  of  knowledge;  for  no  belief  which  the 
individual  is  unable  himself  to  test  through  action,  deserves 
to  be  regarded  as  a  part  of  his  knowledge.  The  cultivated 
mind  must  possess  a  knowledge  of  the  most  important  facts 
which  have  been  discovered  concerning  inorganic  nature, 
along  with  some  practice  in  the  method  of  experiment  and 
in  the  use  of  mathematics  as  applied  in  this  field;  it  must 


356  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

understand  the  fundamental  features  of  organic  life,  the 
structures  and  functions  of  living  forms,  the  conditions 
of  their  origin  and  the  laws  of  their  growth,  besides  being 
somewhat  acquainted  with  the  methods  of  investigation 
which  have  brought  these  facts  to  light;  it  must  have  a 
comprehensive  knowledge  of  human  history — of  the  origin 
and  development  of  the  human  species,  and  of  the  charac- 
teristics and  relationships  of  the  different  races  of  men, 
and  also  of  the  evolution  of  social  and  political  institutions, 
recording  as  it  does  the  achievements  of  the  human  spirit 
in  its  effort  at  self-realization — supplemented  by  accurate 
information  regarding  the  methods  and  standards  of  his- 
torical research  and  criticism;  it  must  know  the  leading 
truths  from  the  field  of  the  normative  sciences,  the  world, 
that  is,  of  values  and  appreciation,  and  possess  a  conse- 
quent insight  into  the  demands  which  human  personality 
makes  of  the  real  world,  and  the  resources  available  to 
satisfy  these  demands.  Such  knowledge  will  extend  the 
world  of  the  individual  beyond  the  limits  of  his  immediate 
present,  to  encompass  the  experience  of  past  generations 
of  mankind  with  the  vast  system  of  objects  which  it  has 
shown  to  be  real;  such  breadth  of  intellectual  vision  is 
perhaps  the  most  distinctive  mark  of  culture. 

But  amount  of  knowledge  alone  does  not  constitute  cul- 
ture. Ideas  as  mere  ideas  are  distinguished  from  reality; 
they  are  essentially  characterized  by  their  unreality.  The 
idea  is  of  itself  therefore  incomplete;  it  demands  to  be 
realized.  The  idea  is  in  fact  a  purpose,  which,  until  it 
is  actually  achieved,  remains  fragmentary  and  partial. 
Hence  culture  can  never  consist  simply  in  the  possession 
of  ideas  by  an  individual,  even  if  the  majority  of  these 
ideas  have  been  verified  in  the  lives  of  other  men.  Culture 
has  frequently  been  discredited  because  it  has  been  identi- 
fied with  the  acquisition  of  much  information  upon  many 
subjects.  Now  it  is  possible  for  a  person  to  possess  knowl- 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  VIRTUES  357 

edge  in  the  shape  of  a  great  store  of  ideas,  without  any 
ability  to  put  these  ideas  into  practice.  He  may  appear 
to  be  embarrassed  in  action,  or  even  hindered  from  acting 
altogether,  by  the  very  wealth  of  his  ideas,  which  causes 
him  at  the  time  of  action  to  be  confused  by  a  multitude  of 
inappropriate  and  irrelevant  considerations.  Knowledge 
of  this  sort  is  in  no  sense  a  real  possession  of  the  individual ; 
it  becomes  real  in  him  only  when  realized  in  his  conduct. 
In  cases  where  this  does  not  occur  we  have  that  half-culture 
— or  as  it  is  frequently  but  erroneously  called,  over-culture 
— which,  although  it  may  have  been  laboriously  and  hon- 
estly acquired,  is  little  better  than  no  culture  at  all,  and 
which  when  mistaken  for  the  genuine  culture,  causes  this 
latter  to  be  depreciated  and  derided.  True  culture  in  con- 
tradistinction from  such  counterfeit  is  an  organic  growth, 
a  development  of  personality  through  the  realization  of 
ideas  which  are  chosen  as  ends  of  action.  It  calls  for  more 
than  the  mere  possession  of  ideas,  it  requires  that  they  be 
vitalized  in  the  action  of  the  self,  that  they  be  realized  in 
personal  life. 

Culture  then  consists,  secondly,  in  power  of  action.  . 
It  involves  the  training  of  the  faculty  of  action  in  the 
human  individual.  The  result  of  such  training  is  technical 
skill  or  efficiency.  By  efficiency  or  technical  skill  is  meant 
the  ability  to  realize  the  ideals  of  intelligence  through  the 
employment  of  those  instrumentalities  which  the  specific 
situation  calls  for.  The  exercise  of  the  faculty  of  action 
reveals  to  the  agent  what  means  are  required  for  the  at- 
tainment of  different  ends,  thus  enabling  him  more  effec- 
tively to  achieve  his  purposes,  and  at  the  same  time  giving 
him  new  knowledge  of  the  inner  connection  of  objects. 
Despite  the  indispensable  part  which  action  plays  in  the 
development  of  intelligence  the  exercise  of  this  power  has 
not  always  been  recognized  as  a  necessary  element  in 
culture.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  pure  thought  along 


358  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

with  the  higher  sentiments,  such  as  the  sesthetic  and  the 
religious,  has  been  supposed  to  move  in  a  higher  plane 
than  that  of  practical  affairs.  But  recent  insight  into  the 
dependence  of  thought  upon  action  for  its  verification  makes 
such  a  view  no  longer  tenable.  One  suspects  that  this  view 
was  possible  only  because  a  thorough  training  in  modes  and 
manners  of  action  was  assumed  to  have  already  occurred 
in  the  experience  of  all  those  who  aspired  after  the  higher 
fruits  of  culture;  but  this  is  an  unwarranted  assumption 
— at  least  in  societies  where  the  opportunity  for  culture  is 
not  limited  to  a  privileged  few  who  are  prepared  from 
infancy  for  its  attainment.  Now  the  fields  in  which  the 
faculties  of  action  may  be  trained  are  so  many,  and  the 
methods  so  diverse,  that  it  is  difficult  to  give  any  complete 
account  of  them.  The  home,  the  school,  and  finally  society 
and  the  state,  should  all  furnish  technical  training. 

Of  the  many  kinds  of  training  which  it  is  possible  and 
advantageous  to  give  the  faculty  of  action,  a  few  may  be 
mentioned — with  no  idea  of  a  systematic  classification,  but 
rather  of  illustrating  by  concrete  instances  what  is  meant 
by  such  technical  training.  From  earliest  childhood  the 
individual  should  have  experience  in  handling  physical 
objects,  and  in  manipulating  mechanical  forces,  so  that  he 
may  acquire  skill  in  utilizing  the  materials  and  guiding 
the  processes  of  nature.  Manual  training  in  the  primary 
schools  is  of  great  educational  value  because  it  subserves 
just  this  purpose.  Systematic  gardening,  and  the  con- 
tinued care  and  direction  of  domestic  animals,  also  furnish 
the  child  with  valuable  technical  training — in  this  case, 
in  the  employment  and  control  of  the  lower  forms  of  life. 
A  thorough  training  in  gymnastics  and  practical  hygiene, 
received  early  in  life,  should  give  the  individual  the  ability 
to  utilize  all  the  resources  of  his  physical  organism  down 
to  the  last  ounce  of  energy.  With  such  training  as  a  pre- 
liminary and  preparation,  the  powers  of  action  should  be 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  VIRTUES  359 

exercised  in  those  larger  fields  where  alone  they  can  find 
full  and  free  expression — the  social  and  political.  In  the 
local  community,  the  social  club,  and  the  state,  he  may 
have  his  technical  faculties  trained  in  a  multitude  of  ways, 
and  acquire  in  result  the  ability  to  realize  the  ends  of 
human  well-being  through  practice  of  the  arts  of  business, 
of  government,  of  entertainment,  of  education,  etc.  It  is 
only  necessary  that  the  individual  have  the  will  to  act, 
the  initiative  to  put  his  own  ideas  in  practice,  and  then, 
having  acted,  that  he  be  eager  to  learn  from  his  own  experi- 
ence, and  the  experience  of  others  interpreted  in  the  light  of 
his  own,  better  and  more  efficient  methods  of  realizing  his 
ends.  Only  through  thus  acting,  and  profiting  by  the 
results  of  his  own  action,  can  the  individual  augment  his 
powers  of  action  and  acquire  that  practical  efficiency  which 
is  a  necessary  part  of  true  culture.  Useful  training  in 
the  arts  of  social  and  political  life  is  furnished  to  our 
young  people  in  high  schools  and  colleges  by  student 
societies  and  enterprises  of  various  sorts — debating  and 
literary  societies,  journalistic  and  athletic  activities — and 
for  the  reason  that  the  experience  they  furnish  is  an 
essential  part  of  true  culture,  these  organizations  and  activ- 
ities, when  properly  regulated,  should  be  encouraged  and 
fostered  by  the  authorities  of  such  institutions. 

Our  capacity  for  feeling  furnishes  a  third  element  requi- 
site to  culture.  Feeling  is  the  response  of  the  self,  as 
subject,  to  the  objective  conditions  which  affect  its  own 
existence  and  development;  when  pleasant  it  reflects  the 
strengthening  and  perfecting  of  the  unity  of  self-conscious- 
ness through  the  appropriating  of  new  objects.  Pleasure 
thus  accompanies  all  action  that  is  successful  in  attaining 
its  object,  whether  this  object  be  particular  and  limited, 
like  an  article  of  food,  or  comprehensive  and  universal, 
like  one  of  the  great  causes  of  social  progress.  Through 
such  a  development  of  the  faculties  of  thought  and  action 


360  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

as  we  have  been  considering,  however,  these  pleasures  of 
attainment  are  prolonged  and  harmonized,  since  the  indi- 
vidual is  given  a  source  of  permanent  enjoyment  in  the 
sustained  and  successful  pursuit  of  a  progression  of  ends, 
each  of  which  has  its  place  within  a  single  supreme  ideal. 
Culture  should  therefore  substitute  for  the  fitful  and  con- 
flicting pleasures  of  the  undeveloped  self,  a  lasting  happi- 
ness and  tranquillity.  But  feeling  makes  its  distinctive 
contribution  to  culture  in  aesthetic  enjoyment  or  the  sense 
of  beauty;  since  in  some  cases  it  is  possible  for  the  self 
to  feel  all  the  pleasures  of  an  intimate  and  personal  union 
with  an  object  without  actually  appropriating  it  through 
the  usual  effort  of  action.  Thus,  for  instance,  we  may 
make  a  landscape  ours  and  feel  possessed  of  its  most  essen- 
tial features  through  the  sense  of  beauty  which  it  awakens 
in  us,  though  we  do  not  own,  and  cannot  hope  to  own,  a 
square  foot  of  the  ground  which  enters  into  it.  Because 
it  does  not  involve  the  activities  of  thought  and  action 
which  are  necessary  to  give  us  the  pleasure  of  fulfilled 
desire,  aesthetic  enjoyment  is  called  pure  or  disinterested 
pleasure.  Certain  objects  have  the  ability  to  set  our  fac- 
ulties of  perception  and  imagination,  or  even  of  judgment 
and  reasoning,  in  such  free  and  harmonious  play  as  to  pro- 
duce in  us  the  pleasure  of  immediately  possessing  them  in 
their  inner  meaning  and  significance.  Such  possession  we 
describe  as  an  appreciation  of  their  beauty.  It  would  be 
going  too  far,  however,  to  call  the  aesthetic  experience  pure 
feeling,  if  by  this  was  meant  that  it  contained  only  affective 
elements.  Intellectual  processes  enter,  of  course,  into  the 
representation  of  the  object ;  technical  skill  comes  in  to  a 
degree  also  in  the  bodily  adjustments  made  in  contemplat- 
ing a  beautiful  object.  But  the  aesthetic  experience  is  pre- 
dominantly an  emotional  experience,  nevertheless ;  it  should 
be  recognized  as  the  distinctive  contribution  of  feeling  to 
our  spiritual  life.  Now  culture  demands  that  the  aesthetic 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  VIRTUES  361 

sensibilities  of  the  human  individual  be  developed,  that  his 
sense  of  beauty  be  quickened  and  refined.  With  his  feeling 
for  beauty  undeveloped  he  may  find  only  a  brief  and  occa- 
sional pleasure  in  a  bright  color,  an  obvious  harmony  of 
tones,  a  simple  symmetry  of  figure.  His  taste  must  then 
be  trained  and  improved  until  he  finds  constant  and  en- 
during pleasure  in  more  subtle  schemes  of  color,  more 
complicated  harmonies  of  tone,  and  more  detailed  sym- 
metries of  figure.  Not  that  the  real  beauty  of  objects, 
which  only  the  cultivated  tastes  can  appreciate,  is  always 
proportionate  to  the  complication  of  their  structure  or  to 
elaboration  of  detail.  But  cultivation  of  taste  is  accom- 
panied by  an  increased  ability  to  appreciate  the  harmonies 
which  are  not  apparent  upon  the  surface  but,  at  first  con- 
cealed by  variety  and  apparent  discord,  gradually  reveal 
themselves  and,  shining  through  the  mass  of  details,  give 
them  a  wealth  of  meaning  and  suggestibility  that  is  almost 
endless.  The  result  of  aesthetic  cultivation  is  thus  to  reveal 
to  the  individual  more  beauties  in  land  and  sea  and  sky, 
in  the  social  world,  and  in  his  own  inner  life,  where  the  Ideal 
in  its  progressive  realization  exhibits  that  beauty  which 
"  never  was  on  land  or  sea."  The  objects  of  aesthetic 
appreciation  may  be  divided  into  three  classes,  those  of 
nature,  of  art,  and  of  social  intercourse.  In  the  first  class 
belong  the  landscape,  the  seascape,  the  starry  heavens;  in 
the  second,  architecture,  statuary,  painting,  music,  litera- 
ture ;  in  the  third,  conversation,  and  manners  of  speech 
and  dress.  To  appreciate  beauty  in  all  of  these  fields 
the  emotional  faculties  should  be  trained,  and  such  train- 
ing should  be  deliberately  undertaken,  wisely  planned, 
and  patiently  carried  through.  There  is  no  more  telling 
evidence  of  genuine  culture  than  an  appreciation  of  beauty 
in  nature,  a  taste  for  the  best  music,  the  best  pictures,  the 
best  books,  and  a  delight  in  the  courtesies  and  amenities 
of  social  life,  in  agreeable  conversation,  graceful  carriage, 


362  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

and  attractive  dress.  Unfortunately,  the  impression  is  wide- 
spread, even  in  civilized  countries,  that  aesthetic  apprecia- 
tion is  an  ability  belonging  to  a  limited  class  especially 
gifted  with  artistic  ability  and  that  the  majority  of  men 
have  no  concern  with  it.  This  idea  is  of  course  quite  false 
and  must  be  opposed  in  the  interest  of  the  higher  human 
welfare.  The  artist  only  possesses  to  an  exceptional  de- 
gree powers  of  selective  perception,  imaginative  synthesis, 
and  emotional  response,  which  we  all  possess  and  may 
cultivate  if  we  will.  We  may  avail  ourselves  of  the  work 
of  the  artist  to  quicken  our  own  sense  of  beauty;  he  will 
find  in  our  admiration  and  enjoyment  the  inspiration  of 
still  finer  and  nobler  works.  Only  thus  through  the  in- 
terest and  cooperation  of  the  whole  community  or  nation 
in  the  encouragement  of  art  and  the  preservation  of  natural 
beauty  can  the  full  aesthetic  development  of  individual  mem- 
bers be  achieved. 

This  brief  statement  of  the  essentials  of  culture  will  have 
missed  its  aim  if  it  has  not  shown  with  clearness  that 
thought,  action,  and  feeling,  are  not  three  independent 
activities,  but  only  three  aspects  of  the  one  process  through 
which  the  self  in  its  spiritual  nature  develops  and  expands. 
Each  one  of  these  three  capacities  involves,  and  depends 
upon,  the  other  two.  Thought  is  verified  in  action  and  this 
verification  is  signified  in  feeling;  action  is  guided  by 
thought  and  impelled  by  feeling;  feeling  is  aroused  by  an 
object  of  thought  whose  comprehension  enlists  the  powers 
of  action.  In  true  culture,  therefore,  intellectual,  technical, 
and  aesthetic  activities  blend  in  the  unity  of  developed 
personality.  The  ideal  ends  of  Truth,  Power,  and  Beauty, 
which  are  the  goals  of  thought,  action,  and  feeling,  re- 
spectively, are  themselves  but  different  expressions  of  the 
supreme  ideal  of  complete  self-organization  sought  by  the 
fundamental  activity  of  volition  through  which  self-con- 
scious personality  is  itself  constituted.  The  three  subordi- 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  VIRTUES  363 

nate  virtues  of  Wisdom,  Efficiency,  and  Refinement,  all 
merge  within  the  comprehensive  excellence  of  culture. 

ACHIEVEMENT 

In  addition  to  culture,  idealism  or  the  full  realization 
of  the  psychic  capacities  of  the  human  self,  demands  the 
prolonged  and  progressive  exercise  of  that  ability,  intel- 
lectual, technical,  or  sesthetic,  which  is  most  marked  in  the 
individual.  Such  sustained  and  successful  pursuit  of  the 
end  most  in  line  with  the  individual's  own  talent  is  what 
we  mean  by  achievement.  It  is  an  admitted  fact  that  men 
differ  in  their  abilities — in  the  strength  of  one  capacity 
as  compared  to  the  strength  of  others.  Indeed,  the  diver- 
gence in  this  respect  is  so  wide,  the  resulting  combinations 
of  different  abilities  in  different  amounts  are  so  many, 
that  the  attempt  to  classify  individuals  into  distinct  types 
or  groups  on  the  basis  of  their  predominant  abilities  appears 
quite  hopeless.  Each  individual  falls  into  a  class  by  him- 
self, his  own  particular  combination  of  abilities  rendering 
him  different  from  every  other  individual.  Nevertheless, 
it  does  seem  possible  to  divide  individuals,  roughly,  into 
three  groups  in  accordance  with  the  predominance  of  in- 
intellectual,  technical,  or  esthetic  abilities,  in  their  nature. 
The  first  and  last  types  appear  at  first  glance  to  be  more 
clearly  marked  and  hence  more  easily  distinguishable.  No 
doubt  there  are  individuals  in  whom  intellect  predominates, 
men  who  are  "  born  thinkers  "  like  Kant  and  Spencer. 
The  aesthetic  type  or  "  artistic  temperament  "  is  perhaps 
even  more  sharply  distinguished,  its  peculiarities  are  more 
conspicuous;  to  this  type  belong  the  poets,  the  musicians, 
the  painters, — the  Shelleys,  Chopins,  and  Rembrandts. 
The  third  class — the  technical  or  practical — is  really  so 
large,  occupying  so  extensive  a  field  and  divisible  into 
so  many  subordinate  classes,  that  it  loses  all  distinctness 


364  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

and  seems  to  have  no  exact  boundaries.  Yet  it  cannot  be 
denied  that  there  are  men  who  are  characteristically  "  men 
of  action."  Only  this  superior  technical  ability  is  usually 
displayed  in  one  province  of  the  practical  sphere — in  that 
of  mechanics  or  engineering,  as  in  the  case  of  an  Edison 
or  an  Eads ;  in  plant-  or  animal-breeding  and  control,  where 
men  like  Burbank  show  their  skill ;  in  medicine  and  surgery, 
of  which  many  men  in  the  past  century  have  shown  them- 
selves masters;  in  state-craft  and  diplomacy  where  men 
as  widely  different  as  Bismarck  and  Lincoln  show  supreme 
natural  ability ;  in  education  and  religion ;  in  social  organi- 
zation and  moral  reform ;  in  all  these  and  many  other  fields 
as  well.  According  to  his  type  of  ability,  then,  the  in- 
dividual is  fitted  to  achieve  intellecually,  as  scholar  and 
investigator,  cesthetically  in  the  field  of  art,  or  technically, 
in  practical  pursuits, — the  world  of  action  being  so  large, 
however,  that  special  ability  in  it  is  usually  confined  to 
one  of  its  provinces. 

The  difficulty  which  immediately  arises  in  connection 
with  this  subject  of  an  achievement  which  is  necessarily  spe- 
cialized, is  its  seeming  conflict  with  culture.  Certainly  the 
interests  of  the  two  do  appear  to  be  antagonistic.  Culture 
is  many-sided  and  symmetrical,  achievement  is  one-sided 
and  extreme;  culture  is  extensive  and  universal,  achieve- 
ment is  intensive  and  particular.  How  reconcile  the  bal- 
anced and  proportionate  development  of  all  the  faculties 
of  the  human  self  with  the  exaggerated  and  disproportionate 
exercise  of  a  special  one?  This  is  the  way  the  problem 
states  itself  in  the  minds  of  many  educators,  moralists,  and 
other  students  of  human  nature  and  human  life — and  as 
thus  stated  it  is,  of  course,  insoluble.  Now  the  assertion 
may  well  appear  to  be  a  rash  one;  yet  the  truth  is  that 
there  is  really  no  problem  here  at  all,  for  the  interests  of 
"  culture  "  and  "  specialization  "  are  not  essentially 
antagonistic  when  these  two  are  properly  understood. 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  VIRTUES  365 

Achievement  through  the  exercise  of  some  special  ability 
in  the  individual,  does  not  hinder  but  rather  encourages 
the  development  of  his  other  powers,  provided  this  ability 
preponderates  in  his  nature.  So  far  from  checking  and 
frustrating  the  expression  of  his  other  capacities,  the 
continued  and  successful  use  of  this,  his  special  talent, 
is  the  most  effectual,  yes  the  only,  method  of  enlivening 
and  inspiring  his  whole  nature,  so  that  all  his  powers  may 
function  at  their  maximum  of  efficiency.  The  man  who, 
for  example,  has  marked  musical  gifts,  will  not  have  his 
intellectual  development  cut  short  or  his  practical  efficiency 
diminished  by  achievement  in  the  line  of  his  distinctive 
ability.  On  the  contrary,  without  the  stimulus  of  this 
achievement  which  his  nature  demands,  his  powers  of 
thought  will  languish,  his  capacity  for  action  will  be  dead- 
ened, and  his  whole  personality  be  dwarfed  and  stunted; 
while  on  the  other  hand,  if  his  special  talent  be  given  the 
opportunity  for  expression  it  craves,  his  intellectual  per- 
ceptions are  quickened,  his  technical  skill  increased,  and 
his  whole  nature  is  vitalized  and  expanded.  This  does 
not  mean  that  his  intellectual  and  technical  development 
will  equal  his  aesthetic  achievement;  but  that  inequality 
is  rooted  in  his  own  nature  and  to  destroy  it  would  be 
to  destroy  the  proportions  of  his  own  individuality.  The 
case  is  the  same  if  the  exceptional  ability  is  of  the  in- 
tellectual or  practical  type  rather  than  of  the  aesthetic. 
The  born  engineer  or  politician  will  learn  most  fully  to 
interpret  the  meaning  of  the  world  and  to  enjoy  its  beauty, 
in  a  life  which  permits  of  the  special  exercise  of  his  dis- 
tinctive ability ;  the  born  thinker  will  best  acquire  technical 
skill  and  aesthetic  sensibility  in  connection  with  his  special 
scientific  researches.  Achievement  is  consequently  not  to 
be  regarded  as  the  enemy  of  culture.  As  culture  is  the 
culmination  of  individual  development,  so  achievement  is 
the  apex  and  crown  of  culture,  its  very  pinnacle,  where 


366  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

the  individual  attains  that  triumphant  mastery  of  objective 
conditions,  that  complete  self-possession,  for  which  the  will 
that  is  fundamental  within  him  is  ever  yearning.  It  is 
true  that  the  individual  who  exercises  to  a  special  degree 
an  ability  which  is  not  strongest  by  natural  endowment  will 
miss  the  fruits  of  culture  and  develop  a  one-sided  character. 
Obviously,  this  happens  often  enough.  Sometimes  it  occurs 
through  careless  acceptance  by  the  individual  of  a  certain 
pursuit  because  circumstances  make  it  easy  to  do  so;  in 
other  instances,  it  follows  from  a  real  ignorance  in  the 
individual  of  his  nature  and  special  abilities ;  in  still  others 
— and  these  the  most  numerous  of  all — economic  pressure 
forces  the  individual  to  engage  in  an  activity  inappropriate 
to  his  own  nature  and  hence  uninteresting  and  even  dis- 
tasteful to  him.  Here  of  course  there  is  no  possibility  of 
true  culture;  but  neither  is  there  any  opportunity  for 
genuine  achievement. 

Such  achievement  as  we  have  been  considering  realizes 
ends  of  universal  value.  The  pursuit  of  Truth  and  Power 
and  Beauty  is  a  quest  in  which  all  human  individuals  par- 
ticipate in  so  far  as  they  exercise  their  spiritual  capacities. 
In  fact,  such  achievement,  if  it  is  to  be  truly  progressive, 
requires  the  cooperation  of  many  individuals — men  living 
in  different  places  and  times,  perhaps,  but  united  by  ties 
of  sympathy  and  mutual  understanding  through  their  de- 
votion to  common  ends.  Such  cooperation  enables  the 
single  individual  to  profit  by  the  achievements  of  other 
men  and  then  to  repay  this  debt  by  turning  over  the 
products  of  his  own  skill  to  the  uses  of  his  fellow-workers. 
As  the  result  of  this  cooperative  effort  on  the  part  of 
mankind,  a  great  deal  has  been  achieved  in  the  intellectual, 
technical,  and  esthetic  spheres:  much  truth  has  been  dis- 
covered ;  man 's  power  of  control  over  the  objective  con- 
ditions of  his  life  has  been  greatly  increased ;  many  forms 
of  beauty  have  been  defined  and  exemplified.  The  more 


THE  INDIVIDUAL  VIRTUES  367 

general  problems  of  an  introductory  character  in  each 
of  these  three  lines  of  activity  have  been  in  a  large 
measure  solved.  But  the  consequence  of  this  initial  step 
has  been  to  disclose  a  multitude  of  special  problems  de- 
manding solution  in  each  of  these  fields.  To  one  of  these 
special  subjects  of  study,  branches  of  action,  or  depart- 
ments of  sensibility,  the  individual  must  address  himself 
if  he  expects  to  contribute  anything  to  human  achievement. 
This  means  a  still  stricter  limitation  of  his  activities.  The 
field  of  knowledge  has  been  divided  into  the  particular 
sciences,  and  these  sciences  have  in  most  cases  been  again 
sub-divided;  the  multiplicity  of  fields  in  which  technical 
skill  may  be  exercised  has  already  been  alluded  to;  the 
aesthetic  sphere  has  also  been  partitioned  off  among  a 
variety  of  special  arts.  Some  suggestion  of  the  different 
fields  which  are  open  to  individual  achievement  in  the 
present  state  of  human  culture  may  be  given  by  the  follow- 
ing table,  which  of  course  is  not  exhaustive. 

Mathematics 
Physics 
Chemistry 

MECHANICAL    Astronomy 
Geology 
Mineralogy 

INTELLECTUAL  Meteorology 

(The  Field  of  Thought)  Botany 

Zoology 
Anthropology 
Ethnology 
Sociology 

HISTORICAL      Economics 
Politics 
Psychology 
Logic 
Ethics 
^Esthetics 
Philosophy 


368 


THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 


INORGANIC 


TECHNICAL 

(The  World  of  Action)  ORGANIC 


SOCIAL 


VISUAL 


Land 

Sea 

Air 

Plant 

.Animal 

Human 

Law  and  Government 
War  and  Armament 
Production  and  Manu- 
facture 

Transportation  and  Dis- 
tribution 
Association  and  Entertain 

ment 
Education  and  Religion 

Landscape  and  Seascape 

Buildings 

Statuary 

Pictures 


ESTHETIC 

(The  Sphere  of  Feeling)  AUDITORY      Music 

Poetry 


VERBAL 


Drama 
Fiction 


CHAPTER  H 
THE  SOCIAL  VIRTUES 

1.  The  Social  Adjustment. — 2.  Kindness. — 3.  Friendship.— 4.  Justice. 
— 5.  Benevolence. 

1.  The  Social  Adjustment. — Besides  the  adjustment  of 
impulses  in  the  individual,  self-organization  involves  the 
adjustment  of  the  individual  himself  to  others  in  society. 
The  social  adjustment  does  not  wait  until  the  organization 
of  individuality  is  completed,  however;  the  two  processes 
proceed  simultaneously  and  in  close  connection  with  one 
another.  All  the  individual  virtues  have  an  important 
social  bearing  as  we  are  aware — even  a  man's  temperance 
or  thrift  affects  in  a  decided  way  his  relations  to  others; 
but  this  social  reference  becomes  more  explicit  in  the  case 
of  the  higher  virtues  of  the  individual  which  concern  the 
pursuit  of  the  universal  ends  of  personality,  ends  whose 
attainment  requires  the  cooperation  of  many  individuals. 
Conversely,  as  we  shall  now  see,  the  social  qualities — such 
virtues  as  friendship  and  justice,  for  example — exert  a 
determining  influence  upon  the  development  of  individual- 
ity. Nor  are  we  to  think,  moreover,  that  the  consciousness 
of  others  is  secondary  to,  or  derived  from,  the  consciousness 
of  self,  in  the  sense  of  being  the  result  of  an  inference  based 
upon  the  observed  analogy  between  their  behavior  and  our 
own  in  the  same  circumstances.  On  the  contrary,  as  re- 
cent studies  in  genetic  psychology  have  conclusively  shown, 
the  consciousness  of  ego  and  that  of  alter  grow  up  together : 
they  are  mutually  dependent — the  ego  learning  of  himself 


370  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

from  the  imitation  of  others  and  then  interpreting  their 
experiences  in  terms  of  his  own. 

Despite  these  indubitable  facts,  the  organization  of  in- 
dividuality is  the  condition  and  pre-requisite  of  the  ad- 
justment of  individualities  in  society.  Of  the  promptings 
of  impulse,  of  the  satisfying  of  desire,  of  the  forming  of 
ambition,  the  individual  has  immediate  experience  only  in 
himself;  upon  this  experience  will  therefore  depend  his 
ability  to  enter  into  the  lives  of  others  and  to  understand 
their  desires  and  purposes.  The  individual  can  only  imag- 
ine the  purpose  and  ambitions  of  others,  while  he  realizes 
his  own  and,  although  sympathy  may  give  warmth  and 
urgency  to  the  other's  interests  as  they  are  imagined,  still 
the  individual's  understanding  of  their  character  is  neces- 
sarily limited  by  the  range  of  his  own  experience.  Evi- 
dently, then,  the  individual  must  have  learned  to  control 
his  own  desires,  must  have  succeeded  in  subordinating  them 
to  some  inclusive  and  unifying  purpose,  before  he  can 
appreciate  the  presence  and  supremacy  of  similar  purposes 
and  ambitions  in  the  lives  of  others.  Again  we  must  be 
on  our  guard  against  going  to  an  unwarranted  extreme. 
The  human  self  does  not  first  have  to  go  to  the  limits  of 
egoism  before  it  can  begin  the  practice  of  altruism.  The 
view  is  erroneous  which  conceives  of  moral  development 
in  the  human  individual  as  beginning  with  the  absolute 
egoism  of  childhood,  passing  through  the  prudential  stage 
of  youth,  and  finally  arriving  at  altruism  in  maturity. 
The  child  is  not  an  absolute  egoist.  His  conduct  is  not 
sufficiently  organized  to  permit  of  the  definition  of  his 
individuality ;  he  is  conscious  of  no  interests  as  his  own,  in 
distinction  from  the  interests  of  others;  he  cannot,  there- 
fore, manifest  a  genuine  egoism.  The  child  is  selfish, 
however ;  the  ego  interest  is  growing  more  rapidly  than 
the  alter  interest.  The  conduct  of  the  child  is  occupied 
with  the  satisfaction  of  a  number  of  desires — only  partially 


THE  SOCIAL  VIRTUES  371 

controlled,  and  very  imperfectly  adjusted  to  one  another — 
in  an  environment  in  which  other  individuals  are  taken 
for  granted  as  necessary  and  important  factors.  The  child 
does  not  think  of  distinguishing  his  interest  from  the  in- 
terest of  the  family;  he  is  absorbed  in  gratifying  his  de- 
sires in  and  through  the  family.  But  with  the  organization 
of  impulse  effected  through  the  training  of  childhood,  in- 
dividuality emerges;  clear  consciousness  of  self  and  self- 
interest  arises.  This  result  is  usually  accomplished  during 
the  period  of  adolescence  when  the  powers  of  intellect, 
imagination,  and  emotion,  are  quickened  and  strengthened. 
Then  the  individual  does  for  the  first  time  become  fully 
conscious  of  himself  in  the  uniqueness  of  his  individuality, 
and  of  the  interests  and  ambitions  peculiar  to  his  individual 
nature.  This  is  the  period  really  favorable  to  egoism,  that 
of  youth  and  early  maturity,  wrhen  the  young  person  is 
wholly  wrapped  up  in  his  own  plans  and  either  entirely 
neglects,  or  totally  disregards,  the  interests  of  others.  But 
this  stronger  and  more  adequate  consciousness  of  self  gives 
the  individual  his  first  true  conception  of  individuality 
in  others — his  first  appreciation  of  individual  purposes  and 
ambitions  among  his  fellow-men.  Then  there  becomes  pos- 
sible— and  necessary — an  adjustment  of  these  different  and 
conflicting  individualities,  as  the  next  step  in  self-organiza- 
tion. 

The  social  adjustment,  whose  end  is  the  integration  of 
all  individual  interests  in  one  inclusive  human  good,  is 
effected  in  two  distinct  steps  or  moments.  In  the  first,  the 
individual  adjusts  his  own  interests  to  the  interests  of 
other  individuals  with  whom  he  comes  into  personal  contact. 
When  we  emphasize  the  negative  side  of  this  adjustment, 
thinking  of  the  self-abnegation  which  must  be  practised 
if  we  are  to  make'  common  interest  with  our  fellows, 
we  derive  the  virtue  of  kindness,  the  first  of  the  social 
virtues. 


372  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

2.  Kindness. — Kindness  is  the  practice  of  subordinating 
self-interest  when  this  is  seen  to  conflict  with  the  good  of 
others.  The  ' '  kind  ' '  person,  in  the  popular  understanding 
of  the  word,  is  the  person  who  is  willing  to  "  put  himself 
out  ' '  for  others ;  and  these  words  express  extremely  well 
the  true  nature  of  kindness.  A  willingness  on  the  part  of 
the  individual  to  suffer  personal  discomfort,  to  incur  pri- 
vate disadvantage,  is  the  first  requirement  made  of  him 
on  entering  the  life  of  social  relationships.  He  who  is  so 
absorbed  in  his  own  plans  as  to  be  oblivious  of  the  desires 
of  others,  or  so  bent  upon  his  own  ambitions  as  to  dis- 
regard the  welfare  of  others,  can  never  hope  to  enjoy  the 
larger  satisfactions  of  the  social  life  or  to  realize  his  own 
greater  social  self.  Now  the  actual  sacrifice  demanded  of 
the  individual  in  adjusting  his  own  to  others'  interests 
in  the  different  relationships  of  the  social  life,  varies  in 
amount  from  denying  a  passing  desire  to  violating  a  life- 
purpose  or  endangering  a  personal  ideal.  Where  the  cost 
to  the  individual  is  least,  in  the  sacrifice  of  present  comfort 
or  momentary  pleasure — as  when,  for  instance,  a  man  gives 
up  his  chance  of  securing  a  comfortable  seat  in  order  to 
assist  an  aged  or  infirm  person  in  boarding  a  car — kindness 
is  usually  recognized  as  Courtesy. 

Courtesy  is  simply  kindness — kindness  displayed  in  the 
details  of  social  intercourse,  and  shown  in  an  habitual 
attention  to  others'  wishes  and  welfare  at  the  expense  of 
some  trouble  and  inconvenience  to  oneself.  The  courteous 
person  is  the  "  considerate  "  person,  the  one  who  con- 
stantly considers  others'  feelings  as  well  as  his  own.  It 
is  true  that  courtesy  usually  concerns  the  minor  matters 
of  life.  No  great  interest  is  endangered,  no  momentous 
issue  involved;  the  question  is  generally  one  of  modes  of 
speech  and  manners  of  action,  and  relates  to  one's  tem- 
porary convenience  or  passing  pleasure.  Yet  courtesy  re- 
quires effort,  nevertheless.  It  is  not  easy  always  to  sum- 


THE  SOCIAL  VIRTUES  373 

mon  the  smile  of  welcome  for  the  friendly  caller  who 
comes  inopportunely  and  interrupts  the  progress  of  an 
important  piece  of  work,  or  to  cut  short  an  enjoyable 
conversation  with  an  old  friend  in  order  to  say  a  word 
of  greeting  to  an  uninteresting  stranger.  Courtesy  is  ex- 
acting in  its  demand  that  the  individual  be  always  on  his 
guard — always  ready  by  word  or  by  act  to  assist  and  en- 
courage his  fellows  in  the  many  and  often  irritating  details 
of  the  daily  walk  in  life.  It  consequently  exposes  the  in- 
dividual to  vexatious  interruptions  in  the  prosecution  of 
his  own  plans  and,  not  infrequently,  to  serious  disadvan- 
tage. But  whatever  its  cost,  the  value  of  courtesy  in  social 
life  can  hardly  be  overestimated.  It  is  the  oil  which  makes 
the  machinery  of  social  intercourse  run  smoothly,  removing 
causes  of  friction  and  thus  preventing  the  parts  from  be- 
coming so  worn  and  weakened  as  finally  to  break  and 
throw  the  whole  machine  out  of  gear.  Courtesy  adds  an 
element  of  cheer  and  encouragement  to  life,  which  does 
much  to  lessen  the  nervous  fatigue  and  dispel  the  dis- 
couragement which  our  modern  civilization,  with  its  haste 
and  its  complication,  produces  in  many  individuals,  and 
thus  to  increase  human  efficiency  and  enlarge  the  possibili- 
ties of  human  achievement. 

But  kindness  often  costs  more  than  temporary  incon- 
venience; it  interferes  with  the  realization  of  our  leading 
life-purposes.  Its  exercise,  in  helping  neighbor  or  acquaint- 
ance who  is  in  need,  requires  the  sacrifice  of  time,  money, 
or  reputation.  Because  money  as  the  universal  medium 
of  exchange,  is  convertible  into  so  many  benefits,  it  con- 
stitutes in  a  large  proportion  of  cases  the  most  effective 
instrument  at  the  disposal  of  the  individual  for  relieving 
distress  or  ministering  to  the  welfare  of  his  fellows.  Kind- 
ness in  this  form  of  the  surrender  of  the  ' '  natural  ' '  goods 
of  life  for  the  assistance  of  others,  is  usually  denominated 
Generosity.  Of  the  subordination  of  wealth  to  the  larger 


374  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

spiritual  concerns  of  life,  something  has  already  been  said 
in  the  discussion  of  courage;  but  we  were  interested  there 
in  the  sacrifice  of  wealth  primarily  as  a  means  to  the  greater 
personal  freedom  of  the  individual,  and  here  in  expending  it 
for  the  good  of  others.  The  obligation  resting  upon  those 
who  have  money  in  excess  of  their  present  needs  to  give 
at  least  a  portion  of  their  surplus  to  relieve  the  distress 
of  others  who  through  illness,  misfortune,  or  even  through 
their  own  neglect  are  suffering  from  lack  of  the  necessities 
of  life,  is  universally  admitted.  The  amount  which  one 
ought  in  a  particular  case  to  give  should  be  determined 
on  grounds  of  the  personal  welfare  of  the  individuals  con- 
cerned. One  individual  has  no  right  to  jeopardize  his 
own  personal  usefulness  and  social  efficiency  in  order  to 
give  another  enjoyments  which  he  cries  for  but  can  do 
without.  Nor  has  any  one  the  right,  through  his  generosity, 
to  avert  entirely  from  another  the  consequences  of  his 
own  laziness  and  self-indulgence,  thus  preventing  him  from 
acquiring  the  self-reliance  and  thriftiness  which  are  the 
foundation  of  a  stable  character.  Because  the  generosity 
of  individuals  prompted  by  sympathy  for  the  sufferings 
of  others  in  distress,  often  leads  to  this  latter  result,  it 
has  recently  fallen  into  considerable  disrepute;  and  the 
proposal  is  to  replace  it  altogether  by  systematic  charity, 
organized  upon  a  scientific  basis,  which  aims  through  a 
study  of  social  and  economic  conditions  to  remove  the 
causes  of  poverty  and  make  the  expenditure  of  money  a 
means  to  the  real  personal  betterment  of  the  recipients 
and  not  to  their  temporary  enjoyment.  But  while  organ- 
ized charity  promises  to  do  more  for  the  relief  of  chronic 
poverty  it  by  no  means  takes  the  place  of  individual  gen- 
erosity. The  immediate  contact  of  giver  and  recipient 
in  the  kindly  offices  of  relief  affords  to  both  an  opportunity 
for  personal  expression  and  a  spur  to  moral  betterment 
which  cannot  be  dispensed  with  if  all  the  possibilities  of 


THE  SOCIAL  VIRTUES  375 

our  human  life  are  to  be  realized.  The  reason  why  so 
much  well-meant  charity  fails  to  accomplish  any  real  good 
is  that  it  is  limited  to  the  bestowing  of  money,  while — in 
addition  to  pecuniary  relief — advice,  encouragement,  and 
even  companionship,  are  needed  to  put  the  unfortunate 
one  on  his  feet  again.  But — as  it  may  happen — such 
friendly  attention  can  only  be  given  at  the  further  expense 
of  the  agent.  The  needy  person  frequently  owes  his  distress 
to  his  own  indolence,  folly,  or  wrongdoing ;  in  consequence 
he  has  incurred  the  contempt  and  odium  of  his  fellows. 
One  who  would  give  him  the  companionship  and  counsel 
which  kindness  demands  must  cross  the  social  line  drawn 
against  him  by  the  community,  and  be  prepared  to  injure 
his  own  reputation  for  good  judgment,  if  not  for  good 
intention.  Thus  many  who  are  willing  to  spend  their 
money  to  help  others,  are  unwilling  to  go  further  and 
risk  their  reputation.  The  released  convict  who  needs 
healthful  companionship,  sound  advice,  and  hearty  en- 
couragement, as  he  never  needed  it  before,  finds  that  every 
one  shuns  him;  no  one  is  willing  to  be  seen  walking  or 
talking  with  him;  all  persons  are  reluctant  to  have  him 
live  or  work  in  their  vicinity.  Small  wonder  that  he  is 
drawn  back  to  evil  pursuits!  Surely  that  reputation  is  a 
cheap  and  sorry  thing,  which  will  be  injured  if  we  extend 
a  helping  hand  to  a  fallen  fellow-man.  Kindness  demands 
the  sacrifice  of  nothing  that  is  essential  to  our  own  self- 
realization,  when  it  requires  us  to  subordinate  such  con- 
siderations to  others'  welfare. 

The  practice  of  kindness  may  involve  still  greater  sac- 
rifices than  any  as  yet  described.  It  may  require  the 
individual  to  neglect  his  own  personal  development  and 
the  exercise  of  his  higher  psychic  capacities — to  give  up 
his  opportunity  for  continued  education  or  to  deny  his 
ability  for  original  achievement — for  others'  benefit.  Here 
kindness  becomes  genuine  self-sacrifice.  Fortunately,  kind- 


376  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

ness  does  not  commonly  demand  such  sacrifices;  although 
they  are  not  so  rare,  perhaps,  as  we  imagine.  There  is 
no  record  kept  of  the  young  men  who  have  resolutely 
turned  their  back  upon  college  or  university  with  the  allur- 
ing prospects  of  professional  distinction  which  they  held 
forth  to  a  youth  certain  of  his  ability,  in  order  to  support 
aged  or  enfeebled  parents;  of  the  young  women  who  have 
missed  honorable  careers  as  teachers,  or  the  happiness  of 
wedded  life,  that  they  might  spend  years  and  exhaust  their 
youth  and  vitality  in  caring  for  a  fretful  invalid  mother 
or  sister;  of  the  ministers  and  teachers  who  have  denied 
abilities  for  scholarly  research  in  their  increasing  devotion 
to  the  welfare  of  parishioners  or  students.  If  such  a  roll 
is  anywhere  kept  it  is  certainly  an  honor  roll.  While  such 
instances  of  self-sacrificing  kindness  awaken  a  deep  ad- 
miration that  is  akin  to  reverence  in  every  sober  mind,  still 
they  present  serious  difficulty  to  the  student  of  morality, 
and  particularly  to  the  Self-realizationist.  This  problem 
has  been  already  touched  upon  in  the  chapter  upon  self- 
sacrifice.  We  believe  that  those  practices  which  are  re- 
quired for  the  complete  realization  of  the  self  are  virtuous 
and,  conversely,  that  whatever  is  a  duty  does  thus  con- 
tribute to  Self-realization.  Now  we  all  recognize  that  thus 
to  forego  the  opportunity  for  personal  development  in  order 
to  benefit  others  is  at  times  a  duty  for  the  human  indi- 
vidual— although  we  may  doubt  whether  we  ourselves  should 
have  strength  to  perform  it — and  consequently  we  should 
expect  to  find  it  a  most  effective  means  of  Self-realization. 
But,  is  it?  Theoretically,  we  might  expect  that  the  very 
severity  of  the  struggle  which  preceded  such  self-sacrifice, — 
suddenly  uprooting  plans  which  had  slowly  grown  and 
matured  during  years  of  time,  and  tearing  down  the  aims 
and  ambitions  whose  rearing  had  taken  much  painstaking 
thought  and  effort — would  discover  new  springs  of  hope  in 
the  individual,  and  bring  to  light  capacities  in  himself 


THE  SOCIAL  VIRTUES  377 

whose  possession  he  had  never  dreamt  of ;  as  a  great  con- 
vulsion of  nature,  rending  the  rocks  and  shaking  the  moun- 
tains to  their  foundation,  might  disclose  new  sources  of 
pure  water  and  lay  bare  hidden  veins  of  precious  ore. 
Certainly  this  is  what  happens  with  many  individuals  when 
under  such  stress  of  sacrifice;  they  reveal  a  sweetness  of 
temper,  a  depth  of  insight,  a  capacity  for  achievement  quite 
unsuspected  in  them  before.  Yet  in  other  cases,  and  they 
are  not  few,  the  heroic  kindness  does  not  seem  to  promote 
Self-realization  and  cannot  be  made  by  any  stretch  of  the 
imagination  to  appear  to  do  so.  The  unavoidable  sorrow 
and  disappointment  over  the  failure  of  individual  ambi- 
tions often  leave  the  person  soured  and  embittered;  or  the 
withdrawal  of  all  stimulus  and  incentive  to  individual 
achievement  renders  him  dull,  prosaic,  and  commonplace; 
or  constant  association  with  his  own  intellectual  inferiors 
develops  a  mean,  captious,  or  tyrannizing  spirit  within 
him.  What  can  the  Self-realizationist  say  to  such  cases, 
which  are  of  undoubted  occurrence?  He  cannot  pretend 
to  have  a  full  solution  for  all  the  problems  here  involved. 
Two  considerations  should  not  be  neglected,  however,  which 
when  brought  to  bear  upon  the  difficulty  make  it  appear 
somewhat  less  formidable.  In  the  first  place,  when  the 
opportunity  for  individual  achievement  is  sacrificed  in 
kindness  to  another,  it  should  not  be  forgotten  that  it  is 
only  the  opportunity  to  achieve  that  is  sacrificed.  Perhaps 
the  individual  would  have  failed  to  succeed  even  had  he 
had  the  opportunity  for  education,  technical  training,  or 
whatever  the  preparation  was  which  he  craved ;  perhaps  he 
promised  more  than  he  could  have  fulfilled  under  any 
conditions;  his  own  inherent  weakness  was  merely  exposed 
by  his  inability  to  profit  by  his  resolute  and  heroic  sac- 
rifice for  another's  benefit.  Secondly,  while  we  must  be- 
lieve that  such  kindness  is  a  means  to  Self-realization,  there 
is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  one  such  deed — as  splendid  as 


378  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

it  is — will  bring  Self-realization.  The  individual  must  con- 
tinue to  do  his  duty,  to  observe  the  conditions  of  self- 
development.  Many  times  this  is  what  he  does  not  do, 
one  fears ;  instead  he  allows  the  temporary  exhaustion  of  his 
will,  after  the  supreme  effort,  to  become  a  settled  condition 
or  habit,  thus  sinking  into  a  moral  lethargy  and  permitting 
his  faculties  to  atrophy  and  decay  from  disuse  and  inaction. 
Of  course  the  ultimate  result  is  then  not  Self-realization 
but  self-degeneration. 

3.  Friendship. — When,  moved  by  sympathy  or  love,  the 
individual  sacrifices  his  own  interest,  the  end  sought  is 
the  welfare  of  another.  The  practice  of  promoting  an- 
other's welfare  with  disregard  for  one's  own  self-interest 
is  friendship.  Friendship  is  the  positive  aspect  of  kind- 
ness and  one  of  the  most  important  factors  in  moral  de- 
velopment. As  such  it  has  received  extended  treatment  in 
ethical  literature,  although  it  has  not  always  been  included 
in  the  list  of  the  virtues.  There  is  excellent  reason  for 
making  it  coordinate  with  benevolence,  and  considering  them 
as  the  two  positive  social  virtues,  however;  because  clear- 
ness requires  us  to  distinguish  two  steps  in  the  social 
adjustment — devotion  to  single  persons  or  acquaintances, 
and  service  of  all  persons  or  humanity.  It  is  indeed  an 
evidence  of  the  unique  position  and  surpassing  importance 
of  friendship  in  our  lives,  that  we  are  accustomed  to  think 
of  its  practice  not  as  a  duty  but  as  a  rare  privilege — one 
of  the  priceless  boons  of  human  existence. 

But  friendship  is  not  merely  a  beautiful  ornament  of 
human  life;  it  plays  a  necessary  part  in  the  process  of 
Self-realization.  No  more  potent  instrument  of  self-expan- 
sion exists  than  the  practice  of  friendship,  understood  as 
whole-souled  devotion  to  another's  good.  In  such  devotion 
to  others  there  is  no  question  of  the  individual's  over- 
stepping the  boundaries  of  his  own  life  and  experience 
in  pursuit  of  something  quite  foreign  and  external  to 


THE  SOCIAL  VIRTUES  379 

himself.  Others'  lives  and  others'  interests  are  already 
present  in  his  experience,  essentially  related  to  his  own 
existence  and  individuality.  The  only  question  is,  there- 
fore, shall  these  other  interests  and  individualities  with 
which  he  is  inseparably  connected,  remain  ill-adjusted  to 
his  own,  and  thus  constitute  conflicting  and  discordant 
elements  in  his  selfhood,  or  shall  he  adjust  his  interest  to 
theirs,  integrate  their  lives  with  his  own,  thus  increasing 
the  unity  of  his  conscious  selfhood  and  enriching  the  con- 
tent of  his  own  personality?  Through  the  promotion  of 
another's  plans,  the  realization  of  another's  purposes,  the 
individual  enlarges  his  own  interest,  acquiring  new  ambi- 
tions on  his  own  account  and  discovering  in  himself  hitherto 
unrecognized  abilities.  Through  such  service  of  others,  the 
individual  as  it  were  multiplies  his  own  individuality, 
finding  in  the  personality  of  each  friend  a  new  self  with 
different  interests,  fresh  enthusiasms,  and  original  aspira- 
tions. Moreover,  the  possibilities  for  self-development  in 
thus  "  taking  an  interest  "  in  another  human  being  seem 
quite  endless;  the  potency  for  good  of  the  relation  here 
involved  is  self-augmenting.  Through  devotion  to  my 
friend  my  own  interests  are  extended,  my  own  personality 
enriched;  as  the  result  of  my  self-development  I  am  able 
more  effectively  to  aid  him  in  realizing  the  possibilities  of 
his  own  nature  and  situation,  which  in  its  turn  reacts  still 
more  favorably  upon  my  own  character,  and  thus,  the 
mutual  benefit  derived  from  the  friendship  grows  at  a 
constantly  increasing  rate.  Thus  under  the  influence  of 
true  friendship  persistently  cultivated,  the  personalities 
involved  develop  and  expand  as  plants  grow  under  the 
warming  and  vitalizing  rays  of  the  sun. 

Of  course,  if  friendship  is  to  realize  all  its  possibilities 
as  a  means  of  moral  development,  it  must  involve  mutual 
devotion.  To  the  love  and  devotion  of  one  the  other  flTQst 
respond  with  an  equal  affection  and  loyalty.  Such  is  the 


380  THE  LITE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

ideal  friendship  which  has  been  celebrated  in  poetry  and 
song,  and  which  is  generally  regarded  as  one  of  the  greatest, 
if  not  the  greatest,  blessing  vouchsafed  by  God  to  man. 
What  then  is  the  basis  of  such  love  and  devotion  among 
persons?  Aristotle  believes  that  it  differs  in  the  different 
kinds  of  friendship ;  that  in  fact  friendships  fall  into  three 
classes,  according  as  they  are  based  on  the  utility  or  con- 
venience of  the  relationship,  the  pleasure  it  affords,  or 
the  goodness  of  the  persons  concerned.  The  first  order  of 
friendships  springs  from  a  recognition  by  the  individuals 
of  an  advantage  which  comes  to  both  from  their  relation, 
and  a  desire  to  preserve  this  advantage;  it  is  commercial 
in  character.  The  second  is  based  upon  the  pleasure  which 
arises  from  the  acquaintance  and  is  best  exemplified  by 
the  friendships  of  young  people.  The  third  is  hence  the 
only  one  in  which  the  personality  is  sought  for  its  own 
sake,  in  which  there  is  real  personal  devotion.  It  is 
grounded  upon  the  "  good,"  upon  the  personal  worth  of 
the  individuals  concerned,  with  a  recognition  of  this  worth, 
and  consequent  reciprocal  love  and  devotion.  The  last 
type  is,  Aristotle  admits,  the  only  perfect  friendship,  and 
it  alone  merits  our  serious  consideration  as  involving  that 
genuine  devotion  to  another's  life  and  interest  which  is  a 
necessary  condition  of  Self-realization.  The  first  two  sorts 
of  friendship  may  be  regarded  as  types  of  association  be- 
tween individuals  preparatory  to  true  friendship,  as  forms 
of  social  life  which  lead  up  to  its  only  perfect  and  adequate 
expression  in  human  experience.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  they 
do  indicate  in  a  general  way  the  changes  which  the  attitude 
of  the  individual  towards  his  fellows  undergoes  in  the 
course  of  moral  development.  In  the  first  stage  of  indi- 
vidual development  he  is  interested  in  other  individuals 
as  they  serve  his  convenience  or  promote  his  advantage, 
in  his  efforts  to  provide  for  his  own  natural  wants ;  reputa- 
tion is  sought  as  one  of  the  natural  goods  and  a  means  to 


THE  SOCIAL  VIRTUES  381 

comfort  and  security.  Then  in  the  second  stage  of  indi- 
vidual development  when  the  personal  capacities  find  ex- 
pression, the  individual  is  led  by  his  awakening  aesthetic 
sensibility  to  take  pleasure  in  the  appearance,  actions,  and 
conversation  of  certain  others,  whose  acquaintance  he  cul- 
tivates in  order  to  prolong  this  pleasure.  But  through 
the  pursuit  of  the  ideal  ends  of  Truth  and  Power  and 
Beauty,  which  are  universal  in  their  appeal,  he  comes  to 
value  the  human  personalities  in  which  he  finds  these  ideals 
realized,  and  thus  is  rendered  capable  of  real  devotion 
to  them. 

Friendship  is  based  on  personal  worth;  it  springs  out 
of  the  reciprocal  recognition  by  two  persons  of  this  worth 
in  each  other  and  leads  to  mutual  love  and  devotion.  In 
what  does  such  personal  worth  consist?  Our  recent  study 
of  the  conditions  of  individual  development  supplies  us  with 
the  answer  to  this  question.  The  personal  worth  of  an 
individual  consists  in  the  development  within  him  of  the 
spiritual  qualities  of  wisdom,  efficiency,  and  refinement. 
It  is  measured  by  the  extent  to  which  the  individual  has 
made  his  natural  existence  and  resources  instrumental  to 
the  exercise  of  his  psychic  capacities  for  thought,  action, 
and  feeling.  To  the  fact  that  a  single  person  may  realize 
in  an  individual,  and  hence  unique  way,  ends  of  universal 
value,  is  due  his  worth  for  other  persons.  It  is  this  which 
makes  him  an  end  in  himself  to  his  fellow-men;  for  it  is 
obvious  that  the  more  such  individual  expressions  of  uni- 
versal reality  the  human  self  can  include  in  the  system 
of  its  own  life  and  interests,  the  more  comprehensive  will 
be  its  grasp  on  reality.  Now  the  personal  development 
which  gives  human  individuality  its  worth  and  is  the 
ground  of  friendship  has  two  sides,  an  extensive  and  an 
intensive.  It  involves  the  harmonious  cooperation  and 
interplay  of  all  the  spiritual  faculties  of  man,  with  con- 
sequent extension  of  interest  and  increase  of  ability  in 


382  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

every  important  field  of  human  experience.  Such  a  broad 
and  liberal  culture  tremendously  increases  the  value  of 
the  human  individual  as  an  object  of  friendship.  He  is 
capable  of  varied  responses  to  different  situations ;  his  many 
interests  and  wide  proficiency  make  him  always  an  in- 
structive and  stimulating  companion.  But  the  develop- 
ment of  character  in  the  person  most  worthy  of  friendly 
devotion  must  be  intensive  as  well  as  extensive.  He  must 
have  so  far  achieved  in  some  particular  field  as  to  give 
him  firm  hold  on  the  fundamental  principles  of  this  field,  on 
its  permanent  and  abiding  truth;  since  achievement  like 
this  is  required  to  give  an  individual  the  stability  and  poise 
which  he  needs  to  make  him  reliable  and  trustworthy.  And 
above  all  others,  these  qualities  are  required  in  persons 
who  deserve  our  love  and  devotion.  Such  complete  per- 
sonal development  we  cannot  expect  to  find  realized  in 
all  our  friends,  to  be  sure;  it  is  an  ideal  for  others'  lives 
as  well  as  our  own.  Yet  it  is  helpful  to  define  our  standards 
of  personal  worth  so  that  we  may  discriminate  intelligently 
in  choosing  our  friends. 

From  the  nature  of  friendship  itself,  it  follows  that  the 
number  of  persons  to  whom  the  individual  can  loyally  de- 
vote himself  as  a  friend,  is  strictly  limited.  Grounded  on 
personal  worth,  friendships  take  time  to  spring  up,  to  grow, 
to  reach  their  full  fruition.  True  friendships  in  most 
cases  are  formed  slowly  and  at  the  cost  of  some  effort. 
The  personal  worth  of  human  beings  is  not  apparent  to  the 
eye;  it  does  not  reveal  itself  to  the  passing  glance;  it  is 
not  made  plain  by  manner  of  dress  or  even  by  facial  linea- 
ments. It  manifests  itself  only  in  course  of  acquaintance, 
.  by  word,  by  deed,  by  response  of  feeling,  and  by  countless 
'  other  tokens.  Such  revelation  of  personal  character  must 
be  awaited,  however,  before  we  can  even  intelligently  con- 
sider the  individual  in  question  as  a  possible  friend.  For 
this  is  a  question  that  should  be  intelligently  considered 


THE  SOCIAL  VIRTUES  383 

in  every  case.  We  should  not  be  led  by  chance  into  our 
friendships;  they  should  represent  our  free  and  deliberate 
choices.  Surely  every  reason  exists  to  choose  slowly  and 
with  care,  for  we  make  no  more  important  choices  in  our 
earthly  journey.  After  having  chosen  our  friends  we  must 
be  prepared  to  devote  time  and  labor  to  cultivating  them. 
Only  through  continuous  personal  association  and  mutual 
service  can  the  possibilities  of  any  friendship  be  fully 
realized.  Absence  does  not  make  the  hearts  of  friends  grow 
fonder;  instead,  continued  separation  will  kill  all  but  the 
strongest  and  most  durable  attachments.  Constant  per- 
sonal association,  in  which  the  two  individualities  involved 
are  brought  into  contact  at  every  point,  is  necessary  if  the 
friendship  is  to  yield  its  full  benefit  as  a  means  of  Self- 
realization.  To  the  personal  intercourse  with  its  exchange 
of  opinion  and  harmony  of  feeling,  must  be  added  the  ready 
assistance  and  willing  service  which  friends  give  to  one 
another,  and  which  must  be  reckoned  as  one  of  the  most 
precious  as  well  as  most  essential  factors  in  true  friend- 
ship. "When  we  take  all  this  into  consideration  we  see 
that  a  friendship  is  not  a  light  or  easy  thing;  at  its  best 
it  is  a  long,  an  arduous,  and  a  serious  undertaking.  There 
is  not  time  or  opportunity  in  a  natural  lifetime  for  an 
unlimited  number  of  such  friendships.  To  set  any  number 
as  a  limit,  however,  is  of  course  impossible ;  the  capacity  for 
friendship  varies  greatly  with  individuals.  The  only  limit 
we  need  observe  in  making  friends  is  that  set  by  the  nature 
of  friendship  itself,  and  every  human  individual  should 
endeavor  to  form  as  many  true  friendships  as  he  can  actually 
maintain. 

Reference  has  been  made  to  need  of  taking  time  and 
trouble  to  come  into  contact  with  a  friend's  personality  at 
every  important  point.  Thought  and  study  are  required 
to  share  in  interests  which  are  unfamiliar  to  us,  and  appre- 
ciate achievement  in  fields  of  which  we  are  ignorant.  It 


384  THE  LITE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

is  one  of  the  beneficial  results  of  friendship  that  it  does 
thus  awaken  new  interests  in  us  and  makes  us  aware  of 
the  value  of  achievements  hitherto  unrecognized;  thus  the 
narrowing  effects  of  concentrating  our  attention  upon  a 
particular  pursuit  are  counteracted  and  we  are  lifted 
out  of  the  ruts  of  professional  habit  and  routine  into  which 
we  tend  to  sink.  Yet  the  conditions  of  successful  achieve- 
ment for  the  individual  in  his  own  special  line,  impose 
strict  limits  upon  the  thought  and  attention  he  can  give 
to  others '  interests,  even  those  of  his  closest  friends.  Hence 
comes  the  great  advantage  of  a  community  of  interest  and 
endeavor  between  friends.  When  the  minds  of  two  persons 
are  preoccupied  with  the  same  subject,  when  they  are  both 
working  to  realize  the  same  end,  we  have  conditions  most 
favorable  to  the  rapid  growth  and  firm  cementing  of  friend- 
ship between  them.  No  preliminary  effort  is  then  required 
to  learn  of  new  things,  to  understand  unfamiliar  under- 
takings. Instead,  each  individual  by  pressing  forward  with 
his  own  achievement  is  strengthening  the  common  interest 
which  binds  him  to  his  friend.  In  such  circumstances  it 
is  possible  for  a  person  actually  to  cultivate  another's  friend- 
ship while  wholly  absorbed  in  the  work  of  his  own  vocation ; 
for  he  may  derive  added  inspiration  from  the  consciousness 
of  his  friend's  eager  and  constant  interest  in  what  he  is 
doing,  and  the  expectation  of  sharing  with  that  friend  the 
advantages  of  his  discoveries  and  success.  Hence  friend- 
ships among  professional  colleagues  are  natural;  with  the 
exception  of  attachments  between  husband  and  wife,  parent 
and  child,  where  there  is  also  a  massive  common  interest, 
they  yield  the  richest  returns.  Doubtless  it  is  possible  to 
go  too  far  in  emphasizing  the  advantages  of  likeness  be- 
tween friends;  differences  in  temperament  and  ability  add 
to  the  charm  and  increase  the  benefit  of  friendship.  Yet 
identities  of  interest  and  sentiment  are  more  important  in 
making  it  solid  and  enduring.  An  unreasonable  prejudice 


THE  SOCIAL  VIRTUES  385 

exists  to  the  effect  that  "  talking  shop  "  does  not  constitute 
the  ideal  of  friendly  intercourse.  Yet  what  is  more  normal 
or  deeply  satisfying  than  that  two  friends  who  have  the 
same  trade  should  spend  a  social  hour  discussing  the  con- 
cerns of  their  common  occupation,  or  that  two  mothers 
who  are  friends  should  take  the  evening  for  an  exchange 
of  opinion  and  information  regarding  the  welfare  of  their 
children  ? 

True  friendship,  Aristotle  holds,  is  permanent ;  because 
it  is  based  on  virtue,  and  virtue  is  a  permanent  quality. 
Human  thought  has  generally  agreed  in  finding  this  quality 
of  permanence  in  genuine  friendship — something  of  eternal 
reality  which  enables  it  to  resist  all  influence  of  change 
and  decay,  and  makes  it  triumph  over  death  itself.  In 
all  ages  men  have  willingly  endured  death  for  the  sake 
of  their  friends,  firmly  convinced  that  the  friendship  was 
more  real  than  the  accident  of  natural  existence,  and  cheer- 
fully confident  of  continuing  it  in  a  future  life.  Good 
reason  exists  for  this  belief  in  the  permanence  of  friend- 
ship, if  we  have  correctly  described  its  nature.  For  we 
understood  it  to  be  grounded  in  personality,  and  personality 
consists  in  the  realization,  through  a  particular  individual, 
of  principles  and  purposes  (such  as  Truth  and  Beauty, 
Power  and  Goodness)  which  are  universal  in  their  scope 
and  permanent  in  their  value.  Being  thus  rooted  in  uni- 
versal and  permanent  reality,  the  true  love  of  friends 
abides,  unaffected  by  change  in  physical  appearance,  in 
financial  fortune,  in  reputation  among  men.  Founded 
upon  personality,  the  only  agency  which  can  destroy  such 
friendship  is  one  that  destroys  personality  itself.  Aside 
from  death,  or  mental  decay  due  to  physical  disease  or 
enfeeblement,  the  only  danger  threatening  the  integrity 
of  personality  and  hence  the  permanence  of  friendship  is 
that  of  moral  degeneration.  "What  should  be  the  effect 
upon  a  friendship,  of  wrongdoing  leading  to  vice,  and 


386  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

finally  to  complete  loss  of  self-control,  on  the  part  of  one 
of  the  persons  concerned?  Certainly,  it  will  be  the  duty 
of  a  friend  to  check  such  a  course  of  wrongdoing  if  pos- 
sible at  the  start  and,  in  later  days,  to  exercise  greater 
forbearance,  and  make  more  zealous  efforts  than  any  one 
else  to  bring  about  reform.  If  all  such  endeavors  are  fruit- 
less, however,  all  friendly  intercourse  must  cease.  But  no 
matter  how  low  one  of  the  individuals  concerned  may  sink, 
the  bond  of  friendship  is  never  entirely  destroyed.  The 
one  fallen  must  always  remain  a  former  friend  and,  while 
he  lives  and  the  faintest  possibility  of  restoration  remains, 
must  receive  some  thought  and  care. 

Naturally,  friendships  are  first  formed  within  the  family- 
circle.  The  physical  relationships  of  sex  and  parenthood 
are  not  always  accompanied  by  real  love,  to  be  sure ;  since 
love  or  friendship  is  a  personal  relation.  The  reason  why 
so  many  marriages  fail  of  permanence  is  that  they  are 
based  merely  on  physical  attraction  which  is  certain  to  pass 
in  the  course  of  years.  The  real  love  which  marriage 
should  but  express  is  a  personal  attachment  which  is  per- 
manent and  bids  defiance  to  the  changes  and  vicissitudes 
of  life.  Such  love  between  a  man  and  a  woman,  with  the 
mutual  devotion  and  self-surrender  which  it  involves,  can 
receive  adequate  fulfilment  only  under  conditions  of 
monogamous  marriage.  The  principle  on  which  friend- 
ship is  based — that  of  treating  all  persons  of  one's  ac- 
quaintance as  ends  in  themselves  and  never  as  means  of 
selfish  gratification — when  observed  in  one's  relations  to 
the  opposite  sex  constitutes  the  virtue  of  Chastity.  This 
principle  of  reverence  for  personality,  if  always  observed, 
would  cure  all  sexual  vice  and  remove  entirely  the  so-called 
"  social  evil  "  which  has  ever  been  a  dark  blot  upon  human 
society. 

To  the  relations  of  parent  and  child  the  same  considera- 
tions apply.  The  instinctive  attachment  which  depends 


THE  SOCIAL  VIRTUES  387 

upon  blood  kinship  is  not  enough  of  itself  to  produce 
genuine  love.  It  is  necessary  here  too  that  the  attachment 
have  a  personal  ground  if  it  is  to  last.  Parents  must  take 
trouble  to  make  friends  with  their  children,  learning  their 
personalities,  sharing  their  interests,  and  participating  in 
their  experiences,  if  they  expect  to  have  a  permanent  in- 
fluence over  them  and  guide  their  further  development. 

With  all  its  shortcomings  and  failures  the  life  of  the 
family  as  it  is  organized  in  civilized  countries  to-day  fur- 
nishes the  soil  most  favorable  to  the  growth  of  true  friend- 
ship. The  existence  of  the  blood-tie  pre-disposes  the  in- 
dividuals thus  bound,  to  love  and  serve  one  another;  and 
the  constant  association  in  daily  life  gives  that  knowledge 
of  others'  personalities  which  is  essential  to  the  formation 
of  friendship.  The  human  individual  receives  his  first 
lessons  in  the  pains  and  the  joys  of  unselfish  love  in  his 
early  life  with  parents  and  brothers  and  sisters  in  the 
home.  Very  soon,  however,  the  circle  of  acquaintanceship 
begins  to  widen.  Among  his  playfellows  acquaintance 
progresses  and  friendships  are  begun  some  of  which  are 
likely  to  last  a  lifetime.  In  young  manhood  and  woman- 
hood, when  the  powers  of  thought  and  imagination  come 
into  play,  emotions  and  enthusiasms  are  aroused,  and  the 
capacity  for  sympathetic  understanding  of  others  greatly 
enlarged,  we  reach  the  period  when  friendships  are  the 
most  easily  and  eagerly  formed.  The  tides  of  life  run 
high:  romantic  love  and  altruistic  sentiment  are  readily 
awakened.  But  because  personality  is  not  yet  organized 
by  any  settled  purpose  or  given  stability  by  any  continuous 
or  consistent  achievement,  attachments  formed  at  this  time 
are  many  of  them  transitory  and  uninfluential.  Neverthe- 
less, it  is  probable  that  some  friendship  will  be  formed 
during — say,  the  college  or  university  years — which  will 
wield  a  determining  influence  upon  the  life  of  the  indi- 
vidual. When  finally  maturity  is  reached,  the  range  of 


388  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

the  individual's  acquaintance  tends  to  enlarge — through 
trade  union,  professional  societies,  and  business  associations, 
religious  and  philanthropic  organizations,  clubs  for  culture 
and  amusement — until  it  is  practically  co-extensive  with 
the  local  community  itself,  and  then  by  various  channels 
extends  to  individuals  scattered  throughout  the  nation,  and 
even  over  the  whole  world.  Not  that  the  circle  of  any 
individual's  friends  may  be  as  wide  as  this.  That,  as 
we  understand  true  friendship,  would  be  impossible;  a 
dozen  lives  would  be  required  to  make  so  great  a  number 
of  friends.  The  circle  of  acquaintance  is  merely  the  field 
in  which  one  may  choose  his  friends.  But  it  is  possible 
throughout  the  range  of  the  widest  acquaintance  to  exhibit 
a  spirit  of  friendly  devotion  and,  at  opportunity  as  one 
moves  among  acquaintances  in  the  daily  walk  of  life,  to 
say  a  helpful  word  or  give  needed  assistance,  and  receive 
in  passing  an  inspiring  touch  of  another  personality. 

But  beyond  the  limits  of  the  widest  acquaintance  lies 
the  great  mass  of  mankind  whose  lives  are  none  the  less 
real  in  their  aspirations  and  disappointments,  their  thinking 
and  their  striving,  than  those  of  our  nearest  neighbors. 
Into  personal  contact  with  these  the  individual  can  never 
come;  yet  his  life  may  influence  theirs — his  ideas,  his 
inventions,  his  achievements,  may  affect  for  better  or  for 
worse  the  general  human  welfare.  An  illustration  of  this 
fact  is  afforded  by  the  participation  of  the  individual  citi- 
zen in  the  government  of  a  democracy  like  our  own.  Al- 
though he  may  know  but  a  few  hundred  of  the  hundred 
.million  people  composing  this  nation,  still  he  may,  through 
his  ballot,  exert  an  influence,  very  slight  it  is  true,  upon 
the  welfare  of  these  myriads.  Complete  self-organization 
calls,  therefore,  for  a  second  activity  of  adjustment  within 
the  social  sphere:  the  adjustment  by  the  individual  of 
his  own  interest,  along  with  those  other  interests  which 
have  become  identified  with  his  own,  to  the  welfare  of 


THE  SOCIAL  VIRTUES  389 

humanity.  Here  again  we  must  guard  against  conceiving 
of  the  human  individual  as  an  isolated  being  who  first 
defines  his  own  interest  and  then  sacrifices  it  to  a  cause 
quite  outside  himself — i.e.  the  general  good.  Such  a  view 
has  its  root  in  an  entirely  false  conception  of  the  individual. 
What  Self-realization  actually  demands  to  complete  the 
organization  of  human  life,  is  the  integration  of  all  lesser 
private  interests  within  the  larger  personal  good  which  all 
individuals  as  rational  beings  share  in  common.  The  sac- 
rifice, which  is  here  involved,  of  the  limited  and  exclusive 
aims  of  individuality  to  the  comprehensive  good  of  human 
personality,  as  such,  is  identical  with  the  virtue  of  justice. 

4.  Justice. — Justice  is  the  habit  of  subordinating  in- 
dividual interest,  whether  of  self  or  of  others,  to  the  good 
of  humanity.  This  virtue  is  the  recognition  in  practice 
of  the  right  of  human  personality  always  to  be  treated  as 
an  end,  to  which  all  private  interests  whatsoever  must  be 
subordinated.  The  subordination  in  question  applies  not 
merely  to  the  individual's  exclusive  aims  and  desires  but 
also  to  those  of  the  family,  friends,  or  social  class  with 
which  the  individual  has  consciously  identified  his  interest. 
Often  the  fact  that  the  individual  seeks  not  his  own  private 
interest  but  the  interest  of  family  or  friends  or  class  or 
party,  constitutes  in  his  opinion  a  justification  for  his  neglect 
of  the  good  of  humanity  as  a  whole,  or  even  his  violation 
of  general  human  rights.  Justice  condemns  all  favoritism, 
however ;  whether  it  is  himself  whom  the  individual  favors 
or  a  selected  group  of  his  acquaintances.  Justice  forbids 
men  ever  to  employ  human  personality  as  a  means  to  the 
furtherance  of  their  private  schemes  and  ambitions;  it 
insists  upon  the  duty  of  making  all  lesser  interests  of 
different  individuals  means  to  the  promotion  of  total  human 
welfare. 

Justice  thus  maintains  the  right  of  human  personality 
always  to  be  sought  as  an  end  and  never  to  be  employed 


390  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

as  a  means.  It  is  negative  in  character  inasmuch  as  it 
defends  this  right  by  prohibiting  any  violation  of  it  for 
private  interest  or  through  special  privilege.  Now  to  make 
human  personality  always  an  end  is  to  aim  at  its  free 
development  and  full  expression  in  the  lives  of  all  human 
beings.  As  complete  Self-realization  is  man 's  highest  good, 
the  opportunity  thus  freely  to  realize  his  personal  capacities 
is  man's  moral  right.  But,  as  we  know,  complete  Self- 
realization  is  possible  in  human  life  only  under  certain 
conditions — the  preservation  of  bodily  and  mental  health; 
the  possession  of  some  property ;  the  education  of  the  higher 
faculties,  intellectual,  technical,  and  aesthetic;  the  estab- 
lishment of  ties  of  family  and  friendship ;  the  maintenance 
of  a  certain  position  and  standing  in  human  society.  The 
same  right  with  which  a  human  individual  may  demand 
the  opportunity  for  self-development  extends  to  the  con- 
ditions necessary  for  such  development.  Every  man  has 
therefore  the  right  to  the  possession  and  preservation  of 
his  bodily  organism,  to  the  ownership  of  property,  to  an 
education,  to  family  care  and  friendly  love,  to  citizenship 
and  occupation — in  the  degree  and  to  the  extent  required 
for  his  own  Self-realization.  This  right,  belonging  to  every 
human  individual  as  a  free  person,  brings  with  it  an 
obligation  also  absolute  and  universal,  that  of  respecting 
the  rights  of  all  other  human  beings  to  the  conditions 
necessary  for  free  self-development.  Justice  defends  the 
ethical  right  of  human  personality  to  develop  in  accordance 
with  its  freedom,  by  enforcing  upon  all  individuals  the 
moral  obligation  equally  authoritative — that  they  refrain 
from  any  interference  with  the  exercise  of  this  right  by 
others.  Hence  the  demands  of  justice  have  naturally  found 
expression  in  a  series  of  prohibitions:  Thou  shalt  not  kill; 
Thou  shalt  not  steal;  Thou  shalt  not  bear  false  witness; 
Thou  shalt  not  commit  adultery,  etc. 


THE  SOCIAL  VIRTUES  391 

POLITICAL,  JUSTICE 

The  end  of  human  society  is  the  fullest  possible  develop- 
ment of  the  powers  of  human  personality  in  all  its  members 
— in  other  words,  the  realization  of  the  highest  human  ; 
good.  To  this  end  it  aims  to  establish  the  conditions  requi- 
site to  Self-realization  among  human  beings.  But  since 
these  conditions — health  and  security,  private  property, 
education,  etc. — can  be  made  conditions  of  self-realization 
only  through  the  volition  of  the  individuals  concerned, 
the  primary  function  of  society  is  the  protection  of  its 
members  from  any  interference  in  the  exercise  of  this, 
their  right  to  avail  themselves  of  the  means  necessary  to 
their  own  personal  development.  The  state,  or  body  politic, 
is  society  acting  as  a  unit  in  defense  of  the  rights  of  its 
members,  through  the  use  of  physical  power;  it  is  society 
exercising  force  in  the  attainment  of  its  end,  which  is 
the  promotion  of  the  highest  human  welfare.  With  the 
means  at  its  disposal,  i.e.  force,  the  state  cannot  directly 
affect  the  wills  of  its  members  and  produce  either  the  in- 
tention to  exercise  the  right  of  self-development,  or  the 
acknowledgment  of  the  obligation  to  respect  this  right  in 
the  case  of  others,  All  it  can  do  is  to  remove  hindrances 
to  self-development  by  protecting  its  members  from  in-  j 
terference  or  encroachment  while  exercising  this  right.  In 
thus  "  removing  hindrances  "  the  state  is  compelled  again 
to  act  in  an  indirect  and  negative  way.  It  cannot  force 
its  members  to  respect  each  other's  rights;  but  by  the  in- 
flicting of  penalties  it  can  interpose  obstacles  which  effectu- 
ally hinder  all  violation  of  others'  rights  through  outward 
action.  Thus  Professor  Bosanquet x  finds  the  function  of 
the  state  most  adequately  expressed  in  the  principle  of 
"  hindrances  to  hindrances."  This  phrase  well  expresses 
the  limitation  imposed  on  all  state  action,  as  long  as  it 
1  Cf.  BOSANQUET  :  Philosophical  Theory  of  the  State. 


392  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

acts  through  the  instrumentality  distinctive  of  it,  physical 
force.  For  force  can  only  determine  outward  action.  This 
does  not  mean,  of  course,  outward  movement  alone,  since 
all  voluntary  actions  proceed  from  intention.  But  the 
state  can  only  enforce  such  intention  as  is  necessary  to 
bring  about  compliance  with  requirements  stated  in  terms 
of  outward  movement ;  it  cannot  make  sure  that  the  action 
will  be  performed  from  a  motive  that  would  give  it  moral 
value.  Thus  the  state  can  produce  in  the  minds  of  in- 
dividual citizens  the  intention  to  keep  hands  off  others' 
property;  it  cannot,  however,  make  sure  that  such  honesty 
will  proceed  from  a  regard  for  others '  welfare ;  in  the  case 
of  many  individuals  it  will  be  due  to  a  fear  of  the  law's 
penalties.  Hence  there  are  decided  limits  to  the  profitable 
use  of  force  by  the  state  in  the  promotion  of  human  welfare. 
No  one  would  think  of  enforcing  by  law  the  finer  expres- 
sions of  courtesy,  loyalty  and  devotion  to  friends,  courage 
in  the  defense  or  rescue  of  the  weak  and  afflicted;  for  to 
appeal  to  the  lower  motive  in  the  case  of  these  actions  would 
tend  to  prevent  their  performance  by  the  higher  motive, 
the  one  which  gives  them  greater  moral  value.  Thus  it  has 
been  said  that  only  those  acts  should  be  enforced  by  public 
power  which  it  is  better  to  have  done  from  any  motive, 
than  not  to  have  done  at  all.  Even  though  we  adopt  the 
principle  of  ' '  hindrances  to  hindrances  ' '  as  expressing  the 
distinctive  function  of  the  state  in  the  moral  development 
of  man,  if  we  understand  its  ultimate  aim  to  be,  not  the 
happiness  of  separate  individuals  but  the  highest  personal 
development  of  humanity,  the  sphere  in  which  it  may 
legitimately  exercise  its  power  remains,  nevertheless,  a  large 
one.  As  human  societies  grow  in  experience  and  intelli- 
gence they  gain  an  ever  increasing  insight  into  the  essential 
conditions  of  personal  development.  In  consequence,  they 
are  able  in  a  growing  degree  to  secure  for  their  members 
an  opportunity  for  Self-realization,  by  removing  the  ob- 


THE  SOCIAL  VIRTUES  393 

stacles  which  have  hitherto  deprived  them  of  this  oppor- 
tunity, either  as  a  whole  or  in  part.  Thus  it  is  apparent 
that  sufficient  food  and  proper  training  in  childhood  are 
necessary  to  the  later  development  of  the  distinctively 
human  faculties,  and  it  is  now  seen  to  be  the  duty  of  the 
state  to  provide  care  and  education,  if  need  be,  at  the  public 
expense.  It  is  obvious  that  if  working  men  are  to  enjoy  the 
benefits  of  a  truly  human  life,  they  must  be  guaranteed  as 
much  safety  in  their  work  as  the  character  of  their  occupa- 
tion permits,  with  the  added  assurance  of  support  for  self 
and  family  if  injury  results  in  occupations  particularly 
hazardous;  nations  are  now  enacting  laws  by  which  these 
fundamental  human  rights  are  secured  for  workers  largely 
at  the  expense  of  those  who  profit  directly  by  their  industry. 
And  indeed  when  we  consider  the  work  of  the  state  in  the 
large — its  office  in  furthering  the  highest  human  good — 
the  line  we  have  drawn  between  a  negative  activity  in 
the  hindrance  of  hindrances  and  a  positive  work  for  human 
betterment,  seems  abstract  and  artificial.  "While  it  is  true 
that  the  state  in  enforcing  its  laws  can  only  determine 
external  actions,  still  the  existence  of  laws  and  the  ma- 
chinery for  their  enforcement  tend  to  create  a  social  senti- 
ment and  public  opinion,  both  of  which  act  as  a  direct  stimu- 
lus to  moral  development. 

The  human  individual,  who  is  a  citizen  of  a  state,  has 
therefore  legal  in  addition  to  moral  rights.  A  legal  right 
is  a  claim  upon  the  public  power  to  be  protected  from 
interference  in  free  personal  development.  These  legal 
rights  are  enforced  by  the  state  and  represent  the  conditions 
of  Self-realization  in  so  far  as  the  social  community  is  able 
to  secure  them  for  its  members.  In  the  strict  and  impartial 
enforcement  of  all  laws  enacted  to  maintain  the  rights 
of  citizens,  consists,  then,  political  justice.  Of  course,  the 
human  individual  has  moral  rights  which  extend  beyond 
his  legal  rights.  He  has  a  moral  right  to  the  com- 


394  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

panionship  and  sympathy  of  his  fellows  which  he,  as  a 
social  being,  craves,  yet  this  is  not  and  cannot  be  a  right 
enforced  by  law;  to  recognize  and  observe  this  right  must 
remain  for  the  higher  sense  of  justice  in  his  fellows. 
But  in  gaining  legal  rights  the  citizen  also  incurs  legal 
obligations.  He  is  bound  to  respect  the  rights  of  others 
as  these  are  defined  by  the  law;  in  thus  complying  fully 
with  the  law  he  meets  the  demands  of  legal  justice.  Justice 
as  a  moral  attribute,  however,  requires  that  he  respect  the 
rights  of  his  fellows  out  of  a  genuine  regard  for  their 
welfare  and  not  from  fear  of  the  penalties  of  the  law; 
the  law  may  nevertheless  influence  him  in  his  conduct 
towards  other  men,  by  making  clear  to  him  their  rights, 
and  bringing  home  to  him  his  duties  towards  them.  But 
moral  justice  must  necessarily  go  farther  than  legal  justice 
in  its  requirements ;  man 's  full  duty  to  his  fellows '  welfare 
cannot  be  enforced  by  law.  As  Paulsen  says:  "  A  legal 
system  attempting  to  enforce  the  complete  realization  of 
the  idea  of  justice  in  the  acts  of  men  would,  as  may  readily 
be  seen,  necessarily  lead  to  a  most  intolerable  state  of 
insecurity  and  tyranny.  Hence  the  legal  order  confines 
itself  to  enforcing  that  minimum  of  righteous  acts  without 
which  the  human  social  life  would  not  be  possible.  It  thereby 
of  course  leaves  a  wide  margin  for  injuries  and  unjust 
assertion  of  individual  interests  at  the  expense  of  those  of 
others. ' ' 2  The  law  forbids  murder  and  assault  but  it  does 
not  forbid  the  renting  at  a  profit  of  unsanitary  and  flimsily 
built  houses  which  cause  the  death  of  their  occupants  by 
disease  and  fire.  The  law  forbids  robbery  and  burglary, 
forgery  and  embezzlement,  but  not  sharp  business  practices 
which  deprive  men  of  their  honest  savings  and  hard-won 
financial  standing.  The  law  forbids  libel  and  slander  but 
not  malicious  gossip  and  mischievous  tale-bearing,  which 
ruin  reputations  and  produce  discouragement  and  despair. 
2  PAULSEX  :  Op.  cit.,  p.  633. 


THE  SOCIAL  VIRTUES  395 

The  law  forbids  the  violation  of  the  marriage  vows  and 
seduction  of  the  youthful  and  unexperienced,  but  not  the 
secret  disloyalties  of  inind  and  heart  nor  the  pollution  of  im- 
mature minds  by  improper  plays,  stories,  and  conversation. 
But  these  latter  actions  as  well  as  the  former — and  they 
are,  of  course,  only  examples — the  practice  of  justice  as 
a  virtue  prohibits  as  a  matter  of  course,  since  they  hinder 
the  development  of  human  personality. 


CORRECTIVE  JUSTICE 

The  state  enforces  its  laws  enacted  to  maintain  the 
fundamental  rights  of  citizens,  by  punishment  of  those  who 
transgress  them.  This  exercise  of  force  in  defense  of  its 
enactments  is  a  right  belonging  to  the  state,  representing 
as  it  does  the  general  will  and  common  interest  of  its  citi- 
zens. Punishment  in  a  civilized  state  takes  the  form  of 
fine,  imprisonment,  or,  in  extreme  cases,  of  death.  Now 
since  the  ultimate  aim  of  that  system  of  rights  enforced 
by  the  public  power  is  the  self -development  of  humanity 
within  its  boundaries,  it  is  clear  that  the  aim  of  punishment 
is  the  promotion  of  human  welfare.  After  the  offense  is 
committed  punishment  is  necessary  to  conserve  that  social 
order  and  security  which  are  required  for  further  human 
development.  This  end  it  subserves  primarily  by  hinder- 
ing others,  and  the  criminal  himself,  from  committing  such 
offenses  in  the  future.  In  the  second  place,  it  contributes 
to  the  same  end,  of  social  well-being,  by  bringing  home 
to  the  criminal  the  serious  and  self-destructive  character 
of  his  act  and  thus  turning  him  back  into  the  paths  of 
useful  citizenship  and  personal  rectitude.  All  this  is  so 
clear  that  it  seems  strange  that  any  other  view  of  the 
aims  of  punishment  should  have  arisen  or  gained  currency. 
Yet  the  reason  for  this  becomes  plain  in  its  turn  if  we 


396  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

consider  the  origin  and  development  of  the  institution  of 
public  justice  in  course  of  social  evolution. 

Methods  of  corrective  justice  have  their  natural  root  in 
an  instinct  possessed  by  animals  as  well  as  men.  "When 
injured,  or  threatened  with  injury  the  animal  instinctively 
defends  itself  by  retaliating  upon  the  aggressor  and  seek- 
ing to  inflict  similar  injury  upon  him.  Such  instinctive 
resentment  or  retaliation  is  at  first  man's  only  means 
of  defending  his  life,  person,  and  property,  from  attack. 
The  evolution  of  justice  as  a  social  institution  begins  when 
individual  injuries  are  taken  up  by  the  clan  or  tribe  of 
the  injured  individual,  which  revenges  itself  not  upon  the 
offender  alone  but  upon  his  tribe  or  clan.  The  "  blood- 
feud  "  being  defined  and  regulated  by  custom  grows  into  a 
recognized  social  institution  but  in  its  purpose  remains 
entirely  retaliatory.  When  society  becomes  sufficiently 
organized  to  have  chiefs  or  sovereigns  of  admitted  and  per- 
manent authority  we  have  the  beginnings  of  justice  admin- 
istered by  the  public  power.  But  justice  as  meted  out  by 
the  sovereign  in  his  decrees  is  at  first  altogether  retaliatory ; 
for  the  sovereign  punishes  offenders  not  because  they  have 
violated  the  rights  of  their  fellows  but  because  they  have 
transgressed  his  authority — have  violated  the  "  king's 
peace. ' ' 3  Gradually  the  idea  gains  ground  that  the  polit- 
ical authority  in  inflicting  punishment  is  not  wreaking 
private  vengeance  but  is  acting  for  society  and  is  defending 
the  rights  of  subjects  or  citizens.  But  still  the  idea  of 
retaliation  survives  and  lingers;  for  the  punishment  of 
the  criminal  is  looked  upon  as  the  just  retaliation  upon 
him  of  the  social  order  which  he  has  injured,  as  the  retribu- 
tion which  his  fellows,  acting  through  the  duly  constituted 
political  authorities,  have  a  right  to  exact  from  him.  This 
view  that  the  first  purpose  of  punishment  is  retribution 
still  prevails  among  many,  probably  the  majority  of  people, 
•HoBBOUSE:  Morals  in  Evolution,  Vol.  I,  Chap.  IIL 


THE  SOCIAL  VIRTUES  397 

even  in  civilized  countries,  and  is  subscribed  to  by  not  a 
few  political  theorists  and  moralists.4 

According  to  the  retributiye__theory  punishment  in  its 
primary  function  does  not  look  forward  to  social  progress 
which  it  aims  to  promote,  but  backward  towards  the  offense 
which  it  aims  to  requite.  The  suffering  of  the  offender 
when  punished  is  conceived  as  something  that  he  owes  to 
the  social  order  which  he  has  injured,  as  a  debt  which  he 
is  obliged  to  pay.  In  harmony  with  this  view  it  is  further 
believed  that  punishments  should  be  graded  in  their  severity 
according  to  the  gravity  of  offenses.  The  hold  which  the 
retributive  theory  has  on  the  popular  mind  is  not  difficult 
to  explain ;  it  gives  articulate  expression — and  ethical  justi- 
fication— to  the  instinct  of  revenge  which  is  still  a  part 
of  our  nature ;  nearly  every  one  of  us  feels  the  instinctive 
craving  for  vengeance  when  a  particularly  cruel  and  cow- 
ardly crime  is  brought  to  his  attention.  But  the  influence 
which  this  view  still  has  among  intelligent  students  of 
human  life  and  society — an  influence  which  is  growing 
steadily  less — is  due  mostly  to  the  influence  of  several 
great  modern  thinkers  who  have  sought  to  find  an  ethical 
or  even  a  metaphysical  justification  for  retributive  pun- 
ishment. Most  notable  in  this  connection  are  the  views 
of  Hegel.  According  to  this  philosopher  a  crime,  while  it 
is  actual  as  an  external  event,  possesses  no  positive  reality ; 
rather  it  is  essentially  naught,  the  negation  of  the  real 
will,  the  true  self,  of  the  wrongdoer.  The  realization  of  his 
true  will,  then,  his  own  right  in  fact,  demands  the  negation 
of  this  negation.  This  is  what  occurs  in  punishment  and 
therefore  punishment  is  logically  necessary — made  so  by 
the  crime  itself.  Even  capital  punishment  is,  in  extreme 
cases,  owed  by  society  to  the  criminal  as  his  own  right. 
An  element  of  truth  may  be  recognized  in  this  conception 

'  Cf.  SHARP:  "Popular  Attitude  Toward  Retributive  Punishment," 
International  Journal  of  Ethics,  Vol.  XX,  p.  341. 


398  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

of  punishment,  without  at  the  same  time  admitting  any 
truth  in  the  retributive  theory.  No  doubt  the  criminal 
does  by  his  own  act  negate  his  own  larger  self ;  but  punish- 
ment is  not  needed  to  establish  this  fact.  Nay,  the  less 
conscious  he  is  of  his  own  guilt,  the  more  insensible  to  the 
suffering  he  has  inflicted,  the  more  completely  self -destruc- 
tive is  his  act.  It  is  undoubtedly  necessary,  furthermore, 
to  bring  home  to  the  criminal  consciousness  the  nullifying 
and  self -destructive  effect  of  his  act  upon  his  own  character 
as  a  social  being.  But  this  is  necessary  as  the  condition 
of  his  reform  and  not  as  the  consequence  of  his  crime. 
Thus  we  are  brought  around  again  to  the  teleological  theory 
of  punishment,  which  has  as  its  aim  always  the  self-de- 
velopment of  humanity. 

If  punishment  is  to  accomplish  its  true  aim  the  first 
object  which  must  be  sought  by  the  society  which  inflicts 
it,  is  the  prevention  of  crime.  The  degrees  of  punishment 
prescribed  and  inflicted  for  different  offenses  must  be  de- 
termined with  a  view  to  this  object.  It  is  a  mistake  to 
think,  however,  that  the  severer  the  punishment  the  more 
efficacious  it  is  as  a  deterrent  to  crime.  The  experience  of 
past  ages  has  shown — ages  when  the  direst  penalties,  even 
death  itself  with  torture,  were  inflicted  for  what  appear  to 
us  now  as  minor  offenses,  such  as,  for  instance,  the  picking 
of  pockets  or  the  stealing  of  horses  and  cattle — that  when 
the  severity  of  the  punishment  is  increased  beyond  a  certain 
point  it  tends  to  defeat  its  own  purpose  by  breeding  among 
those  individuals  of  the  populace  who  have  criminal  pro- 
clivities a  spirit  of  recklessness  and  indifference  to  their 
own  life  and  safety,  as  well  as  to  the  life  and  safety  of 
others.  Much  more  important  than  severity  of  punishment 
in  the  prevention  of  crime  is  the  speed  and  certainty  of 
detection  and  conviction  whenever  crime  is  committed. 
But  besides  the  office  of  prevention  punishment  has  a  work 
of  reformation  to  accomplish.  Aiming  as  it  does  at  the 


THE  SOCIAL  VIRTUES  399 

highest  human  good,  punishment  cannot  neglect  the  personal 
well-being  of  the  offender.  And  by  forcing  upon  the  crim- 
inal's  attention  the  seriousness  of  his  offense  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  society  of  which  he  is  a  member  punish- 
ment may  be,  as  we  have  seen,  a  most  effective  instrument 
of  reform.  In  this  reformative  work,  however,  our  present 
methods  of  punishment  are  most  inadequate.  Our  prisons 
and  penitentiaries  are  in  all  too  many  instances  schools  of 
crime  instead  of  true  reformatories.  This  is  particularly 
true  in  the  case  of  youthful  offenders.  Close  confinement 
and  enforced  inactivity  have  further  checked  the  normal 
development  of  capacities  for  achievement,  and  association 
with  older  and  more  hardened  criminals  has  contributed  to 
a  further  corruption  of  character  and  perversion  of  motives 
of  action.  That  prisons  should  become  institutions  of  re- 
form does  not  mean,  however,  that  they  shall  be  converted 
into  pleasant  sanitariums  or  schools  of  moral  instruction. 
The  convicts  in  such  institutions  need  to  gain  new  ideals 
of  conduct,  to  be  sure.  But  more  than  preaching  they  need 
training — more  than  new  conceptions  of  life  they  need  new 
habits  of  living,  habits  of  industry  and  application,  and 
perseverance.  And  the  continued  effort  which  is  required 
for  the  learning  of  a  trade  or  the  development  of  a  capacity 
is  none  the  less  beneficial  because  exceedingly  irksome  and 
distasteful.  Often  it  is  because  the  individual,  through 
weakness  of  will  or  unfavorable  surroundings,  has  been  un- 
able to  endure  the  tedium  and  drudgery  incidental  to  learn- 
ing a  legitimate  trade,  that  his  activity  has  been  turned 
into  evil  channels  and  he  has  been  prevented  from  becoming 
a  useful  citizen.  That  deficiencies  in  early  training  should 
thus  be  remedied  by  the  teaching  of  trades  in  our  peni- 
tentiaries, and  that  additional  incentives  to  faithful  effort 
in  this  direction  should  be  provided  in  the  way  of  oppor- 
tunities for  further  development  and  of  earlier  release, 
seem  to  be  in  every  way  wise  and  salutary.  Many  new  and 


400  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

promising  methods  of  reformative  work  in  prisons  have 
been  devised  in  recent  years  and  their  prompt  and  thorough 
trial  should  be  encouraged  by  all  those  interested  in  human 
welfare.  There  is  certainly  no  field  where  humanitarian 
zeal  may  be  more  profitably  exercised  than  that  of  prison 
reform. 

DISTRIBUTIVE  JUSTICE 

Human  societies  are  concerned  with  the  distribution  not 
only  of  penalties,  but  of  "  rewards."  By  rewards,  in  the 
present  connection,  we  mean  external  possessions  and  pre- 
rogatives, such  as  wealth  and  public  recognition,  whose  use 
and  enjoyment  in  some  degree  are  necessary  to  the  human 
individual  if  he  is  to  attain  Self-realization.  To  the  extent 
in  which  wealth  and  fame  are  required  as  means  of  Self- 
realization,  their  possession  is  of  course  man's  moral  right. 
And  if  the  supply  of  these  "  goods  "  were  unlimited  we 
might,  conceivably,  leave  it  altogether  to  the  conscience 
of  the  individual  to  decide  how  much  effort  the  interests 
of  his  own  personal  development  would  allow  him  to  devote 
to  the  pursuit  and  enjoyment  of  them.  As  we  well  know, 
however,  the  quantity  of  wealth  available  for  man's  use 
and  the  amount  of  honors  which  human  societies  can  bestow 
is  not  unlimited ;  the  supply  is  in  both  cases  so  far  limited 
that  such  amount  as  is  appropriated  by  any  one  individual 
for  his  own  exclusive  use  is  thereby  withdrawn  from  the 
quantity  available  for  others.  In  these  circumstances 
human  society,  in  the  pursuit  of  its  own  proper  end,  cannot 
afford  to  overlook  the  question  of  the  distribution  of  these 
rewards  among  its  members;  it  must  endeavor  through  its 
authorized  agencies  to  secure  such  distribution  of  wealth 
and  honors  as  will  most  effectually  further  the  development 
of  human  personality.  But  this  task  is  by  no  means  easy ; 
it  is  beset  with  many  difficulties,  both  theoretical  and  prac- 


THE  SOCIAL  VIRTUES  401 

tical.  Indeed,  we  encounter  radical  disagreement  among 
authorities  at  the  very  outset — in  respect  to  the  principle 
upon  which  this  distribution  should  be  effected.  This  dis- 
agreement is  at  present  most  clearly  seen  in  the  conflict  be- 
tween the  principle  generally  accepted  by  European  thought 
since  the  time  of  Aristotle,  that  reward  should  be  appor- 
tioned to  individual  ability  and  accomplishment,  and  the 
"  socialistic  "  principle  which  has  lately  gained  wide  ac- 
ceptance that  external  goods  should  be  distributed  among 
men  according  to  their  needs  which  are  fundamentally  alike, 
leaving  superior  ability  and  greater  efficiency  to  be  their 
own  reward. 

That  the  private  ownership  of  property  is,  under  the 
conditions  of  human  life,  a  means  necessary  to  man's  Self- 
realization,  can  scarcely  be  disputed.  The  value  of  the  in- 
stitution of  property  as  an  instrument  of  self -development 
in  enabling  the  individual  to  provide  for  his  own  material 
well-being,  present  and  future,  and  thus  encouraging  him 
in  the  exercise  of  forethought,  industry,  and  self-control, 
has  already  been  shown.  The  possession  of  wealth  con- 
tributes to  Self-realization  also  by  enabling  the  individual 
to  provide  himself  with  the  tools  and  equipment  necessary 
to  the  advantageous  exercise  of  his  abilities.  But  the  owner- 
ship of  property  even  in  excess  of  the  amount  needed  to 
supply  all  these  wants  now  and  to  come — property  which  be- 
longs to  the  individual  to  dispose  of  at  will  in  the  realization 
of  his  purposes — seems  required  for  complete  self-develop- 
ment. How  is  the  total  wealth  available  for  human  use  to 
be  distributed  in  order  that  these  fundamental  rights  of  hu- 
man personality  shall  be  fully  observed  ?  What  principle  of 
distribution  is  prescribed  by  the  ideal  of  Self-realization? 
To  this  question  we  may  answer  with  some  assurance  that 
Self-realization  would  distribute  wealth  among  men  in  ac- 
cordance with  what  is  needed  to  make  their  individual 
capacities  most  effective  in  promoting  human  welfare.  To 


402  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

make  clear  the  meaning  of  this  principle,  let  us  indicate  in  a 
word  what  it  does  not  admit  as  a  just  basis  for  the  dis- 
tribution of  external  goods  among  human  beings.  In  the 
first  place,  it  does  not  propose  to  distribute  wealth  among 
individuals  in  accordance  with  their  differences  in  native 
ability.  The  possession  of  superior  capacity  by  certain  in- 
dividuals constitutes  no  rightful  claim  to  superior  reward. 
It  is  certainly  the  height  of  injustice  to  increase  the  ad- 
vantages which  some  individuals  possess  by  giving  them  a 
larger  share  of  the  fruits  of  labor;  extraordinary  ability  is 
certainly  its  own  reward.  Nor,  on  the  other  hand,  is  it 
proposed  to  apportion  the  amount  of  reward  to  the  value 
of  the  service  which  the  individual  renders  society.  It  is 
practically  impossible  to  determine  the  comparative  value 
to  society  of  the  various  human  activities.  Indeed  there  is 
reason  for  holding  that  all  human  capacities  honestly  exer- 
cised have  equal  value  to  society ;  since  all  are  factors  equally 
necessary  in  the  development  of  human  personality.  Who 
shall  say  that  the  work  of  the  miner  has  less  value  to 
society  than  that  of  the  artist,  the  work  of  the  navigator 
less  than  that  of  the  lawyer  or  merchant?  But  our  prin- 
ciple does  recognize  differences  in  the  amount  of  wealth 
which  must  be  expended  in  the  training  and  exercise  of 
different  human  capacities  if  they  are  to  attain  full  de- 
velopment. The  achievements  of  house-builder  and  archi- 
tect are  equally  necessary  and  valuable  to  human  society, 
yet  the  training  and  exercise  of  distinctive  capacities  of 
the  latter  require  the  expenditure  of  much  more  money  in 
study,  travel,  and  equipment.  Instead  of  the  words  "  if 
they  are  to  attain  full  development  "  we  might  with  the 
same  truth  have  said  "  if  they  are  to  be  of  greatest  social 
service,"  since  we  may  assume  that  the  various  capacities 
of  man  receive  their  full  development  only  when  they  con- 
tribute most  to  the  personal  well-being  of  humanity.  In 
fact,  the  principle  which  Self-realization  prescribes  for  the 


THE  SOCIAL  VIRTUES  403 

distribution  of  rewards  is  difficult  to  grasp  because  of  its 
very  concreteness  which  forces  us  to  consider  at  once  the 
many  aspects  of  the  human  situation — the  amount  of  re- 
ward which  the  individual  is  to  receive  being  determined 
not  solely  by  the  degree  or  kind  of  ability  which  he  pos- 
sesses, nor  alone  by  the  value  of  the  service  he  renders  to 
society,  but  by  the  requirements  which  the  exercise  of  his 
particular  capacity  makes,  if  it  is  to  be  of  largest  service 
in  the  personal  development  of  man. 

Justice  requires  that  rewards  be  so  distributed  among 
men  that  all  individuals  shall  be  given  an  equal  opportunity  ] 
for  self-development.  In  the  expenditure  of  public  money 
to  provide  facilities  of  education  and  training  the  needs  of 
all  individuals  should  receive  the  same  consideration.  This 
does  not  mean  that  all  individuals  shall  be  given  an  educa- 
tion equally  costly,  a  training  equally  prolonged ;  but  rather 
that  the  kind  of  education  provided  for  each  individual 
shall  be  determined  by  the  character  of  his  distinctive 
abilities,  as  these  abilities  are  manifested  in  his  early  de- 
velopment. When  the  preliminary  period  of  training  and 
education  is  past  and  the  individual  is  put  in  full  posses- 
sion of  his  personal  powers,  wealth  should  be  distributed 
among  individuals  in  accordance  with  the  demands  which 
their  different  capacities  make  if  they  are  to  achieve  their 
utmost  for  human  welfare.  It  is  obvious  that  different 
"  callings  "  equally  honorable  and  alike  necessary  for 
human  well-being  require  for  their  successful  pursuit  the 
employment  of  widely  varying  amounts  of  wealth.  For  the 
work  of  both  diplomat  and  teacher,  for  example,  a  pre- 
paratory training  prolonged  and  costly  is  required  but  the 
activity  of  the  former,  when  his  career  is  actually  begun, 
makes  much  larger  demands  in  the  way  of  external  emolu- 
ments than  that  of  the  latter.  Certain  important  positions 
in  human  life,  if  they  are  to  be  so  filled  as  to  contribute 
their  utmost  to  social  welfare,  require  the  expenditure  of 


404  THE  LITE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

wealth  far  above  the  average,  in  securing  for  their  occupants 
freedom  from  material  discomforts  and  inconvenience,  the 
opportunity  for  leisure  and  travel,  and  the  intellectual 
stimulus  which  congenial  companionship  affords.  To  such 
positions  should  attach  incomes  proportionate  to  their  needs. 
An  equitable  distribution  of  incomes  would  be  based,  as  a 
recent  writer  has  said,  upon  "  the  individual  necessities  of 
livelihood  (essentially  the  same  for  all  men)  and  the  added 
needs  which  the  position  itself  imposes." 

This  principle  of  distributive  justice  which  seems  to  be 
implied  in  the  Moral  Ideal  gives  to  us,  to  be  sure,  no 
formula  for  calculating  precisely  what  the  incomes  of  differ- 
ent men  in  different  walks  of  life  shall  be.  It  partakes  of 
the  nature  of  an  ideal,  very  general  in  character,  and  whose 
application  to  particular  cases  is  difficult  to  see,  because 
of  the  many  and  perplexing  details  which  must  be  con- 
sidered. Yet  it  affords  us  a  standard  by  which  existing 
economic  systems  may  be  criticised  and  their  justice  esti- 
mated. And  when  we  measure  our  present  system  of  dis- 
tributing wealth  by  this  standard  it  falls  far  short  of  the 
requirements  of  justice.  Doubtless  the  system  of  free  com- 
petition which  now  prevails  in  civilized  societies  is  much 
more  just  than  the  system  which  preceded  it,  by  which 
the  opportunity  of  personal  development  accorded  to  the 
individual  as  well  as  that  of  sharing  in  the  fruits  of  human 
industry  was  strictly  limited  by  his  hereditary  status. 
With  the  injustice  of  the  older  system  fresh  in  memory  it 
is  not  strange  that  men  believed  that  if  they  were  accorded 
the  liberty  to  labor  in  a  chosen  field  in  competition  with 
others,  and  to  dispose  at  will  of  the  products  of  their  labor, 
the  ends  of  justice  would  be  attained.  But  the  system  of 
"  unlimited  competition,  unlimited  accumulation,  and  un- 
limited inheritance  "  has,  in  actual  practice,  been  attended 
with  great  injustice.  Free  competition  in  business  and 
industry  has  bestowed  upon  a  certain  few  capacities  having 


THE  SOCIAL  VIRTUES  405 

but  a  narrow  range — those  of  technical  proficiency  in  one 
or  two  departments  of  practical  life — a  reward  far  in  ex- 
cess of  their  own  demands  for  fulfilment,  or  of  the  con- 
tribution they  are  able  to  make  to  human  welfare.  An 
artificially  high  premium  has  been  set  upon  shrewdness, 
foresight,  and  enterprise,  when  exercised  in  the  manufacture 
and  distribution  of  material  commodities.  It  has  permitted 
the  accumulation  of  wealth  in  the  hands  of  those  possessing 
these  qualities  which,  privately  owned  and  employed  as 
capital,  has  given  them  such  enormous  advantage  as  prac- 
tically to  deprive  others  of  the  right  of  free  competition 
which  on  theoretical  grounds  they  possess  in  equal  degree 
with  the  capitalists.  Finally,  unrestricted  inheritance  of 
vast  sums  of  wealth  and  its  further  use  as  capital  by  those 
who  receive  it,  gives  this  great  and  unfair  advantage  to 
individuals  who  cannot  claim  even  to  have  "  earned  "  it 
by  the  exercise  of  any  personal  capacity  whatsoever.  The 
result  of  all  this  has  been  the  growth  of  monopoly,  the 
concentration  of  wealth  in  the  possession  of  a  few,  and  the 
comparative  impoverishment  of  the  many.  No  wonder  cries 
of  protest  are  raised  against  the  social  injustice  of  such  a 
system;  and  that  men  are  everywhere  seeking  a  new  prin- 
ciple for  the  distribution  of  wealth  which  shall  remedy  these 
abuses.  Flagrant  examples  of  the  injustice  of  the  present 
system  come  to  attention  daily.  In  the  reports  of  the  death 
of  a  real  estate  agent  recently  published  in  the  newspapers 
of  his  city  it  was  stated  that  his  income  had  frequently 
reached  $50,000  a  year  owing  to  the  special  ability 
he  possessed  of  closing  large  "  deals  "  in  real  estate  which 
had  for  long  been  pending  but  not  brought  to  the  point  of 
decision.  Surely  a  large  reward  for  the  capacity  exercised ; 
yet  the  present  system  is  responsible  for  just  such  cases 
as  this !  The  capacity  for  shrewd  prevision  along  with  the 
possession  of  some  capital  enables  certain  individuals, 
through  the  buying  and  selling  of  houses  and  land,  to  reap 


406  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

profits  so  huge  from  the  labor  of  others  in  the  up-building 
of  cities  and  the  settling  of  localities  that  they  are  led  to 
pay  commissions  proportionately  large  and  undeserved  to 
all  the  intermediaries  in  their  transactions.  A  railway 
official  was  lately  quoted  in  protest  against  the  review  and 
revision,  by  a  state  officer  paid  $2,500  a  year,  of  rates  fixed 
by  a  railway  traffic  officer  paid  $25,000  a  year.  Certainly 
the  ability  requisite  for  reviewing  and  adjusting  railway 
rates  in  the  interest  of  all  the  inhabitants  of  a  state  demands 
for  its  training  and  development  the  use  of  as  much  wealth, 
and  in  its  exercise  makes  as  great  a  contribution  to  human 
welfare,  as  that  required  to  fix  charges  with  reference 
solely  to  the  profit  of  a  single  corporation.  There  is  no 
questioning  the  fact  that  if  the  ends  of  democracy  are  to 
be  realized  and  every  individual  is  to  be  given  an  equal 
opportunity  for  self-development,  a  new  and  truer  method 
for  the  distribution  of  wealth  and  the  adjustment  of  in- 
comes must  be  put  in  practice. 

5.  Benevolence. — The  end  which  is  sought  through  all 
the  various  restrictions  imposed  upon  individuals  by  the 
practice  of  justice  is  the  development  of  human  personality 
itself,  recognized  wherever  and  whenever  it  exists  as  an 
end  of  absolute  moral  worth.  The  habit  of  promoting  the 
well-being  of  all  fellow-men  in  the  community,  in  the  nation, 
and  in  the  world,  through  individual  effort  and  initiative, 
is  the  virtue  of  benevolence.  Benevolence  is,  therefore,  jus- 
tice with  emphasis  laid  upon  the  positive  end  towards  which 
this  latter  virtue  is  directed.  It  is  a  more  comprehensive 
and  hence  a  higher  virtue  than  friendship;  in  the  ideal 
which  it  sets  before  the  human  individual  it  indicates  the 
goal  of  self -organization  in  the  social  sphere. 

The  duty  which  benevolence  imposes  upon  us  is  the 
service  of  humanity.  This  means  the  human  self  as  such, 
humanity  as  a  whole,  with  no  limitation  of  age  or  sex,  race 
or  nationality,  time  or  place.  There  is  no  blinking  the  wide 


THE  SOCIAL  VIRTUES  407 

and  sweeping  character  of  the  obligation  which  the  Moral 
Ideal  lays  upon  us  as  the  final  step  in  Self-realization.  It 
demands  the  development  of  the  capacities  of  human  per- 
sonality universally;  it  will  brook  no  discrimination  or  re- 
striction whatsoever  among  individuals  or  among  peoples. 
It  includes  the  most  unattractive  individuals,  the  most  un- 
promising peoples.  Benevolence,  in  fact,  is  humanitarian- 
ism  in  practice.  To  insist  upon  this  point  may  seem  to 
some  minds  to  be  discrediting  benevolence ;  for  humanitari- 
anism  is  often  compared  unfavorably  with  less  comprehen- 
sive virtues  like  patriotism  and  ridiculed  or  denounced  as 
vague,  impracticable,  and  hypocritical.  If  pretensions  of 
humanitarianism  are  used  as  a  cloak  to  hide  a  lack  of 
neighborly  kindness  or  sympathy,  or  if  ineffective  and 
foolish  methods  are  employed  in  efforts  to  further  its  ends, 
surely  these  faults  are  not  to  be  charged  to  the  account 
of  the  ideal  itself.  The  truth  remains  that  complete  self- 
organization  requires  the  adoption  and  pursuit  of  an  ideal 
no  less  comprehensive  than  that  of  total  human  welfare. 
If,  therefore,  the  individual  is  justified,  from  the  ethical 
standpoint,  in  cultivating  especially  a  few  chosen  friends 
and  in  failing  of  the  same  devotion  in  case  of  all  other 
human  beings  it  must  be,  and  is,  because  the  develop- 
ment of  his  own  capacities  for  human  service,  under  the 
conditions  of  human  existence,  make  such  limitations  of  his 
activity  necessary.  Or  if  a  man  strives  for  the  good  of  his 
own  country  and  neglects,  by  comparison,  the  well-being  of 
other  nations — if  he  consents  to  the  continued  development 
of  the  more  civilized  at  the  expense  of  the  less  civilized 
peoples, — it  must  be  because  he  understands  in  the  former 
case  that  the  good  of  his  own  country  includes  the  per- 
formance of  a  helpful  office  in  the  family  of  nations,  and 
believes  in  the  latter  case  that  the  uninterrupted  develop- 
ment of  the  civilized  peoples  is  necessary  to  the  best  interests 
of  future  humanity.  Doubtless,  in  case  of  such  judgments, 


408  THE  LITE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

too,  there  is  a  peculiar  danger  that  self-interest  may  lead 
to  self-deception  or  insincerity,  yet  man's  short-sightedness 
or  the  impurity  of  his  motives  should  not  be  allowed  to 
reflect  discredit  upon  the  ideal  whose  realization  is  required 
for  the  complete  and  permanent  satisfaction  of  his  will. 

If  we  are  to  understand  aright  what  the  "  service  of 
humanity  "  means  we  must  guard  against  a  prevalent  mis- 
conception of  social  well-being  in  its  relation  to  individual 
interests.  A  misunderstanding  on  this  point  may  cause  the 
ideal  of  benevolence  to  appear  as  a  mistake  and  an  ab- 
surdity. If  human  society  be  conceived  as  an  aggregate 
of  individuals  each  of  whom  has  his  own  private  and  ex- 
clusive good,  then  such  service  of  others,  as  benevolence 
contemplates,  must  mean  that  every  individual  shall  deny 
to  his  own  nature  the  satisfaction  it  craves,  and  devote  him- 
self to  the  fulfilment  of  others'  desires.  Suppose  benevo- 
lence to  be  practised  universally  and  we  have  all  individuals 
abandoning  their  natural  pursuits  and  occupied  with  the 
interests  of  others,  each  of  whom  is  likewise  busy  with  the 
affairs  of  his  neighbor  rather  than  with  his  own  individual 
interest.  Such  a  social  life  would  of  course  be  quite 
empty  and  worthless.  That  "  life  of  humanity  "  whose 
development  is  the  end  sought  by  benevolence  is  something 
altogether  different  from  this.  It  is  truly  conceived  not 
as  a  sum  of  individual  lives  and  interests  but  as  a  spiritual 
whole  of  which  individual  selves  are  the  differentiations. 
It  is  an  organization  of  personalities  in  which  each  indi- 
vidual may  perform  his  peculiar  function  in  effective  ad- 
justment to  all  the  rest.  The  development  of  this,  the  per- 
sonal life  of  humanity,  is  the  end  whose  attainment  is  re- 
quired for  the  complete  satisfaction  of  the  human  will.  It 
is  the  comprehensive  ideal  which  underlies  and  correlates 
all  lesser  interests.  As  Hobhouse  says:  "  That  the  indi- 
vidual is  member  of  a  spiritual  whole  with  a  common  life 
and  a  general  interest,  is  the  axiom  which  gives  the  needed 


THE  SOCIAL  VIRTUES  409 

coherence  to  the  multitudinous  sympathies,  susceptibilities, 
reluctancies,  that  guide  the  moral  life  of  the  unreflecting 
man."  6  The  inclusive  social  well-being  to  the  furtherance 
of  which  benevolence  is  directed  is,  therefore,  not  a  monot- 
onous and  empty  round  of  futile  self-sacrifice ;  it  possesses 
content  inexhaustibly  rich  and  infinitely  varied.  It  con- 
sists in  the  maximum  development  of  all  the  personal  capac- 
ities of  its  members  exercised  in  complete  organic  adjust- 
ment. 

But  how  shall  the  individual  with  his  limited  range  of 
acquaintance  and  influence,  affect  for  better — or  for  worse 
— the  well-being  of  humanity?  Is  not  this  end,  through 
the  vastness  of  its  range  and  the  magnitude  of  its  content, 
so  far  beyond  the  scope  of  any  individual's  action  as  to 
cause  whatever  effort  he  may  devote  to  its  realization  to 
be  entirely  wasted,  and,  as  withdrawn  from  lesser  interests 
nearer  at  hand,  to  be  positively  injuripus  in  result  upon  his 
life  ?  Is  not  the  humanitarian  ideal  an  impracticable  dream  ? 
The  best  answer  to  all  these  really  perplexing  questions  in 
regard  to  the  method  whereby  the  end  of  benevolence  may 
be  realized,  is  found  in  the  idea  of  vocation.  The  indi- 
vidual best  serves  humanity  who  most  faithfully  and  fully 
develops  the  capacity  that  is  greatest  within  him,  in  effective 
cooperation  with  the  efforts  of  his  fellows  to  realize  their 
distinctive  capacities.  One  who  does  this  may  rest  assured 
that  his  achievements,  although  they  make  no  apparent 
difference  to  humanity  are  nevertheless  real  contributions 
to  human  progress.  In  the  present  age,  moreover,  with  its 
improved  methods  of  transportation  and  communication  the 
value  to  all  existing  humanity  of  productions  of  the  indi- 
vidual need  not  remain  a  matter  of  faith  with  him ;  he  may 
hope  to  see  his  original  achievements  appropriated  by  all 
his  fellow-men  and  made  means  to  general  human  better- 
ment. By  railway  and  steamship,  printing-press  and  postal- 
•HOBHOUSE:  Morals  in  Evolution,  Vol.  II,  p.  219. 


410  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

service,  telegraph  and  telephone,  the  individual's  illuminat- 
ing idea,  his  life-saving  remedy,  or  his  labor-saving  inven- 
tion, are  in  the  course  of  a  few  days,  or  months,  or  years, 
made  the  property  of  humanity.  This  idea  of  vocation,  by 
which  is  meant  the  call  to  each  human  individual  to  make, 
through  the  exercise  of  the  capacity  most  marked  in  his 
nature,  his  own  unique  contribution  to  human  develop- 
ment, is  of  utmost  ethical  importance.  For  the  "  welfare 
of  humanity,"  as  we  have  seen,  is  not  an  undifferentiated 
mass,  a  great  sum-total  of  happiness,  say,  homogeneous  in 
character.  It  resides  rather  in  the  union  and  communion 
of  personalities,  each  different,  each  in  fact  unique  in  the 
combination  of  abilities  which  it  possesses.  The  develop- 
ment of  such  spiritual  system  takes  by  a  necessity  of  its 
nature  the  form,  not  of  an  obliteration  of  distinctions  be- 
tween its  constituent  members,  but  of  further  differentiation 
accompanied  by  increasing  organic  inter-dependence.  It  is 
now  a  commonplace  of  social  philosophy  that  the  progress 
of  human  society  depends  upon  growth  in  organization 
with  an  ever  more  complete  division  of  labor  among  the 
individuals  involved.  Thus  every  person  will  achieve  what 
he  is  best  fitted  to  achieve,  dedicating  to  the  use  of  humanity 
the  products  of  his  labor;  he  will  in  the  meantime  avail 
himself  of  a  share  in  the  achievements  of  all  other  indi- 
viduals in  their  respective  fields  of  action.  The  physician 
contributes  his  skill  to  the  relief  of  his  sick  and  suffering 
fellows;  he  enjoys  during  his  career  the  better  methods  of 
government  devised  by  legislators  and  administered  by  ex- 
ecutives, the  superior  educational  opportunities  provided 
by  teachers,  the  conveniences  and  comforts  originated  by 
inventors  and  engineers,  and  so  forth. 

From  these  facts  it  follows  that  the  choice  of  a  vocation 
is  a  momentous  event  in  the  life  of  the  human  individual. 
So  fraught  is  it  with  possibilities  of  good  and  ill  that  its 
significance  cannot  be  exaggerated.  Such  choice  should  be 


THE  SOCIAL  VIRTUES  411 

based  upon  the  knowledge  which  the  individual  has  of  his 
own  capacities,  and  also  upon  a  consideration  of  the  differ- 
ent kinds  of  activities  which  are  recognized  by  men  as 
contributing  to  human  welfare.  Most  important  certainly 
is  the  knowledge  which  each  person  alone  possesses  of  his 
own  abilities  and  of  that  which,  because  strongest  and  most 
urgent  in  its  demands  for  expression,  holds  forth  the  great- 
est promise  of  achievement.  Much  assistance  is  given  to 
the  individual  in  thus  sounding  the  depths  of  his  own  nature, 
however,  by  a  study  of  the  various  pursuits  which  have 
acknowledged  social  value.  For  the  occupations  and  insti- 
tutions of  society  are  but  the  objective  expression  of  the 
powers  of  human  personality  itself ;  in  them  the  individual 
may  see  realized  on  a  larger  scale  the  capacities  of  his 
own  nature.  Hence  it  may  well  be  that  his  own  distinctive 
ability  will  be  revealed  to  him  by  the  compelling  attraction 
of  some  department  of  social  service  rather  than  by  the 
stirrings  of  some  special  potency  within  him.  Besides  these 
fundamental  criteria  which  should  govern  the  individual 
in  his  choice  of  a  profession,  are  minor  considerations  of  a 
practical  nature  which  must  exert  a  varying  influence  in 
different  cases.  Mr.  Rashdall,  who,  in  his  profound  and 
penetrating  study  of  the  moral  life,6  gives  an  important 
place  to  the  idea  of  vocation,  mentions  a  number  of  such 
practical  considerations  which,  he  holds,  must  set  limits  to 
the  requirement  of  the  Ideal 7  that  each  person  should 
choose  the  most  useful  and  laborious  calling.  These  prac- 
tical considerations  are  in  substance  as  follows:8  (1)  A 
person  should  hesitate  before  embarking  under  the  influ- 
ence of  high  motives  upon  a  course  of  action  calling  for 

•  RASHDAJLL:  Theories  of  Good  and  Evil. 

7  The  Ideal  of  Social  Welfare,  when  conceived  abstractly,  i.e.,  aa 
requiring  the  individual  to  sacrifice  his  own  preferences  and  enjoy- 
ments altogether,  in  the  service  of  his  fellows.  Op.  tit.,  Vol.  II, 
p.  121. 

•  Ibid.,  p.  122  ff . 


412  THE  LITE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

severe  labor  and  constant  self-sacrifice  when  he  is  not  sure 
that  the  inspiration  to  carry  it  through  will  be  forthcoming. 

(2)  Certain  social  functions  require  to  be  performed  in  a 
certain  spirit  which  cannot  always  be  summoned  at  will. 
Unless  the  individual  possess  the  qualities  of  mind  and 
heart  that  produce  this  spirit  he  should  avoid  such  pursuits. 

(3)  As  a  general  rule  a  man  cannot  hope  to  do  well»  and 
hence  is  not  qualified  to  perform  successfully,  a  work  for 
which  he  has  not  a  natural  liking.     (4)  All  men  cannot 
engage  in  the  most  altruistic  and  self-sacrificing  pursuits; 
consequently  it  must  be  the  duty  of  some  men  to  continue 
in  the  more  worldly  and  self -profiting  occupations.     (5) 
Some  men  require  more  ease  and  amusement  than  others 
if  they  are  to  work  to  best  advantage  in  any  line ;  they  have 
a  right  to  consider  this  fact  in  choosing  a  vocation.     (6)  A 
person's  own  happiness  is  part  of  that  social  good  which 
he  should  aim  to  promote  through  the  discharge  of  his 
vocation ;  it  ought  not,  therefore,  to  be  sacrificed  to  promote 
a  less  amount  of  it  in  others.     (7)  That  differentiation  in 
modes  of  life  which  is  necessary  to  social  progress  must  lead 
to  inequalities  in  the  amount  of  luxury  and  enjoyment 
possible  to  different  individuals;  this  fact  may  in  certain 
circumstances  justify  the  individual  in  choosing  the  easier 
and  pleasanter  career.     (8)    Some  kinds  of  work  which 
call  for  less  self-sacrifice  are  as  socially  useful  as  those  which 
call  for  more ;  thus  a  moral  justification  exists  for  choosing 
them. — These  considerations  contain  much  truth  and  prac- 
tical wisdom,  and  it  is  without  doubt  helpful  to  bear  them 
in  mind.    Yet  whatever  truth  they  contain  seems  to  have 
been    already   comprehended   in   the   principles  we   have 
adopted  to  govern  the  choice  of  a  vocation — that  the  indi- 
vidual should  choose  that  line  of  activity  in  which  he  is 
best  fitted  by  his  distinctive  capacity  to  achieve  permanent 
results,  considering  the  actual  state  of  human  society  and 
the  existing  division  of  labor  within  it.     In  accordance  with 


THE  SOCIAL  VIRTUES  413 

these  principles,  having  chosen  a  vocation  as  the  most  effec- 
tive means  of  promoting  human  welfare,  the  individual  is 
constrained  by  all  the  force  and  authority  of  the  Moral 
Ideal  to  prepare  himself  as  thoroughly  and  perfectly  as 
possible  for  its  discharge  and  then,  when  preparation  is 
complete,  to  devote  all  his  strength  and  ability  to  the  ful- 
filment of  this,  his  vocation. 

The  choice  and  practice  of  a  vocation  by  no  means  re- 
moves all  the  difficulties,  it  must  be  confessed,  from  the 
path  of  one  who  sincerely  desires  to  realize  the  larger  pos- 
sibilities of  his  nature  in  the  service  of  humanity.  Innumer- 
able perplexities  remain  regarding  the  relation  of  legitimate 
individual  interest  and  the  social  well-being  which  the  in- 
dividual is  bound  morally  to  promote.  No  one  can  pretend 
that  every  actual,  and  apparently  necessary,  occupation  in 
our  social  economy  is  a  true  vocation,  or  that  every  genuine 
human  capacity  can  find  satisfactory  expression  in  some 
acknowledged  form  of  social  service.  We  can  only  hope 
that  the  further  diversification  of  activities  which  must 
accompany  continued  social  progress  will  make  some  place 
for  the  talents  of  those  individuals  for  whom  the  world 
seems  at  present  to  have  no  use,  and  that  industrial  progress 
will  so  alter  methods  and  conditions  of  work  as  to  make 
the  occupations  of  machine  operatives,  domestic  servants, 
and  ' '  day  laborers  ' '  truly  human  vocations — which,  in  too 
many  cases  at  present,  it  must  be  admitted  with  regret,  they 
are  not.  Allusion  has  already  been  made  to  the  hard  fact 
that,  at  present,  economic  pressure,  by  driving  individuals 
forth  in  search  of  the  means  of  subsistence  before  their  fac- 
ulties have  had  development  or  training,  prevents  many  from 
discovering  what  their  distinctive  abilities  are,  and  prevents 
others  who  are  aware  of  their  own  aptitudes,  from  entering 
those  occupations  in  which  alone  their  special  capacities 
can  find  realization.  It  is  a  demand  of  simple  justice  that 
these  conditions  should  be  removed  which  deprive  our  fel- 


414 


THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 


low-men  of  their  fundamental  moral  right — the  opportunity 
to  attain  Self-realization  through  participating  in  the  per- 
sonal life  of  humanity.  But  these  reforms  await  the  coming 
of  a  clearer  vision  of  the  larger  social  welfare,  a  more  sin- 
cere devotion  to  the  self-development  of  human  personality, 
a  stronger  feeling  of  the  essential  unity  of  all  intelligent 
beings  within  the  one  universal  life. 

At  the  end  of  the  previous  chapter  an  outline  of  the 
various  fields  of  human  activity  was  given,  based  upon  that 
classification  of  the  capacities  which  has  been  followed  in  the 
present  book.  In  connection  with  this  outline  a  list  of 
human  vocations  may  be  made  which,  though  it  can  make 
no  pretensions  to  completeness  or  finality,  may  be  useful 
for  purposes  of  illustration. 


NATURE 
INTELLECTUAL  MAN 

UNIVERSE 


INORGANIC 


Scientist 

Humanist 

Philosopher 

Mining  Engineer 
Land  Mechanical  Engineer 

Civil  Engineer 
Electrical  Engineer 

Water          Navigator 
Plant  Farmer 


ORGANIC       Animal        Breeder 


TECHNICAL 


Human 


Physician 
Surgeon 
Dentist,  etc. 


SOCIAL 


Law  and      Statesman 
Government  Diplomatist 

Lawyer 
War  Soldier 


THE  SOCIAL  VIRTUES  415 

Industry      Manufacturer 
Distributor 

Education    Teacher 
Eeligion       Clergyman 

Architect 

VISUAL  Painter 

Sculptor 

AESTHETIC          AUDITORY  Musician 

Poet 

VEEBAL  Dramatist 

Novelist 


CHAPTER  III 
THE  RELIGIOUS  VIRTUES 

There  is  a  third  feature  characteristic  of  the  life  of 
man  which  adds  another  aspect  to  the  process  of  Self- 
realization  that  we  have  been  studying — the  presence  in 
human  experience  of  universal  reality.  This  essential 
feature  of  our  lives  necessitates  a  third  adjustment,  the 
adjustment  of  man  to  the  universe,  the  integration  of 
universal  reality  within  the  life  of  the  human  self.  This, 
the  final  step  in  the  organization  of  conduct,  is  an  affair 
of  religion  rather  than  of  morality.  The  conception  of 
religion  which  it  suggests  is  not  unfamiliar, — it  is  most 
common  at  present,  although  differently  expressed  by  differ- 
ent thinkers,  according  to  each  one's  philosophical  bias, 
as  the  "  final  synthesis  of  subject  and  object  "  or  the 
' '  feeling  of  harmony  between  ourselves  and  the  universe, ' ' 
or  a  "  faith  in  the  ultimate  conservation  of  values."  But 
when  understood  in  connection  with  the  theory  of  moral 
development  just  outlined,  this  conception  of  religion  as  an 
adjustment  of  man  to  the  universe  is  illuminating,  both  as 
to  the  development  of  the  religious  consciousness  and  the 
relation  of  religion  and  morality. 

If  we  thus  regard  religion  as  the  final  step  in  Self-realiza- 
tion, it  is  possible  to  distinguish  three  stages  in  its  evolution 
and  also  to  show  why  these  three  stages  are  directly  de- 
pendent for  their  specific  character  upon  the  degree  of 
moral  development  attained  by  the  self.  The  first  two 
adjustments,  which  belong  properly  to  the  field  of  morality, 
are  logically  prior  to  that  of  religion;  since  the  final  ad- 

416 


THE  RELIGIOUS  VIRTUES  417 

justment  of  the  self  to  the  universe  can  be  attained  only 
when  its  capacities  have  been  fully  realized  in  its  natural 
and  social  environment.  But  notwithstanding  the  fact 
that  such  a  relation  of  dependence  exists  between  these  dif- 
ferent steps  in  the  process  of  Self-realization,  they  do  not 
occur  in  strict  temporal  sequence.  Thus  religion  does  not 
delay  its  appearance  until  moral  development  is  complete 
and  the  individual  thoroughly  socialized.  We  find  the  re- 
ligious adjustment  attempted  in  the  lowest  stage  of  human 
culture.  The  universe  presses  in  upon  the  individual  and 
forces  him  to  take  towards  it  some  attitude.  It  is  inevitable 
that  the  attitude  taken  should  vary  with  the  character  of 
the  self.  The  form  of  belief  required  to  adjust  man  and 
the  universe  will  depend  upon  the  needs  and  aspirations 
of  the  human  self  and  the  view  which  it  takes  of  the  uni- 
verse. Thus  religion  while  distinct  from  morality  is  still  de- 
pendent on  it,  and  its  successive  stages  are  determined  by 
the  successive  epochs  in  moral  development. 

At  the  lowest  stage  the  self  consists  of  a  medley  of 
different  impulses,  unregulated  except  by  those  customs 
which  have  grown  up  as  conditions  of  social  survival,  and 
whose  significance  is  not  understood  by  those  who  obey 
them:  Anything  like  a  controlling  aim  or  life-purpose  is 
entirely  absent  from  the  consciousness  of  the  self  at  this 
stage.  The  universe  is  regarded  as  an  aggregate  of  objects 
or  agencies  capable  of  ministering  to  the  desires  of  man, 
or  of  inflicting  upon  him  dire  calamities.  Religion  at  this 
stage  takes  the  form  of  belief  in  divinities  which,  in  re- 
sponse to  human  appeal,  have  power  to  influence  the  objects 
and  forces  of  nature  so  that  they  may  minister  to  human 
needs.  As  there  are  many  impulses  and  many  objects, 
so  there  are  many  gods.  Each  main  source  of  food  supply 
has  its  divinity,  so  have  springs  and  wells.  There  is  a  god 
of  the  chase  and  one  who  controls  procreation.  The  leading 
attribute  of  deity  at  this  stage  is  Power.  This  power  is 


418  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

neither  exclusively  physical  nor  mental  but  something  of 
both,  the  two  not  being  clearly  distinguished.  The  worship 
of  such  divinities  takes  the  form  of  an  endeavor  to  placate 
them  by  offering  and  sacrifice.  They  are  assumed  to  have 
the  same  desires  as  man,  and  their  favor  is  sought  by  gifts 
of  food  and  drink.  Within  this  stage  fall  the  various  forms 
of  religion  usually  regarded  as  primitive,  from  animism, 
through  the  different  forms  of  nature-worship,  to  poly- 
theism. 

In  the  second  stage  we  find  the  self  in  possession  of  a 
well-developed  individuality,  the  result  of  subordinating 
the  many  conflicting  impulses  to  a  few  controlling  aims 
and  ambitions  which  represent  the  interest  of  the  self  as 
a  unit.  The  universe  is  consequently  looked  upon  as  a 
factor  influencing  the  fortunes  of  the  individual.  The  form 
of  religion  needed  to  adjust  individual  interest  and  the 
universal  order,  is  belief  in  a  power  able  to  guarantee  to 
the  individual  who  fulfils  certain  stated  conditions,  the 
realization  of  his  own  ambitions.  Hence  the  tendency  is 
at  this  stage  to  conceive  of  God  as  a  conscious  individual 
possessing  the  attribute  of  Justice  in  addition  to  the  power 
possessed  by  the  divinities  of  an  earlier  stage.  He  is  re- 
garded as  one  who  rewards  or  punishes  men  according  to 
their  deserts.  As  the  human  individual  has  his  own  interests 
and  ambitions,  so  God  is  believed  to  have  his  own  designs 
and  purposes.  These  are  expressed  in  laws  and  decrees 
supernaturally  revealed.  The  man  who  obeys  these  divine 
laws  is  rewarded  with  happiness  and  the  fulfilment  of  his 
ambition  while  he  who  disobeys  is  punished  by  misery  and 
deprivation;  for  God  is  not  only  Legislator  but  Judge  of 
all  the  world.  The  reward  of  those  who  obey  the  divine 
commands  is  at  first  supposed  to  come  within  the  limits  of 
earthly  existence.  But  experience  proving  that  fortune 
does  not  discriminate  between  the  deserving  and  the  un- 
deserving in  this  present  world,  the  reward  of  the  individual 


THE  RELIGIOUS  VIRTUES  419 

who  serves  God  is  postponed  to  a  future  life.  This  stage 
includes  types  of  religion  from  organized  polytheism 
through  henotheism  to  monotheism — at  least  such  monothe- 
ism as  makes  God  sharply  individual  and  separate  from 
the  world. 

Finally,  in  the  third  place,  we  have  the  social  or  ideal 
self  more  or  less  fully  developed,  as  the  result  of  the  adjust- 
ment of  individual  interest  to  the  welfare  of  society.  Man 
seeks  to  realize,  now,  not  narrow  self-centered  ambitions 
which  are  different  from,  and  opposed  to,  the  good  of 
others,  but  those  larger  ends  which  embrace  the  well-being 
of  humanity.  He  looks  upon  the  universe,  not  as  deciding 
his  fortunes  as  an  individual,  but  as  determining  the  des- 
tiny of  man  and  the  reality  of  those  ideals,  social  and  in- 
tellectual, which  are  being  slowly  and  painfully  realized 
in  the  course  of  human  progress.  The  kind  of  belief  re- 
quired to  adjust  the  individual,  thus  socialized,  to  the 
universe,  is  faith  in  the  existence  of  a  universal  principle 
of  such  character  as  to  conserve  the  highest  human  welfare 
and  guarantee  the  reality  of  those  values  to  which  man 
attributes  supreme  moral  worth.  Now  man,  at  the  height 
of  his  moral  development,  regards  the  complete  social  life, 
— the  recognition  of  brotherhood,  the  feeling  of  sympathy, 
the  practice  of  cooperation, — as  the  object  of  supreme  worth 
in  human  life.  Hence  the  religion  that  gives  reality  to 
those  values  which  man  holds  highest,  is  one  which  finds 
the  nature  of  God,  the  universal  principle,  most  completely 
expressed,  not  in  power,  not  in  justice,  but  in  Benevolence. 
Faith  in  such  a  God  who  is  the  expression  of  infinite  benev- 
olence, gives  to  those  altruistic  qualities  and  habits  which 
the  social  life  demands,  a  foundation  deep  in  the  nature 
of  reality.  The  individual  who  sacrifices  health  and  pos- 
sessions and  even,  in  extreme  cases,  physical  existence  itself, 
in  the  service  of  others,  receives  from  such  a  faith  the 
assurance  that  he  has  not  lost  but  gained  reality  thereby; 


420  THE  LIFE  OF  SELF-REALIZATION 

for  such  a  life  approaches  most  nearly  to  the  absolutely 
real.  At  this,  the  culminating  stage  in  the  evolution  of 
the  religious  consciousness,  man  adjusts  himself  to  the 
universe,  not  by  sacrifice  offered  to  win  the  favor  of  a 
capricious  divinity,  nor  by  obedience  to  a  law  externally 
imposed  by  a  deity  who  has  his  own  ends  to  attain,  but 
by  faithfully  discharging  his  duties  in  society  and  devoting 
his  life  to  the  service  of  his  fellow-beings.  Thus  the  claims 
of  religion  and  morality  are  brought  into  perfect  harmony, 
and  man,  by  the  performance  of  earthly  duty,  identifies 
himself  with  Universal  Reality.  This  final  form  of  re- 
ligion may  be  called  theism  (if  we  contrast  theism  with 
deism)  or,  as  has  been  suggested,  spiritual  pantheism. 

The  existence  of  a  Universal  Purpose  which  is  striving 
to  adapt  the  natural  world  to  the  needs  of  a  society  of 
free,  self-developing  persons  has,  to  be  sure,  not  been 
demonstrated.  Complete  proof  of  the  working  of  such  a 
Universal  Purpose  whose  aim  is  the  welfare  of  all  intelligent 
beings,  will  be  given  only  when  this  purpose  is  itself  realized. 
The  realization  of  the  purpose  awaits  the  fulfilment  of  the 
process  of  Self-realization  which  is  being  accomplished  in 
the  moral  development  of  man.  But  faith  in  the  existence 
of  a  universal  principle  which  makes  for  righteousness  is 
being  justified,  belief  in  a  God  of  universal  benevolence  is 
receiving  verification,  in  the  power  which  it  has  given,  and 
is  giving,  to  man  of  organizing  his  life  and  adapting  the 
conditions  of  his  existence  to  the  demands  of  a  free  per- 
sonal life.  Indeed,  this  is  all  the  proof  we  should  expect 
since,  as  we  have  seen,  man 's  personal  development  at  every 
stage  depends  upon  the  exercise  of  faith — a  faith  which 
is  justified  only  through  the  success  which  it  gives  to  the 
human  self  in  attaining  a  larger  and  more  comprehensive 
life. 

The  religious  adjustment  is  the  basis  of  two  further 
virtues  whose  place  and  importance  in  the  moral  life  is 


THE  RELIGIOUS  VIRTUES  421 

generally  recognized.  It  requires,  first,  the  subordination 
of  all  the  particular  interests  of  the  human  species  to  the 
ends  of  universal  intelligence,  or  reverence.  Reverence  for 
God  is  thus  an  expression  of  the  reverence  which  we  owe 
to  the  Moral  Ideal  itself — when  this  ideal  is  defined  and 
personalized.  Second  and  finally,  self-organization  requires 
that  man  employ  all  distinctively  human  abilities  in  the 
realization  of  the  Divine  Purpose,  and  this  is  to  practise 
piety. 


INDEX 


Achievement,  definition  of,  363; 
t».  culture,  364  f. ;  fields  of, 
367 

Action,  capacity  of,  20  f.,  177  f.; 
in  culture,  357;  aim  and 
method  of,  358,  359 

Adclaras,    Jane,    331 

^Esthetic  capacity,  nature  of, 
24  f.,  177  f.;  in  culture,  359; 
development  of,  360  f. 

Alexander,  the  Good  some  form 
of  conduct,  92;  individual  vs. 
social  adjustment,  218 

Altruism,  place  in  Self-realiza- 
tion, 186;  maxim  of,  229;  vs. 
egoism,  272  f. 

Amusements,  importance  of,  330 

Angell,  3 

Antisthenes,  founder  of  Cynicism, 
113 

Aristippus,  founder  of  Cyrenai- 
cism,  97 

Aristotle,  on  the  pre-eminence 
of  reason  in  man,  117;  the 
"mean,"  185;  courage,  253, 
345;  self-love,  281;  happiness, 
298;  classification  of  virtues, 
311;  temperance,  323,  325; 
forms  of  friendship,  380 

Arnold,  Matthew,  contrast  of 
Hellenism  to  Hebraism,  202  f. 

Asceticism,  moral  value  of,  124; 
injurious  effects  of,  125 

Attention,  effort  of,  necessary 
to  voluntary  action,  10,  91 

Authority,  of  conventional  mo- 
rality, 49,  50;  of  conscience, 
55;  of  moral  law,  61;  of  sum- 
mum  bonum,  70 

Baldwin,  on  development  of  ac- 
tion,  138,   141 
Beauty,  as  ideal,  179  f.,  353 
Benevolence,    definition   of,   406; 


problem     of,      408;      solution 
through  idea  of  vocation,  409  f. 
Bosanquet,   theory  of  the   state, 
391 

Capitalism,  injustice  attendant 
upon,  338,  404  f. 

Categorical  Imperative,  Kant's 
theory  of,  67;  criticism  of 
Kant's  theory,  69;  attaching 
to  the  summum  bonum,  70 

Character,  in  relation  to  con- 
duct, 93 

Chastity,  386 

Chesterton,  231 

Christianity,  in  relation  to  He- 
braism and  Hellenism,  207  f . ; 
as  a  theory  of  Self-realization, 
207  f . ;  conception  of  Provi- 
dence, 295;  conception  of 
God,  419 

Citizenship,  duty  of,  222  f . ;  edu- 
cation for,  267,  268 

Classification  of  virtues,  desi- 
rability of,  308  f. ;  historical, 
310  f.;  defects  of  historical, 
313;  according  to  Self-realiza- 
tion, 314  f. 

Conduct,  meaning  of,  3;  human, 
as  subject-matter  of  Ethics, 
12;  Ethics  considers  whole  of 
human  conduct,  13  f. ;  in  re- 
lation to  character,  93 

Conscience,  not  special  faculty, 
38;  identical  with  moral  judg- 
ment, 39;  influenced  by  feeling, 
43 ;  Intuitional  and  Empirical 
theories  of,  44  f. ;  rational 
basis  of,  50;  summum  bonum 
as  ground  of,  51 ;  Self-realiza- 
tion as  supplying  standard  for, 
214  f.;  supreme  importance  of, 
54 

Consequences,     not     always     in 


423 


424 


INDEX 


agreement  with  intention,  73; 
when  good  usually  indicate 
good  intention,  76 

Corrective  justice,  395  f. 

Courage,  definition  of,  341 ; 
ethical  significance  of,  342; 
physical,  343  f . ;  economic, 
347  f . ;  moral,  350 

Courtesy,  372,  373 

Crothers,  on  mixed  motives,  286 

Culture,  place  in  Self-realization, 
185;  definition  of,  354;  in- 
tellectual, 354  f. ;  technical, 
357  f . ;  aesthetic,  359  f . ;  vs. 
achievement,  364 

Custom,  nature  and  origin  of, 
85  f. ;  relation  to  the  Good,  84 

Cynicism,  doctrine  of,  113,  114 

Cyrenaicism,  origin  of,  97;  truth 
in,  98;  criticism  of,  99 

Darwin,  on  remorse,  56;  on  so- 
cial instinct,  269 

Descriptive  science,  distinguished 
from  normative,  17,  18 

Desire,  description  of,  141,  142; 
pre-supposition  of  moral  de- 
velopment, 321,  322 

Determinism,  meaning  of,  160; 
defense  of,  160;  criticism  of, 
162 

Dewey,  on  moral  conduct,  14;  on 
egoism,  263;  on  classification 
of  virtues,  309 

Dickinson,  Lowes,  on  immoral- 
ity, 302 

Distributive  justice,  400  f . 

Duty,  definition  of,  94;  relation 
to  virtue,  94;  not  categorical 
imperative,  69;  emphasized  in 
Christian  ethics,  94 

Economic  courage,  347 

Efficiency,  363 

Egoism,   cf.   Self-interest 

Empiricism,  theory  of  conscience, 
44;  conflict  with  Intuitionism, 
45,  46;  agreement  with  the 
facts  of  moral  history,  47 ; 
empirical  conception  of  virtue, 
305  (cf.  Experience) 

End,    in     voluntary    action,     6; 


psychological  analysis  of,  7;  in 
contrast  to  actual  existence,  8; 
choice  of,  9 ;  as  expression  of 
character,  10  f.;  most  common, 
good  only  as  means,  30;  sum- 
mum  bonum  an  end  in  itself, 
32;  universal  ends,  179 

Epicureanism,  theory  of,  100; 
merits  of,  101 

Epicurus,  life  and  teachings,  100 

Ethics,  defined,  3 ;  method  of, 
16  f. ;  a  practical  science,  16, 
17;  a  normative  science,  17  i. ; 
comprehensiveness  of,  27 ; 
problem  of,  32,  33;  need  for, 
53;  origin  of,  87 

Eucken,  on  relation  of  feeling 
and  thought,  135;  on  modern 
democratic  movement,  235 

Evil,  natural  and  moral,  257  f. 

Evolution,  man  the  product  of, 
173;  mistaken  inference  from, 
117;  involves  adjustment  and 
sacrifice,  242;  evil  in,  257, 
258;  outcome  of,  259;  evolu- 
tionary conception  of  virtues, 
313,  314,  317 

Experience,  the  source  of  moral 
sentiments,  47,  48;  of  race,  48; 
of  individual,  49;  powerful  in- 
fluence of,  upon  individual,  50; 
determines  content  of  summtim 
bonum,  170 

Faith,  moral,  100,  295;  Chris- 
tian, 208;  religious,  301,  303 

Feeling,  source  of  object's  appeal 
to  will,  58;  relation  to  ac- 
tion, 96;  as  the  Good,  96  f.; 
aesthetic,  177  f.;  359  f.;  rela- 
tion to  volition,  134  f. 

Food,  temperance  in  eating,  326; 
supply  of,  333 

Freedom,  as  self-determination, 
157,  158,  161;  as  Self-realiza- 
tion, 158;  theories  of,  Liber- 
tarianism,  159;  Determinism, 
160 

Friendship,  definition  of,  378; 
value  of,  379;  kinds  of,  380; 
basis  of,  381;  range  of,  382; 
permanence,  385 


INDEX 


425 


Generosity,  373  f. 

God,  conceptions  of,  417  f. ;  exist- 
ence of,  189,  301 

Goodness,  as  power  of  object  to 
satisfy  will,  19;  in  relation  to 
Truth  and  Beauty,  25  f.  (Cf. 
Summum  bonum) 

Green,  on  desire,  138;  on  self- 
sacrifice,  239 

Habit,  influence  of,  201 

Happiness,  not  a  sum  of  pleas- 
ures, 289  f . ;  a  harmony  of 
pleasures,  291  f. ;  identical  with 
Self-realization,  291;  and  with 
goodness,  294,  298;  subjective 
in  reference,  296;  passive  in 
implication,  297 

Health,  332  f. 

Hearn,  Lafcadio,  on  Japanese 
customs,  84 

Hebraism,  203  f. 

Hedonism,  definition  of,  97;  or- 
igin of,  97 ;  psychological,  102, 
103;  criticism  of,  psychologi- 
cal, 104  f.;  ethical,  104;  criti- 
cism of  ethical,  106  f. ;  and  Ra- 
tionalism, 109  f. ;  place  in  Self- 
realization,  184 

Hegel,  in  condemnation  of  ab- 
stract idealism,  129;  on  sec- 
ond nature,  201 ;  theory  of 
retributive  punishment,  397 

Hellenism,  205  f. 

Highest  Good,  cf.  Summum  bo- 
num 

Hobbes,  egoistic  Ethics,  262 

Hobhouse,  moral  sentiments  of 
mankind,  46;  development  of 
conscious  selfhood,  176 

Hoffding,  development  of  volun- 
tary action,  138,  140;  defini- 
tion of  religion,  276 

Humanitarianism,  place  in  Self- 
realization,  187;  maxim  of, 
233  f . ;  identical  with  benevo- 
lence, 407 

Ideal,  defined,  33;  formation  of, 
33,  34;  relation  of  moral,  in- 
tellectual, and  aesthetic  ideals, 
26,  27;  criticism  of  existing 


ideals,  30,  31;  conflict  of  his- 
toric ideals,  29;  its  distinction 
from  actuality,  138  f.;  action 
from,  144 

Idealism,  maxim  of,  226;  as  a 
virtue,  353;  involves  culture, 
354  f.;  and  achievement,  363 

Imitation,  factor  in  self-develop- 
ment, 141 

Immortality,  an  ethical  postu- 
late, 301  f. 

Impulse,  in  development  of  voli- 
tion, 137 

Inclination,  as  appeal  of  good- 
ness, 59,  196,  197;  opposed  to 
obligation,  60;  criticism  of 
Kant's  view  that  goodness  is 
always  opposed  to,  68 

Individual  self,  distinguished 
from  social,  156;  development 
of,  183  f.,  369  f.;  vs.  social, 
199;  principle  of  individual 
interest,  218  f. 

Individualism,  of  Sophists,  88; 
of  Rationalism,  129;  of  Hedon- 
ism, 130;  legitimate  sphere  of, 
219 

Instinct,  operation  of,  136,  137; 
human  instincts,  174 

Intellectualism,  negative  char- 
acter of,  124  f.;  impracticabil- 
ity of,  127;  individualism  of, 
129 

Intention,  not  in  agreement  with 
consequences,  73;  if  good,  usu- 
ally produces  good  conse- 
quences, 75;  but  does  not  in- 
sure good  consequences,  78 

Internationalism,  223 

Intoxicants,  temperance  in  use 
of,  327  f. 

Intuitionism,  theory  of  con- 
science, 44,  45;  difficulties  of 
intuitional  view  of  conscience, 
45,  46;  element  of  truth  In, 
55;  conception  of  virtue,  305 

Involuntary  action,  development 
of,  136  f.;  types  of,  137  f. 

James,  on  moral  value  of  ascet- 
icism, 125;  on  ethical  import 
of  effort,  149;  on  moral  value 


426 


INDEX 


of  military  virtues,  346;  on 
moral  equivalent  of  war,  347 

Jesus,  Ethics  of,  207  f. 

Justice,  definition  of,  389;  po- 
litical, 391  f.;  corrective,  393  f.; 
distributive,  400  f . 

Kant,  his  conception  of  duty,  66; 
reverence  for  moral  law,  66, 
70;  distinction  of  categorical 
from  hypothetical  imperative, 
67;  criticism  of  his  view  that 
goodness  is  opposed  to  incli- 
nation, 68;  that  duties  are 
categorical  imperatives,  69 ; 
his  view  that  goodness  de- 
pends upon  motive  rather 
than  consequences,  73 ;  his  be- 
lief that  existence  of  God  is  an 
ethical  postulate,  299;  lesson 
of  his  life,  229 

Kindness,  definition  of,  371; 
forms  of,  372  f. ;  courtesy, 
372  f. ;  generosity,  373  f . ;  self- 
sacrifice,  375  f. 

Law,  moral  and  civil,  392 
Libertarianism,  meaning  of,  159; 

arguments  in  defense  of,   159, 

160;  criticism  of,  162 
Love,  cf.  Friendship 

Mackenzie,  on  authority  of  duty, 
62;  on  classification  of  vir- 
tues, 309 

Man,  essential  and  incidental  in 
human  nature,  170  f.;  a 
natural  being,  173;  his  in- 
stincts, 174;  a  conscious  self, 
175  f.;  his  spiritual  capacities, 
177  f.;  relation  of  good  to, 
193  f. 

Mill,  on  conscience,  43;  on  de- 
pendence of  goodness  upon 
consequences,  73;  in  defense  of 
psychological  Hedonism,  103 

Moral  courage,  350  f. 

Moral  enlightenment,  meaning 
of,  52;  need  for,  53 

Moral  Ideal,  identical  with  sum- 
mum  bonum,  33;  quest  of,  the 


problem  of  Ethics,  33;  abili- 
ties involved  in  its  construc- 
tion, 33,  34;  characteristics  of, 
35;  power  of,  36,  37 

Moral  judgment,  identical  with 
conscience,  38;  subject  and 
predicate  of,  39,  40;  ground  of, 
40,  41 ;  feeling  as  the  ground 
of,  42,  43;  idea  of  the  sum- 
mum  bonum  as  the  rational 
ground  of,  50,  51;  Self-realiza- 
tion as  the  standard  of,  214 

Moral  law,  goodness  as  a  rule 
imposed  by  an  external  author- 
ity, 61 

Moral  sentiments,  character  and 
existence  of,  43 

Moral  training,  and  moral  en- 
lightenment, 53 ;  advantages 
of,  54 

Moral  value,  grounded  on  human 
will,  19,  20;  judgments  of,  39; 
kinds  of,  40;  standard  of,  51 

Motive,  psychological  definition 
of,  72;  of  good  conduct,  72; 
when  good,  does  not  insure 
good  consequences,  78;  three 
leading,  261;  self-interest, 
262  f . ;  sympathy,  269  f . ;  fear 
of  God,  275  f. ;  Self-realization 
as  motive,  278  f.;  self-respect, 
280;  philanthropy,  282;  rev- 
erence, 283 ;  mixed,  284  f. 

Miinsterberg,  220 

Nature,  maladjustment  in,  257 

Natural  self,  154,  155 

Normative  science,  distinguished 
from  descriptive,  17,  18; 
classification  of,  25  f . ;  distin- 
guished from  practical,  19 

Obligation,  the  characteristic  ap- 
peal of  the  good,  61 ;  opposed 
to  inclination,  60;  the  require- 
ment of  an  external  authority, 
61,  62,  195;  genesis  of.  631.; 
the  demand  of  the  will  for  a 
larger  attainment,  65,  66; 
Kant's  theory  of,  66  f. 

Optimism,  grounds  for,  257  f. 


INDEX 


427 


Organization,  meaning  of,  151, 
152;  its  two  aspects,  241;  in- 
volves sacrifice  of  part  to 
whole,  241  f. 

Paulsen,  on  conscience,  54;  on 
free-will,  166;  on  temperance, 
322;  on  legal  and  moral  jus- 
tice, 394 

Personality,  personal  self,  155 ; 
development  by  volition,  156, 
157;  capacities  of,  177  f.;  an 
end  in  itself,  187,  231 

Pessimism,  grounds  for,  257  f. 

Philanthropy,  as  a  motive,  282, 
283 

Piety,  as  a  virtue,  421 

Plato,  theory  of  the  good,  185; 
on  self-mastery,  245;  classifi- 
cation of  the  virtues,  310 

Pleasure,  as  the  good,  96;  place 
in  Self-realization,  184;  an  ac- 
companiment of  Self-realiza- 
tion, 288;  pleasures  cannot  be 
added,  289,  290;  qualitative 
differences  between,  290 

Political  justice,  391  f. 

Power,  as  an  end,  179  f.,  353 

Practical  science,  distinguished 
from  theoretical,  16;  classes 
of,  20  f. ;  distinguished  from 
normative,  19 

Present  self,   152  f. 

Principles  of  conduct,  derived 
from  ideal  of  Self-realization, 
216  f.;  of  individual  interest, 
218  f.;  of  social  welfare,  222  f. 

Prisons,  need  for  reform  in,  399 

Property,   moral  value  of,   335  f. 

Prudence,  maxim  of,  224  f. ;  as 
virtue,  322;  three  purposes  in- 
volved in,  340;  health,  332; 
property,  335 ;  reputation, 
338  f. 

Psychological  Hedonism,  argu- 
ment of,  102,  103;  criticism  of, 
104  f. 

Punishment,  ethical  aim  of,  395; 
criticism  of  retributive  theory 
of,  396  f.;  methods  of,  398 

Purpose,  nature  and  development 
of,  142  f. 


Rashdall,  on  the  choice  of  voca- 
tion, 41  If. 

Rationalism,  definition  of,  112; 
types  of,  113;  historical 
schools  of,  116;  truth  of, 
116f.;  criticism  of,  124f.; 
and  Hedonism,  130;  place  in 
Self-realization,  184 

Reason,  distinctive  human  fac- 
ulty, 116  f.;  universalizing 
faculty,  119f. ;  as  source  of 
social  insight,  122  f. 

Refinement,  363 

Religion,  in  relation  to  Self-real- 
ization, 188f.;  as  motive  of 
good  conduct,  275  f. ;  an  ethi- 
cal postulate,  300,  301 ;  nature 
of,  416;  development  of,  416  f.; 
forms  of,  417  f.;  relation  to 
morality,  417,  421 

Remorse,  56,  57 

Reputation,  moral  value  of, 
338  f. ;  duty  to  sacrifice,  350  f. 

Reverence,  as  motive,  283,  284; 
as  virtue,  421 

Rights,  moral,  389,  390,  394; 
legal,  393  f. 

Royce,  on  conscience,  55;  on  loy- 
alty and  self-sacrifice,  250 

Sanctions  of  morality,  331 

Self,  created  by  activity  of  voli- 
tion, 146,  147,  156,  157;  real- 
ized by  volition,  151,  152;  the 
present,  153,  154;  the  personal, 
155,  156;  individual  and  so- 
cial, 156;  man  as  a  conscious, 
175 

Self-interest,  motive  of,  262  f. ; 
efficacy  and  value  of,  264  f. ; 
defects  of,  266  f. 

Self-mastery,  necessity  for,  243  f. 

Self-realization,  the  summum  bo- 
num,  151,  152;  identical  with 
self-determination,  157.  158; 
form  and  content  in,  169,  170; 
explaining  relation  of  Good 
to  human  individual,  198  f.; 
ideal  of,  as  standard  of  moral 
judgment,  214  f. ;  yields  prin- 
ciples of  conduct,  individual 
and  social,  216  f.;  as  motive, 


428 


INDEX 


278  f. ;      self-sacrifice,      as      a 
means    to,    250;    attended    by 
pleasure,    288;    identical   with 
happiness,    290  f.;     conception 
of  virtue,  306  f . ;  classification 
of  virtues,  314f. 
Self-respect,  as  motive,  280,  281 
Self-sacrifice,    when    required    of 
individual,   23 If.;    importance 
of,  237  f . ;  problem  of,  239 ;  so- 
lution   of    problem    of,    24 If.; 
necessity  and  value  of,  247 
Sex,  Greek  rule  of  moderation  vs. 
Christian  ideal  of  chastity,  329 
Social  heredity,  48 
Social    self,    distinguished    from 
individual,    156;    development 
of,    185,    369;    vs.    individual, 
199;    principle   of   social   wel- 
fare, 222  f. 
Socialism,  118,  401 
Socrates,     life    of,     88;     ethical 
theory    of,     89;     criticism    of 
Ethics  of,  90  f.;  his  teachings 
the   source    of   Hedonism,    97; 
of  Rationalism,    113;    solution 
of     problem    of    self-sacrifice, 
238 
Sophists,  character  and  teachings 

of,  87,  88 

Spencer,  on  conduct,  3,  13;  on 
origin  of  moral  sentiments, 
48;  on  pleasure,  96;  on  rea- 
son, 120;  on  final  social  ad- 
justment, 252;  on  value  of 
egoism,  265 

Spiritual  capacities,  of  man, 
177;  source  in  volition,  177, 
181 ;  intellectual,  technical, 
and  aesthetic,  177  f . ;  their 
universality,  179;  more  com- 
prehensive in  object  than 
natural  interests,  227  f. 
Stages  necessary  to  Self-realiza- 
tion, 182,  314f. 

Standard  of  moral  judgment, 
furnished  by  idea  of  summum 
bonum,  51;  constituted  by 
ideal  of  Self-realization,  214  f.; 
defined  in  principles  of  con- 
duct, 217 
State,  ethical  function  of,  391  f. 


Stephen,  Leslie,  on  self-sacrifice 
240;  criticism  of  this  view; 
255  f . ;  theory  of  the  good,  269 

Stoicism,  Ethics  of,  115,  116 

Summum  bonum,  defined,  32; 
discovery  of,  the  problem  of 
Ethics,  32;  as  ideal  rather 
than  actual,  32,  33;  as  fur- 
nishing the  ground  of  moral 
judgment,  50;  as  the  stand- 
ard of  moral  value,  51;  has 
authority  of  a  categorical  im- 
perative, 70;  as  motive  of 
good  conduct,  72;  importance 
of  inquiry  into,  83;  as  deter- 
mined by  custom,  84;  as  dis- 
covered by  reflection,  86;  as 
action  or  the  end  of  action, 
92;  as  conduct  or  as  char- 
acter, 93;  as  pleasure,  96;  as 
the  exercise  of  reason,  112;  as 
Self-realization,  151,  152;  as 
self-determination,  157,  158; 
relation  to  human  individual, 
193  f . ;  furnishes  standard  of 
moral  judgment,  51,  211;  as 
happiness,  291 

Sutherland,  ethical  theory,  270; 
on  importance  of  sympathy, 
271;  on  limitations  of  sym- 
pathy, 274 

Sympathy,     its     organic     basis, 

269,  270;  an  original  instinct, 

270,  271;    value    of,   271;    in- 
adequacy of,  272  f. 

Temperance,  definition  of,  322; 
in  eating,  326;  in  drinking, 
327;  in  sextual  indulgence, 
329 

Theoretical  science,  distin- 
guished from  practical,  16 

Thought,  intellectual  capacity, 
22  f.,  177  f.;  relation  to  vo- 
lition, 134  f.;  in  culture,  354; 
aim  and  method  of,  355  f. 

Thrift,  336 

Titchener,  3,  43 

Truth,  as  end,  179  f.,  353 

Universal  reality,  as  concerned 
in  Self-realization,  188f. 


INDEX 


429 


Utilitarianism,  102 

Value,  defined,  17;  contrasted 
with  existence,  18 

Virtue,  defined,  94;  in  relation  to 
duty,  94;  Intuitional  and  Em- 
pirical conceptions  of,  305, 
306;  as  interpreted  by  Self- 
realization,  306  f. ;  classifica- 
tion of,  308  f . ;  as  stages  in 
Self-realization,  314  f. 

Vocation,  meaning  of,  409,  410; 
significance  of,  410,  411;  the 
choice  of,  41  If.;  list  of  voca- 
tions, 414,  415;  vocation  bu- 
reaus, 220 

Volition,  source  of  moral  value, 
19;  inclusive  human  capacity, 
26;  its  demands  determine  the 
summum  bonum,  32;  an 
agency  of  organization,  132, 
133;  in  relation  to  feeling  and 
thought,  133  f.;  development  of, 
136  f . ;  creative  of  personality, 


146,  147,  156;  limitations  of 
its  development,  147  f.;  it  de- 
mands Self-realization,  151, 
152;  as  determining  the  form 
of  the  summum  bonum,  169; 
its  three  capacities,  177  f. 
Voluntary  action,  defined,  6; 
four  essential  features  of,  5; 
involves  distinction  of  ideal 
from  actual,  138 

Warfare,  as  developing  courage, 
344  f. ;  against  nature,  346 

Wealth,  a  means  not  an  end,  30; 
over-valuation  of,  225;  uses  of, 
305,  401 ;  unjust  distribution 
of,  404;  principle  for  just  dis- 
tribution of,  401  f.;  hindrance 
to  moral  development,  348  f. 

Westermarck,  moral  sentiments 
of  mankind,  102 

Wisdom,  363 

Zeno,  founder  of  Stoicism,  114 


A     000  032  180     2 


